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UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI STUDIES

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UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI STUDIES

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PREFACE

The Cod. A 16 (19) in the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid is described in detail by v. Hartel-Löwe, *Bibliotheca Patrum Latinorum Hispaniensis*, Vindobonae, 1886, tom. I, pp. 315-17. It contains 203 leaves of parchment in double columns, quires of eight leaves and with hyphens. In its contents it is eminently miscellaneous, having extracts resting on classical foundations, others patristic; deals with astronomy, chronology and geography; and finally furnishes the subject of this paper, a series of recipes for making several metals, colors, inks and varnishes. The first extract is a sort of preface to Bede's *De Temporibus*, a chapter not occurring in very many MSS., headed, *De indigitatione*, or *de loquella digitorum*. It is immediately followed by four pages of illustrations to this chapter, which, with a page of the writing, will find a place in the editor's *Palaeographia Iberica*. Regarding the MS. and the subject-matter, consult Ewald, *Reisebericht*, etc., 1878; Sittl, *Die Gebärden der Griechen und Römer*, 1890, pp. 256-61, with several citations; Chevalier, *Bio-bibliographie* under Rhabdas; Cantor, *Geschichte der Mathematik*, 3te Ausg., Bd. I, pp. 6-7, 41, 86-7, 130, 514-15, 567, 609, 710, 824, 829, 830 and citations; Bechtel, *Finger Counting Among the Romans in the Fourth Century*, in *Classical Philology* for 1909, pp. 25-31; D. E. Smith, *Rara Arithmetica*, pp. 54-57 and 136-138.

The Recipes occupy the leaves 199-203, ending incomplete. They are alchemical, as well as chemical and practical. They are done in bad Latin, low Latin in fact, and thus all the more interesting to the philologist, who will observe that the present editor, by using these and their twin brother, soon to be mentioned, has been able to list some sixty words not in any dictionary, and in about twenty places remove the star from the well-known lexicon

of Körting. One notices a mixture of Greek, Syriac, Hispano-arabic, localisms and a substratum which in all likelihood goes back to antique and classical sources. Whence came this Codex?

1. Note the Spanish symptoms, *helidrium*, *heris*, *quoquo* for *coquo*, occasional use of *calentem* for *caldam*, the latter current in other parts of the Romanic domain.

2. Note the almost constant use of *ipse* as an article; this points at once either to Sardinia or the region on both sides of the Pyrenees. We can not expect to find Sardinian MSS. in a Spanish library, but Catalonia, as part of their empire, furnished very many. We must exclude Valencia and Mallorca from the calculation, as the Codex is from about 1130.

3. Catalonia and Santa Maria de Ripoll are in a corner of the earth where the various conditions meet, Latin, Arabic, Syriac (via Hispano-arabic). Greek, too, flourished there, as witness an unpublished Greco-Latin Glossary originating at Ripoll about 950, as an appendix to a Priscian, Ripoll 59, in the Barcelonese Archivo.

4. R. Beer, in his treatise, "*Die Handschriften des Klosters Santa Maria de Ripoll*," Wien, 1907-08, has well discussed the convent and its catalogue of 1047, emphasizing the large number of its MSS. dealing with the Liberal Arts, including Mathematics and Astronomy, and the established habit of producing miscellaneous Codices. As already pointed out, this characteristic reappears in our A 16.

5. The catalogue of 1047, reprinted, pp. 101-109, lists under Nos. 82 and 193 a *Boethius de Temporibus* and another Boethius without further designation, the latter supposed to contain the *de Arithmetica*, of which No. 211 is perhaps another copy. When we remember that a mediæval catalogue usually listed as contents of a codex only the first treatise therein, and observe that A 16 (Hartel-Löwe, l. c., p. 315) reproduces the Incipits of the *de Temporibus* and the *de Temporum ratione*, we do not have to go far in order to suppose that A 16 was largely drawn from those Ripoll MSS.

6. Let us now pass to Lucensis 490. Wattenbach used a part of it on p. 252, n. 3, of his *Schriftwesen*, 3te Ausg., 1896; it is printed in full by Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicae*, tom. IV, Aretii, 1734, cols. 674-717 (hereinafter cited as M), of the *Dis-*

sertatio Vigesimaquarta de artibus Italicorum post inclinationem Romani Imperii. See his remarks, 674 A B, showing the miscellaneous character of the MS., its date (approximately 780), and the ugly cursive style in which this part of it was done — leading to numerous difficulties and many palpable blunders of transcription. It was partly in Greek text, but in Latin letters. The editor hopes to furnish the world of scholars a palæographical edition based on a facsimile.

The MS. has been several times discussed, the last and best by L. Duchesne, *Le Liber Pontificalis*, tom. I, pp. clxiv-lxvi, with a bibliography. In stating the contents he mentions (p. clxv) the tenth of the set of extracts thus: “XVIII. *De compositione cathmiae* (cf. M. 711 B); seize feuillets, dont l’avant-dernier blanc; le dernier l’était aussi d’abord. On en a profité ensuite pour y transcrire un petit poème; Gregorius praesul meritis, etc. Le recueil de recettes commençant par un No. 19, il faut qu’il ait disparu quelquechose auparavant. En effet, on voit que plusieurs feuillets ont été coupés après les Canons apostoliques.” It is also evident that a large portion of this section has perished since M’s time; for while this remnant (de Cathmia) occupies six of M’s columns, the preceding ones take thirty-six such, which is to say that ninety-six columns, or twelve quaternions, have been destroyed. When we add that many of these recipes recur in A 16, we must conclude that still other leaves or even quires have perished. Hence the archetype must have been a voluminous MS., containing very many items current for longer or shorter periods, and reflecting the practice of artisans, artists and decorators of various epochs and countries.

7. While the correspondence between A, in its concluding chapters, and M is close enough to assure us the MSS. have a common origin, they are enough unlike to show that the younger Codex is not a copy of the older. An examination of the text of M shows quite as many Spanish symptoms as A, or even more. It seems probable, too, that M ultimately rests on a semiuncial archetype, datable about 700 or earlier; perhaps such Latinity as post tote bullite means we are in the presence of a very ancient variety of Italian. If so, we must assume that the archetype was from Italy and itself rested on a classical basis; so that in the last analysis we may refer the text and pictures to some Greek

text translated into Latin, with changes and additions, modified afterward by admixtures of Syriac, Arabic and Catalonian usage.

At the end we have added a Glossary, which makes no pretensions to completion or to furnish even a small fraction of the items so interesting to the student of Low Latin or Romance Philology. It devolves on the specialists and experts in these departments to put the finishing touches to the Glossary. Most of our abbreviations, as being quite current, need no explanation. By D. we mean the Ducange for Mediæval Latin; by D. G., the similar lexicon of Low Greek; by K., Körting's Lexikon; by T., Professor C. C. Torrey, the well-known authority on Semitic Languages, and especially Arabic and Syriac.

We trust this little treatise may further the cause of historical study in the fields of Medicine, Chemistry, Technology, Romance, Philology, and Low Latin. Lastly, it is high time that a serious effort be made to supply the deficiencies in the two Ducange dictionaries, which so poorly represent the Mediæval word fund.

JOHN M. BURNAM.

[Owing to the lack of a character for the *e caudata*, we have everywhere used æ, which itself does not occur in the Codex.—UNIVERSITY PRESS.]

I Item de chrisographia.

(1) Aurum obrizum bacte cum malleo. *in*. incude (in-corr. ex an-, ne eras.) subtilissimum quantum plus potes. & incide illud minutum cum forficibus. & misce cum argento uiuo. unam partem (corr. ex pars) auri. & XVIII partes de argento uiuo. & sint insimul die & nocte una. & frequenter commiscæ illud cum articulo in uaso uitreo. (2) Alia uero die mitte illud in caza ferrea. & pone super carbones uiuos. & tamdiu teneto illud ibi usque dum calorem recipiat. (3) Deinde mitte illud in aquam frigidam. absque ipsa cazula. (4) Iterum tolle illud de ipsa aqua & mitte in panno lineo. & exprime fortiter. & illud quod inlinteolo remanserit. mitte in mortario porphiretico. & mitte sulfuris duas partes tales. qualis fuit illa una auri. & commisce in (supra) unum. & trita fortiter cum pistillo porphiretico. usque de ipso auro sanum non pareat (corr. ex pereat). deinde pone illud in ipsa cacza ferrea super carbones uiuos. & suffla modicum. donec ipsum aurum incitrino colore deueniat. (5) Postea mittæ illud in concula cum aqua munda & comiscæ illud

(Col. II)

cum articulo usque dum turbuletur. & laua nouem uicibus. & ipsam aquam quam (corr. ex quæ) semper mutaueris serua illam. & postfactum cola (corr. ex -ll-) quia quantumcumque inuenies ibi de ipso auro. (6) Postquam autem optime illud lauaueris: mitte in calicello cum bambace noua. & mitte comidi infectum. & turbula illud & commisce. & scribe. & frequenter uolue. ipsa bambacem. & cum siccauerit ipsa scriptio. poli cum emathite lapide. (7) Comidi (corr. ex commodi) autem conficitur sic. pone illud in uasculo uitreo cum aceto acro. oppila optime & appende ad solem duobus diebus estatis tempore. postea mittæ (de, supra) aqua quantum ipsum acetum fuit. & appende ad solem diebus sex. deinde mittæ amoniacum ibi. charobbis (corr. ex -bes) tribus pensum. (8) Ipsum amoniacum mitte in paucam aqua calidissimam. & illud quod desuper natauerit ipsum mitte in supradicto comidi. (9) Et fortassis coagulauerit in ipso uasculo uitreo: mitte

aquam (10) & pone exinde in manu tua. & cum alia manu mena illud modicum. (11) & si manu cum manu inuiscauerit. scis optimum esse. sin autem (e, cancell.) iunge comidi. (12) Comidi grecæ dicitur. Latine gummæ. idest lacrimum damascini.

II Item confectio auri ut aurum plurimum facias.

(1) Sume argenti uiui dragmas (corr. ex-mis). XIII. limaturas auri dragmas III. argenti purissimi. limaturas dragmas. VI. Eris cypri limaturas dragmas. VI. aurichalci limaturas. dragmas. II. aluminis scisci. & flores eris quod greci calacantum uocant. dragmas. XII. auripigmenti scissilis. dragmas. VI. elydri. dragmas. X. & tunc miscebis omnes limaturas cum argento uiuo. & (2) facias modum ceroti. & mi(s)catis. elydrium. & auri pigmentum deinde eris flos & alumen. & adi (ci, supra) es omnia in patena. & leuiter coquis super prunas. & aspargens desub manu crocum aceto infusum. & nitrum modicum. & croci quidem dragmas. IIII. minutatim asparges donec soluatur. & cum cremmento. & adice adsuprascriptas species. etiam terrae lunaris. modicum que grece dicitur afroselinum.

III Item alia auri confectio

(1) Sume argenti. dragmas. IIII. mysi cypri. dragmas. IIII. elydri contusy & cribellati. dragmas. IIII. sandarace dragmas

(Fol. 199 Vo. Col. I)

IIII. misces & conflabis argentum. & asparges species supra scriptas. & uehementer igne conflatur. commouet omnia pariter. donec auri colorem uideas. (2) & eximens intinguæ in aqua frigida. in arathera (leg. cratera) habentem commixtionem infectionis huiusmodi. nisi cypri. & sandarace. & helidrii partes equales. & facies pinguedinem mollem. & confla argentum & calefactum ignitum infunde in eadem pinguedinem.

IV Item alia auri confectio

(1) Sume cyprum quod calide productum sit. & eius limaturas teris in aqua cum auri pigmento (ras.) scissilis (ras. 3 lt.) partibus duobus ut fiat glutinis pinguitudo. & assa incaccabulo horis sex. & fi& nigrum. hoc tolle (corr. ex-lis) & ablue (corr. ex -lis). deinde mitte (corr. ex -tis)

salis (corr. ex -em) equalem portionem & teris pariter. (2) Deinde assa in caccabulo. & uide quid (-em, eras.) fiat. si enim album fuerit. misce aurum. si flabum misce argentum equali portionem & fi& miraculum.

V Item auri confectio

(1) Accipies fellis yrcini partes duas. & fellis taurini partem unam & elydri (supra s. XV, i. uermis) quæ sit t(supra, r)iplo a(supra, d) superiores species & tere (corr. ex-is) una cum aceto diebus decem. (2) Deinde sumis crocolicum uel arabicum & tere (corr. ex -is) in mortario thebe (corr. ex tha-). & in sole diebus. VII. canicularibus pone. & adice acetum acerrimum. & tam diu tere. donec se crocum dimittat (corr. ex-te) & consumatur. mitte (corr. ex -tis) autem acetum sextarium. & melius. & patere siccari. (3) Deinde accipies batrachium metallum quod alii cyprum dicunt. & tere minutissime & admisce (ras.) croco. (4) Deinde tolle chrisantimVm quo pictores utuntur quod & lampum appellant. & tere similiter & habebis. in usum autem facies ita. (5) Sume (corr. ex-is) argentum. quantum uoles & adde (corr. ex-is) sale tenue tritum. & commoue (corr. ex-es) diu donec diutius solutur argentum. & ubi solutum fuerit. defunde in aqua marina. (6) Deinde iterum confla & de priore compositione mitte (corr. ex is) inlibram unam. uncias duas. & commouebis fortiter. & rursum dimitte (corr. ex-is) coagulari. (7) Deinde iterum confla. & adicies de secunda compositione untiam unam. similiter confla. & adice de tertia confectione. semiunciam & commoue (ras.) cum ferro bono uehementer. & admisce rursum argentum donec tibi uideatur bene habere. (9) Confectiones autem iste sunt. (10) Prima

(Col. II)

confectio fellis yrcini partes. II. fellis taurini. III. partem unam. elydrii triplum idest partes. VIIII. cum aceto tere (corr. ex -is) diebus decem. (11) Secunda confectio crocolicum uel arabicum. tere (corr. ex -is) in mortario thebaico cum aceto acerrimo. in sole diebus canicularibus septem. donec se crocus dimittat. & consumatur. mitte (corr. ex-is) acetum sicut supra docuimus. (12) Deinde

accipe *batrachium quod* est *cyprum*. tere & admisce *crocum*. (13) *Confectio tertia est*. ita accipe *chrisanthimum* quo *pictores utuntur quod* & *lampum* appellant & tere *similiter*. has *confectiones* habebis. (14) Deprima *confectionem* mitte in *libram* argenti. uncias II. (15) In *unciam uero argenti* (ras.) *scripulos* duos. (16) De *secunda uero compositione* mitte in *libram* argenti. *scrupulos*. VI. in *unciam uero argenti* *dimidium scrupulum*.

VI Item alia auri *confectio*

(1) E x argento *primum produc* (ras.) *laminas* & *substerne* & *medicamentum quod* *declarabitur appellatur* *offa*. *superasperges* & *conflabis*: donec in (supra) *unum omnia* *conducantur*. (2) Accipies auri *scrupulos*. IIII. *glutinis macedonice dragmam* I. *sulphuris uiui dragmam*. I. *nitri dragmam*. I. *fel porcinum totum*. *fuliginis* (corr. ex -es) de fumo. *dragmas* II. *minei spani dragmam*. I. *fel uulpis totum elydrii*. *unciam* I. *croci cilicioti*. *unciam*. I. & fac *caccabellum ferreum*. in quo hec *uniuersa trita mittis*. & ex hoc *medicamine* ut *supra scriptum est* *laminis subternis* & *desuper aspargis*. (3) *mittis autem inlibram* argenti *medicaminis dragmam* I. (4) *Alibi inlibra* argenti *medicamine huius*. *uncias*. II. & *confla* (corr. ex -ans) & *exi& aurum*.

VII Item *confectio auri* quæ non fallit quam oportet abscondere.

(1) S ume auri plurimi quantum uolueris partes tres. & eris *demagnisia partem unam simul conflabis*. & *limabis* *limam auri pigmentis scissilis*. & *adices* (corr. ex *adiecties*) argenti *uiui dragmas*. VIIII. (2) *simul teris* & *adices acetum modicum*. & *modicum salis* donec *conuiuatur argentum uiuum cum* *limatura* & fiat *malagma*. & *dimitte siccare diebus*. VII. *inampullam uitream*. (3) *postea sumis sulphuris uiui preparatis siliquas*. IIII. & *sandarace preparate expusca falsa*. *babuli lutei siliquas* duas. (4) *Auri pigmenti quod* de *cithico atramento* fit. & *fellis uulturini*. *siliquas* duas *pariter conteris*. & *substernis* huic *malagmati in ampullam*. & *latificabis* *malagma* & *opturabis diligenter* os *ampulle*. & *gipso oblinens* & *assabis insuperiorem* *dispositionem fornacis*.

(Fol. 200 Ro., Col. I)

ut sit (ras. 2 litt.) quasi flauum (corr. ex -bum) & tolle & depone. & sumis argenti partes tres. & procurati auri partem unam. & conflabis & inuenies laudabile secretum.

VIII Item aurum uiride facere in conflatione sine omni deceptione.

(1) A uri pigmentis scissilis unciam. I. sandarace rase pure. uncias. IIII. auramentis so (supra) tirichi (corr. ex tiorichi) unciam. I. nitri greci ad similitudinem nitri accedentis. uncias. VI. (2) teris aurum pigmentum ualde tenuiter admiscens atramentum. & simul teris. ut fiat uiride. (3) postea adice sandarace. & rursus conteris. sit ante tritum corpus magnisie ualde tenuiter. donec fiat quasi fuligo. (4) & commisce omnia & adice acetum egiptium acerrimum. & fel taurinum. & simul contere. & fac lutosum. & sicca insole diebus tribus (-bus in ras.) tere & repone inampulla. (5) & assa in fornace diebus. V. postea tollis & adiecto gummi triti. uncias. VI. adicis aquam ut fiat lutosum & formabis collirium partem unam. (6) & confla aurum. & mitte collirium & cum factum fuit aurum uiride. & quod teri possit infecti auri partem unam. & argenti partem unam conflabis simul. & inuenies aurum. (7) Si uero uelis (corr. ex uellis) hic primum facere. infecti auri mittis partes. IIII. & auri comunis partem unam. (8) simul conflabis. & inuenies aurum optimum & probitum. (9) absconde & nulli trade tuum secretum.

VIII Aurum probitum facere

(1) H eris partes. III. argenti partem unam. simul confla. & adice auri pigmenti non usti. idest crudum partes tres. (2) & cum ualde calefeceris. sinito ut refrigeret. (3) & mitte in patena & obline argilla & assa ita ut fiat cervissa. (4) tolle & confla & inuenies argentum. (5) si autem multum assaueris fit electrum. cui si partem unam auri addideris. fit aurum optimum.

X Item auri coctio

(1) S ume aurum in laminis factum atque productum. & adungis crassitudinem (inter lineas s. XV., i. grossitudinem). (2) & accipiens sinopidem egiptie partem unam. & salis partes duas. & simul miscis. (3) & substernis lam-

mine. & cum straueris argillam opturabis. (4) & assabis horis tribus. (5) deinde tollis & inuenies aurum optimum & sine aposia.

XI Auri pondus grauis facere.

(1) A luminis liquidi partem unam. amonii conopice. (ras.) qua (m eras.) aurifices utuntur partem unam. auri partes duas. (2) hec omnia conflantur (ras.), (supra quam :cum auro & fiet) grauius.

XII Item aliud

Gluttinis taurini. partes IIII. cathirae etiam confla. & erit grauius hoc facere & in ere.

XIII Auri duplicatio

(Col. II)

(1) A ccipies auri dragmas. II. & facis fistula. & mittis limaturam auri calci. & alumen scissum & misi cypri. & salis montani. (2) equali modo confla. donec separantur omnia ase. (3) & cum ex tenderis medicamina idest excusseris. mitte fistulam inconflatorio. (4) & nitrum thebeicum nigrum & (ras.) conflas. (5) & retepidas inuenies duplum effectum. quod & in ignem missum & cesum eundem colorem reddit.

XIV Aliter

A uri partes duas. argenti partes duas lamine cyprine partem unam

XV Item aliter duplicatio auri

(1) A rgenti limatura partes. IIII. (2) Cathmie canopodos partem unam (ras.) eris usti partem unam. (4) omnia in u (supra)no teris. & cum uino lauas. & cum pura fuerit commixtio. facis offula. (5) & erit uolarium conflatum & iniunctum. cum hec conflaueris. partes. IIII. Auri atque ita conflabis simul

XVI Aliter

A uri partes duas. laminarum cipriarum partem unam.

XVII Item alia duplicatio auri

(1) A uri partem unam. argenti partem unam. (h eras.) eraminis partem flacaminas. (2) & ungue crassitudinem. & huic substernis. & superadicis hanc confectionem. misi assi partem unam. salis partem unam. (3) Assa horis duabus tolle & inuenies aurum duplicatum.

XVIII Aurum soluere

(1) O pocarpum quod alio modo dicitur arborinum idest lacrimum quasi gumme arboris, in qua arborinum nascitur.

(3) hoc mitte inaurum & solutur.

XVIII Aurum nimium mollire ut in illum sigillum figas.

(1) N itri rufi dragmas. II. minneo dragmas. III. permisce & tere cum aceto. (2) & adice aluminis modicum & dimitte ut siccet. (3) deinde tere & reponere & sume auri (ras.) limatura addimi(d, supra)um oboli. & auri pigmentum scissile dragmam. I. (4) misces omnia & teris. & defundis gumme puram inaquam infusum. (5) tollis & signas quæ uoles. siue epistola siue tabula. (6) & dimitte biduo usque quoageletur sigillum (s expunx.).

XX Item de ghrisographia

(1) A uro mundissimo idest obrizo. limatum omnino delicate. & inmortario ofite. seu porphirite. aspere mittis. ubi bene teri possit. (2) & adicis acetum acerrimum. & teris pariter & lauas. quam diu nigrum fuerit. (3) effundis. & ubi iam acro colore suo fuerit. tunc demum mittis. aut salis granum. aut certe anfrouinum. (4) & sic solutur. ut de eo scribi possit & reponis indoleolo uitreo. (5) & gumme olicini

(200 Vo., Col. I)

mitte modicum ut teneat. (6) Eo modo & cetera metalla potes soluere (7) ubi scripserit. poli cum lapide emathite ut lu (corr. ex li-)ceat. aut cum dente aprino. uel clolea marina.

XXI De alia ghrisographia

(1) P lumbum sepius lique fac & in aqua defunde. & cum hoc frequenter fecerit in eadem aqua ubi plumbum refuderis. tolle exinde plumbum & confla aurum. (2) & in eadem aqua mitte & frangitur in minutissimas partes. (3) Hoc tollis & lima delicate si uoles. (4) & si non uoles illud limare. mitte inmortario. & tere & soluitur cum aceto. (5) & si non uoles adicere acetum. tere illud cum argento uiuo (6) & purgas eum diligenter cum gumme liquido quod in ultimis cauernis abrorum inuenitur. & mitte alumen liquidum & purgatum cum aceto optimo. & sale & intingue calamum & scribe.

XXII Item alia ghrisographia

(1) S criptio similis auri. elydrium dragmas. III. resine frixe lucidissime dragmas. III. gumme auri (ras.) coloris dragmas. III. (2) Auri pigmenti scissilis dragmas. III. fel testudinis dragmas. III. albumen ouorum dragmas. V. (3) adicies autem crocicilicensi dragmas. VII. (4) scribis autem non solum in membrana. aut carta. set etiam in uitreo. uel in marmoreo uase.

XXIII Item alia ghrisographia

(1) A uri pigmenti (s eras.) scissilis partes. III. elydi partem unam spume argenti cui color sit aureus. partem unam. (2) Hec omnia trita subtiliter & infusa scribuntur.

XXIII Item alia ghrisographia

(1) M elan partem unam. auri pigmenti (ras.) partes. III. auri partem unam. (2) set aurum producis diligenter in quantum potes. & forficabis & (ras.) adicies argenti uiui partem unam. aceti acerrimi partem unam. (3) & omnia similiter commisce & tere insupra scripto mortario diligenter. (4) & adice (corr. ex add-) gumme & scribe illud ut atramento. & cum cemathite poli.

XXV Item aliter

A lumen scissum in aqua decoquis & fumus argentum & in mortario simul teris aspargens hoc. (h eras.) ere partem unam. & crocum cum glutine puro & felle uitulinum & conteris & utere.

XXVI Item grisographia quæ fit sine auro

(1) E lidrii partem unam. resine frixe partem unam. ouorum quinque humores. gummi purum partem unam. auripigmenti. scissilis partem unam. fellis testudinis partem unam. croci dragmas. II. (2) facis autem hoc non solum incartis. & inmembranis.

(Col. II)

uerum etiam in marmoreis. & uitreis.

XXVII Aliter

(1) E lidrii (corr. ex -di) partem unam. auripigmenti scissilis partem unam. (supra, gummi partem unam) ouorum quinque croci dragmas. II. (2) Ouorum trium uitella. & unius alborem. gummi dragmas. III. croci optimi dragmam. I. (3) Cristalli triti. dragmam. I. (4)

A uripigmenti scissilis. dragmas. VII. (5) Hec omnia teris diligenter & siccabis biduo sub tecto. & postmodum mitte croco & scribe quod uoles.

XXVIII Item de auratio uitreorum. & chalconeorum & heneorum

(1) L ac sicamini. uel fici. & aluminis quartam partem. adlactem. coque in uaso (corr. ex- se) eneo. (2) per-tingue & inaura. & si uoles leuiter operari ungue solum lacte sicamini. siue fici. & inaura.

XXVIII Aurea facere sine auro

(1) A Vripigmenti (s eras.) scissilis sina dragmas. X. mini peregrini dragmas. XX. heris gallici. limatura dragmas. XX. commari percandidum. dragmas. IIII. (3) omnia contundis & cribellas spisso cribello. & proice quæ lignosa remanserint. (4) Deinde macera in albumen ouorum. L. & dimitte siccare. (5) & rursus contunde & macera gummi liquido & ouis. donec fiat mollis & uteris signo aureo melius ueritati. (6) Hanc confectionem absconde.

XXX Aurei species coloris efficere quæ nulla ratione nisi igne producuntur

(1) A uripigmenti scissilis. & sipie ossum. & eris flos. & sandarace & spume argenti. que habet aureum colorem. & ouorum uitellos equis portionibus. & dracantum & fel caprinum. (2) cum priora tribueris & commiscueris. liquore fellis solum utere in lamina & signa procuras & species quæ unguentur. (3) facis autem prinitus fero limato splendido non aspero. (4) In (h eras.) ere autem igne usto adunguis & est mirabile.

XXXI De auratione omnium si uelis de aurare siue argentum siue heneum uas.

(1) Accipies lamminam auream ualde tenuem & forficabis minutatim & mittis in mortarium. & adicis argenti uiui modicum. (2) & dimittis modico tempore & iungis postea nitri aliquid & aceti. (3) teris pumicem diligenter & mittis donec fiat glutinis pinguitudo. & propter habundantiam argenti uiui. (4) mittis illud in panno mundo & exprimis & exi& inde plu-

(Fol. 201 Ro., Col. I)

rimum argenti uiui. (5) Tunc sumis uas & *extergis* pumicem tenuem & calefacis. & dimittis ut refriger&. (6) Deinde unguis de malagmate & calefacis iterum uas. & *rursum* inunguis. & inigne dabis. (7) *impinguaturque* aurum solum. (8) Cum itaque tibi color placuerit. *primum* calefacis uas. & mittis *inaqua* melanteriæ. *idest*. aqua caligariorum qua de nigrantur coria. & tunc stergis. (9) Si uero uas ereum deauras postquam id exterseris eius aluminis liquido unguis. *nam non recipit* malagma.

XXXII In aureo uaso nigrum pinge ut speres *infestatum* esse (1) Argenti. & (h eras.) eris rubri. & plubi. partes equales confla. & asperge sulphur uiuum. (2) & cum defuderis. expecta refrigerare & mitte in mortario. & adicis aceto acerrimo. & tere. (3) & facis *erament* (e eras.) tum. cum quo scribes de pinguedine supra scripta. (4) & scribe ex eo in auro & in argento quod uoles. & cum refixerit calefacito. & erit ut *infestatum*. (5) Conflatur autem ita carbones sculpis. & mi(t supra)te in eo argento. (h eras.) es & confla. (6) & sihilare fuerit. admisce plumbum. deinde sulphur. & cum bene miscuerit. defunde illud. & fac *sicut diximus*.

XXXIII Deauratio facilis

(1) Accipies lamminas stagneas. constringes aceto & alumine. & conglutinabis. glutine chartineo. (2) Deinde fumus crocum. & glutte purum. *idest* *prospicuum* (s expunx.) limpidum. (3) & infundis in aqua cum aceto. & limatoris igni leui coquis. (4) & cum effluxerit glutte inunguis stagneas lamminas. & apparebunt tibi aureas. (5) uide autem ne elidrium admisceas. (6) sin autem trita omnia feceris. noli mittere g(1 supra)utte confirmabitur tibi opus. gipso cum glutine secretum in auri scriptione adice.

XXXIIII Inunctio auri inferi

Tolle lapidem androdamanta. teris. & modico misce. chrisocolla. & tinge exinde ferrum. & mitte in fornace. & expecta donec coquatur. & erit ornatum.

XXXV *Aliter*

A *rgentum* confla. & cum *adriseri*. *adicis sulphur* & *com-moue* & & dimitte ut *refrig&*. & tere *immortario* bene. & exeo *inungue*. *adicies nitrum* & *oleum*. hec omnia *unguenda sunt* antea.

XXXVI Locus aurco colore apparens & ornamenta simul aureis facias

(1) *Sandaracem isaricam*. aurei coloris. & *auripigmenti* (s *eras*.) *scissilis*. & t(h *corr. ex p*)*rachanthi*. (2) hec tere cum *felle caprino*. & *oui interiora*. & *amoue* ante *oleum opus* & cum

(Col. II)

siccatum fuerit. *habebit colorem auri similem*.

XXXVII *Aurum* crescere.

C *apri dragmas*. IIII. *Auripigmenti scissilis dragmas*. VI.

XXXVIII *Argenti infectio in aurum*

(1) *Misi cipri*. & *sandarace* & *helidrium* equalibus *portionibus*. (2) Hec cum *aqua incocta* sunt *folia sandarace montanis idest*. *papaueris agrestis*. *quod & ammonia dicitur*. *facilis glutinis pinguedine*. (3) & *conflabis argentum optimum*. & cum *fuerit calidum inunguis inpredicta aqua*.

XXXVIII *Plumbum*. es. *confectio*

(1) *P lumbi mna*. I. *Eruginis arse ciprio*. mna. *dimidia*. (2) *Eruginis rasi ciprie mna*. *dimidia*. (3) *Eruginis eris flos semiunciam*. *corii mali punici triti dragmas* III. (4) *Caccabo mitte*. & *obline eum argilla*. & *succende*. donec *conflatur*.

XXXX *Plumbi simile argento facere*

(1) *Plumbi dragmam*. I. *eris dragmas*. IIII. (2) *In unum conflabis*. *ammiscens samiam terram*. & *salem*. & *alumen liquidum*. & *sine dissolui*. simul *ceperis purgare medica-mina*. (3) *Sin autem est*. *igni productile*. *idest caldonium acetum tinctum*. & *defunde inquali uolueris forma*. & *fit nimium album*.

XXXXI *Chrisocolle confectio*

Sume salis mnas. VI. *eris limatura uel rasura*. mnas. IIII. *misce limaturam cum trito sale in uas*. & *aspergens aceto* & *dimitte diebus tribus*. & *fi& uiride*.

XXXXII Eris *commutatio in aurum*

Confla *diebus* tribus. adiciens *crocum cilicioticum*. cui ad iungis & *helidrium dragmas*. II.

XXXXIII *Aliter*

(1) E *ramen mundum limatum* partes duas. & *alumen asianum tritum in mortario diligenter*. & *criballatum partem unam*. (2) & *commisce in unum*. & *mittis incalicium*. & *ponis in prunis donec confletur*. & *commisceatur eramen. cum alumine*. & *desine succendere*. (3) *nam ex multitudo* (n supra s. XV) *incendii. incend& alumen ipsum eramen*. & *postea infundes ex urina ipsa formam*. *uasorum que uis facere*. & *sic funde ipsum eramen*.

XXXXIII Item *de argirographia*

S *puma argenti*. *dragmas*. IIII. *cum stercore columbino* & *aceto teris*. & *scribe grafio calefacto*.

XXXXV *Aliter*

A *rgentum uiuum*. & *tornatura destagno tere*. *defundis aceto liquido*. & *tribueris* & *fac pinguedinem ex qua scribi possit*.

XXXXVI Item *alia argirografia italica*

(1) A *ccipies stagnum dragmas*. II. (2) *Auri dragmas*. II. *confla & cum adhuc liquida sunt adice argenti uiui dragmas*. II. (3) *confla & cum per mixta fuerint utraque peribunt*. & *fit gracilis materia*. (4) *Hanc teris in mortario duro*. *adicis gumme & glutte siccum omnino modice*. & *scribis*

(Fol. 20r Vo., Col. I)

(5) *cum siccaueris poli*. (6) *si uero aurei coloris litteras uoles uidere*. *croco trito cum glutnine puro*. & *priusquam delineis*. *scribe*. & *cum scripseris*. & *siccauerit*. *tunc poli*.

XXXXVII (1) (S)umis *lamminas argenteas tenuas fortiter*. & *teris cum sale uel uitro deinde abluis aqua*. & *adicis fel taurinum*. & *conteris*. & *in uas uitreum reponis*. (2) *scribis de cantia*. *aut pitucello pititorio*. & *cum siccaueris delinibis*. *hoc & quasi auro potes facere*.

XXXXVIII (A)rgenti *partem unam confla & cum fuerit soluta*. *adice stagni puri partes tres*. & *ubi solutum fuerit defunde* & *expecta refrigerare deinde lima & tere*. & *scribe sicut nosti*.

- XXXXVIII (1) (A)ccipies argentum uiuum & mitte in pul-
torium & adice calcem uiuam modicam. & alumen liquidum
(corr. ex -am.) modicum. & aceti acerrimi aliquantum
quoque commouens. donec admodum similem fiat. (2) &
depone de foco. & tere. & mitte in pannum & exprime. &
descend& argentum uiuum & admiscens ydrocolla & scribe.
- L A ccipe naxie cutis tonsorum limatura & teris cum acacia &
alumine & dele cum aqua pluuiali. & ordeum sibi natum
herbam & teris in unum omnia. & scribe & erunt uirides
littere.
- LI (1) (A)ccipies argentum. & es. cyprum. & plumbum. equis
portionibus & confla. (2) & cum fusum fuerit asperge
(corr. ex -ar-) sulphur tritum. & commoue diligenter. de-
funde oblongum. & habe in preparata. (3) Deinde sumis
uas & sculpis in eo quod uis. & calefacis. (uas, supra) &
affricabis de eo quod conflasti. ea quæ scripta sunt. & quod
fossum est replebis. (4) facies autem a informis fusis
nigra signa splendida.
- LII (M)ysum cyprum
(1) & sulphur uiuum. & galla sine cauerna combusta. &
alumen scissile. & siliquam spine qua infectores utuntur.
& eris flos omnia teris simul cum luteo uetere. & extra-
mento scriptori(o) pinguedinem habeat & habebis pre-
paratum. (2) Deinde sumis uas & calefacis. & scribis &
patieris tota nocte siccare. sequenti die ablue.
- LIII S ulphur uiuum. & folia lauri. & spuma argenti. & nitrum.
omnia hec teris cum aqua
(Col. II)
& ponis in carbones. & espumica (corr. ex -at). donec fiat
splendidum. & pingue in eo quod uis & nunquam delebitur.
sit autem medicamentum feruens.
- LIII (A)ccipies eris flos & teris.
& admiscis alumen rotundum & infundis aqua & pumicas
eramentum. & scribis medicamento. & cum siccauerit non
delebitur. & pau& ut infestatum.
- LV (E)ris florem quod grece calcantum uocant. teris in mortario
admisce humidum gummi & scribe. & cum siccauerit poli.
- LVI (1) (C)ute extergis ferrum diligenter. & siccas misso
cyprum teris cum oleo & scribis. & mittis triduo. & abluis

(corr. ex-it) & inuenies nigras litteras que deleri non possunt. (2) Potes tecum & in (h eras.)ere hoc fieri & in uitreo (e supra) quod uolueris. (3) fit enim plus fortior si cornu arietis comburis igni & misc(u)eris ineum cum alumine

tere & defundens acetum album. & facies ceroti pinguedinem. cum frequenter terserit permitte totam noctem ita esse.

LVII (P)lumbi usti aliquantum teris in mortario admiscens modicum & facis glutinis pinguedinem cum aceto & scribis uasa argentea. & cum siccauerit calefacis & nunquam delebitur.

LVIII (1) (S)umis stagnum candidum & splendide purgabis. quartam partem purgatum. & argenti partem unam conflabis. (2) & cum conflaueris. terge diligenter. & fabrica quæ uelis. siue pocula. siue aliud quod uis. (3) fit enim imprimum argentum. quod etiam artifices falluntur.

LVIII (1) (E)ris partem unam. plumbi partem unam. Stagni partes sex. (2) (A)uri partem unam hec conflu. (2) deinde limabis. & teris in mortario duro thebaico. & adicis aquam & nitrum. (3) post adicis in uas plumbeum & inde intinguis uas quod inaurare uolueris & mittis in fornace. & calefacies. donec colorem accipiat.

LX (S)tagni dragmas. VII. argenti uiui dragmas. IIII. terrechie dragmas. II. conflu stagnum adicis terram tritam postea argentum uiuum & commoue ferrum & informa pipulas & repone.

LXI (1) (S)andarace teris cum aceto. & cum deduxeris olei pinguedinem. confluas plumbum. & in medicamine inunguis.

(Fol. 202 Ro.)

(M)olipidine. mna. I. (2) purgabis sandaracham sordidam. & picem mollem (h eras.)ere conflabis. & ex utraque medicaminibus mittis & stagni dragmas. IIII. (3) & tertio conflabis cum medicamentis. & adicies (ras.) chalcitis dragmas. II. & hoc facies inanthabro.

LXII (1) (E)ris partes. II. plumbi partem unam. & dissolue in unum. & operari. neque restrinxeris aqua.

(2) *quod* siuis hic commutare. liquefac eum. (3) succendes autem. quianis & restringe sanguine anseris.

LXIII (1) (S) puma argenti candidi. & terræ samiae mollis & casei caprini. dragmas. IIII. & mini sinon sirico. (2) omnia equis ponderibus contere. & fac trociscos. permixtos eris flos. dragmas. II. & accipe stagnum. mna. I. (3) conflabis donec adoctauam redeant (corr. ex -dd-) & asperge desuper trociscos. (4) deinde admiscis liquidum. adhuc stagno mixto. & erit ualde optimum.

LXIII (1) (S) umis uitrum album & teris diligenter. (2) Deinde accipis plumbum. & innna uitri mittis semiunciam plumbi. & sagapini cretici. *quod* in ciuitatem quæ aconas dicitur. increta insula dicitur semiuncia. (3) Cerusse (corr. ex -os-) inutilis que non habet diffusionem. semiunciam. (4) gisasteros. flaba. dragmam. iafanus. idest spiclari semiunciam cristallum semiunciam. (5) omnia reficis in uas ferreum. & reconflas in formam ferream. donec fiat aspectum uitreo. (6) exterge autem aliquam eminentiam modicam. & postmodum tolle medicamen. (7) & pone inancudinem. & cede. sifrangitur rursum confla. & ubi uideris *quod* non frangatur operare exeo *quod* uis.

LXV (1) (S) umis sulphuris uiui & splendidi & teris unciam. I. & teris flos puri & ab uitrii speciem accedentes unciam. I. (2) pariter teris. & mittis in fiolam magnam. & ponis in batillo magno super tripidem ferreum. (3) cum uero refrixeris fiolam frangis & aperis & inmortario mittis & teris. (4) postea mittis in fiolam & succendis eodem modo, & dimittis ut refriger&. & tollis & utere.

LXVI (1) (S) umis sandaracem non ferro simili. neque lapidosam. set rufam & sanguinem huius uncias. X. (2) teris bene & mittis in fiolam uitream. (3) Tunc deinde accipis aceti acerrimi. cotilas duas. & salis communis. uncias. V. (4) operis fialam laneo panno. apponis batillum cum operculo paterisque id candidari diebus. VII. (5) Deinde transferes (corr. ex -ff-)

(Col. II)

patenam. & succendis horis tribus. (6) postea radis subiectam calignem. (7) Deinde ablui aqua dulce. & inuenies id factum rufum quasi sanguineum. (8) Post sicabis post

solem & mitte iterum infialam. (9) Deinde adice lutium & cooperis inquo maneat diebus. VII. donec hylarius asperiusque existat. (10) & sic adice munda sandarace lota & dimitte id condire diebus. VII. (11) Deinde ablue aqua dulci (corr. ex-ce) & insole siccato. (12) Tolle & habe. ineos exigunt. usus earum que fiunt infectionem.

LXVII (1) (S) umis partem & mittis inaqua salsa diebus. XXII. (2) posthec tollis & mittis inlutium (corr. ex -it-) inuestis pueri diebus. III. (3) Deinde tollis & aqua abluis & mittis inlacouis nigre. (4) Deinde tollis de lacte & aqua abluis & facis bullire cum pusca falsa uehementer a mane usque in horam nonam & plus. donec fiat ignitus sanguineum. (5) que ablue rursum & tosta inbatillo bene donec fiat igneus & macera inoleo & pone aduentum donec conuiuat. (6) Rursus feruens fac. pusca falsa & dimitte ut sicc&. & sumis plumbum siue usum olle delimatura partem unam. & pyritis. partes. II. teris in mortario cum aceto & anchusa. (7) & indisco dimitte siccare & utere.

LXVIII (1) (S) umis cypri eris limatura & mittis inacetum. & patieris siccari. (2) Post admiscis ei nytrum. grecum tritum. dragmas. VIII. & tunc mittis inlinteolo mundo. & suspendens inaceto. (3) Caueris ne amorem contingat. & dimitte triduo & postea inuenies limaturam humorem traxisse. (4) sic ergo ut est inlinteolo infunde aceto & absconde inpaleis diebus. X. & inuenies eruginem.

LXVIII (1) A ccipies piri dragmam. I. qui est omnibus superior. (2) iste inuenitur in mari (corr. ex -re) iuxta montem. (3) (inter lineas, iste facit) ut ne consumantur species subscriptas neque fugiant. (4) teris autem diebus. VII. cum aqua marina. (5) Nitrum fricas & laua cum aceto septies. & iterum relixa cum aceto & sale. usque dum nitrum exeat. (5) Deinde fricas cum aceto diebus. V. insole. (6) Bolos armeniacos fricatur cum aceto diebus III. in sole. (7) Chrisocolla lauantur cum lutio infantis diebus. V. insole. (8) Crocus fricatur diebus tribus. cum uino britio insole. & lidrium fri(bri expunx.) catur in sole diebus. V. cum uino. (9) Sandarace diebus. V. fricatur insole cum lutio infantis & postea assa.

LXX (M) isi fricas cum uino sumptum diebus. V. & assas.

LXXI (1) (C) *athmia fricatur cum aqua marina diebus. III.*
(2) *Calcu anthos fricatur diebus. III. cum aqua marina in*
sole. (3) *Lithus frigijs frigatur cum aqua marina diebus*
(Vo.)

VII. *insole.* (4) *Auri pigmentum scissile fricatur cum*
oleo spano diebus. VII. insole. (5) *Chalcos kecaumenos*
fricatur cum britium uino insole diebus VII. (6) *Mag-*
nesia fricatur cum aqua marina diebus VII. insole. (7)
Hec omnia inunum commiscetur & teris. & accipis argenti
libras. IIII. & cipri caledonii expurgati. libras. VI. &
inunum conflu (s eras.). (8) *& fac (-is eras.) lamminas*
& substernis unam infra unam. & mittes (corr. ex-is)
testam marinam tritam substernis & iterum superaspargis
adicisque afronitrum. (9) *& cocis oris. VI. & postea*
eximis & transfundis in iuscellum croci (s eras.) & elydrii.
(10) *& postea facis lamminis & mittis inlibram argenti &*
heris. (11) *Huius medicaminis. uncias. III. & semis per-*
cocturam idest incocturas tres. mittis medicaminis uncias.
XI. & semis.

LXXII Item alia auri confectio

(1) (M) *ittis argentum uiuum libram. I. chrisantimoN.*
pensu solidi. VIII. magnisie. galurgite. pensu. solidi. VIII.
piritis pensu solidi. VI. andromadas pensu solidi. VIII.
lithon. fragion. pensu solidi. VIII. (2) *Callatini pensu*
solidi. VI. (3) *Calacanthos. pensu solidi. VIII.* (4)
Chrisocolla pensu solidi. VIII. cinnabar pensu solidi. VIII.
(5) *Hec omnia commiscis in unum absque argento uiuo.*
& assa dies. III. & postea mittis incaccabulo nouo. una
cum argento uiuo. & conflas omnia ineminenti igne (corr.
ex -ni) horas. VI. & fiet aurum mirabile.

LXXIII Item margaritas facere.

(1) *S Vmis tracanthi partem unam. & mittis inlac bubulum*
quod sufficit. & dimittis diebus. X. (2) *& tamdiu infundis*
quamdiu habuerit glutinis pinguedinem. & mittis in mor-
tario. (3) *& adicis argenti uiui partes. II. & alborem oui.*
partem unam. & teris similiter cum predictis. & habeto
preparato. (4) *D e inde soluis cere terennice partem*
unam quam calide misces cum predicta (s eras.) specie.
(5) *Sit tibi premanu spiclarum tritum diligenter. & cribel-*

latum partes. III. (6) & infine adice in predicta specie. & omnia simul tere. (7) & mitte informas lapideas. & adhuc cum sint humidæ perdunde. (8) serua autem afumo & apuluere. & ubi coagulata fuerint. dentes defrica. (9) Bene autem inunctam meliores sunt anaturalibus.

LXXIIII Confectio albarum

(1) Accipies citrum. & tollis acetum eius. & miscis cum album(ine, supra)citri. & mittis pariter in mortario & teris. (2) & mittis in pannum & exprimis fortiter & eximis acetum & mittis in ampullam uitream ipsum acetum decitro. (3) & mittis ipsum pannum cum illo (corr. ex -ud) quod est intus quod expressisti

(Col. II)

in ipsa ampulla ita ut non tangat ipsum fundum de ampulla set pendat. (4) & ponis ad solem ipsam ampullam diebus canicularibus donec soluatur. & fiat sicut mucagines (corr. ex -is). & postea accipies afroselinum quod nascitur in edretia apollinis quod non potest consumi. (5) teris autem illud in mortario brixio. & gumme album. accipies coagulum leporis. & uulpis tritum & lac(te eras.) de tutumi- (corr. ex -a-)lo. & lac(te eras.) (de eras.) artemisie. que oliotropium uocatur. (6) & lac(te eras.) baccinum (corr. ex -o). & lac catule albe. & lac equæ albe. & lac caprofici. qui si (co, supra)morus dicitur. (7) misces (corr. ex -is) simul & teres (corr. ex -is). omnia pariter. & facies malagma & mittis in tipos buxeos aut in tipos de gipso. & adicies modicum (corr. ex -co) gumme intipis & ponis siccare. (8) & postea tolle tipos alios fictiles & mittes (corr. ex -is) in fornacem. & coques duas horas. & eximes cal(i, supra)dos ter ne uentum tangant & crepent. (9) postea saponem cum sapone callico & tepida. & si pertusum uis facere dum est tepida ipsa malagma mitte in medio setam porcinam. & fit pertusum & est mirabilis res.

LXXV Confectio prasini

(1) Accipies christallos (corr. ex -la) aformatoribus. idest aclusoribus dicimus septiles. (2) mittis in acetum. postea mittis hos christallos in caccabulum (corr. ex -lo) ita ut pendant intus in uirga ferrea. (3) & habeat ipse caccabus cooperculum crudum (eras.) & ponis in fornacem & in-

cende ex ligno oliue. (4) & quando uideris cooperculum prasinum fieri. leua ipsum caccabum de fornace. quousque in frid&. (5) & sic eximis accipiesque fel uulpis. & fel testudinis marine & fel uituli. & fel capre. & fel porcinum. (6) teris omnia pariter. & mittis hos christallos ibi & coquis horas tres. (7) & postea eximis. & mittis eos in oleo oliuastro. (8) & facis eos coquere horas duas. & exhibunt smaracdi mirabiles. (9) Set sic eos eximis ut non uentus eos tangat. & crepent. & laua(nt eras.) de sapone gallico. & tepida. (10) & postea accipies calamum aromaticum & coquis in oleo mittis eos diebus. V. & amplius.

LXXVI Solutio christalli

(1) Accipies christallum & fricas gummi (s eras.) minutissime. & mitte adequale pensum afronitrum contra christallum. (2) & mittis in caliculum (inter lineas, super caliculum) alium caliculum. qui caliculus superius habeat pertusum. unde mittis ferrum & commoueas donec

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soluatur. (3) lauas ferrum & uide si uessicas dabuntur christallum adhuc coque sicut facit sine uessica. (4) mitte ferrum & commoue & laua. si tamen tibi uisum fuerit uiridis leua ne ardeat. (5) si tamen dum subalbidum mitte bolum ad extanationem donec uiridis exeat. & habebis rem mirabilem.

LXXVII De pestalum aureum

(1) Aurum bizantium unciam I. argentum mundum sicut dibus unciam. I. commisce in unum & purga illud per plumbum. & post funde & commisce. (2) & batte lamminas subtiliter & recide illas subtiliter. per pensum usque quinque tresmses (is, supra m) bizantii. & postquam perfecta fuerit equalitas. si una longa fuerit. aut curta permartellum adequetur. tam delato quam de longo. (3) de illis unciis II. octo petiæ fieri debent. & tene illas communiter cum tenacle. & scalda illas in foco. & batte cum martello. (4) & cum battis. & tornatur de inforas & curte in medio apparecant. & ubi creuerint semissem unum recide illas cum curtello per pensum tercias uices. (5) & in quarta uice equale pensum super totum. & plicatum illum caput ad caput. & pensa equaliter. descende & a forfice recide. (6) & super ipsas

cappilaturas caput. ad caput ponatur & battatur manu una leuiter. & mittatur in oleo. (7) & postquam sunt deillis. VIII. petiæ. LXIII. postea facis cāficem heramenta. (8) & semper eum ibi scalda. & aliud eramen pone adbattere una petiam desuper & unam desubtus. (9) & quomodo battis ex martello plano tante manus deillo capite quante deillo. quout deillo. (10) & quomodo crescit semissem unum recide (corr. ex-ce-) illum. & pone unum super unum usque intertia uice. (11) Post inoleo mittatur & tandiu battantur. ut. deillis (corr. ex -le) petiis VIII. fiant. LXIII. (12) & circinetur illum aforfice (corr. ex -force). & ipse circinature stringe in pannum lineum. (13) & fac illud ardere in ipsa fornace ubi petalum mittitur. (14) & ipsa fornace fieri debet pedes. II. alta a terra. & ponatur tegula pertusa super murum. de uno latere tres pertusa. & de alio tres. (15) & in medio unum. & alia tegula ponatur super semissem unum altum a terra. (16) & pertundatur ipsa in medio loco. & a terra pertusum unde mittatur ligna. & ante unde mitatur aurum. (17) & ipsum aurum debeat cum cinere defeno. (b eras.) bobinum munditer fieret. (18) & de sale equaliter arsa trita.

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cum cinere comisce. in prima cinere mittatur. in secunda & intercia noua.

LXXVIII (1) Ad augendum petala de stagno ut fiant colore aureo coques herbam celidonium. (2) & ex ipsa coctione colata mitte. III. auripigmenti scissilis solidum. I. coques & ungues. (3) & postquam petalum coloratum fuerit. quale laborem deaurare uolueris cum blutti de ouo gallinaceo. (4) & si deaurationem uitri fuerit sic similiter. & (si) de aurationem ligni fuerit gipseo. & bluti de corio taurino. cappilatum minutatim. (5) & fiat ipse corio crudo. & bulliat incaccabum nouum cum aqua. & deferueat dies duos & tres. (6) a tempera cum gipso cribellato. & uolens in ligno aut in parietem fac. (7) & tolle pelle desquatu. & equa illud bene. & postquam siccauerit rade cum curtellum acutum & de aurea postea.

LXXVIII & si plumbum deaurare uolueris funde illum subtiliter. & rade munditer & pone petalum super & cum

emathite lix. at. & stagni opera si deaurare uolueris similiter.

LXXX (1) Si autem ferrum de aurare uolueris. tolle calcitharium & alumen asianum. & sal. & dracanto equis ponderibus. (2) & commisce cum aqua ista tota & incaccabo eramento mitte. & per ora una bulliat. (3) & unge ipsum ferrum & modicum laxa stare & terge illud & fi& color eramentum. & lixa cum lapide onichino. (4) & si exierit ei color eramentum retinge ei iterum. (5) & si ipsa deauratura non uoluerit prendere misce cum medicamen equaliter & unge.

LXXXI Ad deurationem palli sicut superius diximus debritta taurium. inquale uis pannum unge & inaura. & silixare uolueris lixa cum onichino.

LXXXII Similiter cum zumbri deaurare uolueris. cum petalum & cum bluta oui gallinacei. & si ipsum milum facere uolueris tolle mastice. unciam. I. libanum unciam. I. missa inmortario. & commisce inunum & fac milum.

LXXXIII (1) Confectio luce quomodo fieri deb& adpetalum aureum line leon uncias. V. galbanum uncias. II. terbentina. unciam. I. (2) Iste tres species solue inunum semel (corr. ex-sobnel) cum modico linelon. & postea crocum primotica. uncias. II. (3) Veronice uncias. II. lineleon. & orientale. unciam. I. libano uncias. III. mirra uncias. II. mastice uncias. II. resina sappini uncias. II. flore populi auricella commisce & ammassonas. cola postea & misce ibi gumme. cerasi uncias. II. crocu. libanu. lilia. mirra. mastice. gumma cerasi.

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resina sappini. flore populi uero trocme. (4) pisa ista tota & cribellata bulliat. cum uncias. IIII. line leon & post tote bullite. & colate per linteum. (5) misce ibidem ci (corr. ex-ca-) ballum & terebentina. & pice spana. (6) & si aliquid uitium postea habuerit. ut se desiccare non poteat. iunge ibi mastice quantum uolueris.

LXXXIIII Inauratio pellis.

(1) Tollis pellem rubeam. & pumicas eam diligenter. quoadusque limpida aqua egrediatur. (2) Deinde tendis ea incanterio. & lamnizas usque IIII. uices. (3) post hec

tendis inaxe munda faciem. desuper & cum ligno mundo coequa diligenter. (4) postquam autem siccata fuerit tollis albumen oui. & spungia munda. & intinguis ipsum lacrimum & inducis semel in ipsa pelle perordinem. (5) si autem non sufficit inducis iterum. & cum siccatum fuerit ponis petallum. (6) Deinde intinguis spungiam in aqua p& premis & (cum) siccatum fuerit polis. (7) Deinde de supra cum dracanto similiter inauratur. ita mitte illum in aqua quousque soluatur.

LXXXV QValiter debeantur pelles tingui alithine.

(1) tollis pelle depelata. & lauata utiliter. & mittis galla per unaquaque pelle. libras. V. Aqua. libras. XV. (2) & mittis pelle & exagita una die. & post hec laua bene & desiccas. & tolles alumen asianum. & mitte calida aqua in ipsum alumen. (3) & dum residerit funde exinde in ipsa aqua. & iterum mitte tepentem aqua & exagita. & mitte ibidem ex ipsa pelle & postmodum lauas semel. (4) & mitte uermiculum per una quaque pelle dimidiam. libram. (5) Hec est prima tinctio pellis. (6) Tolles uerm(i, supra)culum. & tere eum in mortario. mittis urina expumata incaccabo calido. (7) & ipsum uermiculum tritum. mittis in linteolo retro. & mittis in caccabo calentem. & exagita quousque exeat. (8) quod exierat de linteolo. & reliquum quod remanet. mittis iterum in mortario & teres. (9) & similiter mitis exagita donec non remaneat in linteolo aliquid de ipso uermiculo. (10) & tolles ipsa confec-tionem. & cum se ipsa pelle ut utrem. (11) & mitte ex ipsa iotta per una quaque pelle libram. dimidiam. (12) & defrica bene. & dimitte tota nocte manere. ipso. & mane conficit quantum sufficit. & funde. & laua & sicca. & labora. (13) Secunda tinctio tinguntur pelles pecurine in ipsa medicatione

(Col. II)

inqua pelles caprine tincte sunt.

LXXXVI (1) Si pellis prasine tingere uolueris. tolles pelles depillatas. 2 mittes stercus caninus. & columbinus & gallinacio. (2) & solues cos in iotta. & mittes ibidem in ipsas pelles & conficies eas ibi per tres dies. (3) & post hec eice illas exinde & lauas utiliter & dimittis siccare. (4)

& posthec tolles *alumen asianum* & mitte sicut *superius* docuimus. de alithino. (5) Post hec tolles luza & pisa. & decoque subtiliter cum urina. & dimitte refrigd&. (6) & cuse ipsas pelles sicut utres. & coctiones mittis in ipsas utres & confrica bene. & insufflas modicum ut habeat uentum. & confice bene donec (*con*, supra) uiuat ipsum medicamen. post hec refunde & laua semel ipsas pelles & postea mitte de lulacin *uncias* IIII. per pellem & urina dispumata libras VI. (8) commisce ipsum lulacin sicut iotta. (9) & mitte in ipsos utres & conficis bene. donec sumatur ipse humor confectionis & refundis quod superat in pecorina. iottaluze. & lulacin sicut *prediximus* inalithina. & exi& pecorina *secundum* prasinum.

LXXXVII (1) Si in ueneto tingere uolueris sicut *superius* diximus confices ipsas (ipsas iteratur et expungitur) pelles. & aqua laua & mitte in *alumen*. (2) & post tolle in lacin dimidiam libram. urina spumata libras. X. & commisce inunum & mitte infolles & habeat modicum uentum. & confice sicut *superius* diximus. (3) Ista autem per dies. IIII. assidue confices similiter per IIII. dies mittis in pecorina. (4) & ipsa confices dies. V. & laua & dimittis siccare.

LXXXVIII (1) Si in melino tingere uolueris. confice similiter ipsas pelles alumina (s cancell.) eodem modo. (2) & post hec laua de post *alumen*. & tolle luza ipsa. & decoquens bene cum urina dispumata. (3) & postquam refrigdauerit mittis in ipso folles & conficis. sicut *prediximus* per. V. uel VI. & post hec refundis & tinguis pecorinas, sicut *superius* & laua & desiccas.

LXXXVIII (1) Prima omnium tinctio confice eodem modo pelles & mittis similiter in *alumen*. & post hec lauas & tinguis ipsas pelles in bitriolo & lauas bene & compones ipsum merundum (leg. uermiculum) sicut supra diximus. (2) deinde (ex) ipsa iotta coctam mittis in ipso folles. & conficis ut docuimus & refundis. & exipsas effusiones tingue pecorinas & laua & desiccas.

LXXXX Secunda. . . .

GLOSSARY

- Abluere. Wash off.
 Abscondere. Hide. K. 48.
 Accedere. Approach.
 Accipere. Take.
 Acetum. Vinegar. K. 120.
 Aconas. Place in Bithynia.
 Acque 696 B. Water. K. 780.
 Acro, I 7. Sour. Remove the star from K. 114.
 Adezizza 696 E. Read adde zizanium or zizipham.
 Adicere. Add.
 Adplanare 690 E. Level off. C. Gl., Th. L. L.
 Adriseri, XXXV. Grows hot. (For arserit, K. 821.)
 Adsicca 691 B. Dry out. K. 3494.
 Adungis, X, 1. Anoint. Marked with ? in Th. L. L.
 (Aequalis) Equalis. Equal. K. 313.
 Aeramentinum. See heramentinum.
 Aerietis (lapis) 706 D glossed leoconpandium, *i. e.*, λευκὸν πανόλιον, else-
 where a plant, celandine. Read aetites, eaglestone.
 Afferrea 691 A. Grappling irons, tongs. *New.* K. 3710.
 Affricare. Rub.
 Afronari 711 D. See the next word.
 Afronitrum. Efflorescence of saltpetre.
 Afroselinum. Glossed terra lunaris; talc or crystallized gypsum.
 Afrouinum. Winefoam. *New.*
 Ala 690 E. Cf. D. G. ἄλας. Egg shell. In Latin *New.*
 Albidiante 696 D. White. *New.*
 Alborem. White of the egg.
 Albumen. White of the egg.
 Albus. White. K. 422.
 Alithine. Real, true. Th. L. L. Alethinus; ἀληθινός.
 Altus. High. K. 558.
 Alumen. Alum.
 Aluminare. Treat with alum. *New.* Th. L. L., aluminatus from Pliny.
 Amba 690 E. Both. Acc. pl. of ambo.
 Ammasonas, LXXXVIII, 3. Knead. *New.*
 Ammonia, amonii, amomakos for amoniakos, *i. e.*, ἀμμωνιακός, amoniacum;
 also amoraque. Ammoniac gum.
 Amplius. Longer time. K. 614.
 Ampulla. Small flask. K. 616.
 Anchusa, LXVII, 6. Plant oxtongue.
 Ancudinem, LXIII, 7. For incudinem, anvil. K. 4871.
 Androdamanta, XXXIII; andromadas, LXXII, 1. Bloodstone.
 Anthabro, LXI, 3. "Syriac for something made of hard metal." T. *New.*
 Anticalbus 686 D. Glossed tutimallim, which see. *New.*

Aposia, X, 5. Transfer to Latin; changed spelling of *ἀπονοσία*, but passing via "Syriac, for slag of refined metals." T. In *Latin New*.
 Apparere, apparescent, LXXVII, 4. Appear. K. 746.
 Aqueoleum 695 E. Emulsion of oil?
 Arborinum. Tree gum.
 Argentum (uiuum). (Quick) silver. K. 837.
 Argilla. Clay. K. 839.
 Argiographia, XXXIII, XXXVI. Silver writing. *New*.
 Argirosautista 715 B. Read argirorantista, *i. e.*, ἀργυροραντιστής. Both *New*.
 Aries. Ram. K. 812.
 Arispariso 715 A, *i. e.*, aeris sparsio. Bronze varnish.
 Aromaticus. Aromatic. K. 860.
 Artemisie, LXXIII, 5. Glossed oliotropium, *i. e.*, heliotropium, mugwort.
 Articulo. Some vehicle for a mixture. K. 901.
 Aspargo. Sprinkle. (K. 8911.)
 Assare. Roast.
 Assidue. Carefully, assiduously.
 Assus. Roasted.
 Atramentum. Ink. K. 1008.
 Auramentum. Gold plate, gold leaf.
 Aureas 696 C, aurias 696 B. A weight; classical, aureus?
 Auricalca 692 A. Cover with bronze?
 Auricella, LXXXIII, 3. Colander; also 690 A. D. Celendra, A. D. 1285-1309 mentions the word.
 Aurichalci. Brass K. 1062.
 Auricoloris. Gilt color. Th. L. L.
 Auripigmentum. Orpiment.
 Aurum. Gold. K. 1072.
 Axis, LXXXIII, 3. Bar; for assis. K. 971?

 Babuli lutei, VII, 3. D. G. says calix: "via Arabic." T. In *Latin New*.
 Baccinum, LXXIII, 6. For vaccinum, cow's.
 Bambace, I, 6. Cotton. Cf. K. 1201.
 Banga 707 A. Spade. H. vanga. K. 9982.
 Batillum. Firepan. K. 10016.
 Batrachium, V, 3. Usually ranunculus or crow's foot, but here copperas. (K. 1273.)
 Bene. Well. K. 1315.
 Bitriolum, LXXXVIII, 1. Vitriol. Remove the star from K. 10258.
 Biturum 682 A. Error for vitrum, glass. K. 10259.
 Bizantium. Byzantine. K. 1677.
 Bluta, LXXXII; blutti, LXXVIII, 3. Yolk of the egg. D. quotes blitten from Papias. Doubtless the same as blitum, "Meieramaranth, Blutkraut." K. 1479.
 Bobinum. For bouinum, bovine.
 Bolos armeniacos, LXVIII, 6. Armenian earth; for Βῶλος ἀρμενιακός.
 Brandisii 712 A & B. Bronze. K. 1596.

- Britium. Bruttian; for Brytius, *i. e.*, Βρίττιος. Cf. Marquardt-Henry, *Vie privée des Romains*, tom. II, p. 79, n. 10. *New*.
- Brixius. From Brescia.
- Bullire. Boil. K. 1643.
- Buxeus. Of boxwood. Cf. K. 1675.
- Caccabus, caccabulus, caccabellus. Crucible. K. 1686.
- Caficem, LXXVII, 7. Saucepan. D. reports caffirus, caffium, caficium, cafisa, none of which are as near as this form to the Arabic original of Pt. and O. Sp., cafiz. Santa Rosa de Viterbo, "Elucidario," etc., s. v., says: "Medidos de dos sólidos, ou grãos," adding that there were two sizes of sixteen and eight alqueires. The alqueire contains thirteen and a half litres. *New*.
- Calacanthos, LXXII, 3; calcantum, LV; calcu anthos, LXXI, 2. (*i. e.*, χαλκοῦ άνθος.) Copperas water, vitriol.
- Calamus. Reed, pen. K. 1722.
- Calceo cecaumenon 707 E, caluce caumenon 686 C; chalcos kecaumenos, LXXI, 5. Reduced metallic copper. (Read χαλκός κεκαυμένος.)
- Calcitharim, LXXX, 1, calciatarrim 684 E et 704 D, calcitarin 711 B. "Calcothar for non-quotable χαλκιτάριον via the Arabic." T. *New*.
- Caldonium, XXXX, 2. For Chalcedonium, from Chalcedon.
- Calecetis 683 D. For chalcitis, copper ore.
- Calefacere. Heat, warm.
- Calentem 678 B, LXXXV, 7. Hot. K. 1749.
- Callicla 677 C, caliculus, calicium, calicello. Small vase. K. 1751.
- Calidus. Hot. K. 1745.
- Caligarius. Shoemaker.
- Callatini, LXXII, 2. For callaini, sapphire green?
- Calx (uiua). (Quick) lime. K. 1772.
- Camaleonta 698 E, *i. e.*, χαμαιλέοντα, a plant.
- Candidari. Turn white.
- Candidus. Brilliant white. K. 1821.
- Caniculares (dies). Dog days.
- Caninus. Dog's.
- Canopodos, XV, 2., *i. e.*, Κανωπίδος from Canopus.
- Canterius. Rack, "horse." K. 1850.
- Cantia, XXXXVII, 2; catia 701 D. Glazing. Connected with K. 1779 or 1851?
- Caper. Goat.
- Cappelacia 696 C. Some furzy plant; from capillus, Ital. cappellacia.
- Cappilare, VIII, 4. Shave.
- Cappillatura, LXXVIII, 6. Ribbons. Remove the star from K. 1866.
- Capponovo 707 B. Read caccabo novo.
- Capra. She goat. K. 1888.
- Caprinus. Goat's.
- Caproficus, LXXIII, 6, *i. e.*, caprificus. Male fig tree.
- Carbones. Coals. K. 1920.

Carta. Papyrus paper. K. 2123.
 Caseus. Cheese. K. 1983.
 Cata 690 E. According to. K. 2002.
 Cathinia, LXXI; cathirae, XII; cathmiae, XV, 2. Cadmia, calamine. Note
 706 B: Lapis orebus, quem uocant Alexandrini cathmia. K. 1692.
 Catule (albe). Of (white) puppy. K. 2022.
 Caulide 698 B, cuo calida 698 C, *i. e.*, *κανκαλοειδής*. Shell-like. In Latin
New.
 Caza, cacza, cazula. D. reports cazia and cazula. Small spoon used to
 skim off foam. Arabic, çaça. This disposes of the alleged Germanic
 etymology, K. 2129.
 Celidonia, LXXVIII, 1. Celandine. K. 2131.
 Cemathite, XXIII, 4. Error for emathite, hematite.
 Cemcausis 709 B. Error for encausis, *i. e.*, *ἡ ἐγκανσις*. In Latin *New*.
 Cerasim 690 B, cerasi 691 E, *i. e.*, *κεράσιον*, cerasium. Cherry fruit. In
 Latin *New*. Cf. K. 2084.
 Cera. Wax. K. 2083.
 Cerotum. Wax plaster, pomatum.
 Cerrinum 683 D. Read acerium, of maple. K. 113, 117.
 Cerussa. White lead. K. 2017.
 Chalcitis. Copper ore.
 Chalconeum, XXVIII, Lemma. Bronzen objects. *New*.
 Chalcos. See Calceo.
 Charobbis, I, 7. Locust pods. Arabic. K. 2122.
 Chartineus. Pertaining to papyrus paper.
 Chisimon 715 A. Fusible. *New*.
 Chrisantimum, V, 4. Glossed lampum. Chrysanthemum.
 Chrisocolla, XXXI. Borax; but 686 D. says, "ogrisocollon arbor est."
 Chr—. See Cr—.
 Cianus 686 C; quianus, LXII, 3; quignus, 711 B., *i. e.*, *κίανος*. Some dark-
 blue substance. *New*.
 Ciballum, LXXXIII, 5. Read cibullum, onion. Remove the star from
 K. 2082.
 Ciloti, Cilioticum. Cilician.
 Cinicanthum. Dog thorn.
 Cinis. Ashes. K. 2194.
 Cinnabar. (1) Pigment from dragon's blood, (2) minium or vermilion.
 K. 2196.
 Cipriarum, XVI. Of copper. Cf. K. 2496, with star.
 Ciprum. Copper. Cf. K. 2497.
 Circinare, circinatura. Clip, clipping. Remove the star from K. 2207.
 Cithico, VII, 4. Read Scythico, Scythian.
 Citrinus. Citron yellow. Remove the star from K. 2224.
 Citrum. Lemon. K. 2227.
 Ciuitatem. City. K. 2228.
 Cloclea, XX, 6. Spoon. Remove the star from K. 2266.
 Clusores, LXXV, 1. Glossed formatores, moulders.

Cluttan 708 B. Read gluten, glue.
 Coagolari, quoageletur, XX, 5. Curdle. K. 2276.
 Cocere, LXXI, 9. Cook, boil. Remove the star from K. 2294.
 Coctio. Decoction. K. 2294.
 Coctura. Cooking, boiling. K. 2299.
 Coequare. Level, smooth out.
 Colare. Strain. K. 2230.
 Collirium. Salve.
 Colorare. Color. K. 2336.
 Coltellus, 697 D. Knife. K. 2666.
 Columbinus. Of dove.
 Comburare. Burn.
 Comidi, *i. e.*, *κυμίδι*. Gum arabic. In *Latin New*.
 Commari, XXVIII, 2, *i. e.*, *κόμαρον*. Arbut berry. K. 2345.
 Commiscere. Mix.
 Commouere. Stir. Cf. K. 6323.
 Compositio. Composition. Cf. K. 2400.
 Concula. Small cup. K. 2283.
 Conducere. Reduce. K. 2400.
 Confectio, conficere. Make. Cf. K. 2404.
 Confirmare. Strengthen.
 Confratorio, confricare. Rub well.
 Conglutinare. Glue together.
 Conopice. From Canopus.
 Constringere. Bind. K. 2451.
 Consumere. Dissolve. Cf. K. 2456.
 Contena 691 A. Tongs. Read cortena. *New*. Cf. K. 2711.
 Contundere. Crush.
 Conuiuere. Unite. K. 2491.
 Cooperculum, LXXV, 4. Cover. K. 2493.
 Coquere. Boil, cook. Cf. K. 2292.
 Corium. Hide. K. 2516.
 Cornu. Horn. K. 2521.
 Cotilas. Half a pint.
 Crassitudo. Dregs, sediment.
 Crater. Mixing bowl.
 Crepare. Burst. K. 2598.
 Creticus. Cretan.
 Cribellare, cribellum. Sift, sieve. K. 2603.
 Crisoclabum 708 C, *i. e.*, *χρυσοκλάβος* (D. G.). Having golden stripes. In
Latin New.
 Crisopetala 704 A et B. Gold foil. *New*.
 Crisorantista 714 E. Gold varnish maker. *New*.
 Cristallum. Crystal.
 Crocum, grocum, gracum. Saffron. K. 2618.
 Crocolicum, V, 2. Lycian crocus. *New*. Cf. Plin. N. H., XXI, 31.
 Crosa 675 A. Hollow. Remove the star from K. 2620.

Crucatim 675 D. With a hook. Cf. K. 2613 (with star).
Crudus. Raw, untanned. K. 2631.
Curtellus, LXXVII, 4. Knife. K. 2666.
Curtus. Short. K. 2712.
Cuse. Hammered.
Custum 698 A. Read costum, nard.
Cutis, L, 1. Read cotis. Hone. K. 2554.

De w. abl. for gen., I, 4. K. 2760.
Deaurare, deauratio. Gild, gilt, gilding. K. 2763.
Decoquere. Boil down.
Deferuere. Simmer down.
Defricare. Rub down.
Defundere. Pour out. K. 2763.
Deinde. Next.
Delere. Blot out.
Denante 688 D. Before. See K. 2760.
Dentes. Teeth. K. 2862.
Denigrare. Blacken.
Depelare. Remove the hair. K. 2875.
Depost. After, afterwards. K. 2790.
Desiccare. Dry out.
Desinere. Stop, let.
Desquatu, LXXVII, 7; de squatru 688 E extr. See quatru and D. s.
 Quadriga 2.
Desub. Under. K. 2760.
Desubtus, LXXVII, 8. Beneath. Cf. K. 9205.
Desuper. Above, from above.
Deueniat. Become. K. 2933.
Dimidium. Half. K. 2979.
Dimipsim 695 A, for psimittim. A cosmetic drug?
Dimittere. Let, leave. Cf. K. 2856.
Dispumare. Foam, let off or take off the foam.
Dracantum. Tragacanth.
Dragma. Drachm.
Duplum. Double. K. 3149.

Edretia, LXXIII, 4. Ivy thicket, or bed. *New*. Cf. K. 4529.
Effluere. Flow out.
Eg 678 E. For haec, this. K. 4568.
Egredi. Come out.
Egiptius. Egyptian. K. 311.
Ei cedestiptera 679 C. Read eice de ista patera.
Elcismate, XXVIII, 1. Glossed molibidine. Read helcysma, silver dross.
Electrum. (a) Mixture of gold and silver, (b) amber.
Elimpidatum 683 B. Cleansed.

Elydrium, elidium and lidrium; elirium 693 C. "Alchemist's word for electrum." T. D. G., *Notarum Charcteres*, col. 9. In Latin *New*.
 Emathite. Hematite.
 Eminentia. Prominence, projection.
 Equalis. Equal. K. 313.
 Equa (alba). (White) mare. K. 3262.
 Eramen. Bronze. K. 320.
 Eramenteo, eramentium, eramentinum, etc., 689 B. Bronzen.
 Eris. Bronze.
 Erugo. Verdigris. K. 322.
 Espumicare. Treat or rub with pumice.
 Exagitare. Shake.
 Exalbinum 676 C. Very white. *New*.
 Eximere. Take out.
 Exinde. Next.
 Expectare. Wait, await.
 Exprimere. Squeeze out. K. 3468.
 Extanatio, LXXVI 5. Tinplating.
 Extergere. Wipe off.
 Externiture 704 A, exteritum ibid. Tarnish. K. 9394. *New*.

 Fabricare. Manufacture. K. 3556.
 Faciam 675 B. For faciem, face. K. 3563.
 Fallere. Deceive. K. 3602.
 Falsus. False. K. 3605.
 Fel. Gall; usually a glue. K. 3673.
 Femum 611 D. For usual fimum, dung. K. 3770.
 Fenum. Hay. K. 3685.
 Fenestrella 712 D. Window. D. A. D. 1479.
 Ferreus. Of iron. K. 3699.
 Fersa 690 A. Hot; p. p. from feruere, as arsus from ardere. Remove the star from K. 3710.
 Feruens, feruere. Hot. K. 3710.
 Fictiles. Of earthenware.
 Fiola. Vial. K. 7118.
 Fistula. Pipe. K. 3794.
 Flabus, flauus. Yellow, blond.
 Flacaminas, XVII, 1. "Syriac for intensely black." T. *New*.
 (Flos, flores) eris. Chalcantus, copperas.
 Fodere, fossus. Dig, dug. K. 3874.
 Foliam 697 E. For folium, leaf. K. 3885.
 Fondis 692 B. For fundis, pour out. K. 4057.
 Forfex. Scissors.
 Forficare, XXVIII, 2. Cut with the scissors. Remove the star from K. 3905.
 Forma, formare, formator. Mould, moulder. K. 3914.
 Fornax. Furnace. K. 3926.

Fornaculiclo. Double diminutive, from fornax, little furnace. *New*.
 Fortior. Stronger.
 Fragon, LXXII, 1. For phrygium, Phrygian.
 Frangere. Break. K. 3956.
 Frequenter. Often.
 Fresa 694 D. Kind of bean. K. 3977.
 Frigas 675 B, fricare. Rub. K. 3978.
 Frixe, XXII, 1. Roasted. Cf. K. 3990, 4000, 4001.
 Fugere. Flee, disappear. K. 4026.
 Fuligo. Soot. K. 4036.
 Fumice 707 B. Read pumice, pumice stone.
 Fumus. Smoke, fumes. K. 4046.

 Gabata, 692 A, 703 A. Platter. K. 4103.
 Galbanum, LXXXIII, 1. Galbanum.
 Galla. Gallnut. K. 4134.
 Gallinaceus. Gallinaceous. K. 4139.
 Galurgite, LXXII, 1, *i. e.*, *καλουργίτης*, farmer. D. G. has *καλουργίζεν*. In both *New*.
 Genucolum 706 E. Knee. K. 4227.
 Geropha 696 D. For gerophalum, etc. Gilly flower. K. 1977.
 Gisasteros, LXVIII, 4, *i. e.*, *γῆς ἄστερος*. Star dust, dust of meteoric iron.
 Gypsum. Gypsum. K. 4422.
 Glutine, glutte. Glue.
 Gracilis. Slender, pliable. K. 4309.
 Grilela 692 A. Roast. Doubtless error for grilla. *New*. Replaces K. 2578.
 Gumma, gummi, gumme. Gum. K. 4397.
 Gummamen 707 C. Gum. *New*.

 Habundantia. Abundance. Cf. K. 63.
 Hedrea 686 E. Error for hedera, ivy. K. 4529.
 Heneus. Bronzen.
 Heramentinum 675 A. Bronzen. *New*.
 Hiticollon 705 A, *i. e.*, *ἰχθυόκολλον*. Isinglass. Classical, ichtyocollon, Plin. N. H., VII, 198.
 Hoxsi 714 C. For oxi, *i. e.*, *ὄξους*, vinegar. In Latin *New*.
 Humidum. Moisture.

 Iafanus, LXVIII, 4. Glossed spicalari, mica. For diaphanus, from *διαφανής*. In Latin *New*.
 Iarim 694 E, 695 A, 712 E. Verdigris. In Latin *New*.
 Ibi. There. K. 4696.
 Ibidem. In the same place.
 Ignitus. Fired, ignited. *New*.
 Ille. That, the. K. 4714.
 Illi 676 E. There. K. 4715.
 Impingere. Drive in, attach. K. 4780.

Incus, incudis. Anvil. K. 4871.
 Inde. Thence, therefrom, thereof. K. 4874.
 Inducere. Spread over, cover.
 Infectio, inficere. Coloring, dyeing, to color, to dye. K. 4920.
 Infectus, XIII, 6. Unwrought.
 Inferi, XXXIII, Lemma. Reduced? K. 4828.
 Infestatus, XXXII, 5. Reduced, sickly.
 Inforas, LXXVII, 4. Outside. *New*.
 Informare. To shape.
 Infridare, XXV, 4; infrigidare, LXXV, 5. Cool off.
 Infundere. Pour in.
 Inglutinare 706 B. Glue together. *New*.
 Inorare (inaurare), inoratio, etc. Gild, gilding. Cf. K. 475.
 Insimul, I, 1. Together. K. 5036.
 Intingere. Dip, plunge. K. 5094.
 Intus. Within. K. 5115.
 Inuiscare. Besmear.
 Inungere. Anoint, besmear.
 Iotta, LXXXVI, 9. Residue? *New*.
 Isaricam, XXXVI, 1. For Isauricam, Isaurian.
 Iterum. Again.
 Iuscellum. Broth.

 Laborare. Work. K. 5385.
 Lacca 680 D. Lac, lacquer.
 Lacrimum. Gum drop.
 Lacteficere 706 B. Make milky. *New*.
 Lammina. Plate. K. 5406.
 Lamnizare. Make into leaves or plates.
 Lampus. Painter's marigold.
 Larice 696 E. Larch. K. 5447.
 Latificare. Widen.
 Laucidis 696 B. For λευκάδιος. Asphodel. *New*.
 Laudabilis. Praiseworthy.
 Laxare. Let. K. 5491.
 Lepus. Hare. K. 5535.
 Libanus. Frankincense.
 Libra. Pound. K. 5563.
 Lignosus. Woody. K. 5586.
 Lignum. Wood. K. 5587.
 Lilium. Lily. K. 5595.
 Lima, limare, limator, limatura. File, filer, filing. K. 5608.
 Limpidus. Limpid, clean, clear. K. 5610.
 Lineleon, linelon. For non-quotable λινέλαιον, i. e., linseed oil. *New*.
 Linteolum. Cloth. K. 5629.
 Linteum. Linen cloth. K. 5631.
 Liquefacere. Liquefy.

Lithus frigijs, *i. e.*, λίθος φρύγιος. Yellow ochre. *New.*
 Littera. Letter. K. 5646.
 Lixare. Smooth. Preferable to K. 5641.
 Locus. Place. K. 5668.
 Luce, XXXVI, lemma; luzu, LXXXVI, 5; egluzu 678 E for hec luzu.
 "Syriac for almond." T. Here a varnish.
 Lulacin, LXXXVI, 9, 698 B, 713 A, Lulax idest Indicum. "Vegetable
 color, perhaps lilac, indigo." T. Doubtless artificial indigo.
 Lutium. Urine. K. 5697, 5755.

Macedonice. Macedonian.
 Magma 698 B, *i. e.*, μάγμα. Unguent dregs.
 Malleus. Hammer. K. 5847.
 Malum. punicum. Pomegranate. Cf. K. 5851.
 Manticam 696 C. Cheese. K. 5914. *New.*
 Margarita. Pearl. K. 5946.
 Martellum. Hammer. K. 5976.
 Mastice. Mastic. Cf. K. 5593-4.
 Matiola 690 E. Mallet. Remove the star from K. 6001. *New.*
 Medicare, medicatio. Medicate, drug. K. 6041.
 Medicamen. Drug.
 Medicamentum. Drug. K. 6036.
 Melan. Ink (μέλαν). As Latin *New.*
 Melantheria. Oil of the fennel flower.
 Melinus. Fallow. K. 6063.
 Melius. Better. K. 6064.
 Membrana. Parchment.
 Menare. Knead. K. 6185.
 Metallizare. Harden into a metal. *New.*
 Metallum. Metal. K. 6137.
 Milum, millum, *i. e.*, μύλλα. Grease.
 Mini, minei, minneo. Vermilion. K. 6179.
 Minutus. Minute. K. 6204.
 Miraculum. Miracle. K. 6206.
 Mirra. Myrrh.
 Miscere. Mix. K. 6211.
 Misesos, XV, 3. "Syriac for green vitriol." T. From μίσην, μίσσεως. As
 Latin *New.*
 Mittere. Put. K. 6226.
 Mna. Greek weight. Mina.
 Modicum. Moderate(ly).
 Modus. Measure. K. 6245.
 Mollis. Soft. K. 6261.
 Molybdine 684 A, *i. e.*, μολύβδαινα. Sulphuret of lead, galena.
 Monoclossus 686 D, *i. e.*, μονόγλωσσος. Of one petal. *New.*
 Moriam 702 E. Mandragora.
 Motuosus, mutuosus 676 A. Movable. *New.*

Muccago. Viscous substance. Cf. K. 6328-32.
Mundus, munditer. Clean(ly). K. 6376.
Mysi (cupri). Mysian copper.

Nasci. Be born, produced. K. 6455.
Naxie cutis, L. Polishing stone, hone.
Neulacis 698 E. Tapsia plant. *New*.
Nitrum. Native soda.

Oblinere. Besmear.
Oblongus. Sidewise.
Obolus. Weight, measure.
Obrizum. Refined gold.
Offa. Broth. K. 6670.
Offula. Small vessel. K. 6677.
Ogrizos 684 E. Read ὁ χρυσός, *i. e.*, gold.
Oleum. Oil. K. 6686.
Olicinus. Olive tree.
Oliotropium. For heliotropium, sunflower.
Oliuaster, LXXVI, 7. Wild olive. *New*.
Olla. Pot. K. 6688.
Onichinus. Of onyx. Cf. K. 6697.
Opera, operari. Work. K. 6700, 6704.
Ophites. Serpentine stone.
Opocarpum, XVIII, 1. Tree gum. For ὑποκάρβασος.
Oppilare, I, 7. Close up. *New*. Remove the star from K. 6705.
Opturare. Stop up.
Ordeum. Volunteer barley. K. 4618.
Ordo. Order. K. 6726.
Orebus 706 C. Cadmia, calamine. *New*.
Os. Mouth.
Ossum. Bone. K. 7649.

Palea. Straw. K. 6793.
Palli(um). Cloak.
Pandius, *i. e.*, πανδιος. Celandine. In Latin *New*.
Pannus. Cloth, rag. K. 6830.
Papaver agreste. Wild poppy. K. 6843.
Paridio 715 C, *i. e.*, paricula. Similar. K. 6867.
Pariter. Equally.
Patena. Cup. K. 6922.
Pati. Let, suffer. K. 6932.
Pauere. Quiver, quake.
Peculum 675 A. Error for petalum.
Pecurina. Sheepskin.
Pellis. Hide. K. 7000.
Pendere. Hang. K. 7008.

Pensu. Pound. K. 7021.
 Pertusum. Opening, perforation. Cf. K. 7082.
 Pestalum, LXXVII, Lemma. Error for petalum.
 Petalum. Leaf, petal. (Cf. K. 7090.)
 Petiæ. Pieces. K. 7106.
 Picespina 690 A et B. Read pice spana, *i. e.*, Hispana. See Pix.
 Pingere. Paint. K. 7166.
 Pinguedo, pinguetudo. Oily mixture.
 Piniatu 698 A. Earthenware pot. Ital., pignatta. *New.*
 Pipula. Small pipe.
 Pititorius. Error for pictorius; such as painters use.
 Pitucellus, XXXXVII, 2. Painters' pitch. Diminutive of D. pitzulum?
New.
 Pix. Pitch. K. 7210.
 Plectatura 690 E. Folding. *New.*
 Plicare. Fold. K. 7256.
 Plumbeus. Leaden.
 Plumbinum 675 B. Leaden. D. about A. D. 1130.
 Plumbum. Lead. K. 7267.
 Plus. More. K. 7270.
 Pluiialis. Pertaining to rain.
 Poculum. Cup.
 Polire. Polish.
 Porcinus. Of pig.
 Portio. Portion.
 Postfactum. Afterwards.
 Postmodum. Afterwards.
 Poteat, LXXXIII, 5. May. K. 7335.
 Potest. Can. K. 7335.
 Prasinus. Green.
 Predictus. Aforesaid. K. 7321.
 Primoticus. Of an early variety.
 Probitus. Refined.
 Procuratus. Refined.
 Producere. Extend.
 Prospicius, XXXIII, 2. Error for perspicuus, clear.
 Pruna. Coal of fire.
 Puliberas 675 C. Powders. K. 7545.
 Pultarium. Vessel. K. 7538.
 Puluer. Powder. K. 7545.
 Pumex. Pumice stone. K. 7547.
 Purgare. Clean. K. 7563.
 Pusca. Lemonade. K. 7330.
 Pyritis. Pyrites.

Quadroagutum 706 E. Translation of τετράκανθος. Having four points.
New.

Quatru, LXXVIII, 7, 688 E. Four. Cf. quatro, etc. K. 7652.
 Queiussans 675 A. Error for cerussans. Of white lead color.
 Quianis, LXXII, 3. See Cianus.
 Quoadusque. Until.
 Quoageletur. Coagulate. K. 2276.
 Quod. That. K. 7685.
 Quomodo. As, how. K. 7687.
 Quout. As.

 Radere. Shave. K. 7718.
 Radaverint 692 A. Thin out. *New*.
 Rapone 696 C. Error for sapone, soap.
 Rasura. Shavings, scraps. K. 7797.
 Reconflare. Melt again.
 Refixerit, XXXII, 4. Error for refrikerit. Cool off.
 Refloriens 706 D. Flowering again. *New*. Enables us to remove the star from K. 3849.
 Refridet 675 B; refrigdare, LXXXVI, 5. Cool off. K. 3885-88.
 Refrigerare. Cool off.
 Relinisteo 696 C. Error for *σεληνικός*. Apium, parsley.
 Replere. Refill.
 Residere. Settle down.
 Resina. Resin, rosin. K. 8000.
 Retepidare. Warm again.
 Retro. Back, again. K. 8037.
 Rotundus. Round. K. 8169.
 Rubeam. Red. K. 8175.
 Rursum. Again.
 Ruspant 696 C. Read rusicant (shave off), and remove the star from K. 7791.

 Sagapini, LXIII, 2, *i. e.*, *σαγάπηνον*. A certain gum.
 Sal. Salt. K. 8277.
 Salscistis 685 C. Read sal scithicus. Scythian salt.
 Sandarace. Arsenic; gum of the sandarac tree. But *S. montanis* is glossed papaueris agrestis and as ammonia.
 Sanum. The quick. K. 8336.
 Saponare, LXXIII, 9. Saponify. Remove the star from K. 8347.
 Sapone. Soap. (*Callico, i. e.*, gallico, French.) K. 8345 and 4137.
 Sappinus. Fir. K. 8351.
 Scaldare. Heat. K. 3331.
 Scaraxas 675 D. Scratch. K. 2120.
 Scisci, II, 1. For scissilis. Split.
 Scissilis. Easy to split.
 Scribere. Write. K. 8523.
 Scrupulus. Scruple. (K. 8533.)
 Sculpere. Grave, chisel. K. 8537.

Secretus. Secret. K. 8554.
 Semel. Once. K. 8587.
 Semissis. Half foot.
 Sequens. Next. K. 8627-28.
 Setacciantur 688 D. Sift, clean. Cf. K. 9258.
 Seta (porcina). (Pig) bristle. K. 8257.
 Sicaminus. Mulberry tree.
 Sicomorus, LXXIII, 6. Sycamore.
 Siccare. Dry. K. 8691.
 Sicut. As.
 Sicut dibus, LXXVII, 1. Lectio dubia in a difficult passage. Probably
 stands for sicut diximus.
 Sigillum. Seal. K. 8700.
 Signum. Image. K. 8703.
 Siliqua. Fraction $\frac{1}{1728}$. K. 8710.
 Similitudo. Likeness.
 Similis. Like. K. 8717.
 Sina, XXVIII, 1. "Syriac; usual alchemist's word for silver." T.
 Sinere. Let.
 Sinopidem, X, 2. Red ochre. K. 8738.
 Sipia. Sepia juice. K. 8616.
 Siricus, LXIII, 1. Silk. K. 8636.
 Solidatura. Soldering. K. 8848, 8850-51. D. A. D. 1367.
 Solidus. Coin, weight. K. 8851.
 Soluere. Dissolve. K. 8866.
 Solutio. Solution.
 Sotirichi, VIII, 1. For non-quotable σωτηρικὸς? Salutory. *New*.
 Spanus. Spanish.
 Species. Drug, spice. K. 8928.
 Sperare. Hope, expect. K. 8940.
 Spiclari, LXIII, 4. Mica.
 Spina. Thorn. K. 8951.
 Splendide. Brightly. K. 8964.
 Spuma. Foam. K. 8988.
 Spungia. Sponge. K. 8970.
 Stagneus. Of tin. K. 9012.
 Stercus. Dung. K. 9041.
 Stergis. Wipe off.
 Subalbidus. Whitish.
 Subtilis. Fine, thin. K. 9204.
 Succendere. Set afire.
 Sufficere. Suffice.
 Sufflare. Blow. K. 9237.
 Sulphur. Sulphur. K. 9252.
 Superaspergere. Over sprinkle.
 Superior. Former.

Supernatare. Float on the surface.

Suventium 690 D. Often. *New*. Cf. K. 9168.

Tangere. Touch. K. 9367.

Taurinus. Of bulls.

Tegula. Tile. K. 9418.

Temperare. Temper. K. 9429.

Tenacle, LXXVII, 3; tenalea 687 E. Tongs. K. 9436.

Tendere. Stretch. K. 9440.

Tenuare, XXXVII, 1. Thin out.

Tenuis. Thin. K. 9457.

Tepere. Be warm.

Tepidare. Warm.

Tepidus. Warm, tepid. K. 9458.

Terebintina. Turpentine. K. 9461.

Tero, terere. Rub.

Terra. Earth. K. 9467.

Terrechie, LX; terennice, LXXIII, 4. "Syriac tarnica, whey?" T.

Testa (marina). (Marine) shellfish. K. 9491.

Testudo. Tortoise. K. 9498.

Thebaicus. Theban.

Timon 696 C. Thyme. K. 9529.

Tipus. Type, moulds.

Tollere. Take, take away. K. 9574.

Tornare, tornatura. Turn, turning. K. 9616.

Tostare. Toast, roast.

Trachantus. Tragacanth.

Trahere. Draw.

Tripidem, LXV, 2. Tripod.

Triplus. Triple.

Trociscus. Pill.

Turbulare, I, 5. Become turbid. Remove the star from K. 9823. *New*.

Tutimallin 686 D. "Probably the plant euphorbia. The word occurs in Syriac in several places in the form tuthamilon." T.

Ualde. Very.

Uas. Vase. K. 10007.

Uasculum. Small vessel. K. 10010.

Ubi. Where. K. 9851.

Uenetus. Blue. K. 10042.

Uermiculum. Vermilion. K. 10075.

Ueronica. Betony.

Uero trocme, LXXXXIII, 3. Error for ueronice.

Uessica. Bladder. K. 10116.

Uices. Times. K. 10147.

Uirga. Rod. K. 10207.

Uiridis. Green. K. 10217.

Uitella, uitellos. Yolks of eggs. K. 10239.

Uitreus. Of glass.

Uitrum. Glass. K. 10252-57.

Uitulinus. Of calf. (K. 10263.)

Uncia. Ounce. K. 9885.

Unde. Whence. K. 9891.

Unguer. K. 9896.

Unus. K. 9909.

Uolarium, XV, 5. Error for uiolarium? (Violet bed?).

Urina. Urine. K. 9915.

Usque. Till, up to. K. 9929.

Ustus. Roasted.

Uter. Skin, bag. K. 9936.

Utiliter. Thoroughly.

Uulpis. Fox. K. 10320.

Uulturinus. Of vulture.

Ydrocollon. Water glue.

Yrcinus. Of goat.

Zizifa 696 E. Jujube. K. 10459.

Zumbri, LXXXII, zubri 698 D. "Spanish-arabic for eighth part, whence
Sp. azumbre." T.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI STUDIES

Part I

AN ESSAY ON THE SCIENTIFIC
METHOD

BY
LOUIS T. MORE

University of Cincinnati

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AN ESSAY ON THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

The truth of science has ever had not merely the task of evolving herself from the dull and uniform mist of ignorance, but also that of repressing and dissolving the phantoms of the imagination—FARADAY.

In support of the thesis advanced in previous essays*, I have maintained that our knowledge of phenomena and our formulation of natural law have steadily advanced since the time of Descartes; while our hypotheses, on the other hand, still rest on the ideas and employ the methods which were current in the sixteenth century. If this be true, (and a comparison of the hypothetical system of Descartes with those modern ones which I have sketched has been convincing to me, once I had put aside the prejudices due to my training), how can we assert that an hypothesis, though it be tentative and false to nature, is useful in advancing our knowledge of nature? How can that which stands still, point out or inspire that which is steadily and rapidly advancing? The man, who sets up a finger post to direct the path of the traveller, must himself have travelled over the road beforehand. So the maker of an hypothesis does not point out new paths but, at best, discusses the difficulties in the road already traversed by the experimental philosopher. And so far as I can see he usually describes the road so confusedly as to bother rather than to aid. In fact the discoverer of phenomena and laws is beginning to weary of the labour of reaching back in order to drag along the maker of hypothesis. There may be great ingenuity shown in the description of roads which a wanderer might have traversed if only they had existed, but, so long as these paths are only imaginary, they have precious little utility.

To establish an hypothetical system, we still begin with fundamental and universal assumptions as to the nature of space, of substance, of force, and of matter; and for all these, we turn back

* *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1909, July, 1910, and April, 1912; *Philosophical Magazine*, July, 1909, and February, 1911.

to metaphysical statements, defining them not by experience but by occult notions which cannot be tested. Change the antiquated language of Descartes into our modern idiom, and his ideas and method are practically those we are now discussing. But, perhaps, Descartes reaches in his wonderful clarity of expression the highest attainment in speculative thought? Even in the then little cultivated subjects of electricity and magnetism, his imagination did not fail him and he drew a picture of the field of force about a magnet which is strikingly like those in modern treatises. And to explain electrical attraction, he supposed bodies to contain little filaments of his elementary matter which were crowded out when they were rubbed. These filaments attached themselves like lines of force to neighbouring bodies. When the rubbing was stopped they retracted and so drew the electrified bodies together. If we modernize this explanation, we have a fair statement of Faraday's lines of force. Faraday believed that when a body is electrified the space about it is filled with lines of electric force which are stretched in the direction of their length and experience a pressure at right angles to their direction. This idea, or rather the modification of it, by Maxwell who was able to assign quantitative values to those forces which correspond with the laws of electrical attraction and repulsion, is expressed more precisely. But qualitatively: that is, in telling us what electricity is; why it is produced by friction; and what lines of force are; the modern statement is no more definite than that of Descartes. It is a mistake, however, to suppose he possessed a unique power of formulating hypothesis, other early writers attained eminence in this respect. Thus Sir Thomas Browne thought that electric effluvia (the prevailing name for force) behave like threads of syrup which elongate and contract and so produce attraction; Von Guericke stated that bodies contain effluvia which emanate from them according to their nature and form an electric field of force. In agreement with these opinions, we are taught to-day that the best way to consider lines of force is to picture an electrified body as one surrounded by stretched elastic bands. As a diagram to show the direction of motion of an attracted body, and as a name for the quantity of force, this conception of elastic lines of force is accurate and convenient. But Faraday and Maxwell went far beyond this, as they gave to them

a concrete reality. This conception still persists, although Sir J. J. Thomson showed years ago that no known system of mechanical forces would keep such a system of force-lines in equilibrium and Professor Lorentz now says they cannot really exist but are fictions of the imagination.

It seems rather futile, if such be the normal history of hypothetical models, to inflict on us the labour of learning abstruse hypotheses which continually revamp old metaphysical terms and merely dress them up in new transcendental symbols. It is a valuable exercise to strip hypotheses of their technical phraseology; to change those words which deceive our minds into believing that a clear idea has been conveyed, when, in fact, the words used have been wrenched from their significance. Thus Sir Oliver Lodge says that the ether is very massive. This definition at once increases our belief in its reality since it conveys the impression that the ether is tangible and impenetrable, something like a vast globe of rock. And we must stop to think before we realize that whatever the ether may be, it must be just the opposite to our ordinary ideas of massive things. Or what clear idea is conveyed by Professor Einstein's definition that vacuous space *contains* radiant energy which is an entity of the same kind as matter. Does he not add to the difficulty when he says further, that the difference between a vacuum and the ether is that the latter contains radiant energy and a light vector. What right has he to insinuate into our minds that a vacuum may contain something and still be a vacuum. He does this by a play on the word "energy" which he permits us to think of in the ordinary sense as an attribute of matter and at the same time states to be a distinct entity. We are inclined to pass lightly over the second statement because we tacitly think of a light vector as a geometrical line; the substance of such a line is too intangible to give a distinct shock to the reason. But if we put this definition to a simple test, we easily see how futile it is. Say to any one, that a golf ball in its flight is not a thing of rubber and paint but a complex of energy; and, that this is true because the moving golf ball has a motion vector and consequently changes vacuous space into ether. How quickly such a statement about a familiar action would be recognized as an absurdity. I presume that the reason why we like to indulge in these phantoms of the imagin-

ation is because we still hate to confess our ignorance. But it is a pity that science still lurks in the mists.

We can easily follow hypothesis as it progresses into transcendental symbolism. Sir Joseph Larmor and Professor Lorentz wish to define electricity so that it may be measured. They adopt the hypothetical method to a limited degree. Thus they each postulate the atom of matter. They next assume each atom to consist of a multitude of positively and negatively electrified particles which revolve in orbits. Except to say that these particles may be a modification of an ether, they avoid explicit details. Their method of exposition is still the classic method of mechanics. When they try to account for the Michelson-Morley effect, they merely show that it could be satisfied by supposing the dimensions of bodies to be influenced by their motion. At this point they wisely refrain from further explanations. Next we find that Professor Einstein definitely changes electrical particles into particles of electricity and matter into complexes of energy. He speaks so confidently of his ability to visualize electricity and energy that we feel our own inability to do so results from lack of intelligence. At this point he clinches the whole matter and explains the changes of the dimensions of moving bodies by introducing the occult idea that light is an entity which moves in space with a constant velocity. It is a far cry from the inductive method of science which attempts to build generalizations on experience, thus to make the whole concrete world conform to so abstract an idea as the constancy of the velocity of light in space. Nor does he hesitate to found physical science on the paradox; that motion cannot be absolute but the motion of light is absolute. Then Professor Minkowski goes a step further. He accepts all these ideas and then treats them symbolically. To deduce conclusions from these postulates, he uses mathematical equations as if there were four dimensions to space. The mathematician can employ equations which contain four or any number of variables but the physicist who desires to be intelligible is forced to limit himself to the three which correspond to his powers of measurement, length, breadth and depth. Lastly, Professor Lewis confuses scientific method utterly, by arbitrarily assuming which quantities in an equation shall be treated as variable and which as constant. Thus he says, if the momentum of a body changes, let us suppose that

this happens not because its motion changes but because we shall consider its mass variable. Of course anyone can say, let us consider the universe to act as he wishes. But, after all, what is the use when no one believes it does. Is it any wonder that a gulf is growing not only between men of science and the rest of the world, but also between theorists and those who are still willing to submit their imagination to experience? Such a gulf is certain to continue so long as theorists are willing, and even anxious, to ignore common sense and the facts gained by patient and exact experimentation.

It is true that such a criticism of scientific method is purely destructive. And in that admission may lie the ineffectiveness of the argument to many. Some will say that however weak and vacillating the hypothetical method may be, yet it is the custom of thought and in spite of it or even, in some way, because of it, scientific truth has nobly expanded, dispelling ignorance and subjugating natural forces. But because knowledge advances, objection should not be made to a protest against what tends to embarrass a more rapid advance. Such a protest is the value of destructive criticism. The reason why scientific knowledge advances in spite of hypotheses, those phantoms of the imagination, is because, as I have attempted to show, hypothesis rarely precedes experiment. If we compare the work of the experimenter of today with the ideas of the school of energetics, we find he still goes on calmly working with apparatus and using it with the common sense idea that it is real objective matter in spite of the attempt of the theorist to make it an attribute of energy or electricity. The conclusions derived from experiment and laws may be discussed and condemned or approved as they support the prevailing hypothesis, but scientific hypothesis is much like religious dogma, although it may protest, yet in the end it swerves around to accept all new facts. And in a short time the despised fact is cited as a pillar, or at least as a flying buttress of the hypothesis.

Fortunately, many examples exist, in the work of Newton, Ampère and others, which show the advantages of the abstractive method. According to this method, postulates must be made which seem necessary and adequate to the foundation for a science, and conclusions are deduced from them by mathematical analysis which is continually supported by the data of experience;

but explanations of the postulates and models of hypothetical substances and actions are not attempted.

While it is not possible to draw a definite boundary line between the regions of physics and metaphysics, still we may do so in a general way by saying that the domain of physics is concerned with the discovery of phenomena and the formulation of natural laws based on postulates which are determined by experience and generally accepted as true; the causes of phenomena and the discussion of the postulates of science are the province of the metaphysician. This differentiation in methods of thought cannot be rigidly adhered to since this boundary line is more or less obscure, and is liable to considerable displacement as a science advances; but the acceptance of this principle would prevent much of the confusion which has been introduced into the science of physics by writers who have not recognized it to be a general rule. For example, the principle of relativity is not strictly a physical law but the expression, in mathematical symbols, of the general philosophical law of the finite nature of the human mind which has been accepted for centuries. Again, the discussion of the shape of the atom or electron is not a physical problem, as it is incapable of verification by experience. This does not mean that such questions should not be discussed, but the method of their discussion and the results obtained are properly the method and results of metaphysics and are not in the category of physical phenomena and laws.

In the first place, men of science must accept the existence of an objective universe, whose phenomena and laws are external to our intelligence and will. But, since the interpretation of phenomena is subjective and thus conditioned by our intelligence and will, scientific laws are governed by the mathematical theory of probability, or the consensus of opinion of the greatest number, working with the greatest care.

The basic laws of physics are the laws of continuity and conservation, and the law of cause and effect. Unless we believe that something, matter, energy, or both, remains unchanged in amount and has a continuous existence however changed in appearance, and unless phenomena can be repeated, we have no certainty of knowledge and no means of communicating ideas to others. The

discussion of the reality of these laws may be left to the philosopher, but I dare say however he decides, they will continue to be accepted by mankind generally.

The universality and application of these and other laws should be rigidly limited to experience by the physicist. The law of conservation requires that the quantity of matter and energy is either infinite, which means nothing, or that there is an exact interchange in quantity in every action. This belief is expressed in Newton's law that to every action there is an equal and contrary reaction. But it is evident, that conservation, as a scientific law which may be verified, is limited to a very small category of observations and is only approximate for them. Thus we know nothing of the total amount of energy radiated from the sun or where it goes. Hypothesis here shows considerable oscillation. Some assert that the universe is infinite and so the radiation never reaches a boundary; others say that the universe is so filled with matter that no straight line can be drawn from the sun without reaching an obstacle and so radiant energy is reflected back and forth; again the universe may be finite in size and its boundary be a reflecting surface. These hypotheses are evidently futile speculations and no support to the law which we have been driven to accept and shall continue to accept until personal observation shows results which increasingly depart from the law.

So, too, the law of cause and effect is a generalization from a few observations and neither supports nor is supported by hypothesis. The fact is, the phenomena of the universe do not reveal themselves, as a whole, in any regular sequence of cause and effect; and our theories, based on such a law, show such a complex tangle as to be wholly beyond our power to interpret. The law involves time, and past time at that; and the successive causes of an observed phenomenon, if carried back in any logical sequence, soon widen out into an incomprehensible maze and vanish in the obscurity of the past. The most beautiful and perfect example of this law is the belief in organic evolution. Yet on what meagre and inaccurate observations it rests. Everyone believes in some such law, but no one can point out the sequence of cause and effect, and its rigorous development leads to absurdity. Mathematically it is a law of geometrically decreasing types which

reduce finally to a single protoplasm. If we adopt the hypothetical method, we should discuss the origin of this protoplasm. To say it was made by God, is not scientific. Lord Kelvin offers an hypothesis (although one would suppose he was joking if the context were not so serious) when he writes that the original protoplasm may have fallen on the earth from some celestial body! However we are to consider such an extraordinary statement, we do know that Maxwell tried to support the hypothesis of pan-genetic evolution by the extraordinary method of estimating the number of molecules in a germ. The question with him was whether there were enough molecules to form miniature organs and parts of the mature object into which the germ would expand.

Another illustration may be given to show that as soon as we extend our laws beyond the point where verification is possible, we merely cause confusion. Certain experiments indicate that the apparent mass of a body changes when it moves in an electric field. The law shows that the mass should become infinite when the velocity equals that of light. This conclusion has been accepted as the basis of an hypothesis that the velocity of light is a maximum limit. Such a belief is not only pure hypothesis but it is contrary to the conclusions of other hypotheses. If this hypothetical method is generally applicable it is necessary to explain gravitational action also as due to some form of motion; Laplace has shown that the motion involved requires a velocity many times that of light.

Our most fundamental perception of an external universe seems attainable from our sense perception of force. The muscular sense of effort is apparently the simplest and most general mechanical notion we have, and in the opinion of the masters of the science our idea of force is adequate to serve as the basis of so exact a science as physics. Yet, when we attempt to make force serve as a fundamental measure of phenomena, we have found, since the time of Newton, that it is not so convenient as mass and acceleration. Motion is further divisible into the measurement of length and time. It is therefore customary to reduce all our complex observations into combinations of the fundamental units of mass, length, and time instead of force. The idea of force being thus associated in our minds as an attribute of matter, we

postulate the objective reality and conservation of matter and assume the fundamental attribute of matter to be its mass or inertia. M. Hannequin expresses this idea clearly when he says that nothing in a mechanical sense exists except masses in motion.

We shall next assume length, mass, and time to be the fundamental units of measure. These quantities and their derivatives are continuous or, at least, indefinitely divisible. The continuity of space and time is generally accepted; without this belief it is impossible to establish the geometrical laws of figure founded on the point, line, and surface or the analytical laws of motion derived from the calculus. The only exception, I know of, to this postulate is Professor Planck's theory of quanta, in which motion may occur in jumps. But the divisibility of matter is not usually supposed to be infinite. Indeed, the denial of this assertion is the foundation of all atomic theories. Yet it is difficult to see how mathematics can be anything but abstract logic, or how it can be applied to physical problems unless this third fundamental quantity, which is, as it were, the connecting link between the abstract and the concrete, be also indefinitely divisible. It is only by the postulate of the indefinite divisibility of mass that we may pass from the mathematical laws of pure motion (kinematics) to the physical laws of the motion of bodies (dynamics). How, otherwise, can we replace finite bodies by mathematical centres of inertia? In this connection Sir Joseph Larmor says: "The difficulty of imagining a definite uniform limit of divisibility of matter will always be a philosophical obstacle to an atomic theory, so long as atoms are regarded as discrete particles moving in empty space. But as soon as we take the next step in physical development, that of ceasing to regard space as mere empty geometrical continuity, the atomic constitution of matter (each ultimate atom consisting of parts which are incapable of separate existence, as Lucretius held) is raised to a natural and necessary consequence of the new standpoint." This is clearly an attempt to reconcile the two incommensurable antinomies of continuity and discontinuity, which are usually attached to the names of Descartes and Lucretius. This Sir J. Larmor tries to do by postulating the existence of a *true* matter, which is a continuous plenum and imperceptible to our senses, and relegating sensible matter to the rôle of a mere variation in this otherwise

changless plenum—making it an attribute rather than an entity. If this definition denies the infinite divisibility of matter, it apparently accepts its indefinite divisibility; the atom, as a variation limited only by our power of observation, must become smaller with each advance in the refinement of our apparatus. Such a plenum must remain a pure creation of the imagination, and its existence is not determinable by physical or experimental methods; it must therefore be classed as a problem for the metaphysician. The distinction between atoms continually diminishing in size and the infinite, or at least indefinite, divisibility of matter is here a question of words—the definition of what matter is.

Few things have been brought out more clearly by the work of the school of energetics than that, if we accept the doctrine of the continuity and conservation of energy, either of the two, matter or energy, may be considered as the fundamental unit from which the other can be derived. This undoubtedly follows from the fact that we have no conception of matter without energy or of energy without matter. But while it is thus possible mathematically to make either of them a starting point for the explanation of phenomena, the advocates of energetics apparently soon develop a pronounced tendency to prefer the abstract to the concrete and to subtilize objective facts into metaphysical ideas. A science like physics, to be useful and not merely an intellectual gymnastics, should preserve in all its speculations a close touch with the practical and the concrete—a certain common sense. The history of the science shows these advantages have been obtained most frequently by those who maintain matter and not energy to be a fundamental entity. The failure of the mechanistic school has arisen from the attempt to explain the nature of matter, the cause of its forces, and the properties of atoms. However we may try to reason away the belief in the objective reality of matter, our minds persistently cling to the advantage, and even necessity, of such a postulate, and we consciously or unconsciously endow any substitute of it with all the properties of matter, excepting its name.

Energy is considered then as an attribute of matter and may be defined as the power to do work. It is customary and convenient to divide energy into two classes, potential and kinetic, according as the matter concerned appears to be at rest or in

motion. Since attractive forces exist between all bodies, we find that the idea of work is involved whenever the distance between bodies is altered and we denote this potential energy as the force of attraction times the distance between them. I accept frankly the idea of action at a distance, not because it seems reasonable, for my experience teaches me that to cause motion I must construct a link between two bodies. But the fact remains, that both gravitational and electrical attractions seem to act at a distance and all attempts made to explain them have so confused the mind that the occult phenomenon is less perplexing than the occult explanation. In the majority of such problems we can go no further; but in certain cases, as for instance the theory of gases, a portion of the potential energy due the pressure of gases may be ascribed to the impact of small moving masses of gases. Even here, a portion of the energy of the gas must be considered as potential and incapable of further explanation. Kinetic energy is the power of work due to the motion of bodies. Its measure is one half the moving mass into the square of its velocity. These two kinds account for all the energy of material bodies; they are mutually interchangeable and their sum is a constant.

A third kind of energy remains to be discussed. It is called radiant energy; its difference lies in the fact that it is not associated with material bodies. Certain forms of the energy of bodies which we name heat, light, etc., are observed to appear in other bodies although the space between them is devoid of matter. We suspect that the amount of this energy disappearing in the emitting bodies is equal to the amount appearing in the receiving bodies and that time elapses between the emission and the reception of the energy. On these ideas we have built the theory that energy travels through immaterial space and in its transit we call it radiant energy. The conception of radiant energy is a useful one if we limit it to a mere quantitative idea. For this purpose it suffices to state the facts in a mathematical formula which expresses a continuous passage of a quantity of energy through space equal to the amount lost by the emitting body. We thereby generalize the laws of continuity and conservation and of cause and effect. This is not the custom; it is usual to try to explain radiant energy qualitatively. This requires either that space be

filled with an ether to serve as the vehicle of energy or that energy be regarded as itself an entity.

It has been the persistent attempt of physicists for centuries to explain this radiant energy by mechanical analogies. And this effort has fastened on the science an interminable series of impossible fictitious ethers and mechanical atoms. The most indefatigable labours of the greatest minds have been spent to imagine an atom, which would serve satisfactorily as a source and, at the same time, as a receptacle of radiant energy and an ether which would transfer it. Not one of these models has been even partially adequate; the course of the development has been steadily from the simple to the complex, from the concrete to the abstract, from the physical to the metaphysical, until the most recent atom is a complex more intricate than a stellar cosmogony whose parts are an entity called electricity, and the ether is an abstraction devoid of any mechanical attributes. Out of all this controversy we have gained the following facts:—Heat, light, and electrical energy, originating in one body, may be assumed to pass through space undiminished and unaugmented to another body. We can also express this energy as kinetic energy while it is associated with matter. In transit, since our experience gives us no clue or criterion, we can assume as a formula for the energy, either a periodic motion of an hypothetical something, called an ether, or a projectile motion of an hypothetical mass-particle. In either case, all we really do is to divide the initial or final material energy into two mathematical quantities, one a mass-factor and the other a velocity-factor, and give to each such a value as to make their product remain a constant. As a rule, we make the mass-factor so small that we can shut our eyes to its existence and imagine anything about it we please. The time relation is fixed by experiment. For the purposes of theory, although this energy appeals to our senses in the three forms of heat, light, and electricity, which in their qualitative aspects are each fundamental and not referable one to another, we fortunately find that quantitatively all three are satisfied by one dynamic formula. We have therefore obtained an adequate quantitative knowledge of energy, but not an inkling of the qualitative coefficients in this formula.

The hypothesis of the ether is an attempt to accomplish the

impossible. And while it is now generally admitted that we cannot create such a substance as will satisfy the physical requirements of a transmitter of radiant energy, still the ether is claimed to be a useful hypothesis. This utility is said to consist in giving us a crude image, in a mechanical way, of what occurs. In other words, it lessens our innate dislike to confessing complete ignorance, and it provides a set of concrete analogies for abstract statements and equations. Thus M. Poincaré says in the preface of his *Théorie de la Lumière* that it makes but little difference whether the ether really exists for that is the business of the philosophers to determine; its usefulness to us lies in the fact that nature acts as if it existed and so the hypothesis is convenient in the explanation of phenomena. And after all the existence of material bodies may be only a convenient hypothesis. But he immediately points out the difference between the two, for he says: the existence of material bodies will never cease to be believed but the day will come, without doubt, when the ether will be rejected as useless. This is to my mind an essential difference; and he might have taken a step further, for a belief that is necessary and must always persist is not an hypothesis but a fact. Now the old elastic-solid and mechanical ether did afford us a concrete image of a mechanism for radiant energy, and we could speak of it with some intelligence to one another, because everyone has a conception of an elastic solid. To be sure, this solid ether became a grotesque. It permitted the transference of heat and light energy, but only at the expense of creating a kind of matter entirely outside of, and contradictory to, anything in our experience. We have only to recall the properties ascribed to this ether to find that it operated equally well if it had a density indefinitely great or one indefinitely small; if it were rigid or if it were collapsible, etc. As certainly as one physicist endowed it with a property, another arose who showed that just the opposite property was equally efficient. Yet we might still be staggering along with the conviction that somehow this supposititious stuff was of use to us; at least it gave us a set of words conveying some meaning. But when Maxwell proved mathematically that a third kind of radiant energy of an electrical type should be looked for, and when Hertz demonstrated its existence, no elastic solid would serve for all three kinds; and so, for a time, we

were taught simultaneously the properties of two co-existent ethers. An elastic-solid and a so-called electromagnetic ether in a single space were impossible, and the former soon collapsed since it was more concrete and thus more vulnerable to criticism. Maxwell's idea produced a revolution in the theory of physics; heat and light remained no longer a form of mechanical waves but became electromagnetic waves of a special periodicity. By a progressive subtilization we have now arrived at Sir J. Larmor's celebrated definition of an ether which will satisfy all forms of radiant energy. The ether is "*a plenum* with uniform properties throughout all extension, but permeated by intrinsic singular points, each of which determines and, so to speak, locks up permanently a surrounding steady state of strain or other disturbance." This ether is unaffected by any type of mechanical action since etherial strains are of an unknown kind responding only to electromagnetic stresses. This definition seems general enough to satisfy the most critical, but Professor Einstein goes much further. He says we must abolish the ether because the only difference between empty and occupied space is that the latter is the seat of an entity, energy, and contains a light vector. Such a definition, in the sense of explaining a complex idea in terms of simpler ones, is wholly incomprehensible and at the same time apparently denies and affirms the existence of the ether. But Professor Einstein is not averse to paradoxes. These ideas evidently reduce matter to an attribute of electricity, and make all forces of the type called electrical forces. But if electricity is everything, we must inevitably some time explain pure mechanical actions in terms of this electrical substance. Sir J. Larmor clearly foresees this, as shown by his statement: "The electric character of the forces of chemical affinity was an accepted part of the chemical views of Davy, Berzelius, and Faraday; and more recent discussions, while clearing away crude conceptions, have invariably tended to the strengthening of that hypothesis. The mode in which the ordinary forces of cohesion could be included in such a view is still quite undeveloped." He thus rather leaves this question in the air by concluding that a complete theory is not necessary. But the history of science shows that we shall soon create two ethers or try to give properties to one which will include electrical, chemical, and material forces; indeed, this latter

is already being attempted. If the conception of an elastic-solid ether was admittedly a fiction of the mind, and one impossible to align with any known kind of matter, the electromagnetic ether is so esoteric, so subtilized from all substance, that it merely provides a nomenclature for a set of equations expressing the propagation of radiant energy. We may well go still further, for I believe the time is rapidly approaching when all scientific discussion of the nature of the ether will be considered futile.

In accordance with the view taken in this essay, no hypothesis will be made to express properties of an ether, whose existence is itself incapable of scientific proof. It is, at the same time, perfectly proper to distinguish space through which we say radiant energy passes, by a special name such as the ether. The amount of radiant energy in transit is best given by an equation expressing conservation of energy and containing a velocity and an inertia factor. The velocity factor of this equation most conveniently takes the form of a periodic motion, but no assumptions need to be made as to the nature of the periodicity or of the inertia factor since they also are not subject to experimental verification.

Such a revolution as has occurred in the ideas of the ether requires a like one in our ideas of matter. The most notable effort in theoretical physics, at the present time, is the hypothesis that the ultimate element of matter is not a material atom, a sort of microcosm of sensible matter, but a *free* electrical charge, considered to be an entity for the purpose; added to this are the dependent ideas that inertia and all other properties of matter are attributes of electricity. This hypothesis can mean nothing else than that the Lucretian atom, the centres of force of Bosovich, the vortices of Kelvin and all the atomic models (made of weights and springs and strings), have failed and become useless as aids to the imagination.

Sir J. Larmor defines this new atom as a proton, "in whole or in part a nucleus of intrinsic strain in the ether, a place at which the continuity of the medium has been broken and cemented together again (to use a crude but effective image) without accurately fitting the parts, so that there is a residual strain all round the place." This strain is not of the character of mechan-

ical elasticity, since the "ultimate element of material constitution is taken to be an electric charge or nucleus of permanent etherial strain instead of a vortex ring. Sir J. J. Thomson pictures the atoms of the various chemical elements as nuclei of free positive electricity holding in electrical equilibrium free negative charges, placed in various geometrical designs. The degree of stability each system is determined by the radioactivity of its element. Professor Lorentz considers the proton to be a small particle charged with electricity and probably a local modification of the ether; but his work on electromagnetic mass leads one to the opinion that he believes electricity to be the real essence of the material universe. Professor Abraham and the modern school of German physicists are frankly endeavoring to give a purely electromagnetic foundation to the mechanism of the electron and to mechanical actions in general.

There is at present a controversy whether these electrons are rigid or deformable. The only consequence of these two views necessary to comment on now is a very pertinent remark of Hr. Abraham, that if the electron be deformable, work will be required to effect this deformation, and to avoid contradiction with the law of conservation of energy, the electron must possess internal potential energy. This opinion of Hr. Abraham is almost impossible to avoid. To provide the electron itself with this kind of energy is to deny its character as the fundamental and indivisible unit of matter, for a body having potential energy must contain mutually reacting parts which may themselves be considered as units of a lower order; nor will many approve of M. Poincaré's rather embarrassing suggestion, that the ether may be a great and inexhaustible store-house of energy, drawn on at will by the electron each time it moves. This idea will hardly be taken seriously, as the assumption of unlimited energy existing in a fictitious ether is in no sense a scientific notion; it contradicts the prevailing idea of the inertness of the ether and makes of it a sort of *deus ex machinâ* which interposes to help us out of difficulties. And indeed the electromagnetic ether and atom, without material properties other than imaginary stresses, is an explanation more difficult to grasp than the phenomena of radiant energy which require explanation.

Now to me, and I believe to many men of science, the chief

and indeed only value of an atomic theory is to give a concrete, though crude, image of matter reduced to its simplest conditions. The word electricity gives me no such image of matter; it conveys absolutely no idea of materiality nor even of space or time relations. What the originators of the electrical atom have done is apparently to transpose the words, matter and electricity, tacitly giving to the latter all the ideas usually associated with the former. We may as well take the next step at once and raise the objective universe on the Liebnitzian monad or on Schopenhauer's philosophy of "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung."

Again, the law of the conservation of matter has been one of the most fertile ideas in science; according to this law at least one attribute, inertia, remains constant however all others may change, thus giving continuity to material bodies as well as to space and time. It is quite possible to imagine an element of this new electric matter to be composed of equal quantities of positive and negative electrons, whose motions are so balanced as to make *all* material attributes vanish and produce a quasi-annihilation of matter.

Lastly, when the statement is made that the electron is merely a local modification of the all-pervading ether, some idea should be given us as to the nature of this modification. If it is of the character of a strain, no meaning is conveyed unless this strain is subject to the laws of static or kinetic mechanics. But we have no knowledge of a static strain which fulfils the requirements of matter, especially that it must be localized at definite points and must be uncreatable and indestructible; of kinetic strains, the only one at present available is the vortex ring of Helmholtz and Kelvin. To imply that matter is electricity and that electricity is a static strain or a vortex ring, is to make an impossible assumption and is reasoning in a circle. If the vortex ring of matter failed chiefly because Maxwell said: "That at best it was a mode of motion and not matter as we know it," what chance has this new type to survive criticism?

Although matter appears to us as a continuous quantity or at least as divisible far below our present methods of experimentation, still it is convenient to give to the smallest observable portion of matter some such name as proton. This unit of matter must be reduced in size as refinement of observation increases

so that we may always be able to discuss it mathematically in the aggregate only. It must also be endowed with the same attributes which we recognize in gross matter.

At the present time this protion is the electron, and the only attributes necessary to assign to it are inertia in the Newtonian sense, a force of gravitational attraction and a force of electrical attraction, either positive or negative in sign. No causes for these attributes can be given as they are fundamental. If the experiments of Kaufmann, which show that an electrified particle in motion has an apparently increased momentum, are cited as supporting the view that inertia is a function of velocity and should be considered as an attribute of an invariable quantity, the electrical charge, I hope to show that it is possible to accept Kaufmann's results and at the same time the invariability of inertia. Before proceeding further with this discussion it is convenient to assemble the foregoing ideas in a more concise form.

We have first postulated a real and objective universe and assigned to matter rather than to energy the rôle of being an entity. The fundamental attribute of matter which makes it recognizable by our senses is force.

We next assumed that quantitatively all phenomena may be expressed in mechanical ideas and that the fundamental units of measurement are mass, length, and time. These are continuous functions and consequently indefinitely divisible.

While matter, as measured by mass and extent, is indefinitely divisible, it is convenient to adopt as a scientific unit of mass a quantity so small that it is inferior to our powers of observation and so must be treated mathematically only in aggregates. As this is a general definition, the name protion has been given to this unit in order to avoid confusion with the chemical atom and the electron. At the present time the protion is the electron.

The general laws governing actions are the laws of continuity and conservation and the law of cause and effect. These are generalizations from experience and cannot be extended beyond possible experience without great precaution.

Energy is defined as the power of doing work and is held to be an attribute of matter. True or observational energy is always associated with matter and is divided, for convenience, into potential and kinetic energy.

A third and hypothetical kind of energy is assumed in order to extend quantitatively the laws of continuity and conservation, and of cause and effect, to the apparently well-founded interchange of energy of two bodies situated in a vacuum. This energy is named radiant energy and, in order to link it with kinetic energy, its quantity is expressed as the product of a "mass" and a "velocity" factor. Its velocity is naturally taken to be the distance between the bodies divided by the observed time. It is most conveniently expressed as a periodic motion with a translational velocity equal to 3×10^{10} centimetres per second. No hypothesis is made in regard to the nature of the mass factor; it is taken merely as a coefficient to maintain conservation.

As no attempt is made to account for the mechanism of radiation, no attributes need be assigned to an ether. In fact no ether need be postulated, although it is advisable to use the name to differentiate space when it is occupied by radiant energy.

Action at a distance is a matter of experience and can not be denied until some reasonable proof is found to account for force by some other means.

So far these ideas have had the approval of some acute men of science, however they may be disapproved of by others. Those which follow are more novel and need to be supported.

Since mechanical explanations are to be avoided, it is necessary to endow the electron with all the attributes of gross matter. For example, the proton of oxygen has a different density, force of cohesion, etc., from that of hydrogen. In this discussion, it is necessary to discuss only a few of these attributes.

I shall, therefore, assume that the electron has a constant mass, m , and that it possesses a force of gravitational attraction for all other electrons which is determined only by their masses and the distance between them.

The electron, in addition to gravitational attraction, has a power of electrical attraction. To measure this force, I shall assume that it possesses a quantity of electricity, e . Electrical force obeys the same law as gravitational force, since it is conditioned by the quantity of electricity and the distance between electrons.

The electrical property of matter is also manifested to us by the experimental fact, that an electrified body apparently pos-

sesses a greater mass when in motion than an unelectrified body. A similar effect is noticed when a body is moved in a fluid. As the apparent increase in mass is there due to the resistance of the medium, it is called hydrodynamic mass, we may call the apparent increase in mass of a moving electron, its electromagnetic mass, m_e . The total or effective mass is therefore $m+m_e$.

Since the total mass is found to vary with the velocity of an electron, two suppositions are possible. Most physicists now assume that the mass, m , is a variable and that the mass, m_e is constant. It seems to me more rational and more convenient to adopt the converse idea that the electromagnetic mass, like the hydrodynamic mass, is a variable. I shall, therefore, assume that the electrical charge on matter is a quantity varying with the velocity of a body.

This is of course a pure hypothesis, although it is conceivable that experiments may be devised which would verify or disprove it, and at least it avoids the necessity of revising our settled ideas that matter is a substance and that mass is constant.

So great a revolution in thought as to consider inertia a variable quantity and to substitute electricity for matter as the substance of the universe, would only have been undertaken from a fancied necessity. A mere matter of convenience would scarcely warrant the labor of revising the work of the past and of discarding what has been considered, until lately, as definitely established. The need for some such radical change in theory is based on the experimental facts discovered in connection with the passage of electricity through highly rarefied gases, and with radioactivity.

We may consider it established that the phenomena noted, when electricity is discharged in a high vacuum, are most readily explained by supposing the current due to a stream of electrified particles moving with a velocity comparable to light. The experiments of Sir J. J. Thomson and C. T. R. Wilson go to show that the masses of these projectiles, when charged negatively, are about the one-thousandth part of the mass of a hydrogen atom provided the charge on each is assumed to be the same and equal to that of the hydrogen atom. Those charged positively are comparable to the various chemical atoms.

The Zeeman effect, in its elementary form, is satisfactorily

explained by this theory, although the later discovered complex character of the phenomenon is not accounted for.

Radioactivity, on the whole, is best explained by the projection of positive and negative electrons from a certain class of bodies.

And lastly, Kaufmann has shown by a delicate experiment that the apparent mass of an electron is a function of its velocity. This conclusion has been confirmed by others, although in minor points there is a considerable difference in results and opinions.

It must not be lost sight of that all these experiments deal with quantities of matter, supposing it to exist, too small to be appreciable by either chemical analysis or mechanical apparatus, such as the balance. They are ultimately measured by the force of electrical attraction of an electrical charge. We are, therefore, experimenting with matter which appeals to us through only one of its attributes. Is it not almost inevitable that an exclusive attention paid to this single attribute is likely to exalt it into an undue prominence? We have had, in the past, examples of much the same sort of reasoning. When the phenomena of light were predominantly discussed, physicists drifted into the opinion that this property of matter could be explained only by creating a light substance. Again, this process of reasoning occurred when heat was first investigated; we had the creation of caloric. And now we are asked to do the same thing with electricity. It is safe to predict that history will be repeated again, and that electrical charges and their forces will also sink into the condition of an attribute of matter.

It might certainly be true that two experiments showing equal electrical charges would, if we could measure the amount concerned, provide us with unequal quantities of matter, just as conversely equal quantities of matter might show different quantities of electricity. The hypothesis of equivalence of electrical charge and matter rests solely on an analogy to electrolysis, where matter is in a quite different state and also where the equivalence may be only approximate. Matter, on the other hand, in a solid state shows no connection between volume and density and electrical charge. In dealing with electricity we should not forget the immense superiority of electrical detectors

in delicacy to those for mechanical quantities, so that we can appreciate far smaller quantities of electrified than of neutral bodies.

There is no doubt, from the quotations given, that theorists are basing their work on the assumption of the electron as the unit of matter. And they give to it the following properties: Its mass is wholly electromagnetic; the motive forces are electric forces; and the laws of mechanics are to be deduced from the laws of electromagnetism.

At first sight, it would seem to be a simple matter to devise an experiment which would decide whether the mass or the electrical charge of matter is constant. But so far these two quantities have not only been found to be inseparable but they invariably enter as a simple ratio, whose value decreases with increasing velocity. Such a relation can, of course, be satisfied by assigning a proper variation either to the numerator or the denominator. It therefore becomes a mere matter of expedience which of the two quantities, mass or electrical charge, shall be supposed constant. In addition, the quantity, e/m , is itself a constant for all velocities which can be attained by bodies which are appreciably large. So the whole question of variation is more or less academic, in that it does not become important unless we are discussing hypothetical atomic systems.

To say that e is a constant is an assumption based solely on an analogy to the experimental laws of electrolysis; but in electrolysis, when we obtain equal electrical charges we also find equivalent masses of matter. In the discharge of electricity through gases and in radioactivity the matter deposited is too small to be measured. This is a fundamental difference and vitiates an analogy between the two. For example, we measure the amount of current in a vacuum tube by an electrical device, and at the same time we measure the deflection of the current by an electric and magnetic field; in other words, all quantities and forces are electrical, and we say that equal currents in this case require equivalent quantities of matter. But it has not been shown to be impossible or even improbable that electrons, associated with equal quantities of matter but having different velocities, might show different electrical charges; or that electrons producing equal electrical charges, might deposit different

amounts of matter if it were sufficient in quantity to be detected by chemical or mechanical reactions.

As an hypothesis, I propose that, in order to make the ratio $\frac{e}{m}$ agree with the experimental evidence of its value and to account for electromagnetic mass, we consider m to be the mass of a particle of matter in the Newtonian sense, of constant and small value, and e , the electrical charge, to be a force attribute of matter which varies with the velocity of the particle.

However novel this hypothesis may be, I have not been able to find any experimental facts more difficult to explain by it than by any of the other hypotheses which have been recently advanced; and, on the other hand, it apparently accounts for much of the modern work in terms of old and well-established ideas.

From the very nature of my conception of the limits which should be imposed on scientific inquiry, I make no attempt to explain the cause for this electrical property of matter any more than I should for its gravitational attributes. Both are fundamental phenomena to be accepted as experimental facts until we gain contrary knowledge. Indeed, I have ventured to indulge in this speculation rather with the idea of showing that the recent hypotheses for electricity and matter; for the ether, protons, and corpuscular light; for the electromagnetic and other non-Newtonian mechanics, are not necessary. We may still account as adequately for all our experimental facts by a simple addition to the properties of matter and continue to base our theories on mechanical laws.

So long as the measurement of physical qualities becomes ultimately a matter of measuring mechanical forces, it is advisable to express quantitative physical laws in terms of mechanical formulae. For this reason electricity should be considered a function of mechanical energy rather than the converse. If it be possible to place mechanics on an electrodynamic basis, it is certain that we may always explain electricity in terms of ponderodynamic laws. As both are possible, it seems far more natural and more rational to consider electricity as an attribute of matter than matter as a phenomenon of electricity.

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UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI STUDIES

Part III

VAN DEN VOS REYNAERDE

ÜBERSETZT

von

MAX POLL

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Der mittelniederländische Reineke Fuchs

Eine Übersetzung von Arnout-Willems Gedicht

VAN DEN VOS REYNAERDE

I. VON ARNOUT-WILLEM BIS GOETHE.

Die Reineke-Fuchssage ist sehr alten Ursprungs. Zwar weigert sich die moderne Forschung so weit wie Jacob Grimm zu gehen und anzunehmen, dass die Tiersage ein gemeinsamer Besitz der indogermanischen Völker sei.¹ Sie stimmt jedoch hierin ihm bei, dass nicht Aesop und orientalische Fabelsammlungen allein die Quellen der mittelalterlichen Tierepen gewesen seien, sondern auch die Tiermärchen, jene heitern unterhaltenden Erzählungen wie die Bremer Stadtmusikanten, die im Volke vor grauen Zeiten entstanden sind, die, selbst epischer Natur, sich gern zu Cyclen aneinanderreihen, und die ausserdem die Eigentümlichkeit haben den Tieren rein menschliche Namen beizulegen.

Aus diesen beiden Elementen, der äsopischen Fabel und dem Tiermärchen, baut sich nun die Tierepik des Mittelalters auf. Naturgemäss ist die Entwicklung eine langsame. Zwischen ihrem Anfangspunkt, der alten äsopischen Fabel von der Krankheit des Löwen, der auf des Fuchses Rat Heilung durch eine frisch abgezogene Wolfshaut sucht, und dem Gipfel- und Endpunkt dieser Dichtungsgattung in lateinischer Sprache, dem Isengrimus, liegt eine lange Zeit. Die oben erwähnte Fabel, welche die Feindschaft zwischen Fuchs und Wolf erklärt, wurde wahrscheinlich von Paulus Diaconus in den 70er Jahren des achten Jahrhunderts am Hofe Karl des Grossen in 34 glatten Distichen vorgetragen;² den aus über 6000 Versen

1. Der Verfasser hat diese Frage eingehender in dem Artikel "Grimm's Theory of the Origin of the Animal-Epic and the Ensuing Controversy," Publications of the University of Cincinnati, Bulletin No. 25, behandelt. Vgl. C. Voretzsch: "Jacob Grimms Deutsche Thiersage und die moderne Forschung." Preussische Jahrbücher, 1895, 417 pp.

2. Dümmler "Gedichte aus dem Hofkreise Karls des Grossen," Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum, XII 459ff. XIV 497ff; XVI 430ff.

bestehenden Isengrimus¹ hat ein Magister Nivardus aus Gent um 1150 verfasst.

In diesen 400 Jahren war das Tiergedicht nur allmählich von der didaktischen Fabel zur epischen Erzählung fortgeschritten. Von nun an aber ist der Entwicklungsprozess ein schneller. Bis zum Isengrimus war die Tierepik geistlich, d.h. aus geistlichen Kreisen hervorgegangen und für geistliche Kreise geschrieben, weswegen ihre Satire sich ausschliesslich gegen die Entartung der Kirche und der Geistlichen richtete; die angewandte Sprache war die lateinische. Die darauf folgenden Epen sind in der Sprache des Volkes von Goliarden, Klerken und Spielleuten abgefasst. Priester und Mönche werden zwar auch jetzt noch verspottet und lächerlich gemacht; aber sie sind nicht mehr allein die Zielscheibe, sondern teilen dieses Los mit Hof und Höflingen, mit Rittersum und Ritterpoesie. Mit andern Worten, das Tierpos verweltlicht sich mit seinem Austritt aus den Klostermauern.

Dieser Vorgang fand auf dem Boden des alten Frankenreiches westlich des Rheins statt, und das erste Erzeugnis dieser Art ist der "Roman de Renart."² Derselbe ist nicht das Werk eines Dichters, sondern eine Sammlung oder Zusammenstellung von 32 verschiedenen Gedichten, "branches" genannt, d.h. Zweigen der grossen Tiersage. Sie sind zu verschiedenen Zeiten entstanden und von sehr ungleich dichterischem Werte. Ihre Beliebtheit bezeugen aber die zahlreichen Handschriften, die auf uns gekommen sind. Die Aneinanderkettung der verschiedenen Gedichte fand wahrscheinlich erst in beschränktem Masse statt, nach und nach wurden die kleineren Gruppen zu grösseren Sammlungen vereinigt. Auch wurden einzelne Abenteuer andererseits vom Ganzen losgelöst oder neu bearbeitet und in andern Zusammenhang gebracht.— Mit dem Eindringen persönlicher Satire, deren Anspielungen von späteren Generationen nicht mehr verstanden wurden, erhielt aber die französische Tierepik den Todesstoss; von der Mitte des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts versiegte ihr Born, sogar der "Roman de Renart" geriet in Vergessenheit.

1. Hrsg. von Mone, Stuttgart 1832, unter dem Titel, "Reinardus Vulpes."

2. Hrsg. von Méon, Paris 1826. Neuere Ausgabe von Ernst Martin, Strassburg 1882-87. Vgl. dess. "Observations sur le Roman de Renart, ebd. 1887. L. Sudre "Les sources du Roman de R., Paris, 1893. u. dazu E. Martin, Zeitschr. f. germ. u. rom. Phil. 1894. und J. W. Muller, Taal en letteren, V. 129-160.

Glücklicherweise waren einige der ältesten Branchen auf Mittelhochdeutsch und Mittelniederländisch bearbeitet worden, und diese letztere Übertragung sollte dazu bestimmt sein das Interesse an den Streichen und Schandtaten des Fuchses bis auf den heutigen Tag wachzuhalten.—Bei der mittelhochdeutschen Bearbeitung brauchen wir nicht lange zu verweilen, denn das Werk ist ohne besondern Einfluss auf die deutsche Literatur geblieben. Der Verfasser war Heinrich der Glîchezâre, ein Elsässer, der um 1180 sein Epos "Îsengrînes nôt," ein Titel, der uns an das alte Volksepos "Der Nibelunge nôt" erinnert, verfasste.¹ Von seiner Persönlichkeit wissen wir nur, was sich aus seinem Werke erraten lässt. Verse wie "swer des niht geloubet, der sol mir drumbe niht geben," oder "swer will, daz ez gelogen sî, den laet er sîner gâbe vrî," scheinen darauf hinzudeuten, dass er dem Kreise der Fahrenden, die um Geld sangen, angehörte, der Titel "her," dass er ein Adliger war. Ob der Name Glîchezâre, d.h. Gleissner, ein ererbter oder Beiname war, lässt sich wohl schwerlich entscheiden. Das ursprüngliche Gedicht ist uns nur in vier Blättern erhalten.² Vollständig dagegen ist es auf uns gekommen in einer Bearbeitung, wahrscheinlich aus der ersten Hälfte des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts, unter dem Namen "Reinhart fuhs," Vers 10 zufolge.

Während dieses Epos keine Nachfolger gefunden hat, wenden wir uns jetzt zu dem niederländischen "Reinaert de vos,"³ dem Vorbilde und der Grundlage aller späteren Bearbeitungen. Damit sind wir in der Entwicklung des mittelalterlichen Tierschwanks zu der Zeit angelangt, in der der Stoff nicht mehr ins Ungeheuerliche erweitert, sondern vereinfacht, kristallisiert und in ein logisch zusammenhängendes Ganzes gebracht wird. Während der "Roman de Renart" aus einer grossen Anzahl Abenteuer besteht, die oft nur sehr lose unter einander zusammenhängen, hat der Dichter oder haben die Dichter des niederländischen Gedichtes **eine** Rein-

1. Hrsg. v. Jacob Grimm "Reinhart Fuchs," Berlin 1834, S. 24 ff. Neuere Ausgabe von Karl Reissenberger, Halle 1886.

2. Vgl. Grimms "Sendschreiben an Lachmann," Berlin 1840.

3. Abgedruckt von J. Grimm in "Reinhart Fuchs" S. 115 ff., von Jonckbloet, Groningen 1856, Ernst Martin, Paderborn 1874, van Helten, Groningen 1887, F. Buitenrust Hettema en J. W. Muller, Zwolle 1903, und dazu Inleiding-Aantekeningen-Glossarium, nur von F. Buitenrust Hettema, Zwolle 1909, (Zwolsche Herdrukken, No. 18, 19, 20), Hermann Degering, Münster 1910.

harterzählung zugrunde gelegt, mit grossem Verständnis und Feingefühl Züge aus andern ausgewählt, sie folgerichtig aneinandergereiht, Überflüssiges ausgelassen, Eigenes hinzugefügt, ja jede Einzelheit durch den Charakter der handelnden Personen motiviert, so dass ein Werk geschaffen worden, dem Grimm¹ nicht ansteht, "ihm unter allen Gedichten, die sich über diese Fabel erhalten haben, der Anlage und Ausführung nach, den ersten Platz einzuräumen. Alles schreitet in leichter und gewandter Sprache und mit nie nachlassendem, sondern immer steigendem Interesse von Anfang bis zu Ende fort; alle Begebenheiten hängen, gleich einer wahren Geschichte fest zusammen."

Wer hat nun das Werk verfasst? In der Comburger Hs. (a), die ungefähr um das Jahr 1400 geschrieben worden, ist dem Epos ein Prolog von 40 Versen vorausgeschickt, und dort heisst es:

Willem, die vele bouke maecte,
 Daer hi dicken omme waecte,
 Hem vernoyde so haerde
 Dat die auonture van Reynaerde
 In dietsche onghemaket bleuen
 (Die Willem niet heuet vulscreuen),
 Dat hi die vijte van Reynaerde dede soucken
 Ende hise na den walschen boucken
 In dietsche dus heuet begonnen.
 God moete ons ziere hulpen jonnen!

Die Worte, "vele bouke" im ersten Verse stehen an Stelle eines ausradierten Wortes. Was dieses war, erhellt aus der Brüsseler Hs. (b) aus dem ersten Drittel des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts, welche eine Umarbeitung des Reinaert enthält. Dieser Bearbeiter, der einfach auch den Prolog übernahm, auf den er doch ebensowenig ein Anrecht hatte wie auf den Autornamen, sagt nämlich: "Willam die Madok maecte." Das unverständliche "Die Willem niet heuet vulscreuen" (Vers 6) änderte Jonckbloet in seiner Ausgabe um in "die hi hier hevet vulscreven," so dass, mit Zuhilfenahme von zwei anderen geringeren Emendationen, die Verse ungefähr auf deutsch lauten würden:

1. A. a. O., S. CL.

"Willem, der den Madoc schrieb,
 Warum er häufig spät aufblieb,
 Den hat verdrossen es gar sehr,
 Dass Reinaerts Streiche bis anher,
 (Die er nun völlig hat beschrieben),
 Auf deutsch unübersetzt geblieben.
 Er stöberte welche Bücher auf,
 Worin stand Reinaerts Lebenslauf,
 Den er zu übertragen begann.
 Gott helfe gnädig uns fortan."

Diese Emendationen wurden von den Textherausgebern wohl allgemein acceptiert. Der belgische Gelehrte Léonard Willems jedoch gab sich mit ihnen nicht zufrieden und stellte die Hypothese auf,¹ dass der Name Willem in Vers 6 nicht der richtige sei, und dass dort der Name des Verfassers eines ältern Reinaertepos gestanden habe, welches der Willem aus Vers 1 vollendet habe. Diese Vermutung von Léonard Willems fand seinerzeit wenig Anklang, ist aber mehrere Jahre später durch die Auffindung einer neuen Handschrift (f), die sich im Besitz des Fürsten Salm - Reifferscheidt auf Dyck befindet, augenscheinlich bestätigt worden, denn dort lauten die Verse 3-6:

Dat ene auenture van Reynaerde
 In dietsche was onvolmaket bleuen,
 Die Arnout niet en hadde bescreuen.

Demzufolge ist "Willem die Madoc maecte" nicht länger der einzige Verfasser unseres Epos, sondern er hat nur ein Abenteuer Reinaerts, das Arnout, "unverfertigt" gelassen, in seine Muttersprache übersetzt und mit dem ältern Werke verbunden, und wir sehen uns jetzt, wie es scheint, in die Lage versetzt, unsere Ansichten, die wir uns über diese Perle der Tierepik und deren Dichter seit langem gebildet haben, bis zu einem gewissen Grade umzuwerten.

Welcher Teil nun von unserm Reinaert gehört Willem und welcher Teil Arnout an? Hermann Degering, der Entdecker und Herausgeber der neuen Hs., die circa dreiviertel Jahrhundert älter als die Comburger sein soll,² "neigt der Auffassung zu, Willem den zweiten Teil zuzuschreiben, was natürlich die

1. Tijdschr. voor nl. taal-en letterkunde 1897, XVI 258 ff.

2. Hermann Degering: Van den vos Reynaerde, Münster (Westf.) 1910, Einleitung XVII.

Annahme nötig macht, dass der Prolog auch in der von der Dyker Handschrift überlieferten Form nicht unversehrt ist." (S. XX.) Die Veröffentlichung seiner Untersuchungen steht noch aus. Andererseits meint Léonard Willems,¹ und seiner Ansicht schliesst sich J. Franck, dem wir eine eingehende Besprechung der neuen Handschrift und der sich daran knüpfenden Fragen verdanken, an,² Willem habe den Anfang gedichtet, während Arnouts Werk entweder mit dem Erscheinen Reinaerts bei Hofe beginnt (V. 1751), oder mit der Verurteilung Reinaerts (V. 1883) einsetzt, also auf jeden Fall den Teil umfasst, in welchem die Anthropomorphisierung noch mehr als in den ersten 1700 oder 1800 Versen ausgebildet ist.

Nur die eingehendsten Untersuchungen werden den Anteil der beiden Dichter und ihr Verhältnis zu einander klarlegen können, und diese Aufgaben harren noch der Lösung. Noch schwieriger werden sie durch die Tatsache, dass sprachlich sowohl wie metrisch beide Teile eine so grosse Übereinstimmung zeigen, dass Franck sagt: "Mag man sich wundern, dass zwei verschiedene Individualitäten zu einem solchen Einklang unter einander gekommen sein sollen, mag man darin geradezu ein Phänomen erblicken, man gelangt damit über die bestimmte Nachricht nicht hinweg." (S. 332.)

Wer waren nun Arnout und Willem? Von Arnout wissen wir nichts;³ ein wenig besser sind wir hinsichtlich Willems daran. Wie bereits erwähnt, lautet der erste Vers in Hs. b.: "Willam die Madoc maecte." Grimm a.a.O. hielt Madoc für einen Beinamen und erklärte denselben aus der Wurzel *mate-socius* und *miser, pauper*, und dem Diminutiv *oc, uc* entstanden, also Gesellchen, Kumpan oder Ärmeling bedeutend. Die Übersetzung der beiden Verse würde demnach lauten: Willem, der Kumpan oder der Ärmeling, machte oder dichtete, darum er oft wachte. Was machte er aber? Der Vers gibt keinen Sinn, ohne die Angabe von dem, was er machte. "Die" ist aber nicht nur der Artikel, sondern auch zurückbezügliches Fürwort, und daher können wir auch übersetzen: Willem, welcher den Madoc machte, wonach Madoc dann der Titel

1. Im "Bulletin de la Société d'histoire et d'archéologie de Gand," 1908.

2. J. Franck: Zur Überlieferung und Composition des Reinaert, Zt. f. d. A., Bd. 52 285 ff., 1910. Vgl. F. Buitenrust Hetteema II, XCVIII-XCIX.

3. Vgl. Buitenrust Hetteema II, LXXX.

eines andern Werkes von demselben Verfasser sein würde. Die Richtigkeit dieser Annahme findet sich durch zwei Stellen aus mittelniederländischen Gedichten bestätigt. In Maerlants "Rijmbibel" heisst es:

"dit nes niet (ist nicht) Madocs droom
no Reinaerts no Arturs boerden." (Lügen, Spässe.)

und in "Die burchgrave von Coetchy" sagt eine Dame zu ihrem Ritter, der ihr eine Liebeserklärung gemacht:

"noch wanic, her ridder, dat ghi slaept
of (oder) dat ghi sijt in Madox drome."

Hauptsächlich aus der Zusammenstellung von Reinaert und Artur, den Helden von Gedichten, wird klar, dass Madoc nicht der Beiname des Dichters sein kann. Von einem Gedichte "Madoc" oder "Madox droom" selbst wissen wir zwar nichts. E. Martin, a.a.O.S. XIV, meint, dass es wahrscheinlich einen allegorischen Traum enthalten habe. Derselbe weist auch darauf hin, dass in einer Urkunde aus dem Jahre 1269 ein Kleriker namens Willem in der Nähe von Hulsterlo genannt wird. Dieser Ort kommt in unserem Epos (V. 2576,77) selbst vor, zwar nicht ein Dorf, sondern ein Gebüsch bezeichnend:

"int oostende van Vlandren staet
een bosch, ende heet Hulsterlo."

Noch an zwei anderen Stellen wird seiner Erwähnung getan (2584 und 2667). Dort, behauptet Reinaert, habe er seinen Schatz vergraben und er beschreibt den Platz sehr deutlich. Es ist also möglich, dass in dieser Gegend des Dichters Wiege gestanden hat. Dass er aus Flandern stammt, unterliegt keinem Zweifel. Das beweist nicht nur seine Sprache, sondern er zeigt sich auch genau mit den dortigen Örtlichkeiten vertraut. Sodann scheint der Vers 2255:

ende quam in Waes, int soete lant

anzudeuten, dass das Land von Waes zwischen Gent und Antwerpen ihm besonders teuer gewesen sein muss.¹ Auch der Stand eines "clericus" kann ganz gut der unseres Dichters

1. Diese Folgerung über Willems Heimat und Stand ist natürlich nur unter der Voraussetzung zulässig, dass diese Verse von Willem herstammen. Sonst müsste man das soeben Gesagte auf Arnout beziehen und ihn für einen Ostflämen halten, was ja auch leicht der Fall gewesen sein kann.

gewesen sein. Auch andere mittelniederländische Poeten sind "clerke" gewesen, d.h. Geistliche ohne die Weihen, die sich nicht der Kirche widmeten, sondern als Schreiber in den Dienst der Vornehmen oder Städte traten. Ebenso bietet die Jahreszahl 1269 nichts Unwahrscheinliches dar, denn die Anspielung in Maerlants Rijmbibel auf "Reinaerts boerden" stammt aus dem Jahre 1270. Sonach wäre es möglich, dass dieser "Wilhelmus clericus" unser Dichter ist.¹ Dies ist aber alles, was sich von ihm behaupten lässt.

Der Reinaert muss also vor 1270 geschrieben sein, er kann aber auch nicht sehr viel früher verfasst worden sein, da die französische Quelle selbst erst aus dem Anfang des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts stammt. Martin nimmt kurz vor 1250 an, worin ihm Jonckbloet in seiner "Geschiedenis der mnl. Letterkunde" beistimmt.

Diese Quelle ist die zwanzigste Branche des "Roman de Renart" in Méons, die erste in Martins Ausgabe, aus welcher Arnout-Willem ihren Stoff geschöpft haben.² Martin in seiner Einleitung zum flämischen Epos (X XVIII ff.) hat beide Werke genau mit einander verglichen, indem er die entsprechenden Stellen aus dem altfranzösischen Werke abdruckt. Wir sehen daraus, dass Arnout und Willem mehr als blosse Übersetzer sind. Nicht nur lassen sie Unwesentliches und Ungeeignetes weg, sondern sie fügen auch Selbsterdachtes oder Züge aus andern Abenteuern hinzu, wo es ihnen zur Motivierung nötig schien. Arnouts oder Willems Eigentum ist z.B. die Art und Weise, wie Bruun, der Bär, aus dem Bauernhofe entkommt, in den ihn Reinaert verräterischer Weise geführt hat. Der Fläme dichtet noch einen Haufen Weiber hinzu, die herbeieilen, um den Bären zu töten. Er lässt nun Bruun mitten unter sie springen und solchen Schrecken erregen, dass Julocke, des Pfarrers Frau, und einige andere Weiber ins Wasser fallen. Während man nun damit beschäftigt ist sie herauszufischen, und aller Aufmerksamkeit auf ihre Rettung gerichtet ist, macht sich der Bär die Gelegenheit zunutze und entflieht. Ebenso hat der niederländische Dichter den Schatz des Gotenkönigs Ermanerich (des coninx Hermelinx scat, V. 2239) ein-

1. Vgl. Buitenrust Hetteema II, LXXXIX.

2. W. Knorr: Die zwanzigste Branche des Roman de Renart und ihre Nachbildungen. Eutin 1866, 26 ff.

geführt. Im Roman de Renart begnadigt der König, durch die Bitten Grimbeerts, des Dachses, der ein Neffe Reinaerts ist, erweicht, unerwartet den Angeklagten. Im niederländischen Gedichte macht die Aussicht auf den Schatz, den der Fuchs dem Könige zu verschaffen verspricht, des letztern plötzliche Gesinnungsänderung plausibel; auch können wir jetzt verstehen, warum Reinaerts Feinde in Ungnade fallen. Überhaupt ist die ganze Beichte Reinaerts, in welcher der Schatz eine so grosse Rolle spielt, ein Meisterwerk seiner Art, dem sich aus dem französischen Text nichts gleichstellen lässt.

Arnout-Willems Werk enthält nur die Hofhaltung, Anklage, Vorladung, Reinaerts Beichte, Ankunft bei Hofe, Verteidigungsrede in Gestalt einer zweiten Beichte, erheuchelte Romfahrt, Freisprechung durch den König, Überlistung des Hasen und Widders und schliesst mit einer Rehabilitierung der verurteilten Feinde Reinaerts sowie einer Achterklärung gegen den letzteren und den Widder und seine Familie. Für die Beliebtheit des Gedichtes spricht nicht nur eine lateinische Übersetzung in Distichen von einem Mönche Baldwin, vor 1280 angefertigt,¹ sondern auch die Umarbeitung und Fortsetzung, die es von einem unbekannten Dichter² erfuhr, und welche unter dem Namen: Reinaerts historie oder Reinaert II bekannt ist. Der Dichter war wahrscheinlich ein Klerke wie Willem. Aus Anspielungen auf historische Persönlichkeiten und Zeitereignisse lässt sich folgern, dass er gegen das Ende des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts³ sein Gedicht verfasste und zwar in West-Flandern, in der Umgegend von Brügge. Es besteht einmal aus der Umarbeitung von Arnout-Willems Reinaert, sodann aus einer erweiterten Wiederholung desselben, der Méons vier und zwanzigste Branche zu Grunde liegt. Daneben hat der Verfasser, wie Martin S. XLIV zeigt, reichlichen Gebrauch von Calfstoffs und Noydekijns Esopet, d.h. der niederländischen Bearbeitung des Romulus, gemacht, auch einige Züge den Bestiarien, d.h., Tierschilderungen mit theologischen Vergleichen, entnommen und Eignes hinzugefügt. Die Fort-

1. Hrg. M. F. A. G. Campbell als Reinardus vulpes, Haag 1859, W. Knorr, Eutin 1860. Vgl. Martin, a. a. O. S. XVIII, XIX.

2. Abged. bei Martin, S. 107 ff.

3. Martin, a. a. O. S. XXII setzt als Entstehungszeit "kurz nach 1278" fest, was augenscheinlich ein Druckfehler ist.

setzung ist keine Verbesserung vom ältern Werke. Eine didaktisch-satirische Tendenz drängt sich zu sehr in den Vordergrund, ebenso die Sucht des Dichters mit seiner Belesenheit und Gelehrsamkeit zu glänzen. Die Satire ist in seinen Händen zu persönlichen Ausfällen auf die Missbräuche in Kirche, Hof und Gesellschaft gebraucht, welche mit Spott und Hohn überschüttet werden.

Eine vorzügliche Kritik gibt von ihm und seinem Gedichte J. W. Muller¹ in einer Studie, in der er folgendes sagt: "Ein originaler, schöpferischer, genialer Künstler war der Dichter von Reinaert II sicher nicht; selbst erfunden hat er sehr wenig, meistens hat er seinen Vorsänger oder andere französische, deutsche und lateinische Fabelsammlungen geplündert und ist ihnen mehr oder minder sklavisch nachgefolgt. Die Gabe die verschiedenen Teile seiner Erzählung zusammenzustellen, sie zu einem Ganzen zu vereinigen und darin Einheit zu bringen, kann man ihm auch nicht zuschreiben. Im Gegenteil, durch die vielen, in die Fortsetzung eingeschalteten selbständigen Fabeln, die oft in sehr losem Zusammenhang mit der Haupthandlung stehen, wurde die Einheit des Ganzen so sehr gestört, dass dies sehr ungünstig auf den Eindruck wirkt, den das Gedicht als Ganzes macht."

"Sein Verhältnis zum Tierepos ist von dem Willems verschieden. Für den letzteren ist die epische Erzählung Hauptsache, die feine witzige Anspielung auf die Menschenwelt Nebensache; für den Umarbeiter ist zwar die Erzählung nichts Untergeordnetes, aber doch mehr ein Mittel; der Hauptzweck ist: Belehrung, Moral, Satire. Der objectiv-epische Ton ist einem subjectiv-didaktischen gewichen; der Bearbeiter ist nicht naiv, im Gegenteil, im höchsten Grade selbstbewusst. Die Subjectivität des alten Dichters beschränkt sich auf die allgemeinen, im mittelalterlichen Epos gewohnten Formeln; der Umarbeiter stellt seine eigene Person auf ganz andere Weise in den Vordergrund, d.h. er ist viel individueller. Mehrmals fällt er aus der Rolle, legt seine Bühnenmaske als Erzähler ab und setzt sich unter das Publikum, um zu kritisieren, zu philosophieren, oder schlimmer, vor dem Publikum eine Predigt zu halten. . . Soviel über

1. J. W. Muller: *De oude en de jongere bewerking van den Reinaert*, Amsterdam 1884, S. 193 ff.

seine Moralisationen. Seine Satire richtet sich gegen die Strömungen und Sitten seiner Zeit: zuerst gegen die Bösewichter, die Schmeichler und Lügner, dann die Mystik und die Missbräuche der Kirche, und endlich gegen die Städter, deswegen gegen den Verfall der Sitten, vor allem unter Geistlichkeit und Bürgerschaft."

Muller geht dann dazu über des Dichters Neigung seine Gelehrsamkeit zur Schau zu stellen, zu kritisieren, sowie seine Sucht den Stoff zu erweitern und auszuschmücken. Was seine Verkunst anbelangt, so hält er sie für besser als die Willems.

Gerade dies Prangen mit Gelehrsamkeit, dieses Hervortreten der Didaktik waren es, welche dem Reinaert II einen grossen Erfolg und Einfluss verschafften, denn darin entsprach er vollständig dem Geschmack des vierzehnten, fünfzehnten und sechzehnten Jahrhunderts, zu welcher Zeit die Didaktik in den Niederlanden bereits in voller Blüte stand. So kam es, dass, während Arnout-Willems Meisterwerk der Vergessenheit anheimfiel, seines Überarbeiters Gedicht sich noch lange grosser Popularität erfreute. Zeugnis dafür ist einmal die Auflösung desselben in Prosa, die uns in zwei Drucken, Gouda 1479 und Delft 1485, vorliegt, sodann, wenn ich mich so ausdrücken darf, eine Modernisierung des Reinaert II mit Beibehaltung der metrischen Form, welche wahrscheinlich 1487 in Antwerpen aufgelegt wurde. Wir müssen bei diesen Werken etwas länger verweilen. Dem Druck von Gouda 1479¹ folgt die englische Übersetzung, die bereits 1481 bei Caxton in London erschien,² und welche ihrerseits wieder die Grundlage der oft gedruckten englischen Volksbücher von "Reynard the Fox" ist. Von dem Delfter Druck veranstaltete Suhl 1783 in Lübeck eine Ausgabe.

Der Druck des gereimten Reinaert, Antwerpen 1487, übertrifft jedoch die Prosaauflösung bei weitem an Bedeutung, denn auf denselben geht der niederdeutsche Reinke Vos zurück. Leider besitzen wir nur wenige Bruchstücke von diesem Reinaert, welche nach dem ersten Herausgeber, Senator Cule-

1. Neudruck von J. W. Muller en H. Logeman: Die Historie van Reynaert die Vos, Zwolle 1892. Vgl. E. Martin, Zt. f. d. Alt. 1893.

2. Neudruck von E. Arber, London 1878 und 1892, ebd. (Quaritch). Vgl. Fijn van Draat, Engl. Studien XX XIII, 182-186.

mann, die Culemannschen Bruchstücke genannt werden.¹ Dieser Druck des Reinaert II—Gedichtes bietet mehrere interessante Neuheiten: (1) Der Text scheint nicht allenthalben derselbe zu sein wie der der älteren Vorlage, wie Prien a.a.O. in seiner Anmerkung zu V. 3247 klarlegt; (2) das Gedicht ist in Bücher und Kapitel eingeteilt und jedes Kapitel mit Überschriften versehen;² (3) es enthält eine prosaische Glosse, d.h. Moralisationen über jedes Abenteuer oder Lehren, die man aus demselben zu ziehen habe. Diese Glosse finden wir in einem niederländischen Volksbuch wieder, das 1564 in Antwerpen erschien, welches aber zu gleicher Zeit den Text der Delfter Prosaauflösung von 1485 abdruckt. Der Name des Glossators und Neubearbeiters ist uns überliefert. In der Vorrede des niederdeutschen "Reinke de vos" heisst es nämlich: "ick Hinrek van Alekmer, scholemester vnde tuchtlehrer des eddelen, dogentliken vorsten vnde heren hertogen van Lotryngen, vmme bede wyllen mynes gnedyghen heren, hebbe dyt yeghenwerdyge boek vth walscher vnde franszösescher sprake ghesocht vnde vmmeghesath in dudesche sprake" etc., etc.³ Lange Zeit hat man nun diesen Hinrek für den Verfasser des "Reinke de vos" gehalten und dabei ganz übersehen, wie unwahrscheinlich es sein würde, dass ein Niederländer ein niederdeutsches Buch schriebe. Die Tatsache ist, dass der Bearbeiter des niederdeutschen Gedichtes einfach auch die Vorrede seiner niederländischen Vorlage übersetzte und drucken liess.

Wer ist nun dieser Hinrek? Jacob Grimm⁴ und andere haben an einen Mann dieses Namens gedacht, der "urkundlich 1477 und 1481 erwähnt wird, und welcher aus Utrecht verwiesen und wieder in die Stadt aufgenommen wurde." Grimm meint, "es sei möglich dass er, weil er später in Utrecht nicht wieder auftritt, mit Philippa von Egmond, Tochter Herzog Adolfs von Geldern, die sich 1485 dem Renat 2, Herzog von Lothringen vermählte, in lothringische Dienste ging, und den seit 1486 gebornen herzoglichen Kindern als Lehrer zugegeben wurde. Leicht konnte Renat, seiner niederländischen Ge-

1. Wieder abgedruckt von Prien: Reinke de vos, Altdeutsche Textbibliothek No. 8, S. 267 ff., Halle 1887.

2. Vgl. Prien: Zur Vorgeschichte des Reinke Vos in Paul und Braunes Beitr. VIII, S. 1 ff.

3. Prien: Reinke de vos, S. 3, 4.

4. A. a. O., S. CLXXVI.

mahlin zu Liebe, die Söhne in dieser Sprache unterweisen lassen und die neue Bearbeitung des berühmten Werks wünschen." Grimm übersah aber dabei, dass Alckmers Buch wahrscheinlich schon 1487 gedruckt worden ist, also kaum für den Unterricht eines einjährigen Prinzen beabsichtigt gewesen sein kann. Muller¹ macht es wahrscheinlich, dass der urkundlich nachgewiesene Hendrik van Alkmaar nicht mit dem Glossator identisch ist. Wir sind deswegen über seine Persönlichkeit noch im Unklaren. Auch aus den geringen Bruchstücken, die uns vom Druck erhalten sind, lässt sich nichts über ihn folgern. Das ganze Buch wird vielleicht nie ans Tageslicht kommen, da es 1570 durch Alba und die Universität Löwen verboten und zerstört wurde.

Besser daran sind wir mit dem niederdeutschen "Reinke Vos." Der erste Druck stammt aus Lübeck 1498.² Ein zweiter aus Rostock 1517. In beiden ist die Glosse, die mit der Alckmerschen verglichen, erweitert zu sein scheint, vom katholischen Standpunkt abgefasst. Man spricht deswegen von "Reinke Vos" mit der katholischen Glosse. Der Verfasser kann, wie wir gesehen haben, nicht Hinrek sein. Rollenhagen in der Vorrede zu seinem "Froschmäuseler" 1595 nannte als denselben den mecklenburgischen Sekretär Nicolaus Baumann. Zarneke³ bewies die Falschheit dieser Behauptung und verwies auf den Rostocker Buchdrucker Hermann Barkhusen, ohne jedoch imstande zu sein überzeugende Beweise dafür beizubringen. Bieling⁴ sieht in ihm einen Ordensgeistlichen in Lübeck, nach welchem Platze auch die veränderten Angaben von Örtlichkeiten hinweisen.⁵

Der "Reinke Vos" ist das Hauptdenkmal der niederdeutschen Literatur. Grimm⁶ gibt zwar zu, dass er "ein gefüges, reinliches und bei der sonstigen Armut sächsischer Poesie um diese Zeit ein hervorragendes Werk ist; allein den Reiz eines Originals, meint er, oder was dem beinahe gleichkäme einer sehr freien, dichterischen Behandlung büsst sie so vollkommen ein, dass sie zu jenen ältern Gedichten, vorzüglich dem Mako-

1. Tijdschrift van de Matschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde, VII S. 251 ff.

2. Hrsgb. von Hoffmann v. Fallersleben 1834, Lübben 1867, Schröder 1872, Prien 1887.

3. Zt. f. d. Alt. IX, S. 374 ff.

4. Die Reineke-Fuchs-Glosse, Berlin, Prog. 1884.

5. Martin, a.a.O. S. XXIII.

6. A. a. O., S. CL XVI.

tischen gehalten, im einzelnen überall schwächer und geringer erscheint." Eine genauere Vergleichen ergibt aber, dass der Bearbeiter nicht sklavisch seiner Quelle folgte, sondern durch Zusammenziehungen und Zusätze in vielen Fällen das Original verbesserte. Vom Inhalte aber abgesehen, dem ganzen Werke ist Leben eingebläht, es ist mehr abgerundet und zu gleicher Zeit naiver, zu Herzen gehender als seine Vorlage. Und dies ist der Grund, warum es solchen Eindruck machen konnte, warum es die Geister der deutschen Nation, wie Goethe zum Beispiel, sowohl wie die Massen des Volkes anziehen konnte. Und dass dies der Fall ist beweist einmal des Altmeisters Epos, sodann die grosse Anzahl von Drucken und Bearbeitungen, die bis in die neueste Zeit das volkstümliche Interesse an dem Werke bezeugen.¹

Im Jahre 1539 wurde die Glosse vom Standpunkt der Protestanten aus bearbeitet, und dieser Rostocker Druck erfreute sich, wegen seiner Angriffe auf die katholische Kirche, in diesen Zeiten der Reformation einer grossen Popularität. Vergrössert wurde dieselbe noch durch eine Übertragung ins Hochdeutsche, einer nicht sehr glaubhaften Notiz zufolge von Michael Beuther, der auch lateinische Epigramme verfasst hat, die 1544 in Frankfurt erschienen. Aus dieser hochdeutschen Übersetzung stammt einerseits eine Umarbeitung aus dem Jahre 1650, welche dem Geschmack der damaligen Zeit Rechnung trägt und unter dem Einfluss von Opitz und den damaligen in Blüte stehenden Sprachgesellschaften verfasst ist. Prien nennt sie die Zesenianische Bearbeitung, nach Phil. von Zesen, dem Gründer der Deutschgesinnten Genossenschaft in Hamburg. Auf sie geht ein sehr beliebtes und oft gedrucktes Volksbuch zurück. Andererseits wurde die hochdeutsche Übertragung von 1544 durch Hartmann Schopper in lat. Jamben übersetzt (Frankfurt a.M., 1567), nach der eine englische anonyme bei John Nutt, London 1706, erschien.

Dass auch im achtzehnten Jahrhundert die Vorliebe für den Reinke Vos nicht erkaltet war, zeigt Gottscheds Ausgabe des Lübecker Textes vom J. 1498 mit Hinzufügung der katholischen und protestantischen Glossen und einer Umsetzung des Textes in hochdeutsche Prosa, Leipzig und Amsterdam,

2. Vgl. die Bibliographie bei Prien, a.a.O. S. XXIV ff. u. L. Fränkel: Zur Reineke-Fuchs-Bibliog. Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen 7, 99-101.

1752. Bieling, der einen Neudruck davon mit Ausschluss der Glossen veranstaltete,¹ rühmt Gottsched nach, dass er in seiner historisch-kritischen Einleitung eine für damalige Zeit erstaunliche Gelehrsamkeit zeigt und Fragen bespricht, "welche für das Tierepos überhaupt und den Reinke Vos insbesondere in Betracht kommen."

Gottscheds Übersetzung, mit den schönen Kupfern Everdingens geschmückt, zog Goethes Aufmerksamkeit auf sich. Aus dem Jahre 1782 erfahren wir, dass der Altmeister Stellen aus derselben der Herzogin Amalie vorgelesen, und ein Jahr später, als Knebel ihm mitteilt, dass er für ihn ein Exemplar auf einer Auktion gekauft habe, schreibt er an Frau von Stein, "dass ich den Reinike Fuchs kriege freut mich kindisch." Aber erst Anfang 1793 ging er an die Bearbeitung desselben, "dieser unheiligen Weltbibel," wie er ihn selbst nennt, den niederdeutschen Reinke Vos und, in viel grösserem Masse, Gottscheds Text zu Grunde legend. Die Veranlassung war sein Verdruss über die revolutionären Bewegungen der Zeit, namentlich über das Misslingen des Feldzuges nach Frankreich und die Hinrichtung Ludwigs des Sechzehnten. So schreibt er in der "Campagne in Frankreich": "Aber auch aus diesem grässlichen Unheil suchte ich mich zu retten, indem ich die ganze Welt für nichtswürdig erklärte, wobei mir denn durch eine besondere Fügung Reineke Fuchs in die Hände kam. Hatte ich mich bisher an Strassen, - Markt - und Pöbelauftritten bis zum Abscheu übersättigen müssen, so war es nun wirklich erheiternd in den Hof- und Regentenspiegel zu blicken; denn wenn auch hier das Menschengeschlecht sich in seiner ungeheuchelten Tierheit ganz natürlich vorträgt, so geht doch alles, wo nicht musterhaft, doch heiter zu, und nirgends fühlt sich der gute Humor gestört. Um nun das köstliche Werk recht innig zu geniessen, begann ich alsbald eine treue Nachbildung."

So lautet Goethes Bericht. Die Arbeit ging aber nicht schnell vonstatten, denn das Metrum—der Dichter hatte sich entschlossen den Hexameter, der ihm ungewohnt war—anzuwenden, machte ihm viele Schwierigkeiten, und die Korrektur der Verse, die er mitten im Kriegsgetümmel bei der Belagerung von Mainz vornahm, war zeitraubend. Erst gegen

1. Gottscheds *Reineke Fuchs*, Halle 1886.

Ende des Jahres schreibt er an Jacobi: "Reineke Fuchs naht sich der Druckerpresse. Ich hoffe, er soll Dich unterhalten. Es macht mir noch viel Mühe, dem Verse die Aisance und Zierlichkeit zu geben, die er haben muss. Wäre das Leben nicht so kurz, ich liesse ihn noch eine Weile liegen, so mag er aber gehen, dass ich ihn loswerde." Im Jahre 1794 erschien denn auch das Werk als zweiter Band von des Dichters neuen Schriften.¹

Die Aufnahme, die das Gedicht fand, war eine geteilte, und auch bei neuern Literaturhistorikern begegnen wir mancher nicht ganz zustimmenden Kritik. Vergleichen wir sein Werk, z.B. mit Arnout-Willems Epos, das allerdings nicht seine direkte Vorlage gewesen, so senkt sich, glaube ich, die Wagschale sehr zu Gunsten der alten flämischen Dichter. Der letzteren Werk, hat man gesagt, mutet uns wie ein anspruchsloser Waldquell an, dessen klares Wasser uns zum Verweilen einladet und Erquickung verheisst, Goethes wie ein stolzer Springbrunnen, mit hochaufschliessenden schillernden Strahlen, deren unruhiges Spiel uns aber nicht dauernd zu fesseln vermag. Mit diesem Vergleich hat man meiner Meinung nach beide Epen trefflichst charakterisiert.


Auch auf unsere Zeit übt der Reineke Fuchs noch dieselbe Anziehungskraft aus, neue Ausgaben und Bearbeitungen legen Zeugnis dafür ab und beweisen, wie gross die der alten Sage innewohnende Kraft ist.

Das beifolgende Diagramm zeigt vielleicht deutlicher als die Einleitung die Entwicklung, die die Reineke-Fuchssage von Arnout bis zu Goethe durchgemacht hat.

Was meine Übersetzung anbelangt, so bin ich bemüht gewesen so wörtlich wie möglich mich dem Original anzuschliessen, um einen Begriff von dem frischen Humor, der entzückenden Naivität und der derben Originalität der flämischen Dichter zu geben. Nur an ein oder zwei Stellen schien es geboten den Text zu modifizieren, da die Ansichten über den Anstand im dreizehnten Jahrhundert von den unsrigen sehr verschieden waren.

Zu Grunde gelegt ist Ernst Martins Text, Paderborn 1874.

¹ 1. Abdruck von A. Bieling, Berlin 1882. M. Lange: Goethes Quellen u. Hilfsmittel bei der Bearbeitung des R. F. Progr., Dresden 1888.



II

“Vor Jahrhunderten hätte ein Dichter dieses gesungen?

Wie ist das möglich? Der Stoff ist ja von gestern und heut.”

(Goethe, 1796.)

Willem, welcher den Madoc gedichtet, wegen welcher Arbeit er oft bis tief in die Nacht gewacht hat, ihn hat es so sehr verdrossen, dass Reinaerts Abenteuer (die er hier vollständig geschildert) auf deutsch unbearbeitet geblieben sind, dass er nach dessen Lebensbeschreibung suchte und sie nach welschen Büchern in die deutsche Sprache umzudichten begonnen hat. Gott möge uns seine Hilfe gönnen! Nun kommt mir in den Sinn, gleich am Anfang, die bürgerlichen sowohl wie die törichten Menschen zu ersuchen, wenn sie dazu kommen, diese Reime und Worte, die ihnen unnütz zu hören sind, zu vernehmen, dieselben ungetadelt zu lassen. Zu sehr gleichen diese Menschen dem Raben, der immer ein frecher Patron ist: Sie tadeln solche Verse, von denen sie nichts mehr wissen, als ich weiss, wie diejenigen heissen, die jetzt in Babylonien wohnen. Sie täten wohl sich dieses Tadels zu begeben. Ich dichte nicht aus eigenem Antrieb. Mein Dichten wäre unterlassen worden, hätte mich nicht eine gewisse Dame, die sich gerne höfischer Sitte befleissigt, darum gebeten. Sie ersuchte mich diese Geschichte von Reinaert zu verfassen. Obschon ich die Murrköpfe, Töpel und Toren schelte, will ich doch, dass diejenigen sie hören und richtig auffassen, die gerne der Ehre pflegen und die danach streben höfisch zu leben, ob sie nun arm oder reich sind. Nun hört, wie ich hier beginne.

Es war an einem Pfingsttage, da Busch und Hag mit grünem Laub bedeckt waren. König Nobel hatte überall einen Hoftag ausrufen lassen,¹ den er zu grossem Ruhme zu halten gedachte, wenn es ihm damit glücken sollte. Da kamen zu des

1. Die Rechtsgebräuche, wie sie im alten deutschen Staatsleben herrschten, haben Arnout-Willem mit grossem Geschick und historischer Treue auf den Staat der Tiere übertragen, so dass auch in dieser Hinsicht das Epos von grossem Interesse ist. Auf diese einzelnen Züge, z.B. dass der Hoftag in früheren Zeiten häufig an einem der hohen Kirchenfeste abgehalten wurde, dass der Kläger in Begleitung seiner Verwandten, die als Eideshelfer dienten, vor Gericht erschien (V. 62.), dass Kläger und Angeklagter sich nicht in der ringförmigen Versammlung setzen durften, sondern stehen mussten (V. 171), dass der Reinigungseid auf eine Reliquie abgelegt wurde (V. 82), dass für diejenigen, die sich zum Gericht begaben, Königsfrieden und Königsgeleite galt (V. 140) etc., etc., hat A. F. H. Geyder in den Anmerkungen zu seiner metrischen Übersetzung des Reinaert (Breslau 1844) hingewiesen. Vgl. C. Wiesner: Über einige deutsche Rechtsaltertümer in Willems Gedicht Van den v. R., Progr. Breslau, 1892.

Königs Hofe alle Tiere, gross und klein, mit der einzigen Ausnahme von Reinaert, dem Fuchs. Dieser hatte zu viele Missethaten bei Hofe begangen, so dass er nicht dorthin zu gehen wagte. Wer sich schuldig weiss, hat Furcht. Dies war auch der Fall mit Reinaert, und darum scheute er des Königs Hof, wo man nicht viel Gutes von ihm sprach. Als der ganze Hof versammelt war, war niemand ausser dem Dachs da, der nicht über Reinaert, den Bösewicht mit dem roten Barte, zu klagen hätte.

Nun beginnt hier die Anklage. Isengrijn und seine Sippschaft traten vor den König hin. Isengrijn fing sogleich an und sprach: "O Herr König! Bei Eurer edlen Geburt und bei Eurer Ehre und um der Gerechtigkeit und Gnade willen, erbarmt Euch meines Schadens, den mir Reinaert zugefügt hat, und wovon ich oft grosse Schmach und schweren Verlust erlitten habe. Vor allem erbarmt Euch dessentwegen, dass er mein Weib zur Hure gemacht und meine Kinder so übel zugerichtet hat, indem er sie in ihrer Lagerstätte beseichte, so dass zwei von ihnen ihr Augenlicht verloren haben und starblind geworden sind. Später brachte er mich noch mehr in Schande. Es war dahin gekommen, dass ein Tag festgesetzt war, an dem Reinaert seine Unschuld hätte beweisen sollen. Sobald aber als die Reliquien gebracht waren, wurde er andern Sinnes und floh von uns nach seiner Burg. O Herr! Die Vornehmsten, die hierher zu Hofe gekommen sind, wissen noch, dass Reinaert, das boshafte Tier, mir so viel zuleide getan hat, dass (und ich bin hiervon fest überzeugt), wenn alles Tuch, welches man jetzt in Gent¹ macht, Pergament wäre, ich es nicht darauf schreiben könnte. Trotzdem schweige ich davon. Nur meines Weibes Schmach kann nicht übersehen, noch verschwiegen oder ungerächt bleiben."

Als Isengrijn dies gesprochen hatte, erhob sich ein Hündchen, namens Cortois, und klagte dem Könige auf französisch, wie es einst so arm gewesen wäre, dass es in einem Winter während eines Frostes von allem Gute nichts mehr besessen hätte als eine einzige Wurst, und diese selbe Wurst habe ihm Reinaert, der Bösewicht, gestohlen und fortgenommen. Ti-beert, der Kater, der wurde ärgerlich. Also begann er seine

1. Gent war bereits früh wegen seiner Wollspinnereien und Tuchewebereien berühmt.

Rede und sprang mitten in die Gerichtsversammlung und sagte: "Herr König, weil Ihr Reinaert feindselig seid, so ist hier niemand, weder jung noch alt, der nicht bei Euch zu klagen hätte. Das, was Cortois jetzt klagt, das ist vor vielen Jahren geschehen. Die Wurst war mein, obschon ich nicht klage. Ich hatte sie durch List gewonnen, da ich bei Nacht um des Erwerbes willen in eine Mühle gelaufen kam, wo ich die Wurst einem schlafenden Müller gestohlen. Hatte Cortois irgend ein Recht darauf, so verdankte er es niemandem als mir. Mit Recht sollte die Klage, welche Cortois vorbringt, abgewiesen werden."

Pancer, der Biber, sprach: "Dünkt es Euch, Tibeert, gut, dass man die Anschuldigung zurückweise? Reinaert ist ein richtiger Mörder, Betrüger und Dieb; er hat auch niemand also lieb, sogar nicht meinen Herrn, den König, dass er nicht wünschte, dass einer Leben und Ehre verlöre, könnte er dadurch einen fetten Bissen von einer Henne bekommen. Was sprecht Ihr von der Abweisung der Klage? Beging er nicht am gestrigen Tage an Cuwaert, dem Hasen, der hier steht, die grösste Missetat, die ein Tier begangen, als er ihm, mitten im Königsfrieden und während des Königs Geleite, gelobte ihn das Glaubensbekenntnis zu lehren und er ihn zum Kaplan¹ machen sollte? Da liess er ihn sich fest zwischen die Beine setzen, und sie beide begannen gleichmässig zu buchstabieren, zu lesen und laut das Credo zu singen. Es geschah, dass ich gerade dann zu derselben Stätte zu gehen hatte. Da hörte ich ihrer beider Gesang und begab mich schnellen Schrittes dahin. Dort fand ich Meister Reinaert, der seine vorher angefangene Schullehrertätigkeit aufgegeben hatte und der sich seines alten Spiels bediente, indem er Cuwaert bei der Kehle gefasst hatte und ihm den Kopf abgerissen haben würde, wäre ich nicht zufällig gerade in dem Augenblick ihm zu Hilfe gekommen. Seht hier noch die frische Wunde und die Narbe, Herr König, die Cuwaert von ihm empfing. Lasset Ihr ungerächt, dass Euer Friede auf solche Weise gebrochen wird, strafet Ihr nicht dem Urteil Eurer Mannen gemäss, so wird man es Euren Kindern noch später über Jahr und Tag vorwerfen." "Bei Gott, Pancer, Ihr sprecht wahr," sagte Isen-

1. Vielleicht ein Ausfall auf die Geistlichen, deren Unwissenheit dadurch blosgestellt wird, dass der Dichter andeutet, die Kenntnis des Credo allein genüge, um irgendeinen Laien zum Kaplan zu machen. Vgl. Buitenrust Hettema II, Anmk. zu 143.

grijn von seinem Standorte aus. "Wäre Reinaert tot, das wäre uns gut, so wahr mir Gott mein Leben erhalte. Wird ihm dies jedoch vergeben, so wird er binnen Mondesfrist noch Schande über manchen bringen, der sich dessen nicht vermutet."

Da sprang Grimbeert, der Dachs, der Reinaerts Brudersohn war, auf und sprach zorniglich: "Herr Isengrijn, man weiss das wohl und es lautet ein altes Sprichwort: Feindes Mund spricht selten Gutes. Hört und gebt auf meine Rede acht: Ich wollte, der hinge wie ein Dieb bei seiner Kehle an einem Baume, der andern das grösste Leid zugefügt hat. Herr Isengrijn, wollt Ihr Sühne verlangen und dieselbe annehmen, so will ich gerne dabei helfen. Mein Ohm soll sie auch nicht verweigern. Und der am schlimmsten den andern behandelt hat, soll dem andern Busse leisten, gleichviel ob es mein Oheim ist oder ob Ihr es seid. Mein Ohm kommt zwar jetzt nicht um anzuklagen: Stünde er aber bei Hofe in Gunst und würde er vom Könige wie Ihr, Herr Isengrijn, geehrt, es würde den König nicht gut dünken, wenn Ihr dafür unangegriffen bliebet, dass Ihr oftmals sein Fell mit Euren scharfen Zähnen zerzaust habt, was er nimmer ahnden konnte."

Isengrijn sprach: "Habt Ihr von Eurem Oheim so augenscheinlich lügen gelernt?" "Nein," antwortete der Dachs, "ich habe nicht gelogen, Ihr habt gar oft meinen Ohm auf mannigfaltige Weise zum Narren gehabt. Ihr betrogt ihn hinsichtlich der Steinbutten, die er Euch von dem Karren zuwarf, da Ihr ihm von ferne folgtet und Ihr die beste auflaset. Nachdem Ihr euch gesättigt hattet, gabt ihr ihm weiter nichts als eine einzige Gräte, die Ihr ihm entgegenbrachtetet, weil Ihr sie nicht essen mochtet. Später brachtetet Ihr ihn wegen einer Speckseite in Schande, die fett und von gutem Geschmacke war. Die tatet ihr in Euren Rachen. Da Reinaert seinen Anteil heischte, erwidertet Ihr ihm voll Hohn: 'Euren Teil will ich Euch gerne geben, Reinaert, schöner Jüngling. Der Strang, an dem die Speckseite hing, der ist schön fett, benagt den.' Reinaert hatte wenig Vorteil davon, dass er die fette Speckseite mit so viel Gefahr erworben, weil ein Mann ihn fing und in seinen Sack steckte. Diese Pein und dieses Unge- mach hat er durch Isengrijn erlitten und noch hundertmal mehr Qualen.

"Ihr Herren, dünkt Euch das genug? Dennoch gibt es

noch mehr Ungebühr, über welche er wegen seiner Frau klagt, die meinen Oheim ihr ganzes Leben geliebt hat, wie auch er sie. Obschon sie es nicht bekannt machten, wage ich es doch als wahr zu behaupten, dass es länger als sieben Jahre her ist, dass Reinaert ihre Liebeszusage empfing. Dass Haersint, das schöne Weib, aus Liebe und wegen schlimmen Benehmens, sich Reinaerts Willen fügte, was schadet das? Sie genas bald von seiner Umarmung. Warum so viel Redens davon machen? Nun bringt Herr Cuwaert, der Hase, eine Klage vor, die rein gar nichts bedeutet. Wenn er das Credo nicht gut las, durfte nicht Reinaert, der sein Lehrer war, seinen Schüler durchprügeln? Das wäre wahrhaftig unrecht. Cortois klagt über eine Wurst, die er während eines Frostes verloren hätte. Diese Klage bliebe besser ungeäussert. Hörtet Ihr, dass sie gestohlen war? *Male quesite male perдите.*¹ Von Rechts wegen wird man auf üble Weise los, was man auf üble Weise gewonnen hat. Wer kann Reinaert das verübeln, wenn er sich gestohlenen Gutes bemächtigte? Niemand kann ihm das Recht nehmen.

“Reinaert ist ein gerechter Mann. Denn, seitdem der König Bann und Frieden verkündet hat, hat er nichts, ich weiss es wohl, verbrochen, gleichsam als ob er Eremit oder Klausner wäre. Auf seiner Haut trägt er ein härnes Gewand. Während des letzten Jahres hat er weder wildes noch zahmes Fleisch gegessen. Malcrois, seine Burg, hat er verlassen und sich eine Klausen gebaut, in der er wohnt. Ich weiss wohl, dass er keinen andern Erwerb, noch andere Einnahmen hat, als die Almosen, die man ihm gibt. Bleich und mager ist er von den Leiden geworden. Hunger, Durst und strenge Kasteiungen erduldet er für seine Sünden.”

Gerade als Grimbeert in dieser Erzählung begriffen war, sah man vom Berge herab Canticleer sich nähern, der auf einer Bahre eine tote Henne, namens Coppe, herbeibrachte, welcher Reinaert Kropf und Hals abgebissen hatte. Der König musste dies natürlich erfahren. Canticleer, heftig mit seinen Flügeln schlagend, kam vorangegangen. Zu jeder Seite der Bahre schritt ein weitberühmter Hahn; der eine hiess Cantaert,

1. Dieses falsche Latein ist natürlich ein Scherz des Dichters, den allerdings der Überarbeiter nicht gesehen und deswegen die richtigen Formen 'quaesit' und 'perdidit' substituiert hat, Reinaert II, V, 269.—Vgl. auch V. 1451, wo die lateinischen Eingangsworte der Beichte auf scherzhafte Weise verdreht sind.

nach dem einst der gute Hahn der Frau Alente¹ genannt worden war; des andern Name war, meiner Meinung nach, Craiant, und er war der schönste Gockel, den man zwischen Portaengen² und Polen finden konnte. Jeder von diesen Hähnen trug eine brennende Kerze, die lang und aufrecht war. Dies waren der Coppe zwei Brüder, die "o weh und ach" riefen. Um den Tod ihrer Schwester erhoben sie Klage und grosses Jammergeschrei. Pinte und Sproete trugen die Bahre; ihnen war wegen ihrer Schwester, die sie verloren, das Gemüt schwer. Schon von weitem konnte man ihr Wehklagen hören. Auf solche Weise kamen sie in die Gerichtsversammlung gezogen.

Canticleer sprang in den Kreis und sagte: "Um Gottes und der Gnade willen, erbarmt Euch meines Schadens, den Reinaert mir zugefügt hat und meinen hier stehenden Kindern zu ihrem grossen Leidwesen. Es war im Anfange des April, als der Winter verflossen war, und man überall auf den grünen Feldern die Blumen blühen sah; da war ich kühn und stolz auf mein grosses Geschlecht. Ich hatte acht junge Söhne und sieben schöne Töchter, voll von Lebenslust, die mir Rode, die Kluge, als eine einzige Brut geschenkt hatte. Sie waren alle fett und stark und stolzierten in einem mit einer Mauer umfassten Park herum. Da drinnen stand eine Scheuer; dahin gehörten auch viele Hunde. Weil sie manches böse Tier zerissen, deshalb waren meine Kinder ohne Furcht. Es erregte Reinaerts Neid, dass sie da drinnen so sicher waren, so dass er keins von ihnen sich holen konnte. Denn Reinaert, der böse Nachbar, wie oft nicht ging er lauernd um die Mauer herum und stellte uns nach! Sobald ihn dann die Hunde sahen, liefen sie ihm aus voller Kraft nach. Einmal war er am Graben glücklicherweise überfallen, so dass ich ihn teuer für sein Stehlen und Rauben zahlen sah, indem ihm der Pelz stob. Trotzdem entkam er durch Trug; möge Gott ihn verfluchen! Da waren wir ihn auf lange Zeit los. Später erschien er als Eremit, der mörderische Dieb, und brachte mir einen Brief zu lesen, an dem Euer Siegel, Herr König, hing.

1. Diese Alente ist nach Geyder, S. 238, vielleicht die nicht mit Namen genannte Dame (V. 27), für die der Dichter sein Epos verfasste. Diese Annahme scheint aber unhaltbar, da doch der Prolog weiter nichts als eine feine Satire auf die Ausdrucksweise der ritterlichen Epik ist.

2. Kann kaum Portugal sein, welches V. 599 Portegale genannt wird. Es gibt auch ein Dorf Portengen in Holland. Vgl. Buitenrust Hetteema, II, S. 94.

“Da ich den Brief zu lesen begann, schien mir darin geschrieben zu stehen, dass Ihr auf königliche Weise allen Tieren und auch den Vögeln Frieden in Eurem Reiche entboten hättet. Auch brachte er mir noch die andere Neuigkeit, dass er ein Klausner sei, der sich aus der Welt zurückgezogen und wahrhaftig für seine Sünden manche Qual erlitten habe. Er zeigte mir Pilgerstab und Pilgerkleid, die er aus dem Kloster Elmare¹ mitgebracht; darunter ein rauhes härenes Gewand. Da sprach er: “Herr Canticleer, nun braucht Ihr künftighin nicht mehr auf Eurer Hut vor mir zu sein. Bei der Stola² habe ich Fleisch und Schmalz abgeschworen. Ferner bin ich so alt, dass ich an mein Seelenheil denken muss. Ich will Euch der Gnade Gottes empfehlen. Ich gehe jetzt, wo ich zu tun habe. Ich muss das Mittags- Nachmittags- und Morgengebet vom Tage³ sagen. Dann nahm er seinen Weg an einem Hag entlang und bei der Trennung las er sein Credo. Ich war froh und furchtlos, begab mich zu meinen Kindern und fühlte mich so völlig sicher, dass ich mit meiner ganzen Brut sorglos ausserhalb der Mauer spazieren ging. Da begegnete mir ein böses Abenteuer, denn Reinaert, die tückische Pest, war durch den Hag gekrochen und hatte uns von der Pforte abgeschnitten. Da ward aus der Zahl meiner Kinder eins gestohlen, welches Reinaert in seinen Ranzen steckte. Da nahte sich mir Unheil. Denn seitdem er einmal Blut geleckt, konnte uns weder Wächter noch Hund bewachen oder beschirmen. Herr, möge Euch unsere Not mit Mitleid erfüllen. Bei Tag und Nacht legte uns Reinaert einen Hinterhalt und raubte mir meine Kinder. So sehr hat sich nun ihre Zahl, wie sie zu sein pflegte, vermindert, dass die fünfzehn von ihnen bis auf vier zu Grunde gegangen sind. So reinen Tisch hat Reinaert, das Ungeheuer, gemacht, indem er sie verschlang. Noch gestern ward ihm Coppe, die weitberühmte, die hier auf der Bahre liegt, von den Hunden abgejagt. Dies klage

1. Eine Benediktiner Propstei, die zwischen Aardenburg und Biervliet lag.

2. Der Text hat, “scole,” “Die hslische Lesart hat De Vries sehr einfach und schön gebessert: “bi der stole.” Der Priester legte dem Gelobenden die beiden Enden der Stola auf den Kopf.” (Martin, Anmkg. zu V. 378.) Dass diese Emendation richtig ist, beweist Hs. f (V. 366.)

3. Der geistliche Tag wurde in sieben Zeiten geteilt (Grimm, R. F. zu V. 2983): “Matutinae im 3. Viertel der Nacht., Prima mit Sonnenaufgang; Tertia um Mittvormittag; Sexta um Mittag; Nona Mittenachmittag; Vespera 1 Stunde vor Sonnenuntergang; Completorium um Tagesschluss.” (Buitenrust Hettema II zu V 384.)

ich Euch schmerzerfüllt. Erbarmt Euch meiner, gar süsser Herr!"

Der König sprach: "Grimbeert, Euer Ohm, der Klausner geworden ist, hat ja ausgezeichnet gefastet. Lebe ich noch ein Jahr, so soll er von mir hören. Nun hört, Canticleer! Was soll es noch mehr der Worte? Eure Tochter liegt hier erschlagen (Gott möge sich ihrer Seele erbarmen!); wir können sie nicht länger bei uns behalten (Gott möge sie jetzt¹ beschirmen!) und wir müssen das Totenamt halten. Danach sollen wir sie mit grossen Ehren in die Erde versenken. Dann werden wir uns mit diesen Herren beraten und besprechen, auf welche Weise wir uns am besten an Reinaert wegen dieses Mordes rächen." Als er diese Worte gesprochen, befahl er jung und alt die Vigilien zu singen.

Was er gebot, wurde sogleich getan. Da konnte man das "Placebo domino" und die dazugehörigen Verse gar laut anstimmen hören. Ich würde auch der Wahrheit gemäss erzählen, wer da die Verse für die Seele sang und wer die Seelenmesse las, wenn es nicht zu lang wäre. Als die Vigilie beendet war, legte man Coppe in das Grab, das man mit grosser Kunst unter der Linde im Grase gegraben hatte. Von glattem Marmor war der Grabstein, der darüber lag. Die Buchstaben, die man darauf sah, liessen an dem Grabe erkennen, wer da drinnen begraben lag. Sie erzählten folgendes: "Hier ruht Coppe, die so schön scharren konnte, und welche Reinaert, der Fuchs, der ihrem Geschlechte feindselig war, zu Tode gebissen."

Nun liegt Coppe unter der Erde. Der König befahl allen seinen Getreuen sich zu besprechen, wie sie die grosse Missetat am allerbesten rächen könnten. Da beschlossen sie insgesamt dem Könige zu raten, dass er ihm entbieten solle zu Hofe zu kommen: Weder um Schaden noch um Vorteil solle Reinaert unterlassen vor Gericht zu erscheinen, und Bruun solle mit der Botschaft beauftragt werden. Dazu war der König bald entschlossen, und er sprach zu Bruun, dem Bären: "Herr Bruun, vor dieser Versammlung befehle ich Euch diese Botschaft auszurichten. Auch bitte ich Euch, dass Ihr klug seid und Euch vor Trug hütet. Reinaert ist böse und schlimm. Er wird Euch schmeicheln und belügen. Liegt es in seiner Macht,

1. Nach van Helten: alnu für al, die hslische Lesart.

wird er Euch mit falschen und schönen Worten betrügen. Kann er es, bei Gott, er wird Schande über Euch bringen." "Herr," erwiderte Bruun, "lasst Euer Zurechtweisen beiseite. Möge Gott mich vermaledeien, wenn mich Reinaert überlisten sollte. und wenn ich es ihm nicht zurückzahlte, so dass es ihm schlecht gehen solle. Sorget Euch nicht um mich." Nun nimmt er Urlaub, um bald dahin zu gelangen, wo er übel ankommen wird.

Nun befindet sich Bruun auf der Reise. In seinem Herzen schätzt er es gering, und es dünkt ihm eine Missetat, dass jemand so schlecht sein, und dass Reinaert ihn in Schande bringen sollte. Durch das Dunkel eines Waldes kam er in eine Wüste gerannt, wo Reinaert seine Pfade krumm und vielfältig getreten hatte, wann immer er um des Erwerbes willen aus dem Forste herausgelaufen war. Vor der Wüste lag ein hoher und langer Berg; mitten über diesen musste Bruun seinen Weg nehmen, um Maupertuus zu erreichen. Reinaert hatte so manches Haus, aber das Kastell Maupertuus war die beste seiner Burgen. Dorthin zog er sich zurück, wenn er in Not und Sorgen befangen war. Nun hat Bruun, der Bär, seine Reise fortgesetzt, bis er nach Maupertuus gekommen ist. Als er die Pforte bemerkte, aus der Reinaert hinauszugehen pflegte, begab er sich vor das Aussenwerk der Festung und sich auf seinen Steiss setzend, rief er: "Reinaert, seid Ihr zu Hause? Ich bin Bruun, der Bote des Königs. Dieser hat bei Gott geschworen Euch zu brechen und zu rädern, wenn Ihr nicht vor Gericht erscheinet, und ich Euch nicht mit mir bringe, damit Ihr Euch dort dem Ausspruch des Richters unterwerfet und versprechet fortan in Frieden zu leben. Reinaert, tut, wie ich Euch rate, und geht mit mir zu Hofe." Dies hörte nun alles Reinaert, der vor seiner Pforte lag, wo er häufig der warmen Sonne wegen zu liegen pflegte. An der Rede, die Bruun begonnen, erkannte ihn sogleich Reinaert, der weiter nach hinten in den dunkelsten Teil der Höhle trat. Hin und her erwog er, wie er einen Anschlag machen könnte, durch den er Bruun, den bösen Fresser, zu betrügen und seine eigene Ehre zu bewahren imstande wäre.

Nach langem Nachsinnen sagte er: "Habt Dank für Euren Rat, Herr Bruun, sehr süsser Freund. Der hat Euch einen schlechten Dienst geleistet, der Euch zu diesem Gange

riet und Euch die Fahrt über diesen langen Berg unternehmen liess. Ich würde zu Hofe gegangen sein, selbst wenn Ihr nicht den Rat gegeben hättet; aber mir ist der Bauch in so unmässiger Weise von einer fremden neuen Speise überladen, dass ich fürchte, dass ich nicht werde gehen können. Ich kann weder sitzen noch stehen; ich bin so übermässig satt." "Reinaert, was assest Du, was war es?" "Her Bruun, ich ass ärmliche Speise. Ein armer Mann, der ist kein Graf; das könnt Ihr an mir wohl merken. Wir armen Leute, wir müssen essen, (könnten wir es doch vermeiden!) was wir nicht mögen. An guten frischen Honigscheiben habe ich einen sehr grossen Vorrat. Die muss ich der Not halber essen, da ich sonst nichts bekommen kann. Ausserdem ziehe ich mir durch sie, so bald ich sie in meinem Bauche habe, Schmerzen zu und fühle mich unbehaglich." Dies hörte Bruun und sprach:

"Beim Himmel, lieber Fuchs, achtet Ihr Honig so gering? Honig ist eine süsse Speise, die ich vor allen Gerichten hochschätze und gern habe. Reinaert, helft mir sie bekommen. Edler Reinaert, süsser Neffe, solange ich am Leben bin, will ich Euch darum lieben. Helft mir sie bekommen!" "Bekommen, Bruun? Ihr habt Euren Spott mit mir." "Gewiss nicht, Reinaert; ich wäre töricht, spottete ich Eurer; nein, ich halte Euch nicht zum Narren." Reinaert sprach: "Bruun, möchtet Ihr etwas von diesem Gerichte? Wenn Ihr Honig gerne esst, bei Eurer Treue, lasst mich's wissen. Möchtet Ihr etwas davon, ich würde Euch damit satt machen. Ich werde Euch, glaubte ich damit Eure Huld zu erwerben, soviel davon verschaffen, dass Ihr mit neun andern ihn nicht essen könntet." "Selbstzehnter? Wie kann das sein? Seid dessen sicher und gewiss: Hätte ich allen Honig, den man zwischen hier und Portugal aufreiben kann, ich ässe ihn zu einer Mahlzeit auf."

Reinaert erwiderte: "Was sagt Ihr, Bruun? Ein Bauer, namens Lamfroit, wohnt hier in der Nähe, der hat wahrhaftig soviel Honig, dass Ihr ihn nicht in sieben Jahren aufässtet. Alle diese Speise würde ich Euch überliefern, Herr Bruun, wolltet Ihr mir geneigt sein und für mich bei Hofe sprechen." Da kam Bruun heran und gelobte und versicherte Reinaert, dass, wenn er ihm so viel Honig verschüfe, dass er denselben nur mit Mühe zum Frühstück verspeisen könnte, er ihm überall ein getreuer Freund und guter Gesell sein wolle. Hier-

über lachte Reinaert, der Bösewicht, und sprach: "Bruun, berühmter Held, wollte Gott, dass mir nun ein gleiches Glück zuteil würde, denn dieser Honig soll Euer werden, ob Ihr schon sieben Ohm¹ davon haben wolltet." Diese Worte waren Bruun angenehm und gefielen ihm so, dass er lachte, bis er nimmermehr konnte. Aber Reinaert dachte bei sich: "Bruun, ist mir das Glück günstig, so gedenke ich Euch noch heute dort zurückzulassen, wo Ihr nur mässig lachen werdet."

Nachdem er so alles überlegt hatte, trat Reinaert aus seiner Burg heraus und sprach laut: "Ohm Bruun, Geselle, seid willkommen. Steht es so, so sollt Ihr den Vorteil davon haben. Hier können wir nicht länger bleiben. Folgt mir, ich werde vorangehen. Wir halten uns auf diesem krummen Pfade. Noch heute sollt Ihr satt werden; wird es nach meinem Willen gehen, so sollt Ihr noch heute sicherlich soviel bekommen, wie Ihr vertragen könnt." Reinaert dachte an tüchtige Schläge; das war es, was er ihm verschaffte. Der elende Bruun wusste es nicht, worauf Reinaert mit seiner Rede zielte, der ihn Honig stehlen lehrte, was er sehr teuer bezahlen sollte. Beständig sprechend und laufend kamen so Reinaert und sein Kumpan Bruun zum Hause Lamfroits, welches an einem Zaune lag.

Wollt Ihr von Lamfroit hören? Der war, wenn es so ist, wie man mir gesagt, ein Zimmermann von gutem Rufe. An seinen Hof hatte er eine Eiche aus dem Walde gebracht, die er entzweispalten sollte, und zwei Holzkeile hatte er in sie hineingetrieben, wie Zimmerleute es noch zu tun pflegen. Die Eiche klappte weit auf, worüber Reinaert sehr froh war. Lachend sprach er zu Bruun: "Seht, wie günstig alles ist, und nehmt Eures Vorteils wohl wahr. In diesem Baume hier ist übermässig viel Honig. Versucht, ob Ihr ihn in Eure Kehle und in Euren Bauch bringen könnt. Ihr sollt Euch jedoch bezwingen, obschon Euch die Honigscheibe gut dünkt. Esset mit Mass und nicht zu viel, so dass Ihr Euch nicht krank macht; ich wäre entehrt und enterbt,² gar süsser Oheim, be-

1. Nl. aam, engl. aam oder awm, ein Flüssigkeitsmass, von verschiedner Grösse, in Amsterdam z. B.—41 Gallonen.

1. "Reinaert meint dies: Ich bin als euer Verwandter euch Treue schuldig und muss eben deshalb für euer Wohl Sorge tragen; thäte ich das nicht, brähe ich die Treue an euch, so wäre ich ehrlos. 'Wer als Treuloser überführt wird—, dem wird die Ehre abgesprochen.' Sächs. Landr. I, 40. Würde euch der Honig das Leben kosten, so könnte ich mein Erbrecht verlieren. 'Tödet einer seinen Vater oder seinen Bruder oder seinen Verwandten oder Jemanden, auf dessen Eigen oder Lehn er eine Anwartschaft hat, so geht ihm diese Anwartschaft gänzlich verloren.' Sächs. Landr. III, 85, 3." (Geyder zu 668.)

käme es Euch übel." Bruun antwortete: "Reinaert, sorget Euch nicht. Wähnt Ihr, dass ich unvernünftig bin? Masshalten ist bei jedem Dinge gut." "Ihr sprecht wahr," sprach Reinaert: "Warum bin ich auch so ängstlich? Nur zu und kriecht hinein!" Bruun dachte nur an das, was er bekommen sollte, und liess sich so betören, dass er den Kopf über die Ohren und die zwei Vorderfüsse hineinsteckte. Reinaert strengte sich an und brach beide Keile aus der Eiche. Bruun, dem er vorher so geschmeichelt, blieb im Baume gefangen. Nun hat der Neffe aus Arglist seinen Oheim in solche Lage gebracht, dass er auf keinerlei Weise, weder durch List noch durch Kraft, entkommen kann und er mit dem Kopf stecken bleibt. Was ratet ihr dem Bären zu tun? Seine Stärke und Kühnheit werden ihm nichts helfen können. Er sah wohl ein, dass er betrogen war. So begann er zu brüllen und zu heulen. Festgehalten war er an Maul und Vorderfüssen; wie er sich auch abmühte, alles war verlorene Arbeit. Flucht schien ihm unmöglich. Von fern stand Reinaert und sah Lamfroit kommen, der auf seiner Schulter eine Axt und ein Beil mit einem Widerhaken trug. Hier kann man von Reinaert hören, wie er seinen Ohm verhöhnte. "Ohm Bruun, grabt nur zu! Hier kommt Lamfroit. Er wird Euch etwas eintränken. Nachdem Ihr gegessen, solltet Ihr auch trinken."

Mit diesen Worten machte sich Reinaert auf den Weg nach seiner Burg, ohne sich zu verabschieden. Lamfroit war unterdes des Bären ansichtig geworden und bemerkte, dass er gefangen war. Unter diesen Umständen konnte der Zimmermann da nicht stehen bleiben. Fort lief er in Eile nach dem nächsten Dorfe, wo er Hilfe nahe wusste, und tat jedermann kund, dass ein Bär in einem Baume stecke. Da folgte ihm eine grosse Schar. Weder Mann noch Frau blieb im Dorfe zurück. Dem Bären sein Leben zu nehmen lief alles, was da laufen konnte. Der eine brachte einen Besen, ein anderer einen Flegel oder einen Rechen. Einige kamen von der Arbeit, so wie sie waren, mit einem Pfahl herbeigerannt. Sogar der Pfaffe brachte einen Kreuzstab aus der Kirche, den ihm der Küster nur ungern gegeben hatte. Der letztere trug eine Fahne, um damit zu stechen und zu schlagen. Des Pfaffen

Weib, Frau Julocke,¹ stürzte mit ihrem Rocken, an dem sie gesponnen hatte, herzu. Vor ihnen allen her kam im Laufschriff Lamfroit mit einer scharfen Axt. Obschon Bruun augenblicklich wenig Bequemlichkeit hatte, fürchtete er noch grösseres Ungemach und setzte alles auf einen Wurf.

Sobald er den Lärm² hörte, sprang er auf, so das er sich alle Haut vom Gesicht abschürfte. Obgleich er den Kopf mit Mühe und unter Schmerzen herausbrachte, liess er doch eins von seinen Ohren und seine beide Backen zurück. Nie hat Gott ein so scheussliches Tier erschaffen. Was hätte ihm Schlimmeres begegnen können? Den Kopf hatte er zwar freigemacht, aber ehe er die Pfoten herausziehen konnte, blieben ihm alle Krallen und die beiden Handschuhe drinnen stecken. So gelangte er mit grossem Leid aus der Haft. Wie konnte er mehr entehrt sein? Die Füsse waren ihm so wund, dass er das Laufen nicht ertragen konnte. Das Blut lief ihm über die Augen, so dass er nicht gut zu sehen imstande war. Er wagte weder zu bleiben noch zu fliehen. Vom Süden her, im vollen Sonnenlicht, sah er Lamfroit herbeieilen, ihm nach den Herrn Priester, der sich gar sehr anstrengte, hinter diesem den Küster mit der Fahne, danach alle Pfarrkinder, die alten wie die jungen Leute. Da kam an ihrer Krücke ein Weib herangehumpelt, das wegen ihres Alters kaum einen einzigen Zahn noch hatte. Wer will, nehme sich vor dem folgenden in acht: Hat einer Schaden oder Verlust oder grosses Unglück, so fällt jedermann über ihn her. Dies wurde dem armen Herrn Bruun sehr klar. Mancher bedrohte jetzt sein Fell, der stillgeschwiegen, hätte Bruun bei seinem Willen beharren können.

Es geschah diesseits eines Flusses, dass Bruun, das unseligste aller Tiere, von vielen Bauern umringt war. Auf Verhandeln liess man sich da wenig ein. Grosses Ungemach nahte sich ihm. Der eine schlug, der andere stach zu, einer hieb, ein anderer warf. Lamfroit war ihm besonders feindlich. Einer hiess Lottram Lancvoet, der trug einen Stock mit einem Horngrieff³ und stach ihm immer nach dem Auge. Frau Vul-

1. Die Tatsache, dass der Priester als verheiratet geschildert wird, zeigt, dass es der Kirche sogar noch zu dieser Zeit nicht völlig gelungen war die Priesterehen aufzuheben. Vgl. Buitrust Hettema zu V. 731.

2. "Dat geruchte," das Geschrei, welches bei der Entdeckung eines Verbrechens oder des Verbrechens erhoben wurde: vgl. wafen, Waffen, aux armes, all'arme.

3. Die Emendation von De Vries: verhoerden für verboerden hat Hs. f. (V. 772) bestätigt.

maerte kochte ihm eine ätzende Lauge mit einem Stabe. Abel Quac und die Frau Bave lagen beide auf der Erde und stritten sich um einen Stock. Ludmoer mit der langen Nase trug eine Bleikugel an einem Strick, um sie rings um sich herumzuschwingen. Ludolf mit den krummen Fingern tat sich vor allen hervor, denn er war von bester Herkunft, Lamfroit allein ausgenommen. Hughelijn mit den krummen Beinen war sein Vater, das ist wohl bekannt, und er wurde in Abstaël geboren und war der Sohn der Frau Ogherne, die alte Laternen ausbesserte.

Manch andres Weib und manch anderer Mann, mehr als ich nennen kann, verursachten Bruun grosses Ungemach, so dass ihm das Blut hinuntertröpfelte. Bruun empfing von jedem ringsum seine Bezahlung. Der Pfaffe liess den Kreuzstab in einem fort Schlag auf Schlag auf ihn regnen, und der Küster ging ihm mit der Fahne scharf zu Leibe. Lamfroit kam zur selben Zeit mit dem scharfen Beil und schlug Bruun zwischen Kopf und Nacken, so dass er ganz betäubt wurde. Infolge des Schlages sprang er auf und davon zwischen Fluss und Wald mitten in eine Schar alter Weiber und warf ein Stücker fünf in den Fluss, der da vorbeifloss und gar breit und tief war. Des Pfaffen Frau war eine von ihnen; darüber was des Pfaffen Freude sehr gering. Da er seine Frau im Wasser sah, gelüstete ihn nicht länger Bruun zu schlagen und nach ihm zu stechen. Er rief: "Edle Pfarrkinder, seht dort Frau Julocke mit Spindel und Rocken dahintreiben. Nur zu, wer ihr helfen kann! Ich gebe ihm auf Jahr und Tag volle Verzeihung und vollständigen Ablass für jede sündliche That."

Mann und Weib liessen den armen elenden Bruun für tot liegen und eilten mit Stricken und Haken zu der Stelle, wohin ihnen der Pfaffe zu laufen befahl. Während sie die Frau herauszogen, gelangte Bruun in den Fluss und entkam schwimmend ihnen allen. Die Bauern waren ärgerlich, denn sie sahen, dass ihnen Bruun entgangen war, und dass sie ihm nicht folgen konnten. Am Ufer standen sie zornentbrannt und liefen ihm mit höhnenden Worten nach. Bruun lag im Flusse, wo die stärkste Strömung war, und bat, indem er sich beständig dahintreiben liess, dass Gott den Baum verdammen und verfluchen möchte, in welchem er sein Ohr und seine beiden Backen zurückgelassen. Weiter verfluchte er das

boshafte Tier, den bösen Fuchs Reinaert, der ihn mit seinem braunen Barte so tief in die Eiche hineinkriechen liess, danach Lamfroit wegen des Stäupens, das ihm so viel Leid verursacht hatte. Derartig betend lag Bruun so lange im Wasser, bis er wohl eine halbe Meile von der Stelle, wo die Bauern zurückgeblieben, getrieben war. Er war von Schmerzen überwältigt und matt und vom Blutverlust geschwächt, so dass er eine böse Reise hatte. Da schwamm er nach dem Lande hin und kroch ans Ufer, um sich dort hinzulegen. Nie sah man irgend ein Tier oder irgend einen Mann betrübter. Jammervoll lag er da und stöhnte und holte tief Atem. Für alles dies konnte er Reinaert danken.

Nun hört, was Reinaert getan. Dieser hatte sich in der Nähe von Lamfroits Haus auf der Heide ein fettes Huhn geholt, ehe er sich weggemacht, und hatte es auf einen Berg getragen, fern von allen Wegen, wo es einsam genug war. Es gereichte ihm wohl zum Vorteil, dass niemand dieses Weges ging, durch dessen Gewalttat er seine Beute hätte aufgeben müssen. Als er das Huhn bis auf die Federn in seine Tasche gesteckt hatte, ging er auf heimlichem Pfade ins Tal hinab. Er war übermässig satt, das Wetter war schön und heiss, er war so gelaufen, dass ihm der Schweiss die Wangen niederträufelte. Deswegen lief er zum Flusse, um sich abzukühlen. Vielfältige Freude bewegte sein Herz. Er hoffte ganz sicher, dass Lamfroit den Bären totgeschlagen und nach Hause getragen hätte. Da sprach er: "Es ist mir wohl ergangen. Der mir am meisten bei Hofe schaden konnte, den habe ich am heutigen Tage töten lassen. Gleichwohl glaube ich ohne Anklage und Missgunst zu bleiben. Mit Recht kann ich mich der Freude hingeben."

Während Reinaert so sprach, schaute er ins Tal hinab und sah Bruun dort liegen. Sobald er ihn wahrnahm, ward er voll Leid und Zorn, (wo Fröhlichkeit zuvor herrschte, erblickte man jetzt Wut und Neid). Und er sprach: "Vermaledeit sei Dein Herz, Lamfroit. Du bist dümmer als ein Schwein, Du Sohn einer schlimmen Metze. An wenig Ehren bist Du gewöhnt. Wie ist Dir nur dieser Bär entgangen, der vorher Dein Gefangner war? Wie mancher Bissen war an ihm, den manch einer gerne essen würde. O weh, Lamfroit, elender

Kunde, was für ein kostbares Bärenfell hast Du heute verloren, das Du bereits in Händen hattest."

Nachdem Reinaert mit dem Schelten fertig war, ging er zur Strasse hinab, um zu sehen, wie es mit Bruun bestellt sei. Als er den armen Bären ganz blutig, siech und krank nun da liegen sah (Reinaert bemerkte das voll Freude), da verhöhnte er ihn nach Herzenslust: "Sire Priester, dieu vos saut! Kennt Ihr Reinaert, den Strolch? Wollt Ihn ihn schauen, so seht ihn hier, den roten Bösewicht, den boshaften gierigen Kerl! Sagt mir, Priester, süsser Freund, bei dem Herrn, dem Ihr dient, in welchen Mönchsorden wollt Ihr eintreten, dass Ihr eine rote Kapuze tragt? Was von beiden seid Ihr, Abt oder Prior? Der hatte es auf Eure Ohren abgesehen, der Euch diese Tonsur geschoren hat. Ihr habt Euren Schopf verloren und Eure Handschuhe abgezogen: Ich glaube, Ihr wollt Euer Abendgebet singen gehen?" Bruun hörte dies und ward betrübt, denn er konnte sich da nicht rächen. Ihn deuchte, das Herz würde ihm bersten; daher warf er sich schnell in den Fluss. Er wollte die Spottreden des boshaften Tiers nicht weiter anhören. Er liess sich sogleich flussabwärts von der Strömung treiben und kroch dann heraus, um am Ufer zu liegen.

Wie soll Bruun nun zu Hofe kommen? Hätte es ihm die ganze Welt verschaffen können, er hätte nicht auf seinen Füssen gehen können. Er war so unsanft in die Eiche hineingestossen worden, wo er kurz vorher alle Krallen und das Fell von seinen Vorderfüssen verloren hatte. Er konnte sich nicht recht denken, wie er am besten zum Könige gelangen könne. Nun hört, auf welche Weise er die Fahrt unternahm: Er setzte sich auf seine Hinterbacken und begann mit grosser Scham auf seinem Steiss entlangzurutschen und, als er dessen müde wurde, rollte er sich sodann eine Zeitlang weiter. So bewegte er sich mehr als eine Meile vorwärts, ehe er an des Königs Hof kam. Da man dort Bruun auf diese Weise von ferne nahen sah, wurde von einigen angezweifelt, was da so herangewälzt käme. Dem Könige, der Bruun sogleich erkannte, ward trübe zu Mute, und er sprach: "Es ist mein Diener Bruun, ihm ist der Kopf so rot, er ist bis auf den Tod verwundet. Ach Gott, wer hat ihn so entstellt?" Indessen hatte sich Bruun genähert, so dass er beim Könige seine Klage vorbringen konnte. Er stöhnte, seufzte tief und sagte: "Kö-

nig, edler Herr, rächet mich um Eurer eignen Ehre willen an Reinaert, dem bösen Tier, der mich durch seine Arglist meine schönen Wangen und meine Ohren verlieren liess und mich so, wie Ihr seht, zugerichtet hat." Der König antwortete: "Wenn ich dies nicht räche, möge ich verdammt sein!" Und darauf berief er alle Vornehmsten, jeden bei Namen, und befahl, dass sie alle insgesamt zu einer Beratung kämen und ihm vorschlugen, wie diese Tat zu des Königs Ehre am besten gerächt werden könnte. Da rieten dort die meisten Herren, dass man mit Genehmigung des Königs Reinaert zweimal vor Gericht fordern und Anklage und Verteidigung hören solle. Auch sagten sie, sie wünschten wohl, dass Tibeert, der Kater, der Überbringer der Botschaft sein möchte. Obgleich er schwach sei, sei er doch klug. Dieser Rat dünkte den König gut.

Da sprach der König: "Herr Tibeert, geht, und ehe Ihr zurückkehrt, seht zu, dass Reinaert mit Euch komme. Einige von den Herren sagen, dass er, trotzdem er den andern Tieren so feindselig ist, so viel Vertrauen zu Euch hat, dass er gerne nach Eurem Rate handelt. Kommt er nicht, so geht es ihm schlecht, denn dann soll man ihn, allen seinen Verwandten zur Schmach, ohne Prozess hängen. Geht, Tibeert, und sagt ihm dies." "Ach Herr," erwiderte Tibeert, "ich bin ein armer Wicht, ein kleines Tier. Herr Bruun, der stark und stolz war, konnte Reinaert nicht überreden; auf welche Weise soll ich es denn beginnen?" Da sprach der König: "Ihr seid weise und sehr gelehrt. Ob Ihr gleich nicht gross seid, was macht das? Es gibt manchen, der mit List und gutem Rate etwas ausführen kann, was er mit Stärke nie hätte tun können. Geht und tut sogleich nach meinem Gebot." Tibeert antwortete: "Nun helfe Gott, dass es mir gut ergehen möge. Ich soll eine Fahrt bestehen, die mir mein Gemüt beschwert. Gott gebe, dass sie gut ausfalle!"

Nun muss Tibeert, voller Betrübniß und Angst, die Reise unternehmen. Als er auf den Weg kam, sah er von ferne den Sankt Martins Vogel¹ dahergeflogen kommen. Da ward er froh und freudigen Mutes und rief: "All Heil, edler Vogel! Kehre Deinen Flug hierher und fliege mir zur Rechten."

1. "Sente Martijns voghel;" Grimm Myth.3 1084 hat die frühere Deutung auf die Krähe abgelehnt und auf den *falco cyaneus* hingewiesen, einen kleinen Raubvogel, der nnl. S. Martens vogel, frz. l'oiseau S. Martin genannt wird. (Martin, Anmk. zu 1047.)

Der Vogel aber flog zu einem Walde, in welchem er sich ergehen wollte, und flog zur Linken.

Dieses Vorzeichen und dieser Angang deuchten Tibeert nicht gut. Hätte er den Vogel hübsch zu seiner rechten Seite vorbeipassieren sehen, so, glaubte er, würde er gutes Glück haben. Nun war er dieser Hoffnung gänzlich beraubt. Trotzdem machte er sich selber Mut und benahm sich, wie es mancher tut, tapferer als ihm zu Mute war. So trabte er ruhigen Schrittes dahin, bis er nach Maupertuus kam, wo er Reinaert in seinem Hause allein und übermütig fand. Tibeert sprach: "Gott, der Reiche, möge Euch einen schönen Abend bescheren. Der König bedroht Euch an Eurem Leben, wenn Ihr nicht mit mir an den Hof kommt." Reinaert erwiderte: "Tibeert, mein Neffe, Ihr freier Held, seid mir willkommen. Gott gebe Euch Ehre und Vorteil." Was kosten Reinaert schöne Worte? Obschon seine Zunge schön spricht, das Herz in seinem Innern ist böse. Dies wird sich an Tibeert in aller kürzester Zeit¹ deutlich zeigen. Gleichzeitig sprach Reinaert: "Neffe, ich wünsche, dass Ihr zur Nacht bei mir herbergt, und morgen bei Tagesanbruch machen wir uns auf den Weg. Ich habe unter allen meinen Verwandten keinen, Tibeert, auf den ich mich mehr verlasse als auf Euch. Bruun, der Fresser, war hierher gekommen; er zeigte aber ein so boshafte Benehmen und er kam mir so riesig stark vor, dass ich nicht um tausend Mark die Reise mit ihm unternommen hätte. Das werde ich mit Euch ganz sicher tun, morgen früh, wenn die Sonne aufgeht." Tibeert sagte darauf: "Es wäre besser und scheint mir klüger gehandelt, wenn wir noch heute Abend zu Hof gingen, als dass wir bis morgen warteten. Der Mond auf der Heide scheint so hell wie der Tag. Ich wähne, eine bessere Zeit zu unsrer Fahrt hat man nie gesehen." "Nein, lieber Neffe," sprach Reinaert; "mancher könnte uns bei Tage begegnen, der uns anreden und grüssen würde, der uns aber nichts Gutes antun würde, stiesse er während der Nacht auf uns. Deswegen verbringt den Abend bei mir."

Tibeert antwortete: "Was würden wir essen, Reinaert, wenn ich hier bliebe?" "Darum mache ich mir Sorgen, lieber Neffe. Hier herrscht Mangel an Speisen. Ihr könnt, wenn Ihr es begehrt, ein Stück von einer Honigscheibe essen, die

1. Wörtlich: "ehe die Zeile zu Ende gelesen wird," übertriebene Ausdrucksweise.

über die Massen wohlschmeckend ist. Was sagt Ihr, wollt Ihr etwas Honig?" Tibeert sagte: "Ich mache mir nichts daraus. Habt Ihr sonst nichts im Hause, Reinaert? Würdet Ihr mir eine fette Maus geben, so würde ich Euch in Ruhe lassen." "Eine fette Maus?" sprach Reinaert, "süßer Neffe, was sagt Ihr? Hier in der Nähe wohnt ein Pfaffe, bei dessen Haus eine Scheuer steht, in der es viele fette Mäuse gibt. Ich glaube, ein Wagen trüge sie nicht. Wie oft nicht höre ich den Pfaffen klagen, dass sie ihn aus dem Hause treiben." "Reinaert, gibt es wirklich dort so fette Mäuse? Gebe Gott, dass ich jetzt da wäre!" "Tibeert," sagte dieser, "sprecht Ihr die Wahrheit? Wollt Ihr Mäuse?" "Ob ich sie will? Reinaert, schweigt davon; Mäuse esse ich über alles gerne. Wisst Ihr nicht, dass Mäuse besser als irgend ein Wildbret schmecken? Wollt Ihr mir den Gefallen tun und mich dahin bringen, wo sie sind, so könntet ihr dadurch meine Huld erlangen, ob Ihr schon meinen Vater und mein ganzes Geschlecht getötet hättet."

Reinaert sprach: "Treibt Ihr Spott mit mir?" "Nicht ich, Reinaert, so wahr mir Gott helfe." "Weiss Gott, Tibeert, wüsste ich das, Ihr solltet noch heute Abend da satt werden." "Satt? Reinaert, das wäre viel." "Tibeert, das sagt Ihr zum Scherz." "Ich sage es nicht, Reinaert, bei allem, was mir heilig ist.¹ Hätte ich eine Maus, und wäre sie fett, ich gäbe sie nicht um ein Goldstück dahin." "Tibeert, geht sogleich mit mir. Ich führe Euch geradezu an die Stätte, wo ich Euch mit Mäusebraten satt machen werde, ehe ich von Euch scheide." Reinaert, ich ginge bei solchem Geleite und unter solcher Bedingung mit Euch bis nach Montpellier."² "So gehen wir denn; wir haben uns schon zu lange verweilt," sprach Reinaert.

So machten sie sich auf den Weg und liefen, wohin sie laufen wollten, und hielten nicht eher die Zügel an, als bis sie zu des Pfaffen Scheune gekommen waren, die ganz ringsum von einem Erdwall eingeschlossen war. Dort war Reinaert nur jüngst vorher eingebrochen, wodurch der Pfaffe einen Hahn verloren, den er ihm gestohlen hatte. Darüber war des Pfaffen Sohn, Martinet, zornig und ärgerlich, und er hatte vor

1. Wörtlich "bei meinem Glauben, meiner Religion."

2. Montpellier, bereits früh als Universität berühmt, wird hier wegen seiner fernen Lage erwähnt.

das Loch eine Schlinge gelegt, um darin den Fuchs zu fangen. Auf diese Weise wollte er den Hahn rächen. Dies wusste Reinaert, das böse Tier, und sprach: "Neffe Tibeert, kriecht hier in dieses Loch hinein. Seid nicht träge und lässig, Ihr müsst überall herumgreifen. Hört, wie die Mäuse pfeifen. Kommt wieder heraus, wenn Ihr satt seid. Ich werde hier vor dem Loche bleiben und Euch hier draussen erwarten. Heute Abend können wir nicht abreisen, morgen aber gehen wir zu Hofe. Tibeert, seht zu, dass Ihr nicht zögert; geht Euch sättigen, und dann lasst uns mit Ehren nach meiner Herberge zurückkehren. Meine Frau soll uns gut empfangen." "Soll ich zu diesem Loche hinein? Was meint Ihr, Reinaert? Ist das Euer Rat? Die Pfaffen sind voller Trug, ich habe sehr ungern mit ihnen zu tun." "Ach, Tibeert, warum seid Ihr blöde? Woher kam Eurem Herzen dieser Wankelmuth?" Tibeert schämte sich und sprang dort hinein, wo ihm grosses Unheil widerfuhr, denn ehe er es wusste, sass ihm der Strick fest um den Hals. Auf solche Weise brachte Reinaert Schande über seinen Gast.

Als Tibeert des Strickes gewahr ward, ängstigte er sich und sprang vorwärts; da zog sich die Schlinge zu. Tibeert konnte nicht anders, er musste rufen und notgedrungenerweise verriet er sich. Er erhob ein so grosses Geschrei und benahm sich so jammervoll, dass es Reinaert draussen auf der Strasse, wo er allein stand, hörte, und er rief: "Findet Ihr sie gut und fett, die Mäuse, lieber Tibeert? Wüsste Martinet nun, dass Ihr Euch zu Tische gesetzt und dieses Wildbret ässet, welches Ihr, ich weiss nicht auf welche Weise, verzehrt, er würde Euch eine Tunke dazu machen; ein so höflicher Knappe ist Martinet. Tibeert, Ihr singet je länger je besser. Pflegt man das am königlichen Hofe zu tun? Gebe Gott, der allmächtig ist, dass Isengrijn, der schlimme Dieb, der Mörder, bei Euch und in eben solcher Freude wäre, wie Ihr es seid!" So hat Reinaert grosses Vergnügen an Tibeerts Missgeschick. Und Tibeert stand gefangen und gellte so laut, dass Martinet erwachte. Dieser rief: "Ha, Gott sei Dank! Meine Schlinge hat nicht umsonst gelegen. Ich habe mit ihr, wie ich glaube, den Hühnerdieb festgenommen. Nun zu! Wir wollen ihn für den Hahn bezahlen."

Sogleich eilte er zum Feuer,¹ zündete schnell einen Stroh-
wisch an, weckte Vater, Mutter und alle Kinder und rief:
"Drauf los! Er ist gefangen" Da konnte man alle, die in
dem Hause waren, schnell dahinlaufen sehen. Selbst der
Pfaffe wollte nicht zögern, aus dem Bette sprang er splitter-
nackt. Martinet, der war zu Tibeert gerannt und rief: "Hier
ist er." Der Pfaffe eilte ans Feuer und erhaschte seines Weibes
Spinnrocken. Frau Julocke nahm eine Opferkerze und steckte
sie in Eile an. Der Pfaffe rannte so nahe wie möglich zu Tibeert
und begann mit dem Rocken loszuschlagen. Da musste
Tibeert manche Schläge aushalten und alle auf einmal. Der
Pfaffe stand, wie er wohl spürte, ganz nackt da und regnete
auf den vor ihm liegenden Tibeert Schlag auf Schlag. Keiner
von ihnen schonte ihn. Martinet erfasste einen Stein und
warf Tibeert ein Auge aus. Der Pfaffe, nackt bis auf die Haut,
holte zu einem mächtigen Schläge aus; als Tibeert sah, dass
er auf jeden Fall sterben musste, handelte er einigermaßen
wie die Kühnen, welche Tat dem Pfaffen zu Schad und Schan-
den ausfallen sollte. Sowohl mit den Krallen wie mit den
Zähnen.....verwundete er so
schwer den Pfaffen, dass dieser in Ohnmacht fiel und zu Bette
gebracht werden musste, während Frau Julocke in lautes
Wehklagen ausbrach.....Inzwischen schlug
Reinaert allein den Weg nach Hause ein und liess Tibeert in
grosser Furcht und Sorge vor dem Tode zurück. Obschon
Tibeert in mächtiger Angst war, fing er doch, als er alle um den
Pfaffen, der verwundet daniederlag, beschäftigt sah, sich
abzumühen an, so dass er mit seinen Zähnen den Strick mitten
entzweibiss. Da wollte er nicht länger zögern, sprang wieder
aus dem Loche heraus und begab sich auf die rechte Strasse,
die nach des Königs Hofe zu lag. Ehe er dahin kam, war es
Tag, und die Sonne begann aufzugehen. Wie ein armer
Kranker erschien bei Hofe Tibeert, der in des Priesters Hause
erhalten hatte, worüber er lange klagen kann. Als der König
sah, dass er ein Auge verloren, konnte man da schreckliche
Drohungen gegen den Dieb Reinaert äussern hören. Der
König wartete nicht länger, sondern berief seine Barone zur
Ratsversammlung und fragte, was er am besten gegen Reinaerts

1. Der Text lautet: "Met desen wart hi toten viere," wo "werden" als Verb der
Bewegung noch seinen Ursprung vom lat. *vertere* zeigt; vgl. "he worth upon his steed
gray" (mounted, Chaucer.)

frevelhaftes Benehmen täte. Gar mancher Rat ward da gegeben, wie Reinaert, der dies Verbrechen begangen, zur Verantwortung gezogen werden könnte.

Da sprach Grimbeert, der Dachs, der Reinaerts Brudersohn war: "Ihr Herren, Ihr seid nicht um Rat verlegen. Selbst wenn mein Oheim doppelt so schlimm wäre, sollte man doch freies Recht weiter gelten lassen. Man soll ihn dreimal vor Gericht fordern, wie man es mit einem freien Manne tut.¹ Und kommt er dann nicht, so ist er all der Verbrechen schuldig, deren er hier vor dem Könige von diesen Herren beschuldigt wird." "Wer soll es sein, Grimbeert, der ihn vors Gericht bringt?" sprach der König, "wer ist hier, der willens wäre sein Auge oder seine Backe des bösen Geschöpfes wegen aufs Spiel zu setzen? Ich wähne, hier ist keiner so dumm." Grimbeert erwiderte: "So helfe mir Gott: Seht mich hier, ich bin so kühn, dass ich es zu unternehmen wage diese Botschaft auszurichten, wenn Ihr es gebietet." "Grimbeert, geht, seid klug und hütet Euch vor Unglück." "Herr König, Ihr könnt Euch auf mich verlassen."

So macht sich Grimbeert auf den Weg nach Maupertuus. Als er dort ankam, fand er seinen Ohm und Frau Ermeline zu Hause, die bei ihren Jungen im unterirdischen Gange lagen. Sobald Grimbeert konnte, begrüßte er seinen Oheim und seine Muhme mit folgenden Worten: "Sollte Euch das Unrecht nicht verdriessen, in welchem Ihr Euch befindet? Dünkt es Euch nicht an der Zeit, Ohm Reinaert, an den königlichen Hof zu ziehen, wo schwere Anklagen Eurer warten? Ihr seid dreimal vor Gericht gefordert. Versäumt Ihr den morgigen Tag, so Sorge ich, dass Euch keine Gnade zuteil werden kann. Am dritten Tage werdet Ihr sehen, dass man Eure Burg Maupertuus bestürmt und Galgen oder Rad² vor Eurem Hause aufrichtet. Als wahr sage ich Euch dies: "Eure Kinder sowohl wie Eure Frau werden ganz sicher auf schmachvolle Weise ihr Leben verlieren. Ihr selbst könnt nicht entkommen.

1. "Dieser dritte Tag ist keine müßige Erfindung des Dichters. 'Hat sich Jemand eines mit 60 Pfund zu büßenden Verbrechens schuldig gemacht, so soll er in seinem Hause vorgeladen werden; hat er keines, so wird er in der Gerichtsversammlung vorgeladen, und kommt er innerhalb drei Tage nicht, so ist er für überführt zu achten.' Verordnung für Gent 1178. Den einer Tödtung Beschuldigten ladet der Gerichtsbote mit drei Schöffen vor, dass er sich innerhalb dreier Tage vor Gericht stellen solle.' Keure von Gent von 1192. Auf gleiche Weise wird der der Notzucht Beschuldigte vorgeladen." (Geyder zu 1380.)

1. Die Strafe des Rades bestand darin, dass der Verbrecher mit einem Rade zerstoßen, sein Leichnam durch die neun oder zehn Speichen des Rades geflochten und so auf einem Pfahle befestigt wurde. Grimm Rechtsalt. 688.

Drum seid Ihr am besten beraten, wenn Ihr mit mir an den Hof geht. Es ist zweifelhaft, wie es enden mag. Euch ist manchmal schon ein sonderbares Glück zugestossen, so dass Ihr doch noch, von ihnen allen befreit, mit der Erlaubnis des Königs morgen vom Hofe scheiden möget."

Reinaert sagte: "Ihr sprecht wahr. Freilich komme ich da unter des Königs Diener; die ich dort am Hofe finde, sind alle auf mich erzürnt. Entschlüpfe ich, es wäre ein Glück. Dennoch dünkt es mich besser mit Euch zu Hofe zu fahren (ich werde mich retten, wenn es möglich ist), als dass hier alles, Kastell, Frau, Kinder und mein eignes Leben obendrein verloren wären. Ich kann dem Könige nicht entgehen. Wie Ihr wollt, ich will gehen." "Frau Hermeline, hört;" sagte er, "ich empfehle Euch meine Kinder, und dass Ihr sie mir während meiner Abwesenheit gut pflegt. Vor allen andern empfehle ich Euch meinen Sohn Reinaerdijn. Gut stehen ihm die Barthaare rings um sein Mäulchen. Ich hoffe, er wird mir nacharten. Hier ist Rossel, ein schöner Taugenichts; den habe ich gleichwohl so lieb, wie nur jemand seine Kinder liebhaben kann. Wenn es schon nicht anders sein kann, dass ich von hinnen muss, so werde ich es mir zur Pflicht machen, wenn möglich, zu entschlüpfen. Neffe Grimbeert, Gott möge Euch dafür belohnen." Mit schönen und höflichen Worten nahm Reinaert von den Seinen Abschied und verliess seinen Hof. Ach, wie betrübt blieben Frau Hermeline und ihre kleinen Jungen zurück, als Reinaert von Maupertuus schied und Haus und Hof so unversorgt hinter sich liess. Nun hört, was Reinaert tat.

Sobald er auf die Heide kam, sagte er zu Grimbeert: "Schöner und süsser Neffe, vor Sorgen seufze und bebe ich. Höre sogleich auf meine Worte, ich will Dir hier beichten; kein anderer ist hier nahe, der ein Geistlicher ist. Habe ich die Beichte getan, so wird meine Seele um so reiner sein, wie auch meine Sachen endigen mögen." Grimbeert antwortete darauf: "Ohm, wollt Ihr beichten, so müsst Ihr sofort Raub und Diebstahl abschwören, oder es hilft Euch nicht im geringsten." "Ich weiss das wohl," sprach Reinaert. "Grimbeert, nun horcht und gebt mir Rat.¹ Ich komme zu Euch um Gnade

1. Siehe Jonckbloet im Wörterverzeichnis unter "vandet mi gheraden." Ebenso Buitrust Hetteema unter "gheraden."

wegen aller meiner sämtlichen Missetaten. Nun hört, Grimbeert, und versteht mich recht: "Confiteor pater mater,¹ dass ich die Otter, den Kater und alle Tiere übel behandelt habe. Davon will ich mich durch die Beichte reinwaschen." Grimbeert sprach: "Ohm, sprecht Ihr Welsch? Wenn Ihr etwa wünscht, dass ich es verstehen soll, sprecht Deutsch zu mir." Da sagte Reinaert: "Ich habe mich an allen Tieren, die jetzt leben, vergangen. Bittet Gott, dass er es mir vergeben möge. Ich machte meinem Oheim Bruun seinen Schopf ganz blutig. Tibeert lehrte ich Mäuse in des Pfaffen Haus fangen, wo er in die Falle ging und ich ihn durchprügeln liess. Canticleer und seinen Kindern habe ich grosses Unheil zugefügt. Gleichviel, ob sie grösser oder kleiner an Zahl waren, oft nahm ich sie weg. Mit Recht verklagt er den Fuchs. Selbst der König ist vor mir nicht sicher gewesen. Auch ihm habe ich Leid und der Königin Schande angetan, so dass sie spät soviel Ehrenbezeugungen von mir verwinden werden. Auch habe ich, das beichte ich Dir, Grimbeert, mehr Leute betrogen, als ich Dir würde sagen können. Und Isengrijn, höret das, nannte ich aus List Oheim. Ich machte ihn zum Mönch in Elmare, in welches Kloster wir beide eingetreten waren. Das ist gar zu sehr zu seinem Leide ausgeschlagen. Ich band ihm seine beiden Füsse ans Glockenseil. Das Läuten gefiel ihm da so sehr, dass er es auf jeden Fall lernen wollte. Das endigte für ihn schmachvoll, denn er läutete so übermässig, dass alle, die auf der Strasse gingen oder in Elmare waren, glaubten, dass es der Teufel wäre, und dorthin liefen, wo sie das Läuten hörten. Ehe er in kurzen Worten sagen konnte 'ich will Mönch werden', hatten sie ihm beinahe das Leben genommen. Darauf schor ich ihm die Tonsur; sein ganzes Leben soll er daran denken; das weiss ich wohl, dass es wahr ist: ich brannte ihm das Haar ab, so dass sich ihm die Kopfhaut zusammenzog. Später tat ich ihm noch mehr Schimpf auf dem Eise an, wo ich ihn fischen lehrte, und wo er nicht entwischen konnte, ohne viele Schläge bekommen zu haben. Darauf führte ich ihn eines Tages in das Haus des Priesters von Amblois. Im ganzen Lande Vermandois² lebte kein reicherer Pfaffe. Dieser Geistliche besass einen Speicher, in welchem manche fette

1. Vgl. Anmerkung S. 26.

2. Landschaft in Nordfrankreich.

Schinken hingen; die gaben mir oft einen guten Schmaus. Unter diesem Speicher hatte ich heimlich ein Loch gegraben. In das liess ich Isengrijn hineinkriechen. Da fand er Rindfleisch in Kufen und viele Schinken hängen. Von dieser Speise liess er so übermässig viel durch seine Kehle gleiten, dass sein leidiger Bauch, als er wieder notgedrungenweise durch das Loch zurückzukehren beabsichtigte, so geschwollen war, dass er seinen Gewinnst beklagte. Wo er hungrig hineingekommen war, konnte er satt nicht heraus. Ich lief ins Dorf, machte grossen Lärm und schlug Alarm. Nun hört, was ich da fertig brachte.

"Ich rannte dorthin, wo der Priester zu Tische sass und ass. Dieser hatte einen Kapaun, den besten, den man im ganzen Lande finden konnte. Der war gewöhnt aus der Hand zu fressen.¹

"Den nahm ich in meinen Mund vor der Tafel, wo er stand, wenn schon der Pfaffe es da sah. Da rief der Pfaffe: 'Man fange und schlage ihn! Hilfe, wer sah je solch ein Wunder? Der Fuchs kommt und beraubt mich vor meinen Augen in meinem eignen Hause. So helfe mir Sancta Spiritus;² desto schlimmer für ihn, dass er hierher kam. Das Tischmesser ergriff er und stechend traf er den Tisch, dass er weit über mich und sehr hoch mitten auf den Flur flog. Er fluchte sehr, schwor und rief laut: 'Man schlage und fange ihn.' Und ich voran und er hinterher. Sein Tischmesser hatte er aufgehoben und trieb mich vor sich hin bis zu der Stelle, wo Isengrijn war. Ich hatte das Huhn, das sehr gross und schwer war, in meinem Munde. Das musste ich fallen lassen, ob es mir lieb oder leid war. Da rief der Pfaffe: 'Ei, Herr Dieb, Ihr müsst den Raub hier lassen.' Und ich ging meines Weges und dorthin, wo ich sein wollte. Als der Pfaffe das Huhn auf-

2. Der Text lautet: "hi was ghewent al toter hant," eine unklare Stelle, die der Umarbeiter des Reinaert (II) ausgelassen hat. Geyder in seiner Übersetzung nimmt an, dass der Kapaun gebraten (so auch im niederdeutschen Epos, bei Gottsched und bei Goethe) auf dem Tische stand, und verdeutscht den Vers durch "der lag ihm gerade vor der Hand." Gegen diese Auffassung lassen sich aber die folgenden Gründe vorbringen: (1) Zwischen V. 1530, 31 steht ein Punkt, also ein neuer Gedanke ist aufgenommen: Der Pfaffe sass an seiner Tafel und ass. Der Pfaffe hatte einen Kapaun. (2) In den V. 1532, 33 wird von dem K. als "dem besten, den man im ganzen Lande finden konnte" gesprochen, welche Worte sich doch schwerlich im Stil des Tierepos auf einen gebratenen beziehen lassen. (3) V. 1536 sagt "vor der Tafel, wo er stand;" das heisst doch, der Hahn stand neben dem Tisch.—Jonckbloet gibt "ghewent" durch "gekeerd," Martin durch "gewöhn't" wieder. Ebenso Buitenrust Hettema zu 1537.

1. Grimm, Einlgt. XCV: "Eigenthümlich, aber ganz im Geiste des Volks, das kein Latein verstand und vortönende Wörter der Liturgie in heilige personifizierte, erscheint hier . . . eine sancta Spiritus, grade so sainte Esperite Renart 3631.

zuheben im Begriffe war, bemerkte er Isengrijn. Da nahte sich diesem grosses Missgeschick.

“Er warf ihm das Messer ins Auge. Dem Pfaffen folgten sechs andere, die alle mit grossen Stäben kamen, und als sie Isengrijn sahen, machten sie einen grossen Lärm; und die Nachbarn kamen heraus und sagten einander die grosse Neuigkeit, dass in des Pfaffen Speicher ein Wolf gefangen sei, der sich mit seinem Bauch im Loch festgerannt habe. Als die Nachbarn dies erfuhren, eilten sie, das Wunder zu schauen. Allda ward Isengrijn zerbläut, dass es schlimm für ihn wurde, denn tapfer schlug man auf ihn zu und warf nach ihm. Dorthin kamen auch die Kinder aus dem Dorfe und verbanden ihm die Augen. Es war so weit mit ihm gekommen, dass er es aushalten musste. So sehr schlugen und stachen sie, dass sie ihn aus dem Loche zogen (da erlitt er viel Unglück) und banden ihm einen Stein um den Hals. Dann liessen sie ihn frei und zeigten ihn sogleich den Hunden, welche ihn anbellten und jagten. Auch bediente man ihn solange mit einer Tracht Prügel, bis dass er erschöpft war. Da fiel er aufs Gras nieder, als ob er ganz tot sei. Da war der Kinder Freude gross; dort herrschte gewaltiger Lärm. Sie legten ihn auf eine Bahre und trugen ihn mit grossem Geschrei über Stock und Stein.

“Die ganze Nacht blieb er in einem Graben ausserhalb des Dorfes liegen. Ich weiss nicht, auf welche Weise er entkam. Später brachte ich zustande, dass er mir völlig seine Huld auf ein Jahr zuschwor und zwar mit dem Beding, dass ich ihn mit Hühnern satt machen sollte. Da führte ich ihn an eine Stätte, wo ich ihm zu verstehen gab, dass zwei Hennen und ein Hahn in einem grossen Hause an einer Strasse auf einem Hahnenbalken¹ bei einer Falltüre sassen. Dort liess ich Isengrijn mit mir auf das Haus hinaufklettern. Ich sagte, ich könne ihm versprechen, wenn er in die Falltür kriechen wolle, dass er Behagen an fetten Hühnern haben würde. Lachend ging er zur Falltür und kroch mit Gefahr hinein und begann in allen Richtungen herumzutasten. Als er nichts fand, sprach er: ‘Neffe, ich bin ein wenig in Furcht, ich finde hier keine Spur von ihnen.’ Ich sagte: ‘Ohm, was ist Euch geschehen? Kriecht ein wenig tiefer hinein; wenn man etwas bekommen

1. Der Hahnenbalken ist der höchste Querbalken unter dem Dache, wo der Haushahn zu sitzen pflegt.

will, muss man sich ordentlich abmühen. Die da vorne sassen, habe ich weggenommen.' So liess er sich betören die Hühner zu weit zu suchen. Ich sah, dass ich Schande über ihn bringen konnte, und gab ihm einen Stoss, dass er von oben herab auf den Flur sauste und so laut hinschlug, dass die im Hause Schlafenden überall aufsprangen. Die, welche bei dem Feuer lagen, riefen, dass irgend etwas im Hause, sie wüssten nicht was, durch den Kamin gefallen sei. Sie erhoben sich und machten Licht. Als sie ihn dann sahen, verwundeten sie ihn bis auf den Tod.—Ich habe ihn in manche Not gebracht, mehr als ich sagen kann. Von allem ferner, was ich ihm je antat, betrübt mich nichts so sehr, als dass ich Frau Haerswende, sein schönes Weib, verraten habe, die er lieber als sein Leben hatte. Ihr fügte ich zu, was besser unterblieben als geschehen wäre." Grimbeert sprach: "Wenn Ihr mir offen beichten und von Euren Sünden frei sein wollt, so solltet Ihr geradeheraus sprechen. Ich weiss nicht, worauf Ihr mit den Worten: 'Ich habe an seinem Weibe gefrevelt' hinzielt. Ohm, das kann ich nicht verstehen, was Ihr damit meint." Reinaert sprach: "Neffe Grimbeert, wäre die Artigkeit gross, wenn ich ganz unverblümt gesagt hätte: "Ich habe bei meiner Muhme geschlafen? Ihr seid mein Verwandter; Euch würde es verdriessen, wenn ich irgendeine Gemeinheit sagte. Grimbeert, nun habe ich Euch alles mitgeteilt, woran ich denken kann. Gebt mir Ablass, darum bitte ich Euch, und legt mir als Busse auf, was Euch gut dünkt." Grimbeert war weise und klug; er brach sich ein Reis von einer Hecke und gab ihm damit vierzig Schläge für alle seine Missetaten. Darauf gab er ihm noch den aufrichtigen Rat gut zu sein, zu wachen und zu lesen, zu fasten und zu feiern und auf den rechten Weg alle die zu leiten, die er verirrt sehe, und hinfort sein Lebelang auf verständige Weise seinen Unterhalt zu verdienen. Hiernach liess er ihn Raub und Diebstahl abschwören. Nun muss Reinaert, nach Grimbeerts Rat, auf sein Seelenheil achthaben, und er ging zu Hofe im Vertrauen auf Gnade.

Jetzt ist die Beichte getan, und die beiden Herren haben die Reise an den königlichen Hof unternommen. Nun lag abseits vom geraden Wege, den sie zu betreten angefangen

hatten, ein Priorat der Schwarzen Nonnen,¹ wo manche Gans und manches Huhn, manche Henne und mancher Kapaun ausserhalb der Mauer auf die Weide zu gehen pflegten. Dies wusste das böse Geschöpf, der ungetreue Reinaert, und sprach: "Nach jenem Gehöft hin liegt unsere richtige Strasse." Mit solcher Truglist führte er Grimbeert zur Scheuer, wo die Hühner ausserhalb der Mauer hierher und dorthin liefen, um ihr Futter aufzulesen. Reinaert ward der Hühner gewahr. Seine Augen begannen ihm in Kopfe herumzugehen. Von den andern entfernt stolzierte ein Hahn, der sehr jung und fett war. Reinaert machte einen Sprung nach ihm, so dass dem Hahn die Federn stoben. Grimbeert sprach: "Ich halte Euch für wahnsinnig. Unseliger, was wollt Ihr tun? Wollt Ihr um eines Hahnes willen all die grossen Sünden noch einmal auf Euch laden, die Ihr abgebeichtet habt? Das muss Euch gar sehr reuen." Reinaert antwortete: "Auf Treu und Redlichkeit, ich hatte es vergessen, lieber Neffe. Bittet Gott, dass er es mir vergebe. Es wird mir nie wieder passieren." Da kehrten sie um und über eine schmale Brücke zurück. Wie oft nicht sah Reinaert über seine Schulter dahin, wo die Hühner herumspazierten. Er konnte sich nicht bezwingen, er musste seiner alten Gewohnheit nachgeben. Wenn man ihm auch das Haupt abgeschlagen hätte, es wäre zu den Hühnern hingeflogen, so weit wie es vermocht hätte. Grimbeert bemerkte dieses Benehmen und sagte: "Unreiner Fresser, es ist eine Schande, dass Euch die Augen so im Kopfe herumgehen!" Reinaert erwiderte: "Ihr tut unrecht, dass Ihr mein Herz so verhöhnt und mein Gebet so stört. Lasst mich doch ein Paternoster für die Seelen der Hühner und zum Seelenheil der Gänse aus dem Kloster lesen, die ich oft treulos behandelt und die ich den heiligen Nonnen mit List fortgenommen habe." Grimbeert zürnte; aber Reinaert hatte immer seine Augen rückwärts, bis sie auf die rechte Strasse kamen, die sie vorher verlassen hatten. Dort kehrten sie ihre Schritte zu Hofe hin. Reinaert zitterte gar sehr, da er begann sich dem Hofe zu nahen, wo er übel anzukommen glaubte.

Als am königlichen Hofe bekannt wurde, dass Reinaert mit Grimbeert, dem Dachs, angekommen sei, war niemand

1. Die Schwarzen Nonnen sind Augustinerinnen, "*sorores nigrae*" nach ihrer Kleidung genannt.

dort, glaube ich, so arm oder von so geringer Verwandschaft, dass er nicht bereit anzuklagen war, und alle diese Anklagen richteten sich gegen Reinaert. Trotzdem spielte dieser den Unerschrockenen, wie schlimm ihm auch zu Mute war, und er sagte zu Grimbeert: "Führt mich durch die Hauptstrasse." Reinaert ging mit so stolzer Miene und einem so kecken Benehmen daher, als ob er der Sohn des Königs wäre und keinen Frevel begangen hätte. Kühn trat er vor Nobel, den König, und sprach: "Gott, der alles ins Leben rief, schenke Euch, Herr König, langwährende Freude und Ehre. Ich grüsse Euch, König, und habe ein Recht dazu. Nie hat ein König einen Diener gehabt, der ihm so treu gewesen wäre, wie ich es immer war und bin. Das ist häufig offenbar geworden. Trotzdem würden gerne manche der Anwesenden mich dennoch Eurer Huld berauben, wenn Ihr ihnen glauben wolltet. Aber nein, das tut Ihr nicht, und Gott möge Euch dafür belohnen. Es ziemt sich nicht für den König, dass er den Schuftten und Bösewichtern zu leicht glaube, was sie vorbringen. Trotzdem will ich es Gott klagen. In unsern Tagen gibt es zu viele der Schurken, die anschuldigen können, und die überall an mächtigen Höfen die Oberhand gewonnen haben. Denen soll man nicht glauben; die Bosheit ist ihnen angeboren. Dass sie den guten Leuten Leid bereiten, das räche Gott an ihrem Leben, und möge er ihnen ewiglich solchen Lohn geben, wie sie ihn verdient haben." Der König antwortete: "O weh, Reinaert, o weh, unreiner Bösewicht, wie schön und unschuldig wisst Ihr Euch zu benehmen, aber das kann Euch nichts im geringsten helfen. Gebt nur Euer Schmeicheln auf; durch Schmeicheleien werde ich Euer Freund nicht. Es ist wahr, dass Ihr mir bei einer gewissen Sache im Walde hättet helfen sollen, wo Ihr aber schlecht den Frieden, den ich geschworen, innegehalten habt." "O weh, was habe ich nicht alles verloren," rief der dabeistehende Canticleer. Der König aber sagte: "Haltet Euren Schnabel, Herr Canticleer, lasst mich jetzt sprechen und seine bösen Streiche beantworten.

"Ei, Herr Dieb, dass Ihr mich lieb habt und wert haltet, das habt Ihr, ohne Euch viel zu bemühen, an meinen Boten gezeigt, am armen Kerl Tibeert, am Herrn Bruun, dem noch sein Kopf blutig ist. Ich werde Euch nicht sehr schmähen; ich glaube, Euer Hals soll es noch heute, nein, in diesem Augen-

blicke entgelten." 'Nomine patrum christum file,'¹ erwiderte Reinaert, wenn meinem Herrn Bruun das Haupt noch ganz blutig ist, wenn er zerbläut oder beschimpft ward, er hätte es gerächt, wäre er tapfer, ehe er sich auch immer² in das Wasser flüchtete. Was andererseits Tibeert, den Kater, anbetrifft, den ich beherbergte und aufnahm, wenn er ohne meinen Rat in des Pfaffen Haus ging, um zu stehlen, und der Pfaffe ihm ein Leid antat, bei Gott, sollte ich dafür büssen, so hätte ich Grund genug mein Schicksal zu beklagen." Reinaert fuhr fort: "Wem stösst ein Zweifel darüber auf, dass Ihr tun könnt, was Ihr über mich verhängt. Wie gut auch meine Sache sei, Ihr könnt mir frommen oder schaden. Wollt Ihr mich kochen oder braten, hängen oder blenden, ich kann Euch nicht entgehen. Alle Tiere stehen unter Eurer Herrschaft. Ihr seid gewaltig, und ich bin schwach; meine Macht ist klein und die Eurige gross; bei Gott, wenn Ihr mich totschrüget, es wäre eine geringe Rache."

Gerade während er so sprach, sprangen Belijn, der Widder, und seine Frau, die Dame Hawi, die mit ihm gekommen war, auf. Belijn sprach: "Lasst uns alle unsere Klage vorbringen." Bruun sprang auf mit seinen Verwandten, und Tibeert, der Bösewicht, und Isengrijn, sein Gefährte; Forcondet, der Eber, und der Rabe Tielcelijn, Pancer, der Biber, auch Brun-eel³ und das Eichhörnchen, Herr Rosseel, Dieweline, seine schöne Frau; Canticleer und seine Kinder schlugen eifrig mit ihren Flügeln. Das Frettchen Clenebejach lief auch mit in der Schar. Alle diese traten offen vor ihren Herrn, den König, hin und nahmen Reinaert gefangen.

Nun begann dort die Gerichtsverhandlung. Nie hat man von Tieren eine so schöne Rede gehört wie die zwischen Reinaert und den andern Tieren. Das wiederzuerzählen, was man da sagte, wäre mir mühevoll und beschwerlich. Deswegen fasse ich mich kurz: Die besten Reden wurden gehalten. Die Klagen, welche die Tiere auseinandersetzten, bewiesen sie mit guten Zeugnissen, wie es ihre Pflicht und Schuldigkeit war. Der König spornte auch die hohen Barone an, ihr Urteil über Reinaerts Angelegenheit zu fällen. Es lautete, dass man

1. Siehe Anmerkung S. 26.

2. S. "noint" Grimm, D. Gr. III, 225.

3. Die Rohrdommel.

einen starken und festen Galgen errichten und daran Reinaert, den bösen Fremdling, bei seiner Kehle aufhängen solle. Nun wird die Sache für Reinaert ernst.

Als er verurteilt worden war, verabschiedete sich Grimbeert, der Dachs, mit Reinaerts nächsten Verwandten. Sie konnten es nicht ertragen, noch konnten sie es aushalten, dass man Reinaert vor ihren Augen wie einen Dieb aufhängen sollte. Dennoch war es einigen von ihnen lieb. Der König, der war sehr klug. Da er bemerkte und vernahm, dass so mancher Jüngling, der Reinaert nahestand, mit Grimbeert von Hofe ging, da dachte er in seinem Sinn: Hier kann anderer Rat einfließen. Obschon Reinaert selbst böse ist, so hat er doch manchen guten Verwandten. Da sprach er: "Warum seid Ihr so träge, Isengrijn und Bruun? Reinaert ist mancher Zaun¹ bekannt, und es ist beinahe Abend. Hier ist Reinaert, entspringt er aus der Haft und kommt er nur drei Fuss weg,² so wird er in Zukunft nie wieder gefangen, denn er ist sehr listig und voll von Streichen. Soll man ihn hängen, warum tut man es denn nicht? Ehe man jetzt einen Galgen aufrichten kann, ist es Nacht." Isengrijn war sehr bedacht und sprach: "Hier nahebei steht ein Galgen." Und bei diesen Worten seufzte er.

Da sprach der Kater, Herr Tibeert: "Herr Isengrijn, Euer Herz ist schmerz erfüllt, ich kann es Euch nicht verargen. War es doch Reinaert, der es anstiftete und selbst mitging, wo man Eure beiden Brüder, Rume und Widelanke, aufhing. Zeit ist es, wenn Ihr ihm dafür danken wollt. Wäret Ihr tapfer, er würde längst getötet worden sein." Isengrijn sprach zu Tibeert: "Was Ihr uns nicht alles lehrt! Mangelte uns nicht ein Strick, so wüsste heute seine Kehle längst, wie viel sein Hinterende wiegen möchte." Reinaert, der lange geschwiegen hatte, sprach: "Ihr Herren, kürzt meine Qual. Tibeert hat eine starke Leine, die er sich für sein Genick in dem Hause erstand, wo ihm viele Widerwärtigkeiten begegneten, und wo er den Pfaffen verwundete, der ohne irgend-

1. Über den er springen oder durch dessen Löcher er schlüpfen kann.

2. "Flüchtet sich ein Todschläger auf den Herrenhof, so hat er sechs Wochen und drei Tage Frieden, und kann er inzwischen oder hernach drei Fuss weit vom Hofe entweichen und wieder darauf zurückkehren, so läuft die Friedensfrist aufs Neue." Wth. von Arweiler; Grimm Wth. II., 648. Noch andere Beispiele bei Geyder zu 1916—Martin dagegen meint (zu 1905), dass es sich nur um die List des Fuchses handle, die ihn retten werde, wenn er auch nur den geringsten Vorsprung haben werde.

welche Kleidung vor ihm stand. Herr Isengrijn, vorwärts nun. Seid Ihr nicht nebst Bruun dazu erkoren, Euren Neffen, den roten Bösewicht, zu töten?" Da sprach er sogleich zu dem König: "Lasst Tibeert mitgehen; er kann klettern, er kann die Leine hinauftragen, ohne Euch viel zu bemühen.¹ Tibeert, geht voran und macht alles fertig. Dass Ihr etwas zögert, das tut mir leid." Da sprach Isengrijn zu Bruun: "Bei meiner im Kloster empfangenen Tonsur², die ich auf dem Kopfe habe, nie habe ich so guten Rat gehört, wie ihn hier Reinaert selber gibt. Ihn gelüstet nach Klosterbier; lasst uns gehen und es ihm brauen!" Bruun sprach: "Neffe Tibeert, nimm die Leine, Du sollst mitlaufen. Reinaert soll jetzt für meine schönen Backen und für dein Auge zahlen. Gehen wir und lasst uns ihn so hoch hängen,³ dass alle seine Freunde Schmach deswegen fühlen! "Gehen wir, er hat es wohl verdient," sprach Tibeert und nahm die Leine: "Ich habe nie so angenehme Arbeit getan."

Nun waren die drei Herren, die so zornig auf Reinaert waren, bereit. Das waren der Wolf, Tibeert und Herr Bruun, der zu seinem Schaden Honig stehlen gelernt hatte. Isengrijn war so bedachtsam,—er wollte das nicht unterlassen,—dass er, bevor er vom Hofe schied, seine Neffen und Nichten und alle, die am Hofe zurückblieben, Nachbarn sowohl wie Freunde, ermahnte, dass sie Reinaert festhielten. Seinem Weibe, der Frau Haersint, befahl er bei ihrem Leben neben Reinaert zu stehen und ihn beim Barte zu fassen und sich nicht von ihm zu trennen, weder um des Gutes willen noch wegen Belohnung, weder aus Neigung noch aus Zwang, noch aus Sorge vor dem Tode.

Reinaert antwortete kurz, dass es alle, die da waren, hörten: "Herr Isengrijn, verzeiht mir wenigstens zur Hälfte.⁴ Obgleich Euch mein grosser Schaden lieb ist, und Ihr mich in Wider-

1. Van Helden lässt das holländische "uwe" aus, so dass der V. lauten würde "er kann ohne Mühe die Leine hinauftragen," was allerdings einen bessern Sinn geben würde, da der König mit der Ausführung der Hinrichtung selbst nichts zu tun hat.

2. Er denkt dabei an seinen Eintritt ins Kloster und an das, was ihm dort widerfahren (v. 1481 ff.) Die Rache, die er an Reinaert zu nehmen gedenkt, bezeichnet er deswegen als "Klosterbier", V. 1952.

3. "Je höher man jemanden hing, desto entehrender war die Strafe.—Das Höherhängen enthielt eine Erschwerung der Strafe, weil der Missetäter dadurch noch mehr zur Schau gestellt ward." (Geyder, Anmk. zu 1967.)

4. Selbst im Angesicht des Todes hat Reinaert, wie wir sehen, seinen ironischen Humor nicht eingebüsst; auch seine Bosheit ist unaussrottbar.

wärtigkeit bringt, so weiss ich wohl, sollte meine Muhme mit Recht einer alten Geschichte gedenken, sie fügte mir nie und nimmer ein Leid zu. Aber Ihr, Herr Isengrijn, süsser Ohm, kümmert Euch wenig um Euren Neffen, ebenso Ihr, Herr Bruun, und Ihr, Herr Tibeert, dass Ihr mich so entehrt habt. Ihr drei habt alles getan, dass man mich ums Leben bringen wird. Ausserdem habt Ihr es zuwege gebracht, dass, wer auch immer sich mir naht, mich einen Dieb schilt und mich kränkt. Deswegen müsst Ihr, Gott weiss es, alle drei entehrt werden, wofern Ihr nicht beschleunigt, dass alles geschehe, was Ihr zu tun begehrt. Ich wage es schon einmal zu sterben. Ward nicht mein Vater, da er verschied, von allen seinen Sünden frei? Geht und rüstet den Galgen. Richtet mich entweder sogleich hin oder fahret alle, wie Ihr seid, zur Hölle!" Da sprach Isengrijn "Amen." Auch Bruun rief "Amen! und möge der zum Teufel gehen, der länger zögert." Tibeert sagte: "Jetzt lasst uns eilen!" Und mit diesen Worten sprangen und liefen Isengrijn und Bruun sehr vergnügt fort und bemühten sich um die Wette über manchen Zaun zu setzen. Tibeert folgte ihnen nach. Das Laufen wurde ihm etwas schwer wegen der Leine, die er trug. Dennoch war er rasch genug, weil er den guten Willen hatte. Reinaert stand da und schwieg ganz still und sah zu, wie seine Feinde eilten, die ihm den Strick anknüpfen wollten. "Das soll aber unterbleiben," sprach Reinaert, der von seinem Platze aus beobachtet, wie sie springen und sich wenden. Er dachte "Deus, was für Junker! Lasst sie nur springen und laufen. Bleibe ich am Leben, so sollen sie noch für ihre Missetat und für den mir angetanen Schimpf bezahlen, wenn mir meine angeborne Schlaueit nicht mangelt. Freilich sähe ich lieber, dass diejenigen, die ich am meisten fürchte, weit von mir entfernt als in meiner Nähe wären. Nun will ich versuchen, ob ich hier bei Hofe eine List anbringen kann, die ich mir in grosser Sorge vor Tagesanbruch während der Nacht ausgedacht habe. Hat meine List den Erfolg, den ich mir von ihr verspreche, so glaube ich noch den König zu

1. Die wörtliche Übersetzung der Verse 2009-11 lautet: "Entweder schont ihr mich keinen Augenblick (?) länger, oder abfahren müsst Ihr, all Eure Füsse und Eure Beine, hinterwärts," eine Verwünschungsformel, welche nach Grimm (R. F. Anmkg. zu 2018) bedeutet: "Ihr müsst tot zu Boden stürzen." Geyder bemerkt dazu: "Ich möchte, wenn diese Erklärung einen rechten Sinn haben soll, an die zum Hängen Verurteilten denken, wenn ihre Füsse von der weggestossenen Leiter abfahren." Jonckbloet hat die Stelle etwas geändert. Ob seine Emendation die richtige ist, bleibe dahingestellt. Recht hat er aber wohl mit der Deutung "abire in malam partem." Ebenso Buitenrust Hetteema. Hs f hat diese Verse ausgelassen.

betören, obschon er schlau und klug ist.“—Der König liess ein Horn blasen und befahl Reinaert hinauszuführen. Reinaert sprach: “Lasst zuerst den Galgen, an dem ich hängen soll, fertigstellen, und inzwischen werde ich vor dem Volke meine Beichte ablegen in der Hoffnung, Vergebung für meine Sünden zu erlangen. Es ist besser, dass alle Leute jetzt von meinem Stehlen und meiner Untat hören, als dass sie später irgend-einen andren meiner Missetat bezichtigen.”

Der König sprach: “Nun, fangt nur an.” Reinaert stand sehr betrübt da, sah sich nach allen Seiten um und begann ganz laut: “Der Herr helfe mir, denn niemand ist hier in dieser Versammlung, weder Freund noch Feind, dem gegenüber ich nicht einer Missetat schuldig bin. Dennoch vernehmt, Ihr Herren alle, lasst Euch weisen und belehren, wie ich Elender die Bosheit anfang. Stets war ich damals noch, spät und früh, ein artiges Kind. Nachdem ich von der Mutterbrust entwöhnt war, ging ich mit den Lämmlein spielen, um ihr Geblöke anzuhören, bis ich eines Tages eins zu Tode biss. Zum ersten Maleleckte ich Blut. Das schmeckte so süss, das war so gut, dass ich auch das Fleisch kostete. Davon lernte ich soviel Näsche-rei, dass ich zu den Ziegen im Walde ging, wo ich sie meckern hörte. Da tötete ich zwei Böckchen. Am dritten Tage tat ich noch mehr und ich ward kühner und frecher und biss Hähne, Hühner und Gänse tot, wo immer ich sie fand. Als mir mein Zahn blutig ward, war ich so böse und grausam, dass ich säuberlich alles auffrass, was ich fand und was mir taugte, was mir passend war und was ich bezwingen konnte. Danach kamen ich und Isengrijn im Winter während eines Frostes unter einen Baum bei Besele.¹ Er rechnete aus, dass er mein Ohm sei und begann die Sippschaft aufzuzählen. Dort wurden wir Kumpene. Das kann mich mit Recht reuen. Da gelobten wir einander auf Treue rechte Genossenschaft. Als wir zusammen zu wandern begannen, raubte er das grosse und ich das kleine Vieh. Was wir erwarben, war gemeinsam, und wenn wir darauf teilen wollten, war ich vergnügt und froh, konnte ich nur die Hälfte von meinem Teil bekommen. Wenn Isengrijn ein Kalb, einen Widder oder einen Bock erjagte, so knurrte er, stellte sich zornig und machte mir ein Gesicht, welches so

1. Ort an der Schelde in Flandern.

sauer und böse war, dass er mich von sich trieb und ich ihm meinen ganzen Anteil überliess. Dennoch machte ich mir nichts daraus. Wie oft habe ich nicht zugesehen, wenn wir einer grossen Beute, einem Ochsen oder einem Mastschwein nachstellten, und die ich und mein Oheim fingen, wie er sich mit seinem Weibe, der Frau Haersint, und seinen sieben Kindern gemächlich zum Mahle niedersetzte, während ich kaum eine der kleinsten Rippen bekommen konnte, die seine Kinder bereits benagt hatten. So habe ich mich mühsam durchgeschlagen. Trotzdem verursachte das mir geringe Not. Wenn nicht mein Gemüt so grossmütig wäre, das Liebe zu meinem Oheim hegte, der jetzt so wenig Sorge um mich trägt, hätte ich gut zu essen bekommen. O König, ich tue Euch kund: Ich habe noch soviel Silber und Gold, welches alles in meiner Gewalt ist, dass es kaum ein Wagen auf sieben Fahrten fortbringen würde."

Als der König dies hörte, unterbrach er ihn schnell:¹ "Reinaert, wo habt Ihr den Schatz her?" Reinaert antwortete: "Ich sage Euch das der Wahrheit gemäss, wenn Ihr es wissen wollt. Weder um der Liebe noch um des Leides wegen soll es dann verborgen bleiben. König, der Schatz² war gestohlen. Wäre er auch nicht gestohlen, so wäre wahrhaftig sinetwillen ein Mord an Euch geschehen, was allen Euren Freunden leid tun möchte." Die Königin erschrak und sprach: "O weh, lieber Reinaert, o weh, o weh! Was sagt Ihr? Ich ermahne Euch bei dem Wege, den Eure Seele wandern wird, dass Ihr uns die Wahrheit ganz offen sagt und erzählt, ob Ihr von einem Morde oder einem Mordanschlag wisst, der gegen meinen Herrn gesponnen ist. Das lasst hier öffentlich hören!"— Nun vernehmt, wie Reinaert den König und die Königin betören und des Königs Freundschaft und Huld mit schlaudem Sinne erwerben wird, und wie er beide, Bruun und Isengrijn, ohne ihre Schuld in grosses Unglück stürzte,³ und sie in Unglück und in Feindschaft gegen den König bringen wird. Die Herren, die jetzt so stolz waren, dass sie glaubten, sie hätten dem Reinaert

1. Das hsliche "felle" ist augenscheinlich ein Schreibfehler für "snelle" nach Martin oder "selke" nach Jonckbloet und van Helten. Hs. f. hat "selue."

2. Die Hs. hat "dien," wo der Nom. "die" zu erwarten wäre. Hs. f. liest "dese."

3. "Upheffen" hat gewöhnlich die Bedeutung von aufheben, aufrichten, herstellen, anfangen. Jonckbloet und van Helten kommt die Stelle verdächtig vor. Hs. f. hat an Stelle von "up hief in groter onghereede" "Op een wel grote o.," was einen bessern Sinn gibt. (V. 2152.)

Bier zu seiner Schande gebraut, ich meine wohl in rechter Treue, dass er dagegen Met mischen wird, den sie mit Schmach trinken sollen.

Als ob er betrübten Sinnes sei, sprach Reinaert: "Edle Königin, selbst wenn Ihr mich nicht jetzt daran erinnert hättet, dass ich einer bin, der zu sterben vermeint, ich lasse nichts auf meiner Seele lasten, und wäre es sogar mein Schicksal in die Hölle zu kommen, wo Marter und Pein herrschen. Vorausgesetzt der milde König wäre willens Stillschweigen zu gebieten, ich würde ungestört erzählen, wie jämmerlich er von seinen eignen Leuten verraten war, um ermordet zu werden. Die am allermeisten dazu rieten sind zwar einige von meinen liebsten Verwandten, die ich nur gezwungen beschuldigen sollte,¹ täte es nicht die Furcht vor der Hölle, in der, wie man sagt, diejenigen leiden, welche hier sterben und von einem Morde wissen und ihn nicht ans Licht bringen." Dem Könige wurde das Herz schwer, und er sprach: "Reinaert, berichtest Du mir die Wahrheit?" "Die Wahrheit?" sagte Reinaert, "fragt Ihr mich danach? Fürwahr, Ihr wisst es wohl nicht, wie es mit mir steht? Glaubt Ihr etwa, edler König, dass ich, obschon ich ein Elender bin, solchen Mord dulden könnte? Meint Ihr, dass ich eine Lüge auf die lange Reise ins Jenseits mit mir nehmen wolle? Wahrlich, das ist nicht meine Absicht," sprach Reinaert.

Auf den Rat der Königin, die sehr den Schaden des Königs fürchtete, gebot der König öffentlich, dass da niemand so kühn sein solle etwa ein Wörtchen zu sprechen, bis Reinaert mit Bequemlichkeit alles vollständig gesagt hätte, was er wolle. Da schwiegen sie alle still. Der König hiess Reinaert sprechen. Reinaert war voller boshafter Streiche; ihn deuchte, gut Glück sei ihm zuteil geworden. Er begann folgendermassen: "Nun schweiget überall, weil das dem Könige lieb ist. Ich werde Euch offen von dem Verrat berichten, Wort für Wort, und niemand schonen, den ich anzuklagen verpflichtet bin. Wer davon Schande hat, schäme sich!"

Nun vernehmte alle zusammen, wie Reinaert seinen leiblichen Vater des Verrats bezichtigt und einen von seinen lieb-

1. Sächs. Landr. III 78, 2: "Der Vasall muss auch wohl seinem König und seinem Richter gegen Unrecht Widerstand leisten und ihn ausserdem vertheidigen helfen auf alle Weise, wäre es auch wider seine Verwandten oder wider seinen Herrn und handelt dadurch nicht wider die ihnen schuldige Treue." Vgl. Buitenrust Hettema zu 2196.

sten Verwandten, Grimbeert, den Dachs, der ihm von Herzen geneigt war. Das tat Reinaert darum, weil er wollte, dass man umsomehr seinen Worten Glauben schenken sollte, wenn er seine Feinde des Verrats zeihen würde. Hört nun, wie er dieses anfang. Er sprach: "Lange ist es her, da mein Herr Vater den Schatz des Königs Ermenrich¹ an heimlicher Stätte fand. Als mein Vater den Schatz entdeckt hatte, wurde er bald so übermütig und stolz, dass er alle Tiere, die vorher seine Genossen waren, geringschätzte. Tibeert, dem Kater, befahl er in das wilde Land der Ardennen² zu reisen, wo er auf Bruun, den Bären, stiess. Der entbot Bruun Gottes Huld und hiess ihn nach Flandern kommen, wenn er König werden wollte. Bruun war darüber froh, er hatte es schon lange begehrt. Da machte er sich auf nach Flandern und kam nach Waes,³ dem süssen Lande, wo er meinen Vater fand. Mein Vater berief den weisen Grimbeert und den grauen Isengrijn zu sich. Tibeert, der Kater, war der fünfte. Sie gelangten in ein Dorf, welches Hijfte⁴ hiess. Zwischen Hijfte und Gent hielten sie in einer dunklen Nacht ihre Besprechung. Dorthin kamen sie durch des Teufels Macht und des Teufels Gewalt, und alle fünf beschwuren da auf einem wüsten Felde den Tod des Königs. Nun vernehmt, Ihr alle, ein grosses Wunder: Sie schworen bei Isengrijns Mönchsplatte,⁵ alle fünf, dass sie Bruun zum Herrn und König machen und ihn auf den Stuhl zu Aachen⁶ setzen würden, und dass er die Krone tragen sollte. Wollte jemand von des Königs Verwandten dem widersprechen, so sollte ihn mein Vater mit seinem Gold und Silber überwinden, dass er Schande davon haben sollte. Dies weiss ich und ich sage Euch, wie ich es erfuhr.

"Sehr früh eines Morgens geschah es, dass mein Neffe, der Dachs, ein wenig vom Weine trunken war und den heimlichen Anschlag meinem Weibe, der Frau Haermeline, Punkt für Punkt mitteilte, wie sie über die Heide liefen. Mein Weib

1. "Dass Ermenrich in die Erzählung gemengt ist, verrät einen uralten deutschen Zug, der in die franz. Bearbeitungen keinen Eingang mehr fand; wahrscheinlich ist eine flandrische Tradition mit dabei im Spiel." (Grimm, S. CLII) Vgl. Buitenrust Hettema unter Ermelin.

2. Der Ardennerwald im Nordosten Frankreichs u. Süden Belgiens.

3. Nördlich von Gent, am linken Scheldeufer.

4. In der Nähe von Gent.

5. Die christliche Sitte auf Reliquien zu schwören (vgl. V. 83) ist hier ins Lächerliche gezogen, indem Isengrijns geschornen Kopf als Reliquienkasten dient.

6. Der Deutsche Königssitz seit Karl d. Grossen.

ist eine wunderbare Frau und gab Grimbeert ihr Wort, dass es verschwiegen bleiben sollte. Sobald sie aber zu dem Walde kam, wo ich war und wo sie mich fand, erzählte sie mir sogleich die Sache brühwarm. Nur geschah es ganz heimlich. Auch erwähnte sie einige Wahrzeichen, die ich als richtig erkannte, so dass mir alle Haare vor grosser Furcht zu Berge standen. Mein Herz ward mir zusehends kalt wie Eis; davon seid überzeugt.

“Die Frösche¹ waren einstmals frei, beklagten sich aber, dass sie ohne Regierung seien. Daher hielten sie eine Versammlung ab und erhoben ein so grosses Geschrei zu Gott, dass er ihnen durch sein Gebot einen König gebe, der sie beherrsche. Um dies baten die Alten und die Jungen mit grossem Geschrei, mit grossem Lärm. Binnen Jahresfrist erhörte Gott die Frösche und sandte ihnen den König Adebar,² der sie zu Tode biss und überall, wo er sie fand, verschlang im Wasser sowohl wie auf dem Felde; wo immer sie in seiner Macht waren, fügte er ihnen stets Unheil zu. Da klagten sie, es war aber zu spät, und ich sage Euch warum. Diejenigen, die vorher frei waren, sollen, ohne dass es geändert werden kann, künftighin dem König Adebar zu eigen bleiben und auf ewig in Furcht vor ihm bleiben.—Ihr Herren, arm und reich, ich fürchtete, ein gleiches Unglück würde Euch befallen; da hegte ich Besorgnis um uns alle. So habe ich für Euch gesorgt. Dafür sagt Ihr mir jetzt wenig Dank. Ich kannte Bruun als falsch und böse und voll von jeder Missetat. Ich dachte, würde er unser Herr, dann (fürchtete ich gar sehr), wären wir alle verloren. Vom König wusste ich, dass er von hoher Geburt, milde, gutmütig und gegen alle Tiere gnädig war. Es deuchte mir unter allen Umständen ein schlechter Wechsel, der uns nicht zur Ehre oder zu Nutzen gereichen könnte. Deswegen mühte ich mich ab und strengte mich an, mein Herz war schwer von Sorgen, wie eine so schlimme Sache zunichte gemacht werde, und wie ich meines Vaters bösen Anschlag verhindere, der einen bäurischen Menschen, einen Vielfrass, zum Herrn und König zu machen beabsichtigte. Stets flehte ich zu Gott und bat dringend, dass er dem König, meinem

2. Diese Fabel von der Königswahl der Frösche hält Jonckbloet für eine Interpolation und hat sie deswegen aus dem Texte ausgeschieden. Sie steht aber auch in Hs. f.

3. Ursprünglich, “der Kinderbringer,” der Storch.

Herrn, sein Herrscheransehen bewahre. Denn mir war klar, behielte mein Vater seinen Schatz, so würden er und seine Gespielen ratseinig, und der König würde verjagt werden. In tiefem Nachdenken und in grossen Sorgen war ich oft, wie ich ausfindig machen sollte, wo der Schatz lag, den mein Vater entdeckt hatte. Sorgfältig beobachtete ich meinen Vater zu allen Stunden und stellte ihm nach in manchem Busch, in manchem Hag, auf freiem Felde sowohl wie im Walde, wo mein Vater, der listige Alte, herumzog und herumlief. Ob es trocken oder nass, ob es bei Nacht oder bei Tage war, ich lag stets im Hinterhalt. War es bei Tage oder bei Nacht, ich war immer auf Wache. Einst ereignete es sich darauf, dass ich mich mit grossen Farnkräutern¹ bedeckt hatte und auf die Erde hingestreckt lag und von dem Schatze, den ich begehrte, gern etwas bemerkt hätte. Da sah ich meinen Vater aus einem Loche herausschlüpfen. Dann begann ich wegen der sonderbaren Bewegungen, die ich ihn machen sah, auf den Schatz zu hoffen, wie ich Euch mitteilen kann. Denn da er aus dem Loche herauskam, bemerkte ich wohl, dass er sich umschaute und aufpasste, ob ihm jemand nahe sei. Und als er niemand sah, da begrüßte er den schönen Tag und verstopfte das Loch mit Sand und machte es dem Boden gleich.

“Dass ich das beobachtete, wusste er nicht. Da sah ich, wie er, ehe er von dannen lief, mit seinem Schwanz über die Stelle fegte, wo er gestanden hatte, und seine Fährte mit Erde bedeckte. Da lernte ich ein wenig von dem klugen Alten meisterhafte kluge Streiche, die ich vorher nicht gekannt hatte. So begab sich mein Vater von dannen nach dem Dorfe, wo Hähne und fette Hennen waren. Sobald ich mich zu zeigen wagte, sprang ich auf und lief zum Loche. Ich wollte nicht länger in Ungewissheit bleiben und erreichte sofort die Stelle. Schnell kratzte ich mit meinen Füßen den Sand auf und kroch hinein, wo ich grosse Reichtümer fand, Silber und Gold. Hier ist niemand so alt, der je so viel davon auf einem Haufen gesehen hätte. Da zögerte ich keinen Augenblick länger, sondern begab mich ans Ziehen und Tragen mit all meiner Kraft, bei Tag und bei Nacht, ohne Karren und Wagen. Mein Weib, Frau Hermeline, half mir. Davon

1. Buitenrust Hettemas Übersetzung von “vare” durch “angstigheid, gejagghheid” (zu 2374) lässt sich nicht aufrecht halten, da der Vers in Hs. f. lautet: Hadde bedect mit groenen verna (V. 2336).

erduldeten wir grosse Mühsal, ehe wir den übergrossen Schatz in ein andres Loch gebracht hatten, wo er bequemer für uns lag. Wie trugen ihn in eine verborgene Grube unter einer Hecke. Da war ich reich.

“Nun hört, was inzwischen die taten, die den König verraten hatten. Bruun, der Bär, sandte heimlich seinen Gruss durch das Land hin und bot allen denjenigen grossen Reichtum, die um Sold dienen wollten. Er versprach ihnen mit freigebiger Hand Silber und Gold zu geben. Mein Vater lief im ganzen Lande umher und trug die Briefe des Herrn Bruun aus. Wie wenig wusste er, dass Diebe an seinen Schatz gelangt waren, die ihn desselben beraubt hatten. Wäre der Schatz nicht ausgegraben¹ gewesen, er hätte mit ihm die ganze Stadt London kaufen können. Das hatte er von seinem Herumlaufen. Als mein Vater das ganze Land zwischen Elbe und Somme in allen Richtungen durchquert und manchen kühnen Dienstmann mit seinem Golde gewonnen hatte, der ihm zu Hilfe kommen sollte, sobald der Sommer ins Land käme, wandte er sich dorthin, wo er Bruun und seine Gefährten fand. Dort berichtete er von den grossen Qualen und mannigfachen Sorgen, die er vor den grossen Burgen im Sachsenlande erlitten, wo die Jäger ihm alle Tage mit ihren Hunden, die ihn häufig geängstigt hätten, nachgeritten seien. Alles dieses erzählte er zum Spass. Danach wies mein Vater Briefe vor, die Herrn Bruun sehr passten, und in welchen zwölfhundert von Herrn Isengrijns Verwandten mit scharfen Krallen und grossen Mäulern, alle bei Namen standen, ohne die Katzen und die Bären, die alle in Bruuns Solde waren, und ohne die Füchse nebst den Dachsen aus Thüringen und dem Sachsenlande. Diese alle hatten geschworen treu zu Bruun mit ihrer Macht zu stehen und ihm zu Befehl zu sein, vorausgesetzt, dass man ihnen ihren Sold von zwanzig Tagen vorausbezahle. Alles dieses verhinderte ich, Gott sei Dank.

“Als mein Vater seine Botschaft ausgerichtet hatte, wollte er sich seinen Schatz ansehen gehen. Und als er zu dem Orte kam, wo er ihn vorher zurückgelassen hatte, war derselbe ver-

1. “Ontghinnen” bedeutet nicht nur “kosten,” “anschneiden,” sondern nach Jonckbloet auch “ausgraben,” was einen bessern Sinn gibt. Grimm (zu 2451) bemerkt dazu: “Die Prosa und Reineke haben hier eine andere, und wohl richtigere Wendung, nicht die Grösse des Schatzes, sondern dass kein Pfennig davon übrig geblieben, schildern sie.” Ebenso Reinaert II, 2458-60. Nach Buitenrust Hetteema “angebrochen,” ironisch scherzend für “ganz weggenommen.”

schwunden, und das Versteck, worin er gelegen, war aufgebrochen. Was würde es helfen hiervon viel zu sprechen? Als mein Vater seinen Verlust wahrnahm, war er so ärgerlich und zornig, dass er sich vor Wut erhängte. So blieb durch meine Geschicklichkeit Bruuns Anschlag völlig unausgeführt. Seht aber jetzt mein Unglück. Herr Isengrijn und Bruun, der Fresser, gehören dem geheimen engen Rat des Königs an, wie jedermann weiss, während der arme Wicht Reinaert der Sündenbock ist."

Der König und die Königin, die beide auf Gewinn hofften, führten Reinaert beiseite, um mit ihm zu ratschlagen, und baten ihn, dass er so gut sein möchte ihnen den Schatz zu zeigen. Und als Reinaert das hörte, sprach er: "Sollte ich Euch, Herr König, der mich hängen lassen will, meinen Reichtum weisen, so wäre ich von Sinnen."

"Nein, Reinaert," sprach die Königin, "mein Herr wird Euch leben lassen und Euch freundlichst die böse Stimmung, in die Ihr ihn gebracht, völlig vergeben, und Ihr sollt künftighin klug und gut und getreu sein." Reinaert erwiderte: "Das will ich, Herrin, vorausgesetzt, dass mir der König hier vor Euch fest verspricht, mir seine Huld zu schenken und mir mein Vergehen und meine Schuld zu vergeben. Dafür will ich ihm, dem Könige, den Schatz zeigen, wo er vergraben liegt." Der König sprach: "Ich wäre übel beraten, wollte ich Reinaert viel Glauben schenken. Ihm ist das Stehlen und Rauben und Lügen angeboren." Die Königin aber antwortete: "Herr, o nein, Ihr könnt Reinaert wohl glauben; obschon er hierzuvor böse war, jetzt ist er es nicht mehr. Ihr habt gehört, wie er den Dachs und seinen eignen Vater des Mordes beschuldigt hat, den er leicht anderen Tieren hätte zur Last legen können, wollte er fernerhin schlimm, boshaft und ungetreu sein." Da sprach der König: "Edle Frau, obschon ich glaube, dass es mir zum Schaden gereichen wird, was Ihr mir zu raten wagt, so will ich auf Eure Gefahr hin diese Abmachung und Übereinkunft auf Reinaerts Treue beruhen lassen. Das aber sage ich ihm, und er kann sich darauf verlassen: "Begeht er noch mehr Bosheiten, so sollen es alle, die mit ihm bis zum zehnten Gliede verwandt sind, bezahlen." Reinaert sah den König überlistet, und ihm ward froh zu Mute, und er sprach: "Herr, ich wäre unvernünftig, glaubte ich nicht Euren Worten."

Da nahm der König einen Strohalm¹ und vergab Reinaert völlig das Verbrechen seines Vaters und auch seine eigne Missetat. Dass Reinaert da froh war, scheint mir nicht wunderbar, denn war er nicht von Tode errettet?

Da Reinaert frei war, war er über die Massen fröhlich und sagte: "König, edler Herr, möge Gott Euch und meine Herrin für all die Ehre belohnen, die Ihr mir erzeigt. Ich versichere es Euch bei meiner Treue, dass Ihr mich sehr ehrt und mir so viel Gutes tut, so dass niemand unter der Sonne ist, dem ich so sehr meinen Schatz und meine Treue gönne als Euch und meiner Herrin." Reinaert nahm einen Strohalm, hielt ihn vor sich hin und sprach: "Herr König, nehmt; hiermit übergebe ich Euch den Schatz, den Ermenrich einstmals besessen hat."

Der König nahm den Halm an und dankte Reinaert so, als wollte er sagen: "Dieser Strohalm macht mich zum Herrn des Schatzes." Reinaert lachte das Herz so sehr, dass man es beinahe hören konnte, da der König ihm so völlig zu Willen war. Reinaert sprach: "Herr, schweiget still. Merket, wo meine Rede hinzielt. Im Osten Flanderns steht ein Busch, der Hulsterlo² heisst. König, Ihr könnt froh sein, könnt Ihr dies im Gedächtnis behalten: Ein Bronn, Kriekeput genannt, fliesst südwestlich nicht weit von da. Herr König, Ihr dürft nicht wännen, dass ich Euch etwas von der Wahrheit verhehle. Das ist die grösste Wildnis, die es in irgend einem Reiche gibt. Manchmal geht wahrhaftig ein halbes Jahr vorbei, dass zu der Quelle weder Mann noch Weib, noch irgendein lebendiges Geschöpf kommt, ausgenommen die Eule und der Schuhu, die dort im Kraute nisten, oder ein andres Vöglein, das dort nicht³ gerne sein wollte und nur durch Zufall dorthin gelangte. An dem Platze liegt mein Schatz verborgen. Versteht dies wohl, es ist Euch nützlich: Die Stätte heisst

1. "Es wird erzählt, dass die vornehmen Franken sich einst nach gewohnter Weise auf dem Felde versammelten, um des Reiches öffentliche Wohlfahrt zu beraten und daselbst einmütig beschlossen, ihr feiger König (Karl der Einfältige) solle nicht länger ihr Herr sein; zum Zeichen warfen sie Strohhalme aus der Hand. Grimm, Rechtsalt. 123. Wie hier der Halmwurf Symbol des Verzichtes auf den bisherigen König, ein Zeichen seiner Absetzung ist, so übergibt umgekehrt in unsrer Dichtung der König dem Fuchs einen Strohalm zum Zeichen, dass er ihn in Gnaden wieder annehmen wolle, und diese Übergabe des Halms ist zugleich ein Symbol der zwischen beiden abgeschlossenen Sühne." (Ceyder, S. 279.)

2. Siehe S. 11.

3. Das "nicht" steht nicht im Texte, der Sinn des Verses verlangt es aber. Die lateinische Übersetzung lautet: *omnis jam volucris trepidum domo transvoiat illum.*

Kriekeput. Ihr und meine Herrin sollt dahin gehen. Ich kenne auch niemand, der so getreu wäre, dass Ihr ihn als Boten schicken könntet (beim Himmel, versteht mich recht, König,) sondern geht selbst dorthin, und wenn Ihr zu der Quelle kommt, werdet Ihr da junge Birken finden. Begebt Euch zu der Birke, die dem Bronn am allernächsten steht, o König, unter der liegt der Schatz vergraben. Dort sollt Ihr graben und auf der einen Seite ein wenig Moos abkratzen: dort werdet Ihr manches goldene Geschmeide, reich und schön, finden. Dort werdet Ihr auch die Krone finden, die Ermenrich, der König, trug, und anderen Schmuck, edle Gesteine und Goldarbeiten. Nicht um tausend Mark könnte man sie kaufen. Ei, König, wenn Ihr den Schatz besitzet, wie oft nicht werdet Ihr in Eurem Gemüt denken: "Ei, Reinaert, getreuer Fuchs, der Du auf listige Weise diese Reichtümer hier vergrubest, Gott beschere Dir Gutes, wo Du bist."

Da antwortete der König sogleich: "Soll ich die Fahrt unternehmen, so müsst Ihr mitgehen, Reinaert, und uns den Schatz ausgraben helfen. Ich glaube, dass ich allein dorthin nimmer gelangen werde. Ich habe Aachen und Paris nennen hören, ist es etwa nahe dabei? Und ist es so, wie ich vernehme, so schmeichelt Ihr und prahlt, Reinaert. Kriekeput, das Ihr erwähnt, ist, glaube ich, ein erlogener Name." Dies passte Reinaert gar nicht, er wurde zornig und sprach: "Ja, ja, König, Ihr seid so nahe dabei, wie es von Köln bis zum Mai¹ ist.

Meint Ihr, dass ich Euch die Leie in den Fluss Jordan² leiten will? Mir scheint, ich kann es Euch leicht klar mit genug Zeugnissen beweisen." Laut rief er: "Cuwaert, kommt hierher, kommt zum Könige, Cuwaert!" Die Tiere sahen, wie dieser eilte. Sie wunderten sich alle, was es da gebe.

1. "Eine spöttische Redeweise. Grimm, Reinhart XCII, hat mehrere Beispiele solcher Mischung örtlicher und zeitlicher Bestimmungen beigebracht: zwischen Ostern und Rheims; zwischen Clugny und Johannis; Hans Sachs sagt: Schlaraffenland ist drei Meilen hinter Weihnachten. In Oberdeutschland hört man noch heute: zwischen Strassburg und Pfingsten. Nach einem noch jetzt üblichen Volkswitz ist die Glocke zu Erfurt so gross, dass wenn sie zu Ostern geläutet wird, man sie noch zu Pfingsten (einem benachbarten Dorfe) hören kann. Ein Mann aus Valenciennes schloss eine Geschichte mit den Worten: das hat sich zugetragen zwischen Maubeuge und Pfingsten." (Geyder zu 2643.) Zu diesen Belegen steuert Martin (zu 2641) noch bei: Zwischen Pfingsten und Esslingen.

2. Die Übersetzung dieser scherzhaften Redewendung bietet einige Schwierigkeit. Geyder und Martin geben "wissen" durch "zeigen" wieder, wonach der Satz dann lauten würde: Meint Ihr, dass ich Euch die Leie in dem Jordan zeige, d.h. wenn ich Euch den Jordan zeige, dass ich dann sagen werde, es ist die Leie? Gegen diese Erklärung spricht aber der Akkusativ, 'in die flume Jordane' wo doch dann der Dativ stehen sollte. Grimms Interpretation von "leie" als "via, —Weg ist ganz unhaltbar, da Leie ein Fluss ist, der bei Gent in die Schelde tritt. Ich ziehe es deswegen vor Mones Erklärung (Anzeiger 1835, S. 52) zu folgen.

Cuwaert trat voll Furcht heran, ihn wunderte, was der König von ihm wollte. Reinaert sprach: "Cuwaert, habt Ihr das Fieber? Ihr zittert. Seid froh und fürchtet Euch nicht und sagt meinem Herrn, dem König, (er ermahnt Euch daran bei der Treue, die Ihr meiner Herrin schuldig seid) die Wahrheit von all dem, was ich Euch fragen werde." "Wenn es mir schon an den Kragen gehen sollte," sprach Cuwaert, "ich würde Euch nichts vorlügen. Ihr habt mich so hoch ermahnt, dass ich es zu sagen verpflichtet bin." Da erwiderte Reinaert: "So erzählt es ihm; weisst Du, wo die Kriekenput liegt?" Cuwaert sprach: "Ob ich es weiss? Natürlich, wie könnte es anders sein? Liegt sie nicht bei Hulsterlo im Morast, in der Wüstenei? Ich habe dort, bei der Kriekenput, grosse Qualen erduldet, Hunger und Kälte und vielfältige Armut nur gar zu oft, so dass ich sie nicht vergessen kann. Wie könnte ich vergessen, dass daselbst Reinout der Friese¹ falsche Pfennige schlug, womit er sein und seiner Gesellen Leben fristete. Das war, ehe ich mit dem Hunde Rijn, der mich von mancher Last befreite, eine Genossenschaft bildete." "O weh," sprach Reinaert, "süsser Rijn, lieber Gefährte, schönes Hündchen! Möchte Gott es gewähren, dass Ihr jetzt hier wäret. Ihr würdet, wenn es darauf ankäme, gegen diese Tiere mit schönen Versen Zeugnis ablegen, dass ich nie so kühn war irgend etwas zu tun, womit ich mit Recht den König auf mich zornig machen konnte. Cuwaert, geht schnell wieder zu jenen Knechten zurück," sprach Reinaert: "mein Herr, der König, hat Euch nichts mehr zu sagen." Cuwaert wandte sich um und begab sich aus der Beratung mit dem Könige dorthin, wohin man ihm zu eilen befohlen hatte. Reinaert sprach: "König, ist es wahr, was ich sagte?" "Reinaert, ja, es ist. Vergebt mir, ich tat Unrecht Euch etwas zu misstrauen. Reinaert, guter Freund, nun seht zu, (Ihr seid um Rat nicht verlegen), dass Ihr mit uns zu der Quelle geht, allwo die Birke steht, unter der der Schatz vergraben liegt." Reinaert antwortete: "Ihr redet wunderlich; glaubt Ihr, ich wäre dessen nicht sehr froh, König, wenn es so um mich stünde, dass ich mit Euch wandern könnte, und zwar auf solche Weise, wie es

1. "Es mag da etwas Friesisches walten: das Asegabok (nach Wiarda vor 1250 verfasst) redet von den friesischen Münzern Rëdnât und Kawing, verschiedene Hss. und das altfriesische Landrecht lesen aber Reynalda und Kawing. Dieser Reynalda soll im Jahre 812 gemünzt haben." (Grimm, CL X.)

uns beiden förderlich wäre, und Ihr ganz ohne Sünde bliebet? Es kann nicht sein, es ist, wie ich Euch berichten und es Euch sagen werde, obschon es mir zur Schande gereicht. Da Isengrijn in des Teufels Namen hierzuvor in den Mönchsorden eintrat und er zum Mönch geschoren ward, da konnte ihm nicht genügen, wovon sechs Mönche sich ernährten. Er klagte beständig und jammerte so sehr, dass ich Mitleid fühlte. Als er krank und träge ward, da tat er mir, weil ich einer seiner Verwandten bin, leid und gab ihm den Rat zu entfliehen. Darum bin ich in des Papstes Bann.

“Morgen, wenn die Sonne aufgeht, will ich nach Rom, um Ablass zu erhalten. Von Rom will ich übers Meer in das heilige Land; von da kehre ich nicht früher zurück, als bis ich soviel getan habe, König, dass meine Begleitung Euch nicht zu Schaden und Schande gereicht, wenn ich wieder heimkomme. Es wäre unschön, König solltet Ihr mit einem Verbannten, auf dem der Fluch liegt, Umgang haben. Möge Gott mich bessern!” Der König sprach: “Reinaert, seid Ihr schon lange im Bann?” Da antwortete Reinaert: “Ach ja, es ist drei Jahre her, dass mich der Dekan Hermann in voller Synode¹ in den Bann tat.” Der König erwiderte: “Weil Ihr gebannt seid, würde man mir einen Vorwurf daraus machen, Reinaert, erlaubte ich Euch mich zu begleiten. Ich werde Cuwaert oder einen anderen zum Schatze mit mir gehen lassen und ich rate Euch die Reise nicht zu unterlassen, damit Ihr Euch vom Banne reiniget.” “Ich werde es nicht unterlassen,” sagte Reinaert, “morgen mache ich mich auf den Weg nach Rom, wenn es nach meinem Willen geht.” Der König antwortete darauf: “Es scheint mir, dass Ihr mit sehr guten Dingen beschäftigt seid. Gott gönne Euch, Reinaert, dass Ihr es zu Eurem, zu meinem und zu unserer aller Nutzen vollbringen möget!”

Als diese Unterredung beendet war, begab sich Nobel, der König, auf eine hohe steinerne Bühne, auf der er allein zu

1. Augenscheinlich eine Anspielung auf einen Zeitgenossen, der aber mit Bestimmtheit noch nicht ermittelt worden ist. (Vgl. Martin, XVIII.)—Über die Synoden berichtet Geyder zu 2754: “Die Bischöfe waren verpflichtet alljährlich Kirchenvisitationen vorzunehmen und bei dieser Gelegenheit nachzuforschen, ob sich jemand der Blutschande, des Verwandtenmordes, des Ehebruchs oder anderer in der heiligen Schrift als Verbrechen wider Gott bezeichneter Handlungen schuldig gemacht habe. Das Gericht, welches zu dem Ende der Bischof abhielt, hieß synodus, Send. Vom Bischof, später, auch von der Gemeinde erwählte und vereidete Männer—waren verpflichtet, alle offenkundig gewordenen Verbrechen zu rügen, d.h. vor das Sendgericht zu bringen. Diese durch die Capitularien weiter ausgebildete kirchliche Einrichtung findet sich natürlich auch in Flandern.”

stehen pflegte, wenn er an seinem Hofe Gericht hielt. Die Tiere sassen im Kreise ringsumher auf dem Grase, je nach Geburt und Rang. Reinaert stand bei der Königin, die er mit Recht wohl lieben mochte. "Betet für mich," sprach er, "edle Herrin, dass ich Euch mit Lust wiedersehe." Sie sprach: "Möge der Herr, von welchem alles abhängt, Euch von Euren Sünden befreien." Der König und die Königin traten mit frohem Sinne vor ihre Tiere, arm und reich. Der König, der sagte freundlich: "Reinaert ist hier zu Hofe gekommen und will, wofür ich Gott lobe, sich mit Herz und Sinn bessern, und meine Frau, die Königin, hat so sehr für ihn gebeten, dass ich sein Freund geworden bin und er mit mir versöhnt ist; und ich habe ihm Leib und Leben freigegeben. Reinaert gebiete ich vollen Frieden, zum zweiten Mal gebiete ich ihm Frieden und zum dritten Mal;¹ und ich gebiete Euch allen bei Eurem Leben, dass Ihr Reinaert, seinem Weibe und seinen Kindern Ehre erweist, wo immer Ihr ihnen begegnen möget, sei es bei Nacht oder sei es bei Tage. Ich will keine Klage mehr über Reinaert hören. Obschon er vorher ruchlos war, er will sich jetzt bessern. Ich sage Euch auf welche Weise: Reinaert will morgen früh den Pilgerstab ergreifen und sein Ränzel umtun und nach Rom gehen; von dort will er über die See und nicht eher zurückkommen, bis er vollen Ablass für jede sündhafte Tat erhalten hat."

Diese Rede vernahm Tielcelijn und er flog dorthin, von wo er gekommen und wo er die drei Gefährten fand. Nun hört, was er ihnen erzählt. Er sprach: "Elende, was tut Ihr hier? Reinaert ist Oberschenk² und übermässig einflussreich. Der König hat ihm alle seine Missetaten vergeben, und Ihr seid alle drei verraten und verkauft."

Isengrijn begann Tielcelijn mit kurzen Worten zu antworten: "Ich glaube, Ihr lügt, Herr Rabe." Damit eilte er von dannen, und Bruun, der folgte seinem Beispiel. In vollem Laufe ging es an den Hof des Königs. Tibeert war sehr erschrocken und blieb auf dem Galgen sitzen. Er war für seinen rauhen Balg so über alle Massen bange, dass er gerne sein Auge

1. So noch heutzutage; der Prediger z. B. verkündet dreimal die Vermählung eines Paares von der Kanzel, der Auktionator ruft: zum ersten, zum zweiten und zum dritten Mal, ehe er den Zuschlag erteilt etc., etc.

2. Er fürchtet, dass der mit dem Könige versöhnte Fuchs ihnen etwas "eintränken" wird. Vgl. 705-706 und 2171-76.

für nichts und wieder nichts hätte fahren lassen, welches er in des Pfaffen Scheuer zurückgelassen, vorausgesetzt, dass er ver-söhnt wäre. Er wusste nicht, was er vor Furcht tun sollte, und setzte sich in die Gabel am Galgen; sehr und gar häufig beklagte er, dass er je Reinaerts Bekanntschaft gemacht.— Isengrijn drang mit grosser Zuversicht bis zur Königin vor und ging so weit in dem, was er in böser Gesinnung über Reinaert sagte, dass der König sehr zornig wurde und Bruun und Isengrijn festzunehmen befahl. Allsogleich wurden sie gefangen genommen und gebunden. Nie saht Ihr, dass man tollen Hunden grössere Schmach antat als diesen beiden, Isengrijn nebst Bruun. Man misshandelte sie wie leidige Fremdlinge, man band sie da so fest, dass sie während der Nacht trotz aller Anstrengung kein Glied rühren konnten. Nun hört, wie er ihnen weiter übel mitspielen wird.

Reinaert, der auf Bruun zornig war, bewirkte, dass man diesem ein Stück Fell von seinem Rücken abschnitt, welches man ihm zur Umhängetasche gab, einen Fuss lang und einen Fuss breit. Nun wäre Reinaert völlig reisefertig gewesen, hätte er vier neue Schuhe gehabt. Vernehmt jetzt, was er dazu tat, um die vier Schuhe zu bekommen. Er rannte der Königin zu: "Herrin, ich bin Euer Pilger. Hier ist mein Oheim Isengrijn; der hat vier starke Schuhe;¹ helft, dass ich sie anziehen kann. Ich nehme Eure Seele in meine Obhut; es ist des Pilgers Pflicht in seinen Gebeten all des Guten zu gedenken, das man ihm je getan hat. Ihr könnt in meiner Person Eurer Seele für ihre letzte Wanderung Schuhe besorgen. Lasst Haersint, meine Muhme, zwei von ihren Schuhen hergeben. Das könnt Ihr ruhig mit Ehren tun; sie bleibt zu Hause und hat es bequem." "Gerne," sprach die Königin; "Ihr, Reinaert, könnt die Schuhe nicht entbehren. Ihr müsst unter dem Schutze Gottes dieses Land verlassen, und Eure Reise geht über Berge und durch² Wälder und über Stock und Stein. Eure Mühsale werden nicht gering sein. Es ist notwendig, dass Ihr Schuhe habt. Ich will gerne meinen Einfluss gebrauchen, dass Ihr sie bekommt. Isengrijns würden Euch gut passen. Die, welche Isengrijn und sein Weib tragen, sind stark und dick. Wenn es ihnen auch ans Leben gehen

1. Nach Hs. f. verlangt Reinaert gleich von Anfang an nur zwei Schuhe Isengrijns.

2. Nach Hs. f.

sollte, jedes von ihnen muss Euch zwei Schuhe geben, mit denen Ihr die Reise machen sollt." Auf diese Weise hat der betrügerische Pilger erlangt, dass der Herr Isengrijn von seinen beiden Vorderfüssen das ganze Fell bis zu den Knien mit Ausschluss von den Klauen¹ verloren hat. Nie saht Ihr einen Vogel, der aufgebräut wird,² alle seine Glieder stiller halten als Isengrijn die seinigen hielt, da man ihm so jammervoll die Schuhe abzog, dass ihm das Blut zu den Zehen hinabströmte.

Nachdem man Isengrijn seine Schuhe abgenommen hatte, musste Frau Haersint, die Wölfin, mit gar trübem Sinn sich auf das Gras legen und sich das Fell und ebenso die Klauen von den Hinterfüssen abziehen lassen. Diese Tat besänftigte sehr Reinaerts trübe Stimmung. Nun hört, was für Klagen er noch mehr vorbringt: "Muhme," sagte er, "liebe Muhme, wie oft habt Ihr nicht Verdruss um meinetwillen gehabt! Das tut mir sehr leid; aber hinsichtlich dieser Schuhe ist es mir lieb, und ich sage Euch warum; Ihr seid mir,—und Ihr möget mir das glauben—die liebste von meinen Verwandten. Darum werde ich Eure Schuhe tragen. Gott weiss, das gereicht Euch nur zum Vorteil. Ihr sollt, liebe Muhme, an dem hohen Ablass und an der vollen Verzeihung, die ich in Euren Schuhen mir über See erringen will, Anteil haben." Frau Haersint war so weh zumute, dass sie kaum sprechen konnte. "Ach, Reinaert, Gott möge an Euch rächen, dass Ihr Euren Willen an uns erfüllt seht." Isengrijn war zornig und fürwahr auch sein Gefährte Bruun. Ihnen war das Herz sehr schwer, denn sie lagen gebunden und verwundet. Wäre auch zu gleicher Zeit Tibeert, der Kater, da gewesen, ich wage es wohl als wahr zu behaupten, der da vorher so viel getan hatte, er wäre dafür nicht unverschont geblieben.

Was würde es helfen, dass ich Euch die Sache lang und breit erzählte? Am folgenden Tage, vor Sonnenaufgang, schnürte sich Reinaert die Schuhe, die vorher Isengrijn und dessen Frau Haersint gehört hatten, an. Als er sie um seine Füsse hatte festbinden lassen, trat er vor den König und die

1. Diese Schuhe ohne die Klauen benutzte Reinaert für seine Vorderfüsse; sie waren "Handschuhe," die seine "Finger" frei liessen.

2. Dieser Ausdruck (mnl. braeuwen) ist der Falkenjagd entnommen. Da man dem Falken zuerst die Augen zunähte "um ihn an das Hören und Fühlen ungewohnter Dinge zu gewöhnen," kann man sich die Schmerzen vorstellen, die der Vogel bei dieser grausamen Behandlung auszuhalten hatte. Diesen Vorgang vergleicht nun unser Dichter mit der "Entschuhung" Isengrijns und mit bitterer Ironie erwähnt er, dass der Wolf dabei seine Glieder still gehalten habe. Vgl. Buitenrust Hetteema zu 2888.

Königin und sprach frohgemut: "Herr, Gott beschere Euch und meiner Herrin, der ich mit Recht Lob zollen kann, einen schönen Tag. Nun gebt Eurem Knechte Reinaert Pilgerstab und Tasche und lasst mich ziehen." Da liess der König sogleich den Kaplan Belijn, den Widder, herbeieilen, und als er zum Könige kam, sagte dieser: "Hier steht der Pilger; lest für ihn die Hochmesse und übergibt ihm Stab und Ränzel." Belijn antwortete darauf: "Ich darf es nicht tun. Reinaert hat selber bekannt, dass er in des Papstes Bann ist." Der König erwiderte: "Belijn, was tut das? Meister Jufroet¹ lehrt uns: 'Hätte ein Mann allein so viele Sünden begangen wie alle, die da leben, und wollte er sich des Bösen begeben und darauf zur Beichte gehen und dadurch Busse erlangen, dass er übers Meer führe, er könnte sich wohl von seinen Sünden reinigen.'" Belijn sagte darauf: "Meine Regel ist mit geistlichen Sachen garnichts zu tun zu haben, wenn Ihr mich nicht beim Bischof und beim Dekan schadlos halten wollt." Der König erwiderte: "In acht Wochen glaube ich Euch nicht um so viel zu bitten. Auch wäre mir lieber, dass Ihr am Galgen baumeltet, als dass ich Euch heute um etwas ersuchen sollte." Wie Belijn hörte, dass der König auf ihn ergrimmt war, erschrak er so sehr, dass er vor Angst bebte und seinen Altar zurechtmachen ging und all die Gebete zu singen und zu lesen begann, die ihn gut deuchten.

Als Belijn, der Kaplan, demütig das Tageszeitgebet² verrichtet hatte, tat er um Reinaerts Hals einen Ransen, aus Bruuns Fell gemacht. Auch gab er dem bösen Gesellen einen Stab in die Hand, der ihm sehr zupass kam. Da war dieser zur Fahrt völlig gerüstet und zum Könige sah er hin. Die erheuchelten Tränen liefen ihm den Bart hinunter, als ob er jammervoll in seinem Herzen vor Leid grosse Schmerzen hätte. Dies geschah deshalb und aus keinem andern Grunde, weil er allen denen, die er dort zurückliess, nicht solche Qualen wie Bruun und Isengrijn bereitet hatte, wenn es hätte geschehen können. Dennoch blieb er stehen und bat alle, dass sie für ihn beten sollten so getreulich, wie sie wünschten, dass er für

1. Grimm R. F. CLIX wies einen theologischen Schriftsteller, namens Goffridus (Andegavensis) in den ersten Zehnteln des zwölften Jahrhunderts nach. Die hier citierten Worte hat er aber in dessen Schriften nicht finden können.

2. Vgl. Anmk. zu S. 28.

sie alle beten möchte. Es dünkte ihn, dass es höchste Zeit wäre, Abschied zu nehmen, denn er wollte gerne von dannen. Der ist beständig in grosser Gefahr, der sich schuldig weiss. Da sprach der König: "Es tut mir leid, Reinaert, dass Ihr so sehr eilt." "Nein, Herr, es ist Zeit. Eine Guttat soll man nicht aufsparen. Gestattet mir meine Reise anzutreten." Der König sagte darauf: "Reiset mit Gott." Dann gebot er allen Anwesenden, mit Ausnahme der Gefangenen, Reinaert vom Hofe zu geleiten.

So wurde Reinaert ein Pilger, und sein Ohm Isengrijn und Bruun lagen in Banden, krank von ihren Wunden. Mich dünkt, und ich glaube, dass es niemand zwischen Pollanen und Scouden¹ gibt, der, wie ernsthaft er auch wäre, und was für Kummer ihn auch befallen möchte, sich des Lachens enthalten hätte, hätte er Reinaert da gesehen, wie er wunderlich von dannen ging, den Ranzen um den Hals in passender Weise, den Stab in der Hand, die Schuhe, die er trug, an seinen Beinen festgebunden, vollkommen so, dass er leicht genug für einen Pilger gehalten werden konnte. Reinaert lachte das Herz vor Freuden, weil da alle in grosser Anzahl ihn begleiteten, die vorher zornig auf ihn gewesen waren. Da sprach er: "König, ich bedaure, dass Ihr so weit mit mir geht; ich fürchte, es kann Euch schlecht ergehen. Ihr habt zwei Mörder zu Gefangenen. Ereignet es sich, dass sie Euch entkommen, so müsst Ihr Euch noch mehr als je zuvor hüten. Bleibt gesund und lasst mich meines Weges ziehen." Nach diesen Worten stellte er sich auf seine zwei Hinterfüsse und ermahnte die Tiere, gross und klein, dass sie alle für ihn beten sollten, wenn sie an seinen Guttaten recht teilzunehmen wünschten. Sie sagten, dass sie seiner in ihrem Gebete gedenken wollten. Nun hört weiter, was Reinaert tat. Da er von dem Könige schied, benahm er sich so trübselig, dass es manchen von ihnen erbarmte. Cuwaert, den Hasen, jammerte er folgendermassen an: "O weh, Cuwaert, dass wir uns trennen sollen! Wenn Gott es will, sollt Ihr und mein Freund Belijn, der Widder, mit mir gehen. Ihr zwei, Ihr tat mir nie ein Leid an. Ihr müsst mich noch weiter begleiten. Süss ist es mit Euch umzugehen; Ihr seid unbescholten und gutartig, kein Tier beklagt sich über Euch;

1. Vielleicht Polen und Schottland, (vgl. Martin, XVII), doch sind auch drei Ortschaften namens Polane in Holland nachgewiesen (vgl. Buitenrust Hettena unter "Polane") und Scoude identifiziert Grimm mit der seeländischen Insel Schouwen.

Euer beider Benehmen ist beständig, wie auch das meine damals zu jener Zeit war, als ich ein Einsiedler war. Habt Ihr nur Laub und Gras, dann begehrt Ihr weder Brot, Fleisch noch einen Leckerbissen." Mit solchen Lobeserhebungen hat Reinaert diese zwei so betört, dass sie mit ihm weitergingen, bis dass er vor sein Haus und vor die Pforte von Maupertuus kam.

Als Reinaert dort angelangt war, sagte er: "Neffe Belijn, Ihr müsst allein draussen bleiben. Ich muss mich in meine Feste begeben, Cuwaert soll mit mir hineingehen. Herr Belijn, bittet ihn, dass er Frau Hermeline nebst ihren kleinen Jungen gut tröste, wenn ich von ihnen Abschied nehme." Belijn gab zur Antwort: "Ich ersuche ihn darum, dass er sie alle gut tröste." Reinaert war ein Schmeichler und tat mit gleissnerischen Worten auf so mannigfaltige Art schön, dass er durch Hinterlist Cuwaert in den unterirdischen Gang brachte.

Als Cuwaert und Reinaert zusammen in das Loch kamen, fanden sie dort Frau Hermeline mit ihren kleinen Jungen. Sie war in Sorge und Angst, weil sie glaubte, dass Reinaert gehängt sei. Und als sie nun sah, dass er wieder heimkam und Stab und Ranzen trug, schien ihr das sehr wunderbar. Sie war froh und sprach sogleich: "Reinaert, wie seid Ihr entkommen?" "Ich bin Pilger geworden; Herr Bruun und Herr Isengrijn sind als Geiseln für mich zurückgeblieben. Der König hat, und ihm sei Dank dafür, uns zu gerechter Sühne Cuwaert übergeben, mit dem wir tun können, was wir wollen. Der König sah, dass Cuwaert der erste war, der uns an ihn verriet, und bei der Treue, die ich Euch, Frau Hermeline, schulde, grosses Leid soll über Cuwaert kommen. Ich bin mit Recht auf ihn zornig. Und als Cuwaert das hörte, kehrte er um und wollte fliehen. Aber das konnte nicht geschehen, denn Reinaert hatte ihm den Ausgang abgeschnitten und ergriff ihn sogleich, voll von Mordbegier, bei der Kehle. Und Cuwaert schrie jämmerlich: "Helft mir, Belijn, wo seid Ihr? Dieser Pilger beisst mich zu Tode."

Das Rufen war schnell vorüber, denn Reinaert hatte ihm sogleich die Kehle durchgebissen. Da sprach er: "Nun lasst uns diesen guten fetten Hasen verspeisen." Die Jungen liefen zu dem Leichnam hin, um ihn gemeinsam aufzuessen. Ihre Trauer war gering, dass Cuwaert das Leben verloren

hatte. Ermeline, Reinaerts Frau, ass das Fleisch und trank das Blut. Ei, wie viel Gutes wünschte sie dem Könige, der aus reiner Güte die kleinen Jungen mit einem guten Mahl erfreut hatte. Reinaert sprach: "Er gönnt es Euch aus vollem Herzen. Ich weiss wohl, bleibt der König am Leben, er würde uns gerne Gaben geben, die er selbst nicht um sieben Mark Gold haben wollte." "Was für ein Geschenk ist es?" fragte Hermeline. Reinaert antwortete: "Es ist ein Strick und der First eines Galgens nebst zwei gabelförmigen Pfählen. Kann ich aber, so werde ich hoffentlich entspringen, ehe zwei Tage vorübergehen, so dass ich um seine Vorladung nichts mehr gebe als er um meine." Sie sagte, "wie kann das sein?"

Reinaert erwiderte: "Frau, ich sage es Euch. Ich kenne eine Wildnis voller Wald und Heide, wo kein Mangel an guter Lagerstätte und Speise herrscht. Dort wohnen Hühner und Rebhühner und mancherlei andere Vögel. Wollt Ihr, Frau Hermeline, dorthin mit mir gehen, so können wir da, wenn wir wollen, wohl sieben Jahre im Schatten wandeln und friedlich dahinleben, ehe wir ausgespäht werden. Sagte ich sogar mehr, ich würde nicht lügen."

"Ei, Reinaert," sprach Frau Hermeline, "dies scheint mir eine Mühe zu sein, die vollständig vergebens wäre. Habt Ihr nicht dieses Land abgeschworen und versprochen darin nicht eher zu wohnen, bis Ihr über die See gefahren seid? Ausserdem habt Ihr Pilgerstab und Tasche angenommen." Reinaert antwortete sogleich: "Je mehr geschworen, desto mehr verloren." Mir erklärte einstmals ein guter Mann, den ich zu Rate zog: 'Gezwungener Eid bindet nicht.' Selbst wenn ich diese Reise ausführte, wäre ich um nichts besser daran. Ich habe dem Könige einen Schatz versprochen, der mir nicht zur Hand ist. Und sobald er die Wahrheit davon erfährt, dass ich ihm alles vorgelogen habe, und dass er durch mich betrogen worden ist, so wird er mich noch viel mehr hassen, als er es je getan hat. Darum denke ich mir, dass das Reisen ebenso gut wie das Bleiben ist," sprach Reinaert. "Und möge mein roter Bart verflucht sein, (es möge mir ergehen, wie es will), weder der Kater, noch der Dachs, noch Bruun, der mir ein so lieber Oheim war, geben mir die Zuversicht, dass ich, weder um des Gewinnstes noch um des Schadens willen,

die Huld des Königs erlangen kann, und lebte ich auch noch so lange. Ich habe so manche Angst erlitten."

Der Widder Belijn war sehr wütend, dass Cuwaert, sein Gefährte, so lang in der Höhle verweilte. Er rief wie einer, der sich sehr erzürnte: "Cuwaert, lasst den Teufel schalten und walten; wie lange wird Euch Reinaert dort zurückhalten? Warum kommt Ihr nicht heraus, so dass wir gehen können?" Als Reinaert dies vernommen hatte, ging er zu Belijn hinaus und sprach ganz heimlich: "Ei, Herr, warum ärgert Ihr Euch? Wenn Cuwaert auch sich mit mir und seiner Muhme unterhielt, warum kann Euch das so verdriessen? Cuwaert gab mir zu verstehen, dass Ihr langsam vorangehen könntet, wenn Ihr hier nicht länger bleiben wollt. Er muss hier noch ein wenig bei seiner Muhme Hermeline und ihren kleinen Jungen verweilen, die sehr weinen und grosse Betrübnis äussern, weil ich sie verlassen muss." Belijn sprach: "Nun sagt mir, Reinaert, was habt Ihr Cuwaert zuleide getan? Wann immer ich hören konnte, rief er laut um Hilfe nach mir." Reinaert sagte: "Was sagt Ihr, Belijn? Gott möge Euch beraten. Ich sage Euch, was wir machten. Als ich ins Haus trat, und Ermeline von mir erfuhr, dass ich übers Meer fahren wollte, wurde ihr sogleich so weh, dass sie lange in Ohnmacht lag. Und als Cuwaert dies sah, rief er laut: 'Freier Held, kommt hierher und helft mir meine Muhme wiederbeleben! Sie ist ohnmächtig.' Das schrie er mit aller Kraft. Das waren die Worte und nichts andres." "Wahrhaftig, ich hörte auch wohl, dass Cuwaert sehr seine Trauer äusserte. Ich glaubte, es wäre ihm etwa übel ergangen." Reinaert sprach: "Nein, das ist nicht der Fall; mir wäre lieber, dass etwas meinem Weibe oder meinen Kindern zustiesse als ihm, meinem Neffen Cuwaert."

Reinaert fuhr fort: "Vernahmt Ihr etwa, wie mir der König gestern vor gar sehr vielen hohen Leuten befahl, als ich von Hofe schied, ihm einige Zeilen zu schreiben? Würdet Ihr sie überbringen, Neffe Belijn? Der Brief ist geschrieben und fertig." Belijn antwortete: "Ich weiss nicht. Reinaert, wüsste ich, dass Euer Schriftstück ehrlich gemeint wäre, Ihr hättet leicht bitten, dass ich es zum Könige trüge, vorausgesetzt, dass ich etwas hätte, worin ich es hineinstecken könnte." Reinaert sprach: "Euch soll nichts mangeln. Lie-

ber als dass der Brief an den König hier bliebe, würde ich Euch, Herr Belijn, diese Tasche geben, die ich trage, und sie um Euren Hals hängen, mit dem Briefe darin. Ihr werdet davon grossen Gewinn, den Dank des Königs und grosse Ehre haben. Ihr werdet dem Könige, meinem Herrn, sehr willkommen sein." Herr Belijn schenkte seinen Worten Glauben.

Reinaert ging in den unterirdischen Gang, kehrte zurück und brachte seinem Freunde Belijn Cuwaerts Haupt, das er in die Tasche gesteckt hatte, und diese tat er, voller böser Streiche, Belijn um den Hals und befahl ihm durchaus sich nicht den Brief anzusehen, wenn er den König zu seinem Freunde machen wolle. Auch sagte er, dass der Brief in der Tasche verborgen sei, und wenn er reich werden und seinem Herrn, dem Könige, teuer und lieb sein wolle, dass er vorgeben solle, dass dieser Brief von ihm allein geschrieben worden sei, und dass er den Rat dazu gegeben habe. Der König würde ihm dafür Dank wissen. Als Belijn dies hörte, sprang er von der Stelle, wo er stand, mehr als einen halben Fuss in die Höhe. So froh war er über diese Sache, die später leidvoll für ihn endigte.

Da sprach Belijn: Herr Reinaert, wohl ist mir bekannt, dass Ihr mir und denjenigen, die am Hofe sind, Ehre erweist. Man wird mir grosses Lob spenden, sobald man weiss, dass ich mit schönen und glatten Worten dichten kann, obgleich ich es in Wirklichkeit nicht verstehe. Oft ist gesagt worden, dass manchem Mann grosse Ehre geschehen ist wegen Dinge, die er wenig kannte, weil es ihm Gott gönnte." Danach sprach Belijn: "Reinaert, was ist Euer Rat? Will Cuwaert mit mir zurück zu Hofe gehen?" "Nein," sprach Reinaert, "aber er soll Euch alsbald auf demselben Pfade folgen; es mangelt ihm noch an Gelegenheit. Geht jetzt mit Gemächlichkeit voran; ich habe Cuwaert etwas zu offenbaren, was noch verborgen ist." "Reinaert, so bleibet Gott empfohlen," sagte Belijn und machte sich auf den Rückweg.—Nun hört, was Reinaert tut. Er kehrte in seinen unterirdischen Gang zurück und sprach: "Lärm wird geschlagen werden und grosses Leid wird über uns hereinbrechen, wenn wir hier bleiben. Macht Euch, Frau Hermeline, und alle meine Kinder fertig. Folgt mir, ich bin Euer Vater, und lasst uns keine Mühe scheuen, zu entkommen." Da zögerte man dort nicht länger; sie traten ihre Reise an.

Ermeline und Herr Reinaert und ihre jungen Füchslin suchten die Wildnis auf.

Nun war Belijn, der Widder, so gelaufen, dass er kurz nach Mittag an den Hof kam. Als der König Belijn sah, der die Tasche zurückbrachte, um welche früher Bruun, der Bär, auf so unsanfte Weise gebracht worden war, sprach er sogleich: "Herr Belijn, von wannen kommt Ihr? Wo ist Reinaert? Wie kommt es, dass er diese Tasche nicht trägt?" Belijn antwortete: "König, ich kann es Euch nach bestem Wissen sagen. Als Reinaert ganz fertig war und seine Burg verlassen wollte, da sagte er mir, dass er Euch, o freier König, ein paar Zeilen senden wollte, und bat mich, Euch zu Liebe, sie mitzunehmen. Ich erwiderte: 'mehr als sieben Briefe würde ich Euretwillen tragen.' Da konnte Reinaert nichts finden, worin ich den Brief tragen konnte; diese Tasche brachte er mir, in die der Brief hineingesteckt war. König, Ihr habt nie von einem bessern Dichter sprechen hören als ich es bin; diesen Brief verfasste ich für ihn, ob es mir nun zum Guten oder zum Bösen ausschlägt. Dieser Brief ist auf meinen Rat so verfasst und geschrieben." Da hiess ihn der König den Brief seinem Schreiber Botsaert¹ geben. Das war der, der dieses Geschäft besser kannte als irgend jemand, der da war. Botsaert pflegte stets die Briefe, die an den Hof kamen, zu lesen. Bruneel und er nahmen Belijn, der aus Dummheit so viel gesagt hatte, dass er schleunig zornig werden wird, die Tasche ab. Botsaert, der Schreiber, nahm sie in Empfang. Da musste Reinaerts Werk zu Tage kommen.

Als Botsaert das Haupt herauszog und es sah, rief er: "Helfe Gott, was für ein Brief ist dies? Herr König, bei meinem Glauben, dies ist Cuwaerts Haupt. O weh, König, dass Ihr je Reinaert so sehr getraut habt!" Da konnte man den König und die Königin betrübt und zornig sehen. Der König stand in traurigem Sinnen mit gesenktem Kopfe. Nach langer Zeit erhob er ihn wieder und begann das schrecklichste Brüllen auszustossen, das je von einem Tiere gehört ward. Alle Tiere waren angsterfüllt.

Da sprang Firapeel, der Leopard, auf. Er war ein weitläufiger Verwandter des Königs, er konnte es wohl wagen. Er sprach: "Herr König Löwe, warum treibt Ihr so grosse

1. Ein unbekanntes Tier. Im Reinke de vos nimmt Bökert, der Biber, seine Stelle ein.

Ungebühr? Ihr jammert genug, als ob die Königin tot wäre. Seid so gut und zeigt Eure grosse Weisheit und lasst etwas mit Eurem Leide nach." Der König erwiderte: "Herr Firapeel, mich hat ein böser Wicht so sehr betrogen und durch Betrug ins Verderben geführt, dass ich darüber zornig bin und mit Recht mich selbst hasse, denn meine Ehre habe ich verloren. Die zuvor meine Freunde waren, der stolze Bruun und Isengrijn, die raubt mir ein betrügerischer Pilger. Das geht meinem Herzen so nahe, dass es mit Recht mir an Ehre und Leben gehen soll!" Da sprach Firapeel dagegen: "Ist übel gehandelt worden, so soll man es sühnen. Man soll dem Wolf und dem kühnen Bruun und ebenso der Frau Hersent die ihnen widerfahrene Unbill gutmachen und ihren Zorn und ihre Qualen mit dem Widder Belijn versöhnen, weil dieser selbst zugestanden hat, dass er Cuwaert verraten. Er hat übel gehandelt, er muss es bezahlen. Und danach sollen wir alle zu Reinaert laufen, ihn fangen und ihn ohne Urteil mit Fug und Recht aufhängen." Da antwortete der König wiederum: "O weh, Herr Firapeel, könnte das geschehen, so wäre der Schmerz, der mich niederdrückt, einigermassen besänftigt." Firapeel sprach: "Herr, es soll geschehen, ich will die Sühne zustande bringen."

Da ging der kühne Firapeel zu den Gefangenen. Ich wähne, dass er sie zuerst losband. Danach sagte er: "Ihr zwei Herren, ich bringe Euch Frieden und sicheres Geleit. Mein Herr, der König, sendet Euch Grösse, und er bereut jetzt sehr, dass er Euch schlimm behandelt hat. Er macht Euch das Anerbieten, wenn Ihr es annehmen wollt (ob Ihr nun frohen oder zornigen Gemütes seid): Er will Euch Belijn, den Widder, übergeben und alle Verwandten des Herrn Belijn von jetzt an bis zum Jüngsten Gericht, sei es im Feld, sei es im Wald, Ihr habt sie alle in Eurer Macht, beisst sie tot, wenn es Euch gefällt. Der König entbietet Euch vor allem, dass Ihr, ohne eine Missetat zu begehen, Reinaert und allen seinen Verwandten Leid und Schlimmes zufügen dürft, wo immer Ihr sie erlauern könnt. Diese grossen Privilegien will Euch heute der König auf ewig als freies Lehen¹ geben. Und inzwischen wünscht der mächtige König, dass Ihr ihm unver-

1. Ein Lehen hiess frei, wenn keine Gegenleistung dafür verlangt wurde. (Vgl. Geyder zu 3459.)

brüchlich Huld schwört. Auch will er nimmermehr mit Absicht sich gegen Euch vergehen. Dies entbietet Euch der König Löwe. Nehmt dies an und lebt in Gnaden; bei Gott, ich darf es Euch wohl raten." Isengriijn sprach zum Bären: "Was sagt Ihr dazu, Herr Bruun?" "Ich ziehe es vor im Walde zu liegen als hier im Eisen.¹ Lasst uns zum Könige gehen und seinen Frieden dort empfangen."

So begleiteten sie Firapeel und schlossen vollen Frieden.

1. Buitenrust Hetteema citiert zu der Stelle aus Traunsdorf: Erst. Tausend d. weltl. Poematum (Bern 1642): Besser in den reissern als in den eisern.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI STUDIES

A NEW CONCEPTION
OF RELATIVITY AND LOCKE

BY

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University of Cincinnati

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RELATIVITY AND LOCKE

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is twofold. In the first place, I seek to offer a new and developed formulation of relativity; and secondly, to present this doctrine in connection with Locke, for whom I thereby hope to gain a renewed and revised consideration.

Relativity has for so long a time been consigned to the rôle of scapegoat in the history of thought that, not unlike the appellation "heresy" in the realm of religion, a stigma has come to adhere to relativity not any more easily counteracted or dispelled. That this should be the case is not wholly without cause; for when we look more closely into this concept, the fact that it has never been subjected to a critical examination is but one of the many singular and surprising features to be enumerated concerning it. My own conviction is, that, if the principle of relativity be given a full and proper formulation, not only would a new and very fruitful starting point in metaphysical inquiry offer itself, but one that in a way effects that closer connection between metaphysics and science so generally expressed in the aspirations no less than in the despair of current thought. The meaning attached to the term relativity must abide its place. I could not attempt its definition at this point without going far afield. I, therefore, leave this matter for the present to speak further of Locke.

While I attach an equal importance to both aspects of the study, the accurate presentation of relativity as it exists in Locke is my more immediate interest. Nor do I aim at urging some mere side doctrine in him, but one that in the slow growth and development of his ideas becomes increasingly central, inclusive, and self-conscious. I frankly confess that this is not the view I held of him a few years ago. Nor is it likely that my older traditional conception of him would have undergone its radical change if conditions had not led me to give Book III of his *Essay* more serious reading than our traditional opinion of it seemed to invite. This Book, supposedly the last of the Books written, in turn became the key for reading the others. I submit the outcome in these pages as a real discovery of Locke.

Locke tells his friend Molyneux that Book III gave him more labor in the writing than the rest of the *Essay*. This fact does

not of necessity insure merit. Yet I mention it as a fact not without its significance, and further, advance the contention that, until Book III was written, Locke never came into full possession of his "new way of ideas"—a philosophical view that not only embraces what is most distinctive in modern pragmatism, but one that presents the relevant metaphysics and system so lacking in pragmatism. I admit Book III does not at first appear to have its specific doctrines writ in italics. Locke himself confesses in respect to this Book: "I should not much wonder if there be in some places of it obscurity and doubtfulness . . . though the thoughts were easy and clear enough, yet [it] cost me more pains to express them than all the rest of my Essay." The fact is that Locke's "new way of ideas" here took its last "new" turn, and its consummate character once clearly grasped, one ceases overnight to view Locke traditionally.

In affirming Locke to be essentially the relativist¹, and not essentially the reputed sensationalist, I expose myself to misunderstanding. He is the sensationalist, as reputed, for those who will not consider Locke beyond the evident sensationalistic implications of his doctrine, and who, in support of their claim, may turn to the British movement in philosophy that arose out of Locke. But let it be remembered that Kant's philosophy also had an origin in Locke, and do I trespass in stating that perhaps Pragmatism owes more to Locke than may be consciously recognized or accepted? So historical outcome pitted against historical outcome avails little in deciding an issue. Nor in denying Locke to be primarily the sensationalist, am I unaware that T. H. Green (not to mention others) has written a critique of him that dare not be ignored. His aim, however, is to show up Locke negatively, not constructively; to show him up in the light of the exclusive sensationalistic precursor of Berkeley and Hume, and in so doing, to expose in him as absurd any departure from this principle and Green's self-imposed dialectics. This sort of criticism is not helpful, however else remarkable the critique may be in its superior merits and mental acrobatics.

To begin with, Locke, instead of abandoning "the historical plain method" to which he pledges himself in his Introduction, in order to pursue the psychological trend of which he stands accused,

1. For a serious attempt at a proper definition of this term I refer the reader to Chapter II.

is in the main so consistent with his original design that I am almost inclined to ignore the first half dozen or more of his chapters in Book II for the havoc they have done in distorting and eclipsing the far more central, consistent, and evolved doctrine existing in his pages. And when, in addition, I find Locke in his psychological digressions expressly acknowledging a departure from his avowed method, I ask myself what blame for all this distortion of our perspective rests with Berkeley and Hume? There is no need, however, for all that to lessen the value of the chapters indicated. Chapter VIII of that Book, in particular, is not the only instance where we find Locke forcing an extreme view; and, hence to discount the exaggeration of his views in this chapter is not any more, nor any less, valid, than to do so with the many other extreme views with which his Essay abounds. Read him where we will, we find, as I shall endeavor to outline, the most one-sided and extreme position brought face to face in his pages with others equally extreme and one-sided; and when we ask where in this jumble of views we are to find Locke, it behooves us to arrest any tendency to frame a too hasty judgment concerning the matter, and, most of all, at the outset, to venture the assumption that Locke did not know his own mind. It requires no great discernment to perceive that Green got his guiding thread, not from Locke himself, but from the traditional view of him. But Locke remains Locke, work the veritable gold mine of his Essay for some of its gold only, or for most of it, or merely for its dross.

The whole matter hinges upon the rôle of the simple ideas. Are they at bottom to be taken as working assumptions or as actual facts? Here Locke in the growth of his thoughts decidedly vacillates, although tradition has obviously failed to follow him. "The historical plain method," at its inception as well as in its constant application, reflects one specific problem: the problem of the One and the Many, in the solution of which, his simple ideas (namely, his sensationalism) are not a *problem* but assumed facts. When he inclines to consider them as more than assumptions, he, with confession, ceases to be the metaphysician and turns psychologist, and then the simple ideas themselves become the *problem*. Yet he writes: "Every mixed mode, consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire, 'whence it has its unity, and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one

idea, since that combination does not always exist together in nature?' To which I answer, it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind."² Whether his simple ideas are in fact simple or whether complex, the problem uppermost with him, notwithstanding, will persist: "how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea." For, as he would say, we do regard charity as one idea, however multitudinous its parts, and so with our notions of man or gold. They have no unity actually existing "in nature;" then "whence do they have their unity?" The sensationalistic interpretation of Locke would imply that the simple ideas rather than the complex ideas engrossed his interest. I venture the opposite contention.

It remains to add that the present study had its initial appearance under the title of "Locke a Constructive Relativist."³ The original study, however, has been subjected to a revision so general as to compel a change from the original to the present title. Chapters II, IV, and XI may be read for the more exclusive treatment of relativity. The study as a whole, however, constitutes a unit.

2. Bk. II, ch. 22, sec. 4.

3. Scientific Press, New York, 1912. It appeared as "A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University."

I

GENERAL SURVEY

CHAPTER I

THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL STEPS IN LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY

"It is past doubt," says Locke, "that men have in their minds several ideas,—such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, —How he comes by them?"¹ Locke's position here is clear. He takes existing distinctions in consciousness as the starting-point in his attempted "account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain these notions of *things* we have."² This position cannot be overemphasized. He accepts the reality of thinking and the reality of distinctions within thought, and his main problem is, not whether such distinctions exist apart from thought, nor what they may chance to be apart from thought, but how such distinctions, as commonly recognized in our experience, come about; what is their ground or basis? And it is my contention that this problem, although given its most specific and most evolved solution in his doctrine of sorts in Book III, receives no less profuse elaboration in every other part of his Essay.

His *first* general attempt to account for such distinctions consists in his well-known contention, that all we know of reality resolves itself into ideas, of which he recognizes two sorts,—simple ideas and complex ideas. Of these, simple ideas are ultimate and underived; the complex ideas a mere aggregation of the simple ideas. Knowledge, in Locke's sense of the word, is in no way involved in the conscious existence of simple ideas, although the organism is involved in the production of some of them (the secondary qualities). Knowledge begins its career only when the simple ideas are brought into union or connection by the mind, and terminates in such products as (1) Complex Ideas,

1. Bk. II, ch. 1, sec. 1.

2. Introduction, sec 2.

(2) Meaning, (3) Knowledge proper, and (4) Knowledge as opinion or judgments of probability. All these evolved distinctions within our experience, so Locke contends, are, notwithstanding, but complications or modes of simple ideas, and that they approximate reality so far only as they admit of a reduction to their source of origin in the simple ideas. Hence that contention in Locke, that complex ideas and meaning, considered apart from their reduction to simple ideas, are unreal, and that knowledge in general is unreal and irrelevant except where grounded in the necessity of a "visible and necessary" relation between them; that is, that knowledge remains unreal until, as a *perceptive* meaning, as it were, it resolves itself to the status of a simple irreducible idea. Here the principle that comes to the surface is, that what is rational is real, in conformity with which, Locke makes the *à priori* modes the highest and most perfect forms of reality. But the simple ideas, as just indicated, were also made the supreme forms of reality. From this it would follow that there are two principles of truth and reality recognized by Locke, and not one, although now it is the one that gains the ascendancy in him, and then the other. But even when we ignore this dual standard and confine ourselves to the empirical standard only, we find the same see-saw manifested in his pages. In different parts of his Essay, he evaluates complex ideas and meaning very differently in respect to simple ideas, by hypothesis, considered the sole ultimates. We find that complex ideas and meaning get themselves viewed, now as unreal, then as real,—as real and as ultimate as his hypothetical simple ideas. And when we ask by which decision Locke in truth stands, we can answer in the affirmative, one way or the other, only by emphasizing his statements at one place and in one context, and by ignoring what he as explicitly states to the contrary in other parts of his Essay. He who does not take these various contradictions of Locke into full consideration and hold them together, may attain to a consistent theory or view of him, but he can do so only by a process of elimination and by a substitution of a dialect, so to speak, for Locke's own rich, although varied, utterance. It is as difficult at times to answer whether Locke is a rationalist as it is to answer whether Locke is an empiricist; just as upon the empirical basis, as just indicated, it is difficult at times to answer whether Locke regards meaning and complex ideas as

ultimate as simple ideas, or not. What are we to make of this tangle? At what point dogmatize concerning him?

Locke's first step, as just stated, "to account for the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have" led him to the belief that simple ideas contained the sole ground of explanation. He rests his claim upon the fact that the simple ideas are essentially non-relative. To admit anything else were to court an infinite regress—such seems his conviction. Yet, on the other hand, he admits as emphatically (1) that they are conditioned in their shape and character by the structure of our sense organs; (2) that, within such existing structure, *variation* in range and acuteness of perception is the law; (3) that their perception by a direct vision, involving a transcendence of the ordinary mode of perception, is ideal; (4) that they involve a latent judgment; (5) that they reduce to mere products of externally conditioning factors (relativity); (6) that simple modes, although complex, are irreducible; (7) that mixed modes are *ultimate* and have their real essence in thought (*à priori* rationalism); (8) that complex ideas of substances are *ultimate* and have their reality in distinctions as final in character as our distinction between a horse and a stone. And thus he wrestles with his problem to and fro! Simple ideas are ultimate—this conclusion he will not let go, and yet he feels himself forced to admit: "that whatever doth or can exist, or be considered as one thing, is positive; and so not only simple ideas and substances, but modes also, are positive beings: though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another; but the whole together, considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing, which idea is in our minds, as one picture though an aggregate of divers parts, is a positive or absolute thing or idea."³ But if simple ideas, by the admissions catalogued, are conceded to be complex or relative, as the case may be, and complex ideas, as just quoted, "positive or absolute," what becomes of our original and fundamental distinction between simple ideas and our complex ideas? The next quotation will aid to a solution of the matter in Locke's own words. "It is not, therefore, unity of substance," writes Locke in his chapter on Identity and Diversity, "that comprehends all sort of identity, or will determine it in every case. . . . Thus in the case of living creatures, their

identity depends, not on a mass of particles, but on something else.”⁴ But what is this “something else,” capable of conferring a unity where there is a diversity? Our answer to this question conducts us into the *second* fundamental step in Locke’s philosophy, and it consists in locating the principle of unity in the subject and no longer in any external object. In Book IV this principle is located in “Reason”; in Book III it is located in what he terms an abstract idea or definition; in Book II in what he terms “ideas of relation”; and, lastly, throughout his Essay, in what he frequently terms “our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being.”⁵ Even our simple ideas do not escape this general transfer in their unity, and, in their case, the unity is found dependent upon the particular character and structure of our sense organs, or upon a single picture or conception in the mind. The outcome of the doctrine, taken in its full setting, is what I term constructive relativity.

His treatment of this general subject is critical and destructive, as well as positive and constructive. A general outline of his inquiry, with a suggestion of the final conclusion to be reached, will amply suffice for a passing orientation in this second and more fundamental step in Locke’s philosophy.

Our simple ideas given, why not rest content with them? Why seek to combine them? And when we thus set about to unite them, what constitutes our motive or motives, and what our “patterns”? Grant, if you will, that a certain aim is compassed in reducing complex ideas to simple ideas, whether that aim be pragmatic (a test of their truth or reality) or epistemological (a determination of the varied elements involved in a possible bit of knowledge, or in knowledge as a whole), and yet it is evident that no *adequate* “account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of *things* we have” could end with the fact that our *particular* notions involve a purely *general* truth or reality; it is well-nigh tantamount to saying that they have no truth or reality at all. The emphasis with Locke throughout is placed, not upon the universal, but upon the particulars. Hence his real problem: simple ideas given, why do we combine them at all, and such and such qualities with this object and others with other objects? We may seek the solution in the answer that different objects are inherently of a different constitution or

4. Ibid., sec. 7.

5. Bk. IV, ch. 11, sec. 8.

essence. But this answer merely begs the question at issue. We answer our question by off-hand asserting a principle of differentiation not discoverable within our experience.

Now Locke vigorously denies the validity thus to explain our *why*. Thus he writes: "Our faculties carry us no further toward the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas which we observe in them. . . . A blind man may as soon sort things by their color, and he that has lost his smell as well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odor, as by those internal constitutions which he knows not."⁶ Locke returns to this contention with a wearisome prolixity, now dominated by the rationalistic, then by the sensationalistic, the nominalistic, the dualistic, or the relativistic point of view, but he is rarely at variance with the conclusion that we never know an object's *real* essence but its *nominal*⁷ essence only; and he constantly questions the legitimacy even to assume the existence of a real essence,—“that inherent constitution which everything has within itself, without any relation to anything without it.”⁸

Thus reduced to our simple ideas, we may ask whether they have any natural and visible “connections and dependencies,” whereby guidance is yielded in the proper formation of our particular complex ideas? And here Locke's answer, in general theory, is again consistently negative.⁹ Hence Locke's conclusion, that our complex ideas, of which there are, according to him, three distinct sorts,—modes, substances, and relations,—“are of man's, and not of nature's making.” In regard to mixed modes, his general contention is, “that they are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without patterns or reference to any real existence. Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the suggestion of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable.”¹⁰

I have now sufficiently outlined, in general theory, the second step in Locke's philosophy. But this second step, so easily over-

6. Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 9.

7. Although the terms *real* and *nominal* undergo some change in their meaning, all of which shall be touched upon in detail later, the distinction in Locke is vital to modern thought and is no mere echo or vestige of mediaeval thought so frequently fancied. There is a sense in which Locke no less than Kant produced a critique of historical thought, and the most profitable entrance to this complete study of Locke is this very distinction of his between the *real* and the *nominal* essences.

8. Bk: III, ch. 6, sec. 6.

9. See Bk. IV, ch. 3, secs. 28-29.

10. Bk. III, ch. 5, sec. 3.

looked as a *second* step, and so commonly regarded as a subordinate phase only of the *first* step in his argument, instead of the reverse, calls for a few additional considerations at this point.

The problem which particularly concerns Locke after he has once settled the claim that it is the nominal and not the real essence "which determines the sorts of things," may be made to take the following form: what constitutes the "measure and boundary" of each particular thing, whereby it is made that particular thing, and distinguished from others? And his answer is: an object's measure and boundary is the "workmanship of the mind," operative within the nominal essence, and a matter of definition or abstract idea; that is, a construct. This answer, as elaborated in Locke, suffers in cogency, only where he persists in his exaggerated theoretical claim, that "there is no individual parcel of matter to which any of its qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it,"¹¹ and rendered with the meaning, that every particular parcel of matter reduces to pure flux as it were; that is, reduces to a degree of variability or instability never experienced save in a theory which ignores *varying* degrees of *instability* and *varying* degrees of *stability*, as commonly experienced. It is only when thus rendered that it is necessary for him to find the *sole* principle of stability or permanence in a realm other than that of matter-of-fact. But it is in this version only that his notion of the definition or abstract idea as constituting the "essence" of a thing, namely, its measure and boundary, chimes in with his generally assumed dualism, or absolute divorce, between "fact" and "meaning," in the varied forms this divorce assumes in his Essay. Thus formulated, Locke's doctrine would be indeed a doctrine of (a rationalistic type of) relativity of a most extreme and exaggerated sort; but it would be a type of relativity where everything was attributed to the function of thought, only to be dashed to naught by one fell stroke: "nothing exists but particulars;"—which doctrine, when pushed to extremes, as Locke's writings only too frequently favor, practically means, *that all knowledge is irrelevant*. "Nothing exists but particulars!" But if "particulars," as indicated, are so elastic in content as to imply any content from a mere blank to the universe, how again avoid an interminable see-saw? Above the level of a mere zero, the "particular" would thus again openly negate knowledge, only itself tacitly to usurp it.

11. Ibid., ch 6, sec. 6.

In holding then, as Locke does, that "each distinct idea is a distinct essence," nothing more is implied by him than that such determination or boundary of a thing, as of this or that kind, is given in an abstract idea or definition, which, although in one sense less complete than reality, in another sense, exceeds it. It is incomplete or inadequate in respect to the sum total of its potential qualities; but in respect to its momentary existences, all alike partial and variable, it is in excess of any such single instance of its actual existence. For, at any moment, any given object may possess almost any quality and lose almost any of its qualities the next. There is a need of unity in the midst of diversity. Hence his conception of an object is that of a construct, which involves a description of an object in Locke truly marvelous, not only because it emerges out of a sea of contradictions and prepossessions, but, because in the form it finally assumes, it stands unsurpassed. The question is not whether we have gotten beyond Locke; rather is it the question whether we have caught up to him. Back to Book III, is the plea I would urge for a proper understanding of the other Books.

CHAPTER II

RELATIVITY DEFINED AND LOCKE'S POSITION INDICATED IN RESPECT TO ITS VARIOUS FORMULATIONS

Historic thought has given specific formulation and currency to several forms of relativity. In its most general form, the principle properly denotes the theory that every object determines, and is determined by, every other object,¹ and, thus considered, commonly supports the claim that any object, at any point of its history, is capable of a still larger growth or of a reduction by a mere *mathematical* increase or decrease of its relations with other objects. Conceived in this form, I designate the principle *radical* relativity. This formulation of it is the one that is most commonly encountered, and it has its usual and explicit statement in Locke. His more peculiar and frequent expression of it, however, is the following: "Substances when truly considered are powers, and hence nothing else than so many relations to other substances."²

Radical relativity is no doubt sound enough in abstract theory.

1. See Baldwin's Dictionary; Article on Relativity.

2. Bk. II, ch. 24, sec. 37.

Its emphasis is upon mutual dependence among objects,—the postulate of all scientific inquiry. But to talk of an object's dependence in general and to talk of a particular object's dependence upon other particular objects in a given situation, are very different things. When discoursing upon this matter of mutual dependence in the abstract, the dependence of one object upon another admits of no partiality; they are all thought to be *equally* interdependent and they are *all* thought to be completely interdependent; whereby their independence, if thought to have any, vanishes like mist in the morning air, the more this central tenet of an impartial mutual dependence is emphasized.³ But objects as we learn from experience on all sides are not *equally* dependent upon each other in any given situation; they do not as a general rule in specific situations entail a perfect equivalence of give-and-take; and as knowledge begins with the given, it is incumbent upon a scientific spirit to hold strictly to the facts as thus revealed. The dependence of a given object in a given situation may be large, yet the dependence of the other objects upon it or upon each other in that particular situation may be zero. The unaffected objects are accordingly more properly designated as independent. *But an independence properly maintained for an object in certain situations may in other situations convert itself into a dependence*, as our scientific postulate of general dependence would naturally dispose us to expect. In so far, then, as we remain strictly empirical, and, further, strictly adhere to our confessed postulate, the following form of relativity seems the more permissible one: objects reveal themselves differently in different situations and, in different situations, are capable of revealing qualities often absolutely incompatible with each other. Relativity thus conceived, I term *empirical*. Locke's common expression of it takes on the following form: "The changes which one 'body' is apt to receive from or produce in other 'bodies,' upon a *due* application, exceeds far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine."⁴

3. And the burden of proof does not rest upon him who denies a fundamental unity to the Universe, but upon him who affirms this fact.

4. I hasten to say that by insisting upon the distinction between the abstract and the empirical basis of the relativistic principle, I feel I fully meet the objection commonly directed against it; namely, that objects, according to it, resolve themselves into a sheer network of empty relations. In addition to what has already been stated, it need only be said that relations, or, to be more specific, particulars, are as effective in reinforcing each other and in preserving each other intact, as they are in building each other up or in destroying each other; and in still other cases

These considerations conduct us to the third form which I am inclined to affirm the principle in question assumes. I term it *constructive* relativity. Let me explain. If a given object reveals itself differently in different situations and in different situations is capable of revealing qualities often absolutely incompatible with each other, then the conclusion follows, as in opposition to the conclusion reached by radical relativity, that *no single situation of actual existence can reveal or exhaust an object's total actuality*, that is, all its possible phases or qualities. It is in its very nature a multiplicity, viewed spatially or temporally. Such unity as may be ascribed to it, Locke assigns to the function of the so-called abstract idea. The object that results is a synthesis and is accordingly viewed in the light of a construct and not a copy, "of man's and not of nature's making," as we, in due place, shall find him propounding with great vigor. He writes in general to the following effect: "It is not unity of substances that comprehends all sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case; but to conceive and judge of it aright . . . whatever does or can exist, or be considered as one thing is positive, and so not only simple ideas and substances, but modes also are positive beings: though the parts of which they consist are often relative one to another . . . it sufficing to the unity of every idea that it be considered as one representation or picture, though made up of ever so many particulars."⁵ The statement involves the contention already enunciated that things, however partial or variable in their matter-of-fact existence of this or that moment, are determined in their character of this or that sort or whole by the idea; namely, that "men determine sorts,"⁶ specific things, which, in accord with his declared relativity, he denies as existing "in nature with any prefixed bounds."⁷

disdain, as it were, to enter into any effective relations with each other at all. For illustration, turn to Chemistry with its combining laws of substances, or to the principle of elimination as involved in the methods governing inductive inferences. Hence a *relative* independence among objects is no less involved and presupposed in the operation of the principle than a *relative* dependence. In fact, properly grasped, the principle of relativity is no other than the fundamental principle of all science; namely, that given conditions produce a given result. Hence, let the results or the conditions be defined as you will, the dependence and correlation, namely, the connection between the factors involved could never be affirmed, if disconnection were not a fact equally obvious and ultimate in any given situation. For further discussion of this matter, see pp. 29-32.

5. Bk. II, ch. 25, sec. 6; ch. 24, sec. 1.

6. Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 35.

7. Ibid., sec. 29.

For the sake of completeness, I mention several additional forms of the relativistic principle.⁸ Thus Protagoras is made the exponent of one such specific formulation. The doctrine that all knowledge is merely phenomenal, yields another specific formulation. The former is based, in the main, upon a declared diversity in our perceptions of a given object; the latter, upon the claim that an object (to quote Mill) "is known to us only in one special relation; namely, as that which produces, or is capable of producing, certain impressions on our senses; and all that we really know is these impressions. This is the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge to the knowing mind, in the simplest, purest, and, as I think, the most proper acceptation of the word." (See Thomson's Dictionary; Art., Relativity.)

To complete this survey,⁹ another specific formulation of relativity, the Kantian, requires mentioning. Spencer gives the following graphic description of it: "Every thought," he says, "involves a whole system of thoughts; and ceases to exist if severed from its various correlatives. As we cannot isolate a single organ of a living body, and deal with it as if it had a life independent of the rest; so, from the organized structure of our cognitions, we cannot cut one out and proceed as though it had survived the separation. . . . A developed intelligence can arise only by a process which, in making thoughts defined, also makes them mutually dependent—establishes among them certain vital connections, the destruction of which causes instant death of the thoughts." (First Prin. sec. 39.)

With these formulations of relativity as covering the ground, I resume the study of Locke. He finds, as I claim, that reality in the last analysis is determined in ideas, formed under the control of ends or purposes within a world of relatively determined needs ("beyond which we have no concernment either to know or be") and of relatively "unalterable organs," and where certain fixed, regular, and constant co-existences among ideas (objects or events) are accepted by him as a fact. This is at once relativistic, positivistic, pragmatic, and constructive.

8. Properly interpreted, however, the formulations offered above should make provision for every other form of it that seems valid. This is not the place, however, for entering upon any such discussion.

9. I do not mention the flux-doctrine as another form of the relativistic principle. It represents its crudest formulation. How vividly this form of it, however, was present in Locke's mind could be demonstrated by adducing many a passage from the Essay.

II

RELATIVISTIC MOTIVES IN LOCKE

CHAPTER III

THE SIMPLE IDEAS: WHAT ARE THEY?

The simple ideas play a somewhat variable rôle in Locke's philosophy and the purpose of this chapter is to trace it, and to define them as nearly as possible.

"One thing," says Locke, "is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are simple and some complex."¹ They distinguish themselves in the fact that complex ideas consist in the unity or supposed unity of distinguishable parts, whereas simple ideas, "being each in itself uncompounded, contain nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and are not distinguishable into different ideas."² By this criterion, simple ideas are (*a*) uncompounded, (*b*) contain but *one uniform* appearance, and (*c*) are but *one* conception in the mind. We shall presently learn that Locke regards them as products; hence compounded. I turn to the remaining differentiae indicated.

They constitute but *one uniform* appearance. Let us consider this mark.

Their uniform appearance, we find, is one that is relative: "blood that is red to the naked eye is not so under the microscope."³ Furthermore, we find that the simple modes, although in themselves complex ideas, are also declared to have a *uniformity* or likeness in their parts: space and time "are justly reckoned among our simple ideas, yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is without composition; it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts; but their parts being all of the same kind . . . hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas."⁴ Thus in the one case we find "the one

1. Bk. II, ch. 2, sec. 1.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., ch. 23, secs. 11-12.

4. Ibid., ch. 15, sec. 9.

uniform appearance" a conditioned affair; in the latter case, they are seen to share this "uniform appearance" in common with simple modes. Hence, no differentia.

The third mark, that of "one conception" in the mind, also fails to be a differentia, as simple ideas are herein found undistinguished from complex ideas as a whole. There is no need to quote him at length. The discrepancy from this standpoint is writ too large in any part of the treatise to which we may turn. One citation therefore will be made to suffice. "Besides these complex ideas of several single substances, as of man, horse, gold, violet, apple, etc., the mind hath also complex collective ideas of substances; which I so call, because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together, as united into one idea, and which, so joined, are looked on as one; v. g., the idea of such a collection of men as made an army . . . is as much one idea as the idea of a man: and the great collective idea of bodies whatever, signified by the name world, is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it; it sufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be considered as one representation or picture, though made up of ever so many particulars."⁵ That is, between an imaginary point and the universe, unity may be appropriated by anything; either by the complex simple idea or by the simple complex one.

He next distinguishes between them in the fact, that in the origin of simple ideas the mind is passive, and that "it cannot invent or frame one new simple idea" nor refuse to have, alter or blot out one of them when offered to the mind; whereas in the case of complex ideas the mind has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them to an infinite variety.⁶ From this follows his conclusion "that simple ideas are the material of all our knowledge,"⁷ and that we have "no complex idea not made out of those simple ones." A total *dependence* upon reality for our simple ideas, and a complete *independence* of reality in regard to complex ideas, is the distinction which discloses itself here. The mind, in its complex ideas, would appear totally dependent upon the simple ideas, but, other than that, the impression conveyed is that complex ideas neither require nor disclose any further dependence upon a reality and general constitution of things. And

5. Ibid., ch. 24, sec. 1.

6. Ibid., ch. 2, sec. 2.

7. Ibid., ch. 7. sec. 4.

yet Locke's distinction between complex ideas of modes and substances is grounded just in this particular fact, that modes, within simple ideas, are more or less purely of the mind's invention, whereas substances are declared to be dependent, not only upon the simple ideas, but upon "the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable."⁸ The affirmed distinction then between complex ideas and simple ideas cannot be based upon the fact that, in the origin of simple ideas, the mind is wholly dependent and passive, and the opposite in respect to complex ideas; for, as indicated, substances are dependent beyond simple ideas in a way that modes are not. As to Locke's motive in thus ascribing a dependence of the mind upon reality, the copy-view theory asserts itself, wherein he affirms, that, in the case of simple ideas, as is evident, the mind, not unlike "a mirror, cannot refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects before it do therein produce."⁹ This copy-view of his, however, even when thus falsely restricted within his theory to simple ideas, encounters several set-backs in his pages. The first is that our senses may not be proportionate to or commensurate with the demands, variety, and richness of reality. To this effect, I quote the following: "I think it is not possible for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies, however constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, taste, smells, visible and tangible qualities But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have, by the assistance of senses and faculties more (in number) or more perfect than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine and a great presumption to deny."¹⁰

The second set-back is experienced when he comes to distinguish between primary qualities as alone copies and secondary qualities as effects: "There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves and what is sweet, blue or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure and motion of the insensible

8. Bk. III, ch. 5, sec. 3.

9. Bk. II, ch. 1, sec. 25.

10. Ibid., ch. 2, sec. 3, and Bk. IV, ch. 3, sec. 22.

parts in the bodies themselves."¹¹ Hence he regards it as possible to have "*positive* ideas even from *privative* causes."¹² Thus the ideas of "heat and cold, light and darkness, white and black, motion and rest are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind; though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them are barely privations in the subjects (objects) from whence our senses derive these ideas."¹³

The original position becomes still further confused when, as just set forth (p. 21), the simple ideas, viewed as effects, are found to be conditioned by the particular character and structure of the sense-organs, no less so and to no less extent, than as conditioned by the structure of the "insensible parts" of an object. "Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, and the real constitution in which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us: and that which is now the yellow color of gold would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts. . . . This microscopes plainly discover to us; for what to our naked eyes produce a certain color, is, by augmenting the acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing."¹⁴ Thus simple ideas, instead of being *simple*, underived, unconditioned, are found to be *complex*, derived and conditioned; and, instead of being copies of objects, are effects; and, instead of effects produced solely by the "insensible part" of bodies, they are effects equally conditioned in their character by the particular character and structure of the sensible organism; and, in the case of positive ideas resulting from privative causes, almost exclusively conditioned, according to Locke's statements, by the sensible organism. Here, then, we have the principle of relativity wholly installed within the sacred precincts of even the simple ideas. In these changes registered in Locke's view of them, they become increasingly regarded as working assumptions and less and less as established facts; and, as is equally apparent, the need of psychology grows less relevant to his arguments. Simple ideas thus come more and more to fill the place of the necessary 'term' in the term-relation motive, to be indicated in subsequent chapters, as well as the 'part' in the part-whole relation. They preserve a

11. Bk. II, ch. 8, sec. 15.

12. Ibid., sec. 1-6.

13. Ibid., sec. 2.

14. Ibid., ch. 23, secs. 11-12.

uniqueness, but it is a uniqueness in kind, and not one of simplicity or unity. The simple modes, as we perceived, are no less simple ideas of a kind; just as pleasure and pain, succession, change, co-existence, etc., are others as ultimate and as unique in their kind. Future chapters will show how consistently this motive works out in his pages.

CHAPTER IV

THE TERM-RELATION MOTIVE

"This is certain," writes Locke, "things however absolute and entire they may seem in themselves are but retainers to other parts of nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us; . . . and there is not so complete and perfect a part that we know of nature which does not owe the being it has, and the excellencies of it, to its neighbors; and we must not confine our thoughts within the surface of any body, but look a great deal further, to comprehend perfectly those qualities that are in it."¹ Here, as in like passages with which the *Essay* abounds, the dependence of terms upon relations is absolute and complete. But then in Locke it is only necessary to turn a page if we wish to read some flat contradiction of what may chance to be said on a preceding page. Turning to such pages we read something very different concerning terms and relations: "The immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge is nothing but particulars. . . . Universality is but accidental to it."² When therefore we quit particulars, the universals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing particulars."³ By particulars, Locke seems to imply "anything as existing in any determined time and place,"⁴ and by universals he denotes meaning or any other thought product. That is, particulars now are the primary things; and relations and what results therefrom, accidental and extraneous.⁵ In the one case, relations are without reservation affirmed

1. Bk. IV, ch. 6, sec 11.

2. *Ibid.*, ch. 17, sec. 8.

3. Bk. III, ch. 3, sec. 11.

4. Bk. II, ch. 27, sec. 1.

5. Bk. II, Chapters on ideas of relations.

to be internal; here, with an equal lack of reserve they are affirmed to be wholly external. Let us follow him step by step to note which line of thought in this contradiction becomes triumphant. I know no viewpoint from which a study of Locke is more worth while or fascinating.

Locke's original conception of particulars is the plain ontological one of ready-made, independent objects, each with its own "prefixed bounds." But particulars, thus conceived, run counter to his doctrine of "the new way of ideas." Suppose, then, that we identify these ontological particulars with Locke's other specified particulars; namely, simple and complex ideas; and if particulars refuse to be thus assimilated, our only alternative is to identify them with real essences; and then, of course, what is said of either, will hold equally true of particulars. It seems to me nothing more remains to be said on the subject. Unless thus capable of being assimilated, they remain wholly foreign to and outside of his philosophy as the "new way of ideas."

Locke's distinction of the primary-secondary qualities marks a step in the direction required. Chapter VII will concern itself with another very significant step in the same direction. I refer to his affirmed primacy of the clear and distinct *ideas* as independent of and external to meaning and knowledge, and wherein Locke comes to hold that meaning and knowledge are confined to the mere relations of such *ideas*. In each case, however, whether dealing with our ontological particular in one of its transformed guises or in its original form, we encounter in Locke what for present convenience may be termed an anti-relativistic motive.

The following passage, typical in its disposition of the primary-secondary qualities, will start us on our way: "Our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real constitutions and differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities as the characteristical marks and notes whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds, and distinguish them one from another: all which secondary qualities are nothing but—mere powers depending on its primary qualities."⁶ Here we have distinct statements enunciated in respect to our insensible objects and the secondary qualities as depending upon them. First, that primary qualities constitute the insensible object, and secondly, that "the secondary

qualities as the characteristical marks and notes" serve "to distinguish" such objects one from another. The first assertion involves the contradiction that the primary qualities, as but a division within simple ideas and therefore sensible, are also to be identified with the insensible real constitution of bodies. The second assertion involves the claim that the secondary qualities constitute the sole data of knowledge and are effects rather than products.

With Locke, therefore, the conception of particulars naturally becomes one thing when made from the standpoint of the secondary qualities as constituting our sole range of ideas, and quite another when made from the standpoint of such data widened in scope as Locke commonly recognizes. Reserving the more specific solution of this particular question for the next chapter, let us turn exclusive attention to Locke's insensible objects as furnishing our so-called terms. Here we enter upon Locke's issue between the real and the nominal essence.

The real essence of an object is conceived by Locke in three distinct ways, the result of three fundamental motives in his general thinking; namely, the rationalistic, the sensation-alistic, and the term-relation motive. Under the influence of the rationalistic motive, Locke's conception of the real essence of an object grows out of the demand for an inherent principle in objects, in virtue of which objects attain to a necessary and precise determination of the number and the kind of simple ideas composing them; "the reason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold when we know not what is or is not gold?" Without knowledge of such a principle, according to him, we can have no object in the strict sense of the word. Each substance would present sheer diversity, or, if held as determined and of this or that sort, variety of determination in each sort would be the inevitable outcome, and, logically considered, each sort would be equally valid in its *different* determination. Have we such ideas of substances as the necessity of the case would seem to demand?—ideas from which their qualities and properties "would be deducible and their necessary connection known, as all the properties of a triangle depend on, and, as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines, including a space?"⁷ Locke's negative answer to this ques-

7. Bk. II, ch. 31, sec. 6.

tion is endless in repetition: "the complex ideas we have of substances are certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance. . . . This essence, from which all these properties flow (as in the case of gold), when I inquire into it and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover; the furthest I can go is, only to presume that, it being nothing but body, its real essence or internal constitution, on which these qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, size and connection of its solid parts; of neither of which having any distinct perception at all, can I have any idea of its essence, which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness, a greater weight than anything I know of the same bulk, and a fitness to have its color changed by the touch of quicksilver. If any one will say that the real essence and internal constitution on which these properties depend, is not the figure, size, and arrangement or connection of its solid parts, but something else, . . . I am even further from having any idea of its real essence than I was before."⁸ In either event, we deal with a 'supposition' only, and one that Locke regards 'useless,'⁹ from the standpoint under consideration. Substances consist of the nominal essence only. I shall return to this matter in a later chapter, when considering Locke's contention that modes, contrary to substances, embody or represent such real essences; whereby substances (to use Kant's terminology) distinguish themselves from modes as respectively *à posteriori* and *à priori* determinable.

From the standpoint of the sensationistic motive, wherein the nominal essence is identified in scope with the secondary qualities, Locke sets up his contrast between simple ideas as consisting of sensible qualities and an unknown cause consisting of insensible parts. It is at this juncture that the primary qualities are compelled to assume their dual rôle. Primary qualities are made equivalent to that essence or reality in which "our senses fail us," and yet he is inclined to view them as mere distinctions within simple ideas. They are accordingly made to pass for simple ideas until forced to function as insensible parts, whereupon "the secondary qualities are nothing but powers depending on primary qualities." But whether narrowly or widely defined, with Locke the

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., sec. 8.

nominal essence, as the knowable, is always opposed to the real essence as the unknowable; and in this motive, the real essence is our ontological particular. Hence, if the primary qualities persist in such identification, the same fate would naturally be theirs that Locke, without exception, visits upon the real essences in general.

But if real essences remain *unknown* from either of the above viewpoints, from the viewpoint of the term-relation motive in the form of radical relativity, Locke goes a step further and holds them as *non-existent*. According to this motive the meaning of the real essence is identified with "that particular constitution which everything has within itself, without any relation to anything without it." Here again he denies the existence of any such essence. He does so in three distinct ways. I quote from the text in order to get the first way stated. "It is evident the internal constitution, wherein their (an object's) properties depend, is unknown to us; for to go no further than the grossest and most obvious of objects we can imagine amongst them, what is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead and antimony fusible, wood and stones not? What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and stones not?"¹⁰ That is to say, objects manifest genuine differences, differences hardly to be explained where we abandon the ultimate character of terms entirely and expect *mere* relations to originate such differences; yet he concludes, that the supposed essence "whereon this difference in their properties depend, is *unknown* to us."

Objects resolve themselves into nothing but "powers"—is the second and more familiar way in which this term-relation motive acquires formulation by him. I select a passage at random: "The simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are nothing but powers, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities . . . all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances, and are not really in the gold (to take an instance), considered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution."¹¹ His disposition, which is general, (a) to resolve substances into pure relations, (b) and yet *not* to do so out of a need adequately to provide for inherent differences in objects, and then (c) to save himself, to affirm an unknown

10. Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 9.

11. Bk. II, ch. 23, sec. 37.

inner constitution, (*d*) which in its turn is again denied reality and, further, held to be a more or less "useless supposition,"—is a circle of thought in which he keeps revolving. Where doubt, however, still persists in his mind concerning the reality of an inner constitution or real essence, the next line of reasoning he falls back upon, according to his own statement, puts the matter conclusively and beyond all doubt: real essences do not even justify the mere supposition of their reality. It involves a statement of the relativistic principle in its so-called radical form. "Put a piece of gold anywhere by itself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its color, weight, etc. . . . Water, in which to us fluidity is an essential quality, left to itself, would cease to be fluid. . . . We are then quite out of the way when we think that things contain within themselves the qualities that appear to us in them; and we in vain search for that (inherent) constitution. . . . upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe in them."¹² Viewed in one light then, substances out of all relations, reduce to zero; viewed in the other light, "no one can doubt," he holds, "that this called gold has *infinite* other properties not contained in any specific complex idea"¹³ we may have of it. The following quotation, however, I take as more truly representative of Locke in this term-relation motive: "The simple qualities which make up the complex ideas being most of them powers in relation to changes which they are apt to make in or receive from other 'bodies,' are almost infinite."¹⁴ From whence the conclusion follows, that if essences exist, such essences, and such meaning as they denote, must be found within the nominal essence; the nominal essence, in the course of the process, ever widening its scope beyond the secondary qualities as the sole ultimates. And this conclusion is a transcription of Locke's view, not of mine, in support of which the following chapters will abundantly testify.

We speak in general as if ideas (whether simple or complex) acquired this or that specific determination in virtue of this or that specific thing actually existing as one; whereas, according to Locke, it is just the reverse that is true. Specific ideas of different union in varying situations, but of a fixed union in the same situations, furnish the data for the specific determination of

12. Bk. IV, ch. 6, sec. 11.

13. Bk. II, ch. 31, sec. 10. Italics are mine.

14. Bk. III, ch. 9, sec. 13.

our abstract ideas: whence it comes to pass that "every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence." Thus water when frozen is held and designated a distinct thing from water in its fluid form, namely ice. Why do we fail to do the same thing in the case of gold when a liquid and when a solid, or with jelly when a liquid and when congealed? Locke's answer is found in his claim that the idea determines the thing, in which view we have (in Kant's familiar phrase in its familiar setting) a complete Copernican shift in our view of things. Locke's dogma: "nothing exists but particulars," thus finds its other extreme contention in him: "nothing essential to particulars." I have already suggested his solution of the matter. It is based upon an empirical relativity and a synthetic process of thought, culminating in what may be termed his "new way of ideas;" in the course of which process the real essence, as defined within his rationalistic motive, is found transferred to the nominal essence. Hence the reason for terming the nominal essence, an essence.

I pause for a moment to consider the term-relation problem on its own merits. If terms threaten to vanish from the standpoint of radical relativity, what hinders a like outcome for them from the standpoint of so-called empirical relativity?

A prompt answer to this question would be: the conservation of matter and energy. In accord with this principle, terms may displace and modify each other, but never can totally extinguish each other. That is, radical relativity in contradiction with this principle would reduce a certain term to zero by a total abstraction of it from the rest of the universe, but it fails to note that this reduction of one of its terms argues some change or other in *some* of the remaining terms; and, if we adhere to the principle of conservation in its abstract form, such change may be maintained as affecting all of the remaining terms. We may conclude, therefore, that empirical relativity stands for the principle of *interdependence* of terms where terms in some form or other are already assumed to exist. It is, accordingly, a logical and not necessarily a genetic principle.

In opposition to any such solution, however, it may, notwithstanding, be argued that the principle of relativity is clearly genetic, since it implies the conclusion that every term is a *product* of other terms. And the answer to this argument is, that the product-view of terms is not the outcome of an interdependence-

view, but the outcome of the One and the Many problem as conjoined with that of interdependence. The notion of interdependence denotes, not merely that this, that, or some other change in a term has and finds its cause and explanation in some other specific terms, but, in harmony with the postulate of all science, that *all* change in *all* terms is thus caused and is not otherwise to be explained. The recognition of change, however, is relatively independent of the notion of interdependence in so far as interdependence involves the *cause* of a change as well as the idea of change. Change is also prior in logical order. It is a complex mental process indicating a comparison with something more or less permanent. It is at this juncture that the product-view of terms, as involving the One and the Many problem, is evoked. The product-view of terms, then, is precipitated only when the One and the Many problem, which any change in any object compels, becomes superinduced upon that of interdependence. It is in recognition of this distinction in problems that I have been led to distinguish between relativity as empirical and as constructive. But the One and the Many problem is not one confined to relativity; it may and does exist as a real problem in quarters where no tincture of relativity is evinced. The question therefore arises, how the One and the Many problem is to find a solution from the standpoint of relativity as interdependence. To postulate terms with an inherent essence will not help us, for in that case we postulate, as Locke has so abundantly taught, we know not what. And where an object changes, and all objects do and can be made to change to an indefinite degree, the question arises to which group of its changing qualities shall I hold as representing *the* group of a particular object? It is in description of this situation that Locke has come to employ the phrase that "objects exist in nature with no prefixed bounds." Now chemistry has its own term-solution in its elementary substances, just as modern physics has its present solution of it in its electrons. As for philosophy (to quote from a recent book), "I do not say that it is impossible to solve the problem of the One and the Many . . . but up to the present time no such solution has been given."¹⁵ Modern realism, with its elusive and protean conception of an object, would surely not offer its solution as the solution of the

15. Russell. *First Course in Philosophy*, 1913, p. 90.

problem in hand. I wonder how long a chemist and physicist would pause to receive the instruction thus offered?

Suppose, then, that we accept the verdict of chemistry as provisionally valid. Our terms in that case are its elementary substances. Secondly, let us also accept its combining laws of substances. *Generalized*, the second assumption would mean that we accept the principle of uniformity as involving fundamental limits and peculiarities, *differences* in its operation as well as a *constancy* within such limits and peculiarities. Where then shall we place the source of these limits and peculiarities incident to the behavior or interaction of substances? Suppose we locate them in the substances. In that event we should have the phrase "relation" implying nothing but the presence of some specific change in one or more of the instances brought into an effective union, and beyond some such abstract meaning, the phrase, to my mind, signifies nothing.

So much granted, we may now return and ask: do the elementary substances of chemistry rightly determine our "terms?" The chemist regards them as irreducible and he regards them in the light of constructs,—as specific groups of itemized properties, demanding time and most varied situations or conditions for their complete realization. But to speak of them as at once irreducible and as constructs involves confusion. Such a claim evokes the One and the Many problem as obviously as could be affirmed in any other quarter. I have no intention of laying bare the technique whereby chemistry seeks to establish its claims. All that is necessary to add here is, that without its affirmed principle of conservation (constancy of weight in change) chemistry would not get very far. But constancy of weight is not uniformly its standard for determining the number and variety of its substances; at times it is not this standard but some declared differences in properties upon which it relies and in dependence upon which it asserts ultimate differences in substances. Such dualism however involves confusion. The confusion is further accentuated when we read chemistry in the light of the electron as ultimate, whereby, as affirmed by many of the leading physicists of today, the electron and not the elementary substances of the chemist is the desired "term." And thus the issue of the One and the Many problem continues, and for all we know, always will continue. But the ideal isolation of the "term," the special aim of both these sciences,

is not of necessity the only ideal. Often we aim to know the effect of a complex term upon other complex terms. Hence all we seem entitled to affirm in any case is, that the principle of uniformity, in so far as it signifies so-called *conditions* and so-called *results*, presupposes the existence of terms at every step of its operation. Terms thus come and go; but with terms in some form or other we begin and with terms in some form or other we end. Whence it follows that relativity is the generally recognized logical principle of interaction and not of necessity a cosmic or genetic principle of outright creation. But any term necessarily presupposed and decided upon is without doubt inherently complex.¹⁶ Hence, no term, as the result of conditions, may be affirmed to exist independently of other terms; for to do so is to go counter to *the* fundamental principle of all science; namely, that all terms find their sole explanation in their conditioning terms. Nor does empirical relativity stand for any thing else than for this principle of science properly grasped by and incorporated within metaphysics. Constructive relativity marks the next step in its metaphysical development,—the incorporation of the One and the Many problem.

CHAPTER V

THE PART-WHOLE MOTIVE

The part-whole motive, in connection with mixed modes and substances, concerns itself with the question, "how such a precise multitude of parts" as manifested in such complex ideas, "comes to make but one idea." Locke's solution of the matter I have reserved for a later chapter. Here I intend to consider the simple modes as a phase of this same motive. How do Space, Time, Number, Infinity, Power come to be? They are not simple, and yet he holds "that they are justly reckoned amongst our simple ideas."¹ Wherein then lie their complexity; wherein their simplicity? To get his position, it is sufficient to consider the modes of Space and Time only. Modes are complex because "they consist of parts, even though their parts are not separable one from

16. Professor Rowland speaks of the atom as being as complex as a piano.

1. Bk. II, ch. 15, sec. 9; ch. 21, sec. 3.

another.”² Their parts are such as will in each case naturally involve and presuppose each other.

But of what do the *parts* consist? His answer is this: “Could the mind, as in Number, come to so small a part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible unit or idea, by repetition of which it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration. *But since the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts*, instead thereof it makes use of the common measures which, by familiar use, in each country, have imprinted themselves in the memory (as inches and feet; seconds, minutes, hours, days, years.) Every part of duration is duration too, and every part of extension is extension, both of them capable of addition or division *in infinitum*. But the least portions of either of them whereof we have clear and distinct ideas may perhaps be fittest to be *considered* by us as the simple ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of space, extension and duration are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly resolved.”³ We have no absolute unit of space and no absolute unit of time; hence “no two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal;”⁴ that is, space and time are inherently variables. We try to control the situation, lacking such absolute units, by practical devices of one kind or another, involving regular, periodic motions, “of which seeming equality, however, we have no other measure, but such as the train of our ideas lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reasons, to persuade us of their equality.”⁵ In a word, our notions of time and space are in their own nature variables, and, hence, a conditioned product no matter after what model they may be conceived or computed. Like ideas in general, they are constructs from which an arbitrary element can never be wholly excluded.

But in this absence of an absolute unit of space or time, what gives occasion for their formation? We find it to be the facts of change, motion, and succession, and that of distance and place, as well as existing needs for unity or order. Of change, Locke writes: “Wherever change is observed, the mind must collect a *power* somewhere able to make that change, as well as a possi-

2. Ibid., ch. 15, sec. 10.

3. Ibid., sec. 9. Italics mine.

4. Ibid., sec. 21.

5. Ibid.

bility in the thing itself to receive it;"⁶ and he might have said the same of succession which he holds conditions our notion of time: wherever succession is observed the mind must collect a notion somewhere able to make the fact of succession a possibility.

But such facts as change, etc., it may be held, are not only complex and relative, but obviously mediate in character. Hence to base the other concepts upon them would look like a twofold removal from reality conceived in terms of our simple ideas. But such a view of Locke fails in force where simple ideas are converted into complex ideas and complex ideas converted into simple ideas, as was shown at large in Chapter III. What then becomes of our so-termed parts, whether a color or sound, or the facts of succession and change? We accept the ideas of color and sound as ultimate under conditions; then succession, change, motion, place, distance, involving aspects equally as unique and irreducible are equally as ultimate. Hence the confusion between perception and conception or the immediate and the mediate, which infects the whole treatment of the simple and complex ideas, is no less evident in respect to his treatment of the simple modes. Take the following passage in illustration: "it seems to me that the constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man, is, as it were, the measure and standard of all other succession; whereof, if any one either exceeds the pace of our ideas, as where two sounds or pains, etc., take up in their succession the duration of but one idea, or else where any motion or succession is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the idea in our minds, or the quickness in which they take their turns . . . there also *the sense of a constant continued succession* is lost, and we perceive it not."⁷ In that event, he goes on to say, "we must have recourse to other means for determining the fact of a succession" as existing in this or that event, "which we then perceive by the change of distance that it hath moved, yet the motion itself we perceive not."⁸

How then do our simple modes come to be? This question I think I have answered. They are constructs inevitably involved in the comprehension of certain organizable aspects, parts, or

6. Ibid., ch. 21, sec. 4.

7. Ibid., ch. 14, sec. 12. Secs. 9-17. Italics are mine.

8. Ibid., sec. 11.

phases of experience; their peculiar kind or quality, in each case, being in a sense dependent upon the more or less unique aspect of the parts or phases involved, "and therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not . . . when we would consider them either abstractly in themselves"¹⁰ or in their supposed ontological character; they work successfully in preventing an "incurable confusion,"⁹ and hence are real pragmatically. Whether they are real ontologically, Locke gives us no ground for concluding one way or the other.¹⁰

CHAPTER VI

LOCKE'S CONCEPTION OF RELATION

A TERM used so freely in Locke as the term *relation*, demands definition. What does Locke understand by this term? The question is not to be answered off-hand, nor, after due inquiry, to be answered dogmatically. If we take Hume's version of it, Locke therein denotes what in itself is a delusion. Knowledge begins with impressions. What, then, is the impression to which I can point as the impression of a relation? And Hume's conclusion is, as we know, that there are no such existing impressions, and that relations, accordingly, are fictitious, or, at least, an arbitrary or subjective importation into knowledge. This proclamation in Hume has its equally full proclamation in Locke. We read in Locke with endless repetition, that whether we consider objects in relation to objects, or ideas in relation to ideas, at no point can we perceive a visible or necessary connection between

9. Ibid., ch. 15, sec. 5; also secs. 6-10.

10. The following is a typical passage: "Where and when are questions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckoned from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable in it. Without some such fixed parts or periods, the order of things would be lost to our finite understandings in the boundless variable oceans of (abstract or conceptual) duration and expansion; which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible Being. But when applied to any particular finite being, the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space as the bulk of the body takes up; . . . all which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration, as inches, feet, miles; and, in the other, minutes, days, years, etc." Ibid., sec. 8.

them, except among one class of ideas only,—modes as *à priori* determinable.¹ Yet Locke, notwithstanding, devotes chapters to “ideas” of relations; speaks of a “visible connection” in respect to modes; and, in respect to our complex ideas of substances, writes that, “when truly considered [such ideas] are only powers . . . nothing else but so many *relations* to other substances.”² And, then, in his chapter on “powers” we read this very remarkable summary of his whole position. It is so significant, yet brief, that I quote it in full. “I confess power includes in it some kind of relation, as indeed, which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not? For our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them *a secret relation* of the parts? Figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly; and sensible qualities, what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception? And, if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? All which include some kind of relation in them. Our idea therefore of power, I think, may well have a place amongst other simple ideas, and be considered as one of them.”³ That is, all ideas reduce to *relations*; yet that seems not to hinder them from being ideas; yes, even simple ideas, according to Locke.

There is only one place in the treatise, that I can recall, where Locke himself deliberately sets about to define the term. “Relation, what?”—is the title of the section.⁴ This sounds propitious; let us turn to it. There we read:—

“Besides the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. . . . When the mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to

1. Bk. IV, ch. 3, sec. 28. “How any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought [simple ideas] in the mind. That it is so, if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like, though they have a constant and regular connection [co-existence or sequence] in the ordinary course of things, yet *the connection being not discoverable in the ideas themselves* . . . we can attribute their connection to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that All-wise Agent.”

2. Bk. II, ch. 24, secs. 6-12 and 37.

3. Ibid., ch. 21, sec. 3. Italics are mine.

4. Ibid., ch. 25, sec. 1.

and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other: that is, as the words import, relation and respect. . . . And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct; therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation For as I said," he adds in a following section, "relation is a way of comparing or considering two things together, and giving one or both some appellation ('denomination') from that comparison; and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name;"⁵ as a result of which, Locke mentions, as some among the "innumerable kinds" of relations, causal, spatial, temporal, quantitative, qualitative, blood, legal, civic, moral⁶ etc.; and that objects, in view of their consideration under this or that relation, take on this or that distinction or denomination, "although it be not contained in the real ('positive or absolute') existence of things, but is something extraneous or superinduced."⁷ Thus Locke, upon the basis of something real or fancied, concedes to thought the capacity to organize our objects into a world where mutual implication and abstract dependence may come to reveal a whole set of new distinctions (denominations) in our objects; but they are distinctions which exist *through* thought and *for* thought only, and this conclusion Locke insists upon over and over again: they are merely superinductions; they in no way alter, modify, or transform the things themselves; thought and facts have no commerce; "nothing really exists but particulars."

Our first conclusion, then, stands out sharply in answer to the question: "Relations, what?" Relations are the pure products of thought, and result from comparing one object with another. But since nothing but particulars, by dogma, are real; and, further, since particulars, by dogma, in their determination, are wholly independent of thought and its processes, relations in that sense are not only non-real and non-existent, but are a deliberate and specious falsification of reality.—Locke's reality as ontological particulars.

But are they the *pure* products of thought? If so, why speak of a necessity enjoined upon the mind in the presence of change "to collect a power somewhere" to account for it, if no such

5. Ibid., sec. 1 and 6.

6. Ibid., ch. 26-28.

7. Ibid., ch. 25, sec. 8.

thing as control of thought exists? Or where does that necessity arise if wholly irrelevant to particulars? Are causality, space, time, power, and morality something or nothing? These are some of his typical relations; but what is their status and part in the scheme of things? Then again, if relations are *pure* products of thought, why designate the "relations" pertaining to modes "visible," and those pertaining to substances "undiscoverable?" If relations are non-existent and invisible as fact-reality within the sphere of substances, just what is that "visible" relation affirmed by Locke as existent within the sphere of modes? These questions are exceedingly pertinent to the matter in hand. Let us see whether an answer to them is accessible in Locke.

THE VISIBLE RELATIONS OF MODES: WHAT IS THEIR KIND; WHAT
THEIR REALITY

We may search at large in Book IV, and on almost every page we shall find ourselves confronted by the statement that modes are essentially different from substances: the former, the pure offspring of reason; the latter, the product of experience as divorced from reason. Then we shall also habitually encounter there, the uncriticized and unanalyzed assertion that the "relations" of the one are "visible," and the *copiously* criticized and analyzed fact that the relations of the other are totally "invisible." Such is the situation. A passage or two from the text will suffice for our purpose.

"Is it true of the ideas of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right ones? Then it is true also of a triangle, wherever it really exists. Whatever other figure exists, that is not exactly answerable to the idea of a triangle *in his mind*, is not at all concerned in that proposition; and therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning such ideas is *real* knowledge; because, *intending* things no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning those figures, *when they have barely an ideal existence in his mind*, will hold true of them also when they have real existences in matter."⁸

The passage is a very compact statement of his doctrine of *à priori* modes, and the doctrine is a fixture in Locke. Its outcome is: reality, in the case of modes, identified with ideality, and

8. Bk. IV, ch. 4, sec. 6. Italics are mine.

because modes alone fulfil his conceived requirements of knowledge proper (that which is not mere opinion), modes become identified by him with reality in its most perfect form. These generalities aside, let us get down to particulars.

The doctrine, in the first place, asserts a certain independence in thought to form ideas not directly depending upon nor directly responsible to sense, and, within its own province, having as it were, its own codes, patterns, and standards of reality. Hence (he writes) if moral knowledge is of the type modes, and they, "as other modes, be of our own making, what strange notions will there be of justice and temperance. No confusion at all," for in the case of morality as in the case of the triangle, as he goes on to say, "we intend things no further than as they are conformable to our ideas,"⁹ and if things are not conformable, so much the worse for them.

It is well to keep in mind this great emphasis which Locke places upon an originating power in thought. But the question contested is, Locke's apparent restriction of it here to modes, and to the extent in which relations with him follow thought, also to note his tendency to restrict them to the status of a pure thought-product. He calls relations in their case visible. Why? Because in their case, he holds that "by the mere contemplation of any of our ideas," I am able to affirm something of another idea "which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it,"¹⁰ that is, relations have no reality save with an *à priori* rationalism, and these relations are referred to by him as "visible". Along this exploded line of inquiry, however, we are not likely to gather much illumination from Locke on the subject. Let us turn, then, to the other question. Wherein lies that necessity which leads reason to produce its modes, such as they are? And I can think of no other answer than the one to be asserted in connection with the other type of relations; namely, the necessity resides in certain uniformities, in certain induced needs, and in a certain interdependence or "constant and regular union of parts." And, if this be true, how is he to defend the claim that in the case of modes objects are *purely* a product of the mind; and in the case of substances, that objects are products purely unaffected by thought.—Locke's world of ontological par-

9. Ibid., sec. 5 and 9.

10. Bk. IV, ch. 8, sec. 8.

ticulars? And if Locke himself is far from persisting in such a divorce shall we conclude with him, that, "apart from our abstract ideas, no determination in our substances is possible?"¹¹ In other words shall we credit Locke with the justice of knowing his own mind in approving the designation of his philosophy as "the new way of ideas?" Further, shall we credit that "new way" with the same Copernican inversion of object and idea that Kant credits himself with originating? Then we must also be ready to admit as Locke's conclusion Kant's own specific one: *relations* are generated in a thought situation and pertain to objects in so far as they are grasped and comprehended by thought. And what an object may be apart from such a thought construct of it,—for that answer we must turn to the destructive and profitless analysis of a Hume, or to Locke himself, where his uncriticized dogmatism throws a confusing shadow upon this brighter vision, fully elaborated by him as we shall come to see.¹² Hence, in his efforts to discover where the unity of objects in general lies,—physical, vegetative, and animal, including that of personal identity,—he does not seek to find a "real" essence, nor an empirical unity (an impression in Hume's sense), but a thought-constructed and a thought-determined unity, "an identity suited to the idea."¹³ Relations stand for determinations, abstract or concrete, of which the mind feels itself privileged, as well as constrained, to take note in any effort to know its objects and to organize them; beyond which end, we may grant, "the mind need not intend things further,"—beyond the articulated needs of an articulated self for an articulated world. Thus does his rationalistic motive, by stages, become thoroughly fused with his positivistic motive. It reflects itself in the scope accorded by Locke to conduct, to the nominal essence, and to synthesis.

11. Bk. III, ch. 6, secs. 1-8.

12. In particular, see chapters 10, 5 and 8 in the order given.

13. Bk. II, ch. 27.

III

ANTI-RELATIVISTIC MOTIVES IN LOCKE

CHAPTER VII

IDEAS *versus* KNOWLEDGE AND MEANING

The tendency in Locke to resolve even simple ideas into relations finds a counter motive in him, in which ideas are the self-sufficient, and all relational reality is a mere consequence. Thus Knowledge, in his restricted sense of the word, "is founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas,"¹ and Meaning founded in "the comparing or considering of two things together," whereby a new and irrelevant type of reality results, commonly designated by him as equivalent to the term signification. I have described it as irrelevant. By that I mean merely that "it is not contained in the real existence of things (the original ideas), but something extraneous and superinduced."² It is to this self-sufficient and originating character of our ideas in their affirmed *independence of relations* to which I wish now to draw attention. Upon what ground does Locke rest this contention?

"To improve our knowledge," says Locke, "is, I think, *to get and fix in our minds clear, distinct and complete ideas . . . and thus, perhaps, without any other principle, but barely considering those perfect ideas*, and by comparing them one with another, finding their agreement or disagreement, and their several relations and habitudes, we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one rule than by taking in principles, and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others."³ If our ideas are to be "clear and complete" before they enter into relations, the relations could scarcely be calculated to make them more so. The implication is evident: ideas or terms elaborate themselves, seek to make themselves "clear and complete" outside of the knowledge or relation situation. Ideas are one thing, knowledge another.

1. Bk. IV, ch. 12, sec. 7.

2. Bk. II, ch. 25, sec. 8.

3. Bk. IV, ch. 12, sec. 6. Italics are mine.

and meaning still another. This is very clearly stated in his triple⁴ division of perception: the perception of an idea; the perception of "a visible connection" (Knowledge); and the perception of signification (Meaning). In no case do we appear to get beyond a "perception"; and the difference between them is one, not of the Understanding, but of three distinct types of reality thus perceived. Let us get at the very roots of this motive if possible.

I think Locke's apotheosis of the idea issues from the union of his two sharply antithetical convictions,—his positivistic reactionary one: nothing exists but particulars; and his rationalistic one: certain and absolute knowledge involves an *à priori* determination of parts and their mutual and inevitable implication. In the course of time the former conviction, dogmatic in form, becomes transformed and substituted by his critical view that simple ideas constitute our ultimates. The simple ideas in turn come to form an alliance with his rationalistic criterion of truth with a center of interest in "clear and distinct" ideas. Nor is there any effort on Locke's part to consider simple ideas as otherwise than synonymous with "clear and distinct" ideas; and if either motive gains the ascendancy, it is the rationalistic one. In proof of this statement, consider his general account of what constitutes the unity of our simple ideas; namely, that simple ideas are to be "considered as one representation or picture in the mind," a description of them stated in the very opening chapters of Book II and one repeated without modification throughout the Essay. Particulars, simple ideas, clear and distinct ideas, and *à priori* ideas—these four prescribe the locus of a distinct phase of his thought. Each in turn, or the four in fusion, as the case may be, aspires to what is final and ultimate in reality. None of them can be made more "perfect and complete"; they are perfect and complete in themselves. Knowledge and meaning in turn become either irrelevant incidents to ideas, or necessary consequences of them; whereby knowledge and meaning issue forth as two new and distinct types of reality, which, if any sort of reality at all, must, like ideas in general, be modes of perception. Thus, in his reaction against the "abuse of words," and likewise, in his re-action against authority or general principles and maxims of all kind he sends us for remedy to "clear and distinct" ideas. That he should

4. See Bk. II, ch. 21, sec. 5.

also have been driven to the same source for knowledge (such as his notion of knowledge is) seems inevitable. Thus we read that ideas are not dependent upon, or the consequence of, the knowledge situation, but "knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that are in our minds . . . that wherever we can suppose such a creature as man is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have, we conclude, he must needs *when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas*, know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas."⁵ The "new way of ideas" does not characterize his doctrine amiss whether we consider this motive in his thinking or whether we consider his far more approved and developed ones. But we must not fail to note, that as a matter of general theory with him, it is primarily the "way of *ideas*" to *knowledge*, and not primarily the "way of ideas" to *objects*; and yet *objects*, in their characterization of modes and substances, constitute the central interest with him. Failing, as he does, to make the idea dependent upon its relations, even while making the relations dependent upon, although wholly external to, ideas, the knowledge said to result really converts itself into an entirely new *thing*. Hence to keep knowledge and objects apart, or to make of knowledge an end independent of objects, is an antithesis in Locke that yields nothing but contradiction and confusion till we come to his doctrine of "Sorts" in Book III. Influenced by his mistaken notion of knowledge, his aim in Book II is not to consider his simple ideas as essentially determinations of things, but as the elements "out of which is made all our other knowledge."⁶ Or, with clear and distinct ideas the touchstone of reality, simple ideas become the means of appraising knowledge, such as it is: he demands any one to produce a complex idea, which, in so far as it is valid, is "not made out of those simple ideas."

Let us consider the subject of discussion in a slightly different light; and this were best done by its presentation from the standpoint of a proposition or predication. The procedure will guard against the conviction that Locke's definition of knowledge, as the agreement or disagreement of ideas, is mere words, and likewise, against the opposite conviction that true predication is thereby involved or understood.

5. Bk. IV, ch. 11, sec. 14. Italics are mine.

6. Bk. II, ch. 7, sec. 10.

There are two sorts of general propositions, says Locke, the truth of which, it is affirmed, we come to know with perfect certainty. "The one is, of those trifling propositions [otherwise called, analytical or explicative propositions] which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the truth and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it: as that the external angles of all triangles are bigger than either of the opposite internal angles."⁷ Modes are said to yield this type of instructive propositions, which Locke then sets up in radical contrast to all general propositions based on substances, as, for example, that "gold is yellow;" which, if they are certain, are trifling; and if instructive, are uncertain.⁸ We have trifling propositions, in respect to substances, "when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole," as "when the genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms. For what information, what knowledge, carries this proposition in it: viz., Lead is a metal, to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? . . . Indeed to a man that knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the word lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead. . . . But, before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it [that is, he is supposed to make his ideas "clear, distinct, complete, and perfect" before they enter a proposition or enter the knowledge situation] or else he talks like a parrot, and making a noise by imitation and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of others; but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he has in his mind."⁹

This passage is illuminating and throws Locke's whole position in full relief. All reality, as thus specified, begins and ends with ideas, and all predication is *explication*; and that explication (and, hence, predication) does not realize itself as a fact, save where ideas are already "complete and perfect" before they enter or attempt to enter the knowledge situation. Hence explication and a knowledge situation are one in meaning. Entering the knowledge situation then, is not for the purpose of studying objects in

7. Bk. IV, ch. 8, sec. 8.

8. Ibid., sec. 9.

9. Ibid., secs. 4-7.

their changing value or relations to other objects thus noted, discovered, or forced upon them (the proper rôle of predication, fully recognized in his account of sorts), but that entrance into the knowledge situation, namely, predication is merely for an explanation of what already exists in a completed form, or comes thus to exist through some assumed inner development or dynamic motive that ideas have of their own and wholly outside of a knowledge situation.

Here then in Locke we have an anti-relativistic motive of importance, because it is so prominent. The contention enjoins the need to inquire more narrowly into this *à priori* claim. For, as this claim implies, ideas (objects) are products involving neither relations nor knowledge. Inquiry into this contention constitutes the subject-matter of the next chapter. Here it will suffice to observe that even though knowledge and meaning are taken by him in the light of "extraneous superinductions," this claim acquires force only to the extent in which the thought-process appears transferred within the periphery of the ideas themselves. How this matter is ultimately resolved in his pages, our future chapters are required to help make clear. At this point, however, be it said, that in this self-sufficient character of our ideas, we find in Locke the one extreme anti-relativistic motive, and, such as it is, the direct opposite of his general contention, that ideas or objects are nothing but "powers," that is, relations.

CHAPTER VIII

ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE: THE PRIMACY OF THE "VISIBLE RELATION" AND OF CONDUCT

Locke's claim that an absolute knowledge exists, bulks forth with large proportions, giving occasion in Book IV for the central problem there set up between knowledge proper and knowledge as mere opinion or judgments of probability.

The distinction made rests upon the assertion, as expressed in Kantian terminology, that certain ideas (modes) are *à priori* determinable, and that others (substances) are *à posteriori* determinable. Thus Locke writes: "In some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, and connections, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them

separable from them by any power whatsoever. *And in these only, we are capable of certain and universal knowledge.* Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this relation, this connection of these two ideas to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power which of choice made it thus or could make it otherwise;¹ whereas in respect to "the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of sensation in us of colors and sounds, etc., by impulse and motion; nay, the original rules and communication of motion being such wherein we can discover no natural connection with any ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the Wise Architect."² When ideas of the latter type are joined together in a proposition, because their "connection and dependencies, being not discoverable in our ideas, *we can have but an experimental knowledge of them.*" All such propositions are held as limited in scope, conditional in character, and full of uncertainty and possible error. "Certainty and universality" in knowledge only exists where, "by the mere contemplation of our ideas," I am able to affirm something of another idea "which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it,"³ although "certainty" without "universality" is attained in the other type of ideas in our judgments of "particulars": "as when our senses are actually employed about any object, we do know that it exists; so by our memory, we may be assured that heretofore things that affected our senses have existed."⁴ But judgments of "particulars" aside, which do not here concern us, "certainty and universality" in knowledge, if anything more than verbal or trifling, is possible only with that type of ideas where, as stated, by the mere contemplation of an idea, we are able to affirm something of another idea "which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea but not contained in it." Where such *à priori* determination of an idea is not possible, we do not have knowledge in his use of the word, as identified with "certainty and universality," but mere "opinion" or judgments of probability. Thus considered and thus distinguished, he regards knowledge

1. Bk. IV, ch. 8, sec. 8. Italics are mine.

2. Ibid., ch. 3, sec. 29.

3. Ibid., ch. 8, sec. 8.

4. Ibid., ch. 11, sec. 11.

possible only in respect to modes, in truth whereof mathematics is cited as an accomplished fact, and "demonstrated morality" a pet faith and conviction of his; whereas "propositions that are made about substances, if they are *certain*, are for the most part trifling; and, if they are *instructive*, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, however much constant observation and analogy may assist our judgment in guessing."⁵ The fact of this distinction in Locke, in its *asserted reality* and in its *nature*, is beautifully summarized in the following brief citation. He writes: "The want of ideas of their *real* essences sends us from our *thoughts* to the things themselves as they exist. *Experience* here must teach me what *reason* cannot."⁶ Relativity will be found to be the outcome of both aspects of this doctrine; latent in respect to modes; explicit in respect to substances. It is necessary to add, however, that substances do not attain their full and proper elaboration from him in Book IV. For that we must turn to the Chapter on Sorts. And the same may be said in regard to modes. Here, substances have their reality despoiled and modes assigned a reality which simulates the rejected innate ideas.

Locke distinguishes between them in two respects.

1. Concerning their origin.
2. Concerning their foundation.

1. In regard to *origin*, modes originate with or in the mind, and present the status of "real" essences; whereas substances have their origin in the simple ideas, and, hence, are of the so-called "nominal" essence only.

2. In regard to their respective *foundation*, modes are held as grounded in abstract reason, and involve for their certainty, (a) "the mere evidence of the thing itself" or (b) the principle of Inconceivability. As for substances, their foundation is said to be experience as divorced from Reason.

FOUNDATION OF MODES

Locke gives the matter incidental rather than deliberate attention. He merely speaks of a "visible" connection between certain of our ideas and the lack of such "visible" connection among other ideas; but he nowhere attempts to articulate what his asser-

5. Ibid., ch. 8, sec. 9. Italics are mine.

6. Ibid., ch. 12, sec. 9. Italics are mine.

tion appears to involve. Thus he writes in his Third Letter to Stillingfleet: "To perceive the agreement or disagreement of two ideas and not to perceive the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is, I think, a criterion to distinguish what a man is certain of from what he is not certain of. Has your Lordship any other or better criterion to distinguish certainty from uncertainty?" That mere awareness is the principle here involved, seems obvious. In other cases, where Locke intimates the existence of a rational foundation between ideas, the principle actually involved is the principle of inconceivability.⁶ One additional quotation in this connection must also suffice. "We cannot conceive the relation, the connection of these two ideas [speaking of certain parts of a triangle], to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power which of choice made it thus or could make it otherwise." They stand for reason, as it were, made objective and inherent in the very nature of this class of things. But as Locke was seen to take his simple ideas more or less for granted (logical data, rather than psychological), so with the fact of consciousness as awareness or perception, he merely accepts its deliverance as a fact that is ultimate, and does not, save incidentally, make it a subject of special inquiry. Certain connections, he affirms, are "visible," and others are not, and, because "visible," they are claimed to be underived, unconditioned, and final. They are then forthwith accepted as constituting knowledge that is absolute. But when we inquire into this alleged distinction within connections, we find that the whole matter resolves itself into the claim that in certain objects, as in the case of a triangle, parts are found that mutually and inevitably involve and implicate each other; whereas, in the case of substance, he takes great pains to prove that the direct opposite is found to characterize its parts; they are discrete and disparate, without rhyme or rhythm in order and arrangement, and at no time permit the mind, by the mere contemplation of the one, to pass to the other. He fails, however, in this affirmed distinction, to take note of three significant facts: first, that the triangle, like any other object of thought, is a construct; secondly, that it is relative to the mind, whose principle of self-evidence, although in itself ultimate, involves, in any given situation, the principle of

6. The connection between ideas of the *à priori* type yields a "certainty every one finds to be so great that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater." Bk. IV, ch. 2, sec. 1.

exclusion or inconceivability, and hence is inherently relative and conditioned, whether such conditions remain fixed or changeable; and thirdly, that it is dependent in this specific instance, upon a derived and fixed conception of space, which conception, if altered, would subject the triangle to the same vicissitudes of change that any other object finds itself exposed to share. Allowing for a difference in degree, I can see no reason why the substance gold, as a construct, deliberately held fixed to the exclusion of change, should any less successfully implicate its parts than a triangle. It may be affirmed of the triangle that its sides implicate the angles in a way that weight and the color of my *fixed* concept of gold would not implicate each other. But in these two situations, is the difference at bottom any other than the fact that the principle of inconceivability is differently involved? I admit a difference of degree, but not a difference of kind. Nor is Locke himself blind to the contention I here raise. Such a passage as the following, wherein it is declared that the principle of uniformity is involved in mathematics no less than in knowledge of substances, helps to destroy, by Locke's own confession, the very essence of the issue propounded. "*If the perception that the same ideas will eternally have the same habitudes and relations be not a sufficient ground of knowledge*, there could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics; for no mathematical demonstration could be other than particular: and when a man has demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle and circle his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram."⁷

Concerning his other claim, that of inconceivability, nothing more needs to be said. An object may be absolute *for me* because I cannot conceive it to be other than it is. But then at what point, pray, is that object in *my* conception of it, or in *my* inability to conceive it otherwise, unconditioned? And to concede this point, is to concede the sole point at issue between a relativistic and an absolute view of an object. The absolute point of view does not only require the possibility of an unconditioned and an undetermined object, but an unconditioned mode of perception or conception as well. But, after all, Locke's interest centers itself primarily in the determination of objects such as they are. Let us then, without more ado, turn to his account of modes as having their origin in Reason and not in Experience. Modes, in their proper

character, as has been stated, shall be taken up for inquiry in future chapters; and so with substances. Here we are merely to concern ourselves with the *à priori* element that modes are made to involve.

ORIGIN OF *à priori* MODES

Relevant statements on modes, scattered throughout the Essay in endless repetition, assume the following forms: (a) that modes are of a real essence; (b) that they are ideas of Reason and not of Experience; (c) "that wherever we can suppose such a creature as man is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have," the same knowledge must follow; (d) "for the same ideas have immutably the same relations and habitudes," and (e) knowledge is a consequence of ideas, and not the reverse; hence (f) these ideas are primary, and not the result of knowledge. And lastly, (g) modes are of the Mind's own making, (h) made very arbitrarily. Consider these statements, and the conclusions to be drawn are, either (1) that the mind out of nothing, under necessity or at pleasure, creates something; or (?) that it has native or original ideas of its own, and hence creates nothing but merely unfolds what is latent; or (3) that it, within a given experience, has the faculty to create something new, as conditioned within and conditioned without. Which conclusion shall we accept? The first conclusion is absurd; the second is in contradiction with his denial of innate ideas; and the third is impossible in the light of the antithesis he here sets up between Reason and Experience. To conclude, then, as we did in a previous chapter, that the Mind, according to Locke, has an originating activity seems to invite least violence to all the facts of the case. This is our positive conclusion. It is only when we ask of Locke, as we must in Book IV, what an originating capacity may achieve where it has no data, that this positive conclusion in Locke is apt to be overlooked. Modes and abstract ideas are the mind's products, it is there affirmed. But if so, where does the mind get its data? In Book IV, nothing else remains to draw upon for such data than Reason as opposed to Experience. But where is Reason, as opposed to Experience, to get that data? From innate ideas? Locke would hardly admit this. But what other alternative lies open to us for choice? In the face of this obvious pre-

dicament, however, let us not lose sight of Locke's conception of the mind as active and as law giving.

SUBSTANCES AS DEPENDENT UPON EXPERIENCE DIVORCED FROM
REASON

I turn from *à priori* modes to consider *à posteriori* substances. With substances, Locke ceases to be merely dogmatic.

Knowledge, as we are told, depends upon the fulfilment of two conditions. First, that we, "by the mere consequence of any idea," can affirm another "which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it."⁸ Or secondly, that "connections and dependencies" must be "visible," and that where "connections and dependencies are not thus discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them." It presupposes that our account of knowledge, in respect to modes, was positive in its outcome, whereas the account proved negative, save for the one positive conclusion we drew above in respect to his view of the mind as originating and form-giving. These convictions, however, furnish the setting of his inquiries concerning substances in Book IV. I begin my account with a passage from the text: "Had we such ideas of substance as to know what real constitutions produce these sensible qualities we find in them, and how these qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific ideas of their real essence in our minds, more certainly find out their properties and discover what qualities they had or had not, than we can now by our senses: and to know the properties of gold, it would be no more necessary that gold should exist and that we should make experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing of the properties of a triangle, that a triangle should exist in any matter, the idea in our minds would serve for one as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the secrets of nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the entrance towards them." How monotonous this strain is in Locke, the projection of the *à priori* ideal in respect to substances and its rejection, must be perfectly familiar. Yet substances as of this or that collection of simple ideas do exist. How then do we come by them?

8. Bk. IV, ch. 6, sec. 11.

(a) THE DISPARATE AND DISCRETE CHARACTER OF SUBSTANCES

"The simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are such as carry with them, in their own nature, no visible necessary connection or inconsistency with any other simple ideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about. . . . Besides our ignorance of the primary qualities on which depend all their secondary qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance, . . . and that is, that there is no discoverable connection between any secondary quality and those primary qualities which it depends on. . . . We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produces a yellow color, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we cannot by any means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the ideas of any color, taste or sound whatsoever; there is no conceivable connection between the one and the other. . . . How any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought in the mind. . . . In vain, therefore, shall we endeavor to discover by our ideas (the only true way of certain and universal knowledge) what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex idea of any substance. . . . So, that, let our complex idea of any species of substance be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple ideas contained in it, evidently determine the necessary co-existence of any other quality whatsoever. Our knowledge in all these inquiries reaches very little further than our experience. . . . That it is so, if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us."⁹ But with ideas of substances lacking an inherent constitution, and also lacking "discoverable connections" between them or their parts, his conclusion is that substances are all alike arbitrary and inadequate forms of reality.

(b) IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES ARBITRARY PRODUCTS AND INADEQUATE

"Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have: but *adequate* ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. . . . Hence no science of bodies."¹⁰ They are *inadequate*, no matter what

9. Bk. IV, ch. 3.

10. Ibid., sec. 26.

specific determination we fix upon, because we do not know what possible relations an object may assume, and hence what qualities properly belong to it and what do not. "No one who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or of gold in particular, can doubt that this called gold has infinite other properties not contained in that complex idea"¹¹ that we, in any specific case, may decide upon. "So that if we make our complex idea of gold a body yellow, fusible, ductile, weighty and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning solubility in aqua regia, and for this reason: since we can never, from the consideration of the ideas themselves, with certainty affirm or deny of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty, etc., that it is soluble in aqua regia; and so on of the rest of its qualities."¹²

The disparate and discrete character, then, of our ideas, the indefinite and inexhaustible number of them that may, upon equal ground, come to form a part of any specific determination of substances, and the flux thus of necessity projected into our substances, and his assumption that such is not the case with modes, constitute the ground upon which Locke forces the sharp antithesis between modes and substances, or "abstract ideas and their relations" and "matter-of-fact." Hence, instead of instructive *à priori* judgments being possible in respect to substances, he forces their antithesis to modes to a point that makes substances seem in Book IV as little else than a highly capricious fluctuation of parts. If only "we had such ideas of substances as to know what *real constitution* [in each] produces those sensible qualities we find in them,"¹³ then all would be well—so Locke keeps repeating. But substances have no such central core of reality, and, then, he concludes, that they have no adequacy, no fixity, no truth, and no reality at all. Nor can the substitution of judgments of probability for this affirmed lack of proper knowledge alter or improve the situation any. If substances are of a pure, unregulated flux in the one case, they continue pure, unregulated flux in the other. And the question is, not how would we, but how does Locke himself handle this situation? This is the subject proper of Book III and of a later chapter.

Suppose we grant Locke that no *abstract* consideration of an

11. Bk. II, ch. 31, sec. 10.

12. Bk. IV, ch. 6, sec. 9.

13. Ibid., sec. 10.

object can yield an *adequate* one,—for such is here the mode of his approach and such the conclusion here drawn. Does it necessarily follow that an *abstract* consideration and determination of an object is the only proper one, or that *adequacy* of an object implies a theoretical exhaustiveness of its infinite possible relations? We get two distinct resolutions of this matter from Locke in Book IV, one that is sceptical in its outcome and the other that is constructive and relativistic. I shall consider the sceptical issue first.

THE PRIMACY OF CONDUCT

He writes: "The way of getting and improving our knowledge in substances only by experience and history, which is all that the weakness of our faculties . . . can attain to, makes me suspect that natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science . . . from whence it is obvious to conclude . . . that morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general."¹⁴ Namely, in the defeat of theory or science turn to conduct for truth and reality. This demands a word.

In this deference, or better, abdication of knowledge in the interest of conduct, we have a lurking fallacy. When we say knowledge must subordinate itself to conduct, the assertion has a certain pertinency when it appears as a needful corrective of a one-sided, opposite theoretical tendency; but beyond that it has no more force than to say that conduct must subordinate itself to knowledge. If the principle of relativity, erroneously construed or applied, compasses the bankruptcy of knowledge in theory, we cannot thereafter logically ignore this defeat of knowledge and make it do service in a sphere, supposedly different, as if knowledge had not met defeat and as if conduct itself were not disrupted in the general disruption of other objects. Knowledge does not cease to be a failure, and as a failure it is totally useless when made to minister to conduct, even when granted that conduct itself remains undisrupted (as if the principle of relativity did not apply to conduct as to all objects in general). Besides, to speak of conduct in general is to speak of an abstraction as mythological as the abstraction involved in the notion "matter." For conduct, as it exists, exists in "sorts," as Locke would say, and how to get the "sorts" of conduct defined, apart from

14. Ibid., ch. 12, secs. 10-11.

knowledge, or apart from the abstract idea, as he would state it, which constitutes the essence of each sort, if knowledge has previously been declared a failure? It is not logical to blow hot and cold with the same principle. Knowledge, if not the pretended failure, may truly subserve conduct; but conduct no less truly subserves knowledge, when it is conduct, rather than some other object, that demands a determination, and without a specific determination (again to speak in Locke's own language) "particular beings, considered barely in themselves, may at once be everything or nothing."¹⁵ Yet conduct would seem to set itself up as an Absolute. Then we might further ask: does conduct belong to the class substances or mixed modes? To one of them or to simple ideas it must belong, if reality has thus been exhaustively outlined by him. And so, instead of having conduct in reserve as a place of safe retreat, when the world, otherwise reared by knowledge, collapses, he really has nothing in reserve but a bare, empty abstraction, just as bare and empty as the notion "matter," for example. Such, to my mind, is the fallacy contained in the conduct-reference. The truth contained in it is this: that the ends, aims and values of life, as revealed in conduct, cannot be prevented from reflecting themselves in the form, character, and structure of things as of this or that sort; that the reality that thus reflects itself in the various sorts is no less cognitive in quality than sense-perceptions; and, according to the principle of relativity, may be either more or less real than sense-perceptions, as being a thing, in large measure, as dependent upon other things as other things in turn are dependent upon it. I shall return to this particular issue in subsequent chapters.

This general conclusion is confirmed in Locke's *constructive* solution of the above-mentioned theoretical defeat. The note is a recurrent one and a brief citation will suffice for a statement of the position. "Our faculties being suited, not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the use of life, they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things which are convenient or inconvenient to us. . . . So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, *i. e.*, happiness or misery; beyond

15. Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 5.

which we have no concernment either of knowing or being."¹⁶ In other words, instead of defining an object's truth, reality, and adequacy or inadequacy in abstraction and in its isolation, he seeks here to define them in terms of a purpose, a limit, or a condition which our 'needs' impose. But even in this shift in his position, it may be held, he has not gained anything, except to extend his principle of relativity to include a new source of change or determination: a further determination of objects in reference to our needs, constitution, or ends. Instead of less flux, then, we ought really to expect more. And, if not, may we ask why? It does not introduce more flux, because he *assumes* a certain fixity in such needs, constitution, or ends. But what right has he to assume a fixity in these objects and fail to assume a higher degree of fixity than he does in objects in general? And suppose we answer by reference to experience, that a fixity is here recognized which is not recognized in respect to objects in general; that my own needs, constitution, and ends fluctuate less than such an object as a stone, let us say; and then we may ask further, is this true? And if not true, we have gained one vast admission in respect to substances: the collections of ideas, constituting this or that substance, do not share equally in their degree of stability or flux; and this Locke himself tacitly admits in his account of primary and secondary ideas and explicitly admits or presents in his empirical and constructive relativity. Moreover, Locke does not deny that things "proceed regularly"¹⁷ and "act by a law set them."¹⁸ He merely insists upon the fact, that, even if they act by a law set them, it is "a law that we know not."¹⁹ It is thus the sensuous *unknowability* and not the *non-existence* of a law or order or union of parts that Locke insists upon.

The reality, truth, adequacy, and certainty of simple ideas in general, he defines in the same way. They are real, etc., for the reason, as he repeats over and over again, "that they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern the state they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses."²⁰ Objects

16. Bk. IV, ch. 11, sec. 8; ch. 12, sec. 11; Bk. II, ch. 23, secs. 12-13.

17. Bk. IV, ch. 3, sec. 29.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., ch. 4, sec. 4.

are thus regarded as partaking of certainty and adequacy when we hold them fixed in a certain definite and restricted context ; namely, hold them fixed to their specific conditions. The *à priori* element, which he felt must exist in order to secure limits and bounds and fixity to things, is now found, by this other view of his, to depend upon certain uniformities in the connection of facts, although such facts are disparate in character and their interdependence an appearance only, and to depend upon needs, interests, or aims. We are now ready to turn to Locke's doctrines in their most perfect form as deliberately elaborated by him.

IV

CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIVITY IN LOCKE

CHAPTER IX

DOCTRINE OF SORTS: MIXED MODES AND SUBSTANCES

By the term "sorts," Locke understands things as of this or that specific determination or kind, as horse, stone, charity, murder. It is a generic term of which substances, modes, and relations are species. Hence to ask how we come by "sorts" is to ask how we come by substances, modes, and relations. Substances and modes are to be considered in this chapter and relations in the chapter following.

In the first place, Locke makes both substances and modes, dependent upon simple ideas or the so-called nominal essence. "The supposition of a real essence that cannot be known," such is his position, "is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things [namely, the nominal] as come within the reach of our knowledge."¹

Next, substances and modes are held to agree in the fact "that sorts, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds."² Hence his conclusion in respect to both: "Each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence. . . . Thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval as a sheep from a goat; and rain is as essentially different from snow as water from earth. . . . Thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary from another with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, as essentially different as any two of the most remote or opposite in the world."³

But modes and substances are found to differ from each

1. Bk. III, ch. 3, sec. 17.

2. Ibid., sec. 13.

3. Ibid., sec. 14.

other as well as to agree. Let me enumerate these differences before turning to modes and substances for separate and enlarged discussion.

Modes, in theory, are made dependent (*a*) solely upon simple ideas and (*b*) upon "the free choice of the mind," giving a union or connection to a certain number of these ideas. Substances, on the other hand, are not solely dependent upon simple ideas, but upon their constant and inseparable union in Nature as well. Substances "carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which its complex ideas are taken and to which they are conformable. But, in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly."⁴

The two are said to be very different in another essential: modes deal with intangible as well as with tangible elements; whereas substances are thought to deal with the tangible only. "And hence I think it is that these mixed modes are called notions, as if they had their original and constant existence more in the thought of men, than in the reality of things; and to form such ideas, it sufficed that the mind puts the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the understanding, without considering whether they had any real being; though I do not deny but several of them might be taken from observation, and the existence of several simple ideas so combined."⁵ From this follows the more peculiar dependence of modes upon words, as "the sensible signs of his ideas who uses them."⁶

I. MIXED MODES

By mixed modes, then, Locke understands such "complex ideas as we mark by the names obligation, drunkenness, a lie, etc. . . . being fleeting and transient combinations of simple ideas, which have but a short existence anywhere but in the minds of men."⁷ Inherently many, how do they come by their unity? "Every mixed mode, consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire, 'whence it has its unity, and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea,' since that combination does not always exist together in nature."⁸

4. Ibid., ch. 5, sec. 3.

5. Bk. II, ch. 22, sec. 2.

6. Bk. III, ch. 2, sec. 2.

7. Bk. II, ch. 22, secs. 1 and 8.

8. Bk. II, ch. 22, sec. 4.

I shall consider mixed modes under three heads:

1. Their independence of Nature and dependence upon the mind and its simple ideas.

2. Their dependence upon Nature.

3. Every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence or sort.

Division three constitutes a far more vital issue in connection with substances. Special consideration of this matter, then, were best reserved for such place.

1. THEIR INDEPENDENCE OF NATURE AND DEPENDENCE UPON THE MIND AND ITS SIMPLE IDEAS

"Nobody can doubt," he writes "that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature. . . . For what greater connection in nature has the idea of a man than the idea of a sheep with killing, that this is made a particular species of action, signified by the word murder, and the other not. . . . It is evident then, that the mind by its free choice gives a connection to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another than others that it leaves out; . . . whereof the intranslatable words of divers languages are a proof, which could not have happened, if these species were the steady workmanship of nature, and not collections made by the mind." Furthermore, mixed modes "do often unite into one abstract idea things that, in their nature, have no coherence; and so under one term bundle together a great variety of compounded and decomposed ideas . . . often involving actions that required time to their performance, and so could never all exist together. . . . Thus the name of procession, what a great mixture of independent ideas of persons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, sound, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together." Or again, "when we speak of justice or ingratitude, we frame to ourselves no imagination of anything existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those virtues, and look not further, as they do when we speak of a horse or iron, whose specific ideas we consider, not as barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original patterns of those ideas. For the originals of mixed modes then, we look no further than the mind, which also shows

them to be the workmanship of the Understanding."⁹ Turn where we will in his account of mixed modes, this line of argument will be found continually repeated.

That this description of modes contains a very large element of truth cannot be denied. The mind certainly has the capacity of holding parts together and keeping them fixed and distinct so that "any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary one from another . . . constitute two distinct sorts, as essentially different as any two of the most remote and opposite in the world."¹⁰ Furthermore, we cannot deny the radical character of the Many in such ideas as those cited; namely, the notion of a procession. Nor can we deny the *arbitrary* character in their determination, so much insisted upon by him; not any more than we can deny the presence of an intangible element: "what the word murder or sacrilege, etc., signifies can never be known from things themselves: there be many of the parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the action itself; the intention of the mind or the relation of holy things, which make a part of murder or sacrilege, have no necessary connection with the outward and visible action of him that commits either."¹¹ What we may deny, is the range he ascribes to "the mind in its liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly," as if it were in no sense dependent at all. The corrective of this view exists in his pages. This will constitute the subject-matter of our next division.

2. DEPENDENCE UPON NATURE

I stated above that, in theory, Locke distinguishes modes from substances by the quality that substances are dependent upon Nature for their pattern, whereas modes are not thus dependent; but dependent solely upon simple ideas and upon "the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends."¹² But instead of the affirmed dependence upon simple ideas only, we find modes dependent at least in part, "upon experience and observation of *things themselves*; . . . for their immediate ingredients are also complex ideas, although all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas."¹³ Or again, "action being the great business

9. See Bk. II, ch. 22; Bk. III, ch. 5.

10. Bk. III, ch. 3, sec. 14.

11. Ibid., ch. 9, sec. 7.

12. Ibid., ch. 5, sec. 6.

13. Bk. II, ch. 22, sec. 9. Italics are mine.

of mankind, and the whole matter about which laws are conversant, it is no wonder [that mixed modes should be made so largely out of them]. . . . Nor could any communication be well had amongst men without such complex ideas, with names to them: and therefore men have settled names, and supposed ideas in their minds, of modes of action distinguishable by their causes, means, objects, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances, and also of their powers fitted for those actions"¹⁴—which amounts to an admission that modes are shaped and generated in concrete and complex situations. Locke's notion of "the mind, pursuing its own ends," becomes particularized in a similar manner. The abstract end of an abstract mind makes way in his essay to ends generated "in the ordinary occurrence of affairs. So that, if we join to the idea of killing the idea of father or mother, and so make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbor, it is because of the different heinousness of the crime, and distinct punishment due to the murdering of a man's father or mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbor; . . . which plainly shows, whereof the intranslatable words of divers languages are a proof, that those of one country, by their customs and manners of life, have found occasion to make several complex ideas, and given names to them which others never collected into specific ideas."¹⁵ When we consider modes in this so-called dependence upon nature, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate them from substances and relations. It is significant that in Book III relations and modes are dealt with as if they presented no differences.

Without needlessly dragging out this account, we may formulate the following conclusions as emerging from his description of modes: (1) They are inherently many and get their unity in an abstract idea; (2) that ends, as manifesting themselves in complex situations, co-operate in determining their origin and specific character; (3) that value and meaning enter them as inseparable elements and ingredients; (4) they are constructs and not copies; and (5) they are inherently relative.

14. Ibid., sec. 10.

15. Ibid., secs. 7-8.

II. SUBSTANCES

If it be true, as I think we have every reason to maintain, that Locke is interested primarily in things, and interested in their ground, foundation, origin, or explanation only so far as they will serve to account for "those notions of *things* we have," then his account of substances (not to speak of modes and relations) ought to be the real test of his theories. In regard to the origin and foundation of modes, whether simple or mixed, Locke's issue is fairly clear and definite throughout the essay, whether or not we agree with his account "whereby the understanding comes by them." In regard to substances, the issue is not fully and frankly met until we come to Book III; but there the issue, at length, is clearly stated: "Why do we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this an animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort?"¹⁶ His answer is, that substances are constructs and not copies; achievements attained through trials, experimentation, and comparisons, in a world where resemblances among things, as well as "regular and constant union" among ideas, is accepted by him as a fact, and our sole knowable reality that designated by him as nominal. How can our objects be copies, when objects reveal different qualities and properties in different situations, and where "there is not so complete and perfect a part that we know of Nature, which does not owe the being it has, and the excellencies of it, to its neighbors: and that we must not confine our thoughts within the surface of any body, but look a great deal further, to comprehend perfectly those qualities that are in it."¹⁷ Hence his conclusion that our ideas or conceptions not "only depend upon the mind of man variously collecting" or elaborating them, but, even at their best, are "seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from."¹⁸

The mind, "in making its complex ideas of substances, never puts any together that do not really or are not supposed to co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature. . . . Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse, nor the color of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the complex ideas of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill his head

16. Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 7.

17. Bk. IV, ch. 6, secs. 11-12; Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 32.

18. Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 37.

with chimeras."¹⁹ But if this be true, as already intimated, substances are not only dependent upon simple ideas but upon "their constant and inseparable union in nature as well." But we may ask again, as we did above: what extension in the meaning of the nominal essence, or the simple idea doctrine, is herein presumed? The simple ideas of taste, color, etc., cannot be our sole type of a real perception, if sequence or co-existence is also a type of reality, and yet no mere taste, color, etc. For to deny this fact a reality of some kind, is to deny the reality of every complex idea in so far as it is complex. In the meantime, the reality of a distinction between a horse and a mule, an animal and an herb persists, as well as his question: how do particular things come to be of this or that sort? Now in Book III, the complex idea never has its reality questioned, save in the one point: "Does it truly borrow its union from nature?" If it does, it may grow ever more and more complex, and, in so doing, make itself ever more perfect and adequate. The sole issue then, that he here considers is the question whether our sort-view of an object does or does not limit and define its whole "measure and boundary." That the sort-view exhausts our total view of objects, is his firm contention—a contention directly at variance with his cruder dogmatism that fact and meaning stand in absolute divorce.

What, then, is this special doctrine of substances to which I have so frequently reverted and so frequently extolled in Locke? I shall present it as fully in Locke's own language as is possible. The doctrine involves the primacy of the idea in the determination of objects, but it does so in a way that is new in the sphere of metaphysics. He writes to the following effect: "In the substance of gold, one man satisfies himself with color and weight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary to be joined with that color in his idea of gold, as any one does its fusibility, solubility in aqua regia being a quality as constantly joined with its color and weight as fusibility or any other [of its infinite possible number.] Who of all these has established the right signification of the word, gold? or who shall be judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea signified by the word gold, those qualities, which, upon trial, he has found united; as another who has not so well examined has

19. Bk. III, ch. 6, secs. 28-29.

to leave them out; or a third who has made other trials, has to put in others. . . . From hence it will unavoidably follow that the complex ideas of substances [and the same fact holds with modes] will be very various, and so the signification of those names very uncertain."²⁰ Or again: "If we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances in all men the same: no, not of that which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. Nor could it possibly be, that the abstract idea, to which the name *man* is given, should be different in several men, if it were of nature's making"²¹; that is, if it were a copy, and not a construct. "Men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take."²² It only remained necessary for him to have correlated with substances, at this point, his modes, relations, and his "practical" motive or the Self, to have given his philosophy all the unity we could have desired of it; for by the incorporation of the Self, as is done in his scattered and unsystematic manner, our notion of "nature" also would have been widened, with this additional standard of reference. His emphasis upon diversity in our conceptions of substances, constitutes a line of argument whereby he seeks to establish that substances are not copies, but constructs; "not of nature's making, but of man's."

But by the side of this view in Locke, wherein our notion of objects is presented in the light of constructs, the complex ideas thereby formed growing fuller and richer in content, Locke presents another view of abstract or complex ideas, wherein he affirms that "the more general our ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are." As the student of Locke commonly goes astray here, the matter needs to be cleared up before proceeding with the above line of thought. The following passage from Locke, though quoted at length, demands no apology: "If the simple ideas that make the nominal essence of the lowest species or first sorting of individuals, depends upon the mind of man variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do so in the more comprehensive classes, which, by the masters of logic, are called genera. . . . This is done by leaving out those

20. Ibid. ch. 9, sec. 13.

21. Ibid., ch. 6, sec. 26.

22. Ibid., sec. 29.

qualities which are peculiar to each sort and retaining a complex idea made up of those that are common to them all; . . . whereby it is plain that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by nature when they make their general ideas of substances, since there is no body to be found which has barely malleableness and fusibility in it [as in the case of the abstract 'general idea' metal] without other qualities as inseparable as those. But men, in making their general ideas, seeking more the convenience of language and quick dispatch by short comprehensive signs, than the true and precise nature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract (general) ideas, chiefly pursued that end, which was to be furnished with a store of general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this whole business of genera and species, the genus, or more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the species, and the species but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. . . . If we would rightly consider what is done in all these genera and species, or sorts, we should find that there is no new thing made, but only more or less comprehensive signs. . . . In all which we may observe that the more general term is always the name of a less complex idea, and that each genus is but a partial conception of the species comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete," it can only be in respect to the ends of language which called them forth, "and not in respect of anything existing, as made by nature."²³ It is hard to find a more suggestive passage in Locke. First, we have here his distinction between *particular* abstract ideas and *general* abstract ideas, or so-termed constructs and the commonly termed abstract ideas; the former involving the mind in its "compounding" character, the latter involving it in its more narrowly "abstracting" character. Secondly, within this difference, it is further to be noted that they are alike in being but partial and incomplete determinations of things; the general abstract idea is a "partial conception of what is in the species, and the species but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual." Thirdly, that the general abstract idea, "if thought to be complete" can only be so in respect to a certain end, just as was found to be the case with modes, and as is found to be the case with the particular abstract idea: "men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious

23. Ibid., sec. 32.

qualities . . . which serve well enough for gross and confused conceptions, and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking; . . . most men wanting either time, inclination, or industry enough" to determine their ideas more fully, or "even to some tolerable degree, contenting themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them *for the common affairs of life*."²⁴ So that, if maintained, that Locke's notion of sorts is an abstraction, rather may the contrary statement be offered as a rejoinder: his general abstract ideas as "partial conceptions," which proceed in their formation "by leaving out qualities," are rather of the nature of constructs even though more obviously "inadequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from."

As the conclusion here drawn will be confirmed by what follows, I proceed with my account, presenting the matter in Locke's own language whenever possible. "This, then, in short, is the case," he writes. "Nature makes many particular things which do agree one with another in many sensible qualities, and probably too in their internal frame and constitution; but it is not this real essence that distinguishes them into species; it is men, who, taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts; under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns; so that this is a man, that a drill."²⁵ In other words, we may here, as in the case of gold, follow the 'compounding' or the 'eliminating' process; the process which makes for a fuller and richer complex idea, or the one which makes for a more partial idea; for no single object, for example, a tree, in any single instance of its actual existence, embodies all the varied qualities embraced in any notion of a tree, not any more so than "that particular parcel of matter which makes the ring on my finger" exhausts all the ideas of gold my complex idea of gold stands for. Or gold may be viewed under the more 'partial idea' the word metal stands for; and the same with the object tree. Thus he writes: "It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and nature have made me so; but there is nothing I have is essential to me. An accident or disease may take away my reason or memory, or both, and an apoplexy leave neither sense nor under-

24. Ibid., secs. 28-29.

25. Ibid., secs. 35-36.

standing, no, nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse faculties than I have; and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one, or the other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things; and then presently, according to the abstract idea of that sort, something is found essential. . . . So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other particular corporeal being to have reason? I say, no; no more than it is essential to this white thing I write on to have words in it. But if that particular being is to be counted of the sort man, and to have the name man given it, then reason is essential to it, supposing reason to be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for; as it is essential to this thing I write on to contain words if I will give it the name treatise, and rank it under that species."²⁶ That is to say, that we depend upon particular instances of a common thing in order to ascertain the different qualities which we ought to unite in our complex idea of an object; an operation which may be pursued under this or that end, and hence leads to different results in the way of a complex idea. These ideas, thus variously determined, and, as thus determined, held fixed, define the essence or species of such objects as may be brought or ranked under them. Accordingly, my aim in one case may be the knowledge of something in its fullest possible particular character, as in the case of gold or man, in the course of which aim I would evolve a very different complex idea of man, as in *Ethics*, for example, than would be the case if I only consider him in the light of some other end, that view of him as embraced by the idea actor or soldier. "If therefore, any one will think that a man, and a horse, and an animal, and a plant, etc., are distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horse, and all these essences liberally bestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is done in all these genera and species, or sorts, we should find that there is no new thing made, but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby we may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or less general

26. *Ibid.*, sec. 4.

conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose."²⁷ Hence Locke's conclusion, that "the essence of each sort is the abstract idea,"²⁸ understanding by essence, that "measure and boundary of each sort or species whereby it is constituted that particular sort and distinguished from others. . . . So that the essential and not essential relates only to our abstract ideas; which amounts to no more than this, that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract idea which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that species nor be called by that name,"²⁹ not any more so than "that particular parcel of matter which makes the ring on my finger" may be called gold and held to possess the essence of gold, unless that particular parcel of matter is either actually or potentially all that my complex idea of gold stands for. "Should there be found a parcel of matter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted obedience to the loadstone, would any one question whether it wanted anything essential? It would be absurd to ask whether a thing really existing wanted anything essential to it; nor could it be demanded whether this made an essential or specific difference or not, since we have no other measure of essential or specific but our abstract idea? And to talk of specific differences in nature, without reference to general ideas in names, is to talk unintelligibly; . . . all such patterns and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their qualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will be essential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For though it may be reasonable to ask, whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron? yet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be essential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with, without considering it under the name iron, or as being of a certain species? . . . Hence we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one species, have yet qualities, depending on their real constitutions, as far different one from another as from others from which they are accounted to differ specifically."³⁰

If then the essence or specific denomination or meaning of each

27. *Ibid.*, sec. 32.

28. *Ibid.*, sec. 2.

29. *Ibid.*, secs. 2-4.

30. *Ibid.*, secs. 5-8.

particular thing refers to its determination within some complex idea, what in the constitution of things is sufficient to justify the formation of a new sort or species? We distinguish between watches and clocks as distinct sorts, yet the variation among watches is large just as it is among clocks;³¹ or we distinguish between water when liquid and frozen, designating the former water and the latter, ice, and yet fail to do so in the case of congealed jelly when it is cold and the same jelly fluid and warm; or in the case of liquid gold in the furnace and hard gold in the hands of a workman.³² This situation Locke suggests, but he does not elaborate it. This is much to be regretted, for Locke in that case would have been led to transfer his present contention into the very citadel of his dogma: nothing exists but particulars; for ice and water denote two particulars; why not so in the case of gold or jelly? All I can find in Book III in any way pertinent to the issue is, that *shape*, in the case of vegetables and animals, and *color*, in respect to bodies not propagated by seed, are the aspects of things we most fix on and are most led by.³³ In his account of mixed modes, as may be recalled, he enters upon this particular inquiry more fully. But in respect to substances, his interest rarely strays beyond the locus of the following inquiry: things are determined and held fixed to their specific sorts by their abstract ideas, whereby particular things, "because they have that nominal essence, which is all one, agree to that abstract idea a name is annexed to,"³⁴ come to be of this or that sort, and so, as we read here and there, "has in truth a reference not so much to the *being* of particular things, as to their general *denominations*."³⁵ But this is but one conclusion; another: "take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes; we have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly shows their relation."³⁶ . . . For to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary signification of the name man, which is our complex idea usually annexed to it, and bid the reader consider man as he is in himself, and as he

31. See *Ibid.*, sec. 39.

32. *Ibid.*, sec. 13.

33. *Ibid.*, sec. 29.

34. *Ibid.*, sec. 7.

35. *Ibid.*, sec. 8. Italics are mine.

36. *Ibid.* sec. 4.

is really distinguished from others . . . looks like trifling."³⁷ "Nothing essential to individuals,"³⁸ is the claim he here sets up, as it were, to confront his familiar dogma: "nothing exists but particulars": and his solution, as noted, appears to be twofold: sorts relate "not so much to the *being* of particular things, as to their *denomination*"; and the opposite one, that to "bid the reader consider man as he is in himself, as he is really distinguished from others," apart from our sort-view of him, "looks like trifling." It is true, he goes on to say, "that I have often mentioned a real essence, distinct in substance from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their nominal essence. By this real essence I mean the real constitution of anything, which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in it, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal essence; that particular constitution which everything has within itself, without any relation to anything without it. *But essence* ('measure and boundary') *even in this sense relates to a sort*, and supposes a species; for being that real constitution on which the properties depend, it (the 'real essence') necessarily supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species and not to individuals."³⁹ That is to say, that even if we grant "essential differences in nature between particulars," the particular would be as much an intellectualized thing, if we get beyond mere empty words, as the "sort". For to talk of particulars, in so far as they are particular, implies that they have something which belongs to them in their own right. They involve the inclusion and exclusion of certain specific determinations. That is, certain properties are affirmed as essentially true of a given thing, others denied as constituting a part of it. And Locke's conclusion is: "There is no individual parcel of matter to which any of its qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it. That which is essential, belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this or that sort; but take away the consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing necessary to it, nothing separable from it."⁴⁰ Namely, the principle of inclusion and exclusion in respect to particulars presupposes and involves comparison, unless

37. Ibid., sec. 43.

38. Ibid., sec. 4.

39. Ibid., sec. 6. Italics are mine.

40. Ibid.

some inherent and discoverable *real* essence furnishes us with the needed principle. And Locke's arguments on this point assume two forms: (a) a proof to establish the ungrounded character for even assuming that such real essences exist, by seeking to exhibit a diversity among our particular parcels of matter, as well as among a supposed natural animal and vegetable species; and (b), by the further claim, that even if real essences did exist, we do not know them and never can know them. This claim is reinforced by the relativistic principle either in its empirical or radical form; namely, isolate a piece of gold from all other bodies and it reduces to zero, for not only substances (in the nominal sense) but objects or bodies in general "are but powers, either active or passive, in reference to other bodies."⁴¹ Locke's frequent reversion from this new to his old view grows out of his tendency to confound the ontological particular (which seems to resist death at all cost) with "a particular parcel of matter." In either case, however, we have his contention that particulars are variable and indeterminate until made determinate by and held fixed in our abstract ideas of them.

Summarized, the following, then, presents Locke's position: he assumes an interplay of distinguishable ideas in uniform and in variable, in fixed and in unstable relations. Owing to these differences in their relations, ideas become as effective in breaking down or altering particulars as in building them up and preserving them intact, at least relatively so; for relations are as capable of neutralizing each other's effects as they are capable of reinforcing them. Hence the justification and rational basis of Locke's empirical relativity: "bodies" are capable of producing change in or receiving it from other "bodies" to an indefinite degree. But bodies of this or that sort, or of this or that determination, involve the abstract idea, which, in turn, involves and presupposes analysis, comparison, and synthesis. The outcome in Locke's language is the more "general abstract idea" or the more "particular abstract idea." "Nature," to which we must turn in the formation of our complex idea of substances, offers "similitudes" and also parts in "constant and inseparable union;" hence nature offers "parts in union," complexes, as real, as ultimate, and as final

41. Ibid., ch. 9, sec. 17. This principle has such frequent restatement in Locke, that any special references are needless. In particular, read ch. 9, Bk. III; ch. 31, Bk. II; and ch. 6, secs. 11-12, Bk. IV.

as parts *in union*, as any of its *parts* viewed in the light of simple ideas. And these parts "in union," however partial or variable the parts "in union," constitute the data upon which the abstract ideas, in their formation, are shown dependent. Hence the dictum that apart from our abstract ideas, no determination in our objects, has its complement stated as well: apart from determinations, however variable or partial in our particular parcels of matter in this or that specific situation, there is no determination of our abstract ideas.

This doctrine in Locke I designate as a phase of his *constructive relativity*, and I request any one to show me a doctrine in his pages, which in merit and comprehensive survey can match itself with this one. In his elaboration of this doctrine, he accepts his simple ideas as such "parts," but he goes further when he insists as he does that the *union* of parts, although no taste, smell, color, etc., is as much of the *nominal* essence as the simple ideas of sensuous perception. Such union represents nothing that is "visible," but it notwithstanding implies that sequence, co-existence, change, succession are perceived facts; so real, that to talk of complex ideas as otherwise complex, is wilful perversion. Hence his admission, as quoted in a previous chapter, "that our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly; and sensible qualities, as color and smell, etc., what are they but the powers of different bodies in relation to our perception, etc? . . . Our idea therefore of power (which includes in it also some kind of relation, a relation to action or change), *I think may well have a place amongst other simple ideas, and be considered as one of them.*"⁴² His notion of substances as facts, and not mere illusions and deceptions, involves the same conclusion: the *union* of its parts is as real and ultimate as the *parts* themselves. In fact, in the above passage, in order to establish the reality of modes, his deliberate effort and lack of hesitancy to resolve "sensible qualities" themselves into sheer relations (no mere passing procedure with him) must appear a very interesting procedure, indeed, to one saturated with the notion that Locke is fundamentally a sensationist and not a relativist.

42. Bk. 11, ch. 21, sec. 3. Italics are mine.

CHAPTER X

DOCTRINE OF MEANING

(*"Ideas of Relation"*)

T. H. GREEN laments that Locke "in his account of our complex ideas, explains them under modes, substances, and relations as if each of these three sorts were independent of the rest." That Locke never thoroughly correlates them is certainly to be regretted, and yet I feel that Locke in actual practice is far from keeping them as independent of each other as he, in theory, often struggles to do. For example, I have tried to show that, with Locke, modes, substances and relations are alike constructs. Moreover, in our account of mixed modes, we might have asked wherein their declared dependence upon so-called Nature kept them distinguished from substances; while substances, in turn, reflected in common with modes and relations a dependence upon a very complex process of mind operating variously under very complex conditions. When we come to our "ideas of relations" the overlapping and interfusion is made even more apparent. Not only does all distinction between mixed modes and relations practically vanish, but that between simple modes and relations vanishes as well; while substances, in general, become identified, as we have seen, with "powers;" namely, relations. We ought not to feel surprised, therefore, if in his account of "ideas of relation" a unified rather than a split-up world should become more or less clearly foreshadowed. No man is more dangerously read in snatches than Locke.

In a sense, therefore, our present chapter may be regarded as a restatement of the problem canvassed at large in our previous chapter; namely, the interdependence of fact and idea; the sole difference being, that there we were supposed to be more narrowly concerned with the sensuous structure of an object, and that here, following Locke, we are to be more narrowly concerned with its *abstract* structure in terms of space, time, causality, etc., and with its *value* structure in terms of the "various ends, objects, manners, and circumstances of human action,"¹ whereby such distinctions are acquired by them as "good, bad or indifferent." The term, 'meaning,' in our common use of it, appears the one best employed

1. Bk. II., ch. 28, sec. 4.

in the present discussion. By adhering to this term, I in no way violate Locke's account and avoid considerable confusion.

Meaning, with Locke, stands primarily for an interdependence of objects as reflected in thought: "Beside the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another,"² whereby certain distinctions or "denominations" are acquired by them, but not as something "contained in the real existence of things, but something extraneous and superinduced;"³ that is, meaning is purely mental in existential status. He holds further, "that there is no one thing . . . which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations in reference to other things," and that meaning therefore "makes no small part of men's thoughts and words; v. g., one single man may at once be concerned in and sustain all these following relations [denominations, meanings], and many more; viz., father, brother, son, grandfather, . . . friend, enemy, judge, patron, . . . servant, master, . . . older, younger, like, unlike, etc., etc., to an almost infinite number; he being capable of as many denominations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things."⁴

The view presented contains nothing novel. When an object is said to have meaning it is not uncommon to hear it spoken of as something imported into the object from without, and never, except by the idealist or pragmatist perchance, viewed as an integral part of said object. But we often, as Locke will be found doing, notwithstanding, begin with the consideration of meaning as actually existing in an object, and then, in virtue of its more obtrusive variability and diversity, hold it up as something more or less gratuitously contributed from without. Relativity is rarely a disputed fact in this realm. What is disputed, is whether meaning does become or ever can become an integral part of an object. It exists in thought and for thought only, proclaims the realist; it is a distortion or falsification of reality, says the naturalist. But to establish either of their contentions, a criterion of an object is presupposed. What that is in their case, I leave for them to decipher. I accept for my object Locke's object as presented in the previous chapter. Locke, too, must be expected consistently

2. Ibid., ch. 25, secs. 1-7.

3. Ibid., sec. 8.

4. Ibid., sec. 7.

to abide by the conception, and the doctrine, just outlined, scanned in the light of it. The deviations will be exposed.

In accord with his notion of an object as a construct, we were not only said to be allowed, but constrained, to fix upon the specific character of our object with a variation of content, and, when once defined and articulated, invited to deny, if we choose, that any *further* qualification of it is relevant. But, then, in denying such relevancy, as we were further shown, another ground for deciding the matter had to be found than is offered in the variable and potential qualities of the object itself. If an object, in accord with relativity, becomes what it is solely in and through its relations to other objects, and such relations are affirmed to be indefinite, if not wholly infinite, then the modifications manifested in an object cannot be designated as real and valid in respect to its so-called "powers," but mere appearances and superinductions when acquired in the character of meaning. It is not logic to blow hot and cold with the same principle. Locke cannot revert to the dogmas of the realist or naturalist as he is apparently seen to do in the above, nor shall we be found under any special obligation to halt with that view of the matter.

But the objection may be raised that, in respect to sorts, the mutual determination of objects was of a mechanical type; whereas here we are dealing with mutual determinations essentially mental. To this objection I need only subjoin that causality, the so-called mechanical type of determination, is but one of Locke's general types of relation included and elaborated in this particular division of his work. In fact, to grasp the full sweep and constructive character of the present doctrine in Locke, we must not fail to keep in mind that it is here at length that we get his modes, whether simple or complex, correlated with substances. And thus considered, is it necessary to ask who got closer to Locke, Kant or Hume? Locke's signal contribution however consists in the fact that he correlated his *mixed* modes with substances as well as the *simple* modes, of time, place, etc. In following Locke here, pragmatism or humanism has in Locke its antecedent in modern thought.

Leaving mere theory, then, for the moment, let us instead direct attention to the facts he adduced in support of theory. Interdependence of fact and meaning, is the contention I seek to es-

tablish; namely, that meaning is grounded in fact, just as in the previous chapter its converse constituted our thesis.

OBJECTS AND MEANING FOREIGN TO EACH OTHER

1. "Relations (denominations) different from the Things related."⁵ Denominations may be the same in men "who have very different ideas of the things that are related, or that are thus compared; v. g., those who have far different ideas of a man may yet agree in the notion of a father; which is a notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and *refers only to an act of that thing*, called man, whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind; let man be what he will."⁶ But if it "refers to an act of that thing," how does meaning fail to constitute an integral part of it? But this observation by the way!

2. Hence, "change of relation (denomination) may be without any change in the object,—Caius, whom I consider to-day as a father, ceases to be so to-morrow only by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares anything, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time; v. g., Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, etc."⁷

3. Meanings seemingly inherent in objects, "conceal a tacit though less observable relation;" that is, show a dependence upon something else; hence reduce to the order of products; reveal themselves detachable; and, therefore, can in no way properly belong to an object. I proceed to quote from the text without criticism or registered protest. That is to follow.

"Time and place are also the foundation of very large relations, and all finite beings at least are concerned in them, . . . but it may suffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things received from time are only relations. Thus, when any one says that Queen Elizabeth lived sixty-nine and reigned forty-five years, these words impart only the relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun; and so are all

5. Ibid., ch. 25, sec. 4.

6. Ibid., sec. 4. *Italics mine.*

7. Ibid., sec. 5.

words answering, How long?"⁸ Such words as young and old are, ordinarily, also thought to stand for positive ideas, which, when considered, will be found to be relative; that is, they intimate preconceived ideas, formed under specialized and limited conditions. "Thus, having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years, when we say a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which men usually attain to; and when we denominate him old, we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed. And so it is comparing the particular age or duration of this or that man, to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animal; which is plain, in the application of these names to other things; for a man is called young at twenty years and very young at seven years old; but a horse we call old at twenty and a dog at seven years, because in each of these we compare their age to different ideas of duration which are settled in our minds."⁹

That meaning is an aspect in objects distinguishable from its sensuous quality, no one would deny. But beyond this very general distinction, the view of an object as a construct presupposes the presence of intellectual principles at every point. And its saturation from this source penetrates to its core and is no mere thing sticking loosely at the surface, ready to be peeled off by any such process as was instituted above. Meaning comes into being, his illustrations would denote, by the consideration of some positive object under some specific idea or other "settled in our minds." That is, apart from some abstract idea, no meaning in objects is possible. This we will grant, but only after being instructed where those "ideas settled in the mind" originate. They would seem to arise, judging from these very same illustrations, from more or less definite and concrete situations. In fact, these illustrations definitely emphasize the point that age, youth, size, etc., are pure abstractions where it is not the age, youth or size of a particular thing in a particular situation with its particular conditions and limitations all held together in one elaborated notion or construct. Let us term the point of his departure, in this general analysis, that of pure objectivity, and then let any man

8. Ibid., ch. 26, sec. 3.

9. Ibid., sec. 4.

tell, if he can, where the contribution made by any of its abstracted elements begins or ends and where that of its other abstracted elements begins or ends. In his chapters on relation, Locke moves on this purely objective plane of existence, and seeks to disrupt it by the introduction of his abstract realistic object on the one hand, and by the introduction of an equally depleted abstract idea on the other. But even from the passages quoted in this chapter, the peculiar novelty of them all lies in the fact that abstract ideas are here revealed as growing out of concrete situations, "and that we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our thought at a loss, when we would consider them abstractly by themselves," as he wrote in connection with his account of space and time in a passage adduced above.¹⁰ Had Locke only followed out this notion and continued his inquiry from it and from these admirable beginnings, instead of pursuing such inquiry from the abstract standpoint of particulars and thought in divorce; or from his abstractions of simple ideas *versus* complex; or from the still further abstractions within complex ideas; namely, those of simple and complex modes *versus* substances,—what a length of needless, fruitless wanderings Locke might have spared himself. Furthermore, he might have spared the identification of pure objectivity, among some of his successors, with that range of experience of which we might be thought susceptible in a protoplasmic stage of existence.

Now there is no doubt that "the ideas settled in our minds" may vary with each other in two fundamental respects: (*a*) in their degree of possible generality, and (*b*) in their degree of response to "the constant and regular order of things" or, on the other hand, in their degree of response to a more or less arbitrary fancy or imagination. But however much ideas may differ from each other in these respects, in one respect they are alike; namely, that the possibility of ideas or objects presupposes in all cases a thought-process and its control. To establish the fact that such is Locke's contention when unfettered by false theory, I shall, in addition to what has been stated, consider two fundamental types of relation; that of cause and effect and that of morality.

ORIGIN OF OUR PRECONCEIVED IDEAS AND THEIR
PROPER CORRELATION WITH FACT-REALITY

1. CAUSE AND EFFECT

"As it would take a volume to go over all sorts of relations [preconceived ideas]," writes Locke, "it is not to be expected that I should here mention them all."¹¹ He proposes, however, to consider "the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned, and that is the relation of cause and effect." I shall in my account of this relation freely turn to every part of his text where this subject of causality comes up for discussion. Space, time, identity and diversity, quantitative, qualitative, blood, instituted, moral, civil, and divine relations, are the other relations he touches upon, briefly or at length, among the "innumerable sorts" which "would take a volume" to exhaust. And the general contention that concerns us is, that relations have no status or reality in objects, and, secondly, leave them accordingly unaffected, and it is this contention I seek to refute in Locke's own words.

"There must always in *relation* be two ideas or things," writes Locke, "either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison;"¹² namely, all relation involves three distinct factors. Hence in the matter of cause and effect, "taking notice how one (thing) comes to an end and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before,"¹³ . . . whatever change is thus observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it."¹⁴ Here then we have 'a,' our original idea, 'b,' a distinct perception of something new in that original idea, and 'c,' the need of the mind to collect a power somewhere. My aim is to search for the ground of that *need*, as scattered passages in Locke favor its articulation. Without the ideas 'a' and 'b' discoverable as distinct, as "either in themselves separate or considered as distinct," the possibility of a comparison would not even exist. But, then, the present comparison is of a kind involving something unique. That element

11. Bk. II, ch. 23, sec. 17.

12. Bk. II, ch. 25, sec. 6.

13. Ibid., ch. 21, sec. 1.

14. Ibid., sec. 4.

of uniqueness is change. Change would seem to be a product of thought induced by the fact that 'a' and 'b,' although distinct or separate, hence Many, are yet constrained by thought to be held in the original Oneness; for we begin with 'a,' which is One, and yet are forced to perceive 'b' as another when it comes "to exist which was not before." Yet "we never finding nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude that whatever exists anywhere at any time excludes all of the same kind and is there itself alone. . . . (But further) since *one* thing cannot have *two* beginnings of existence, nor *two* things *one* beginning; it is impossible for two things . . . to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place, or one and the same thing in different places. That, therefore, that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse."¹⁵ In other words, 'b' having broke out as separate and distinct from 'a,' they cannot as *two* distinct things, have the same *single* beginning able to account for both of them; hence the need of the mind to collect a beginning for 'b' somewhere. But where turn for the originating principle when "powers are relations and not agents,"¹⁶ and when the "communication of motion by impulse, or by thought [the only possible agents] is equally . . . obscure and inconceivable. . . . We have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both. . . . For when the mind would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation or reflection, and penetrate into their causes, and manner of production, we find it discovers nothing but its own shortsightedness; . . . there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance, we know not, should, by thought, set body in motion, than how a substance, we know not, by impulse, set body into motion."¹⁷ Yet the mind is constrained "to collect a power somewhere," even though it has no visible principle to rest upon; for change implies a new existence in space and time, or in time only, and the new thing 'b' must somehow or other find an explanation for its "beginning." The need is as

15. Ibid., ch. 27, sec. 1.

16. Ibid., ch. 21, sec. 19.

17. Ibid., ch. 23, secs. 28-29.

real (1) as the perception of 'a' and 'b' as distinct existences is real; (2) as real as the idea of change, as the result of the comparison; (that is, as real as the original unity and subsequent diversity are real); (3) as real as the principle of conservation; and (4) as real as the inherent intellectual need for unity in our experience. In a word, the notion of *cause and effect is a thought construct, involving comparison on the basis of a real diversity in unity, and the postulate that every new existence involves the idea of a new beginning; something cannot come out of nothing.* Such then would seem to be the origin of our "preconceived idea" of cause and effect. It certainly does not appear as if generated in a vacuum. Rather does the idea appear as if generated in an exceedingly complex situation, wherein the interpenetration of fact and idea or meaning appears so complete as well nigh to baffle analysis.

'Unity' is another such idea. Shall we call it fact or meaning? And if meaning, shall we hold meaning as ungrounded in reality and as leaving reality unaffected, "it sufficing to the unity of an idea [object]," as Locke writes, "that it be considered as one representation or picture, though made up of ever so many particulars?"¹⁸ Under conditions then, "an army, a swarm, a city, a fleet," are "things as perfectly one as one ship or one atom."¹⁹ That reality is not left unaffected by the idea of unity is here evident. But is such unity real? Yes, if it serves our ends, or works; for after all, as Locke's recurrent note would have it: "God has fitted us for the neighborhood of the bodies that surround us"²⁰ . . . and "it will become us, as rational creatures, to employ those faculties we have about what they are most adapted to."²¹ Ideas, then, that work successfully in our efforts to comprehend the world, and in our general lack of others or better, are real; it being as real in the interest of some ends, to regard a fleet or a city as One and not as Many, as in the interest of other ends to do the reverse. Fact and meaning are one, and, at best, distinguishable aspects only.

18. Ibid., ch. 24, sec. 1.

19. Ibid., ch. 24, sec. 2.

20. Ibid., ch. 16, sec. 13.

21. Bk. IV, ch. 12, secs. 10-11.

2. MORAL RELATIONS

"Virtue and vice," writes Locke, "are names supposed everywhere to stand for actions *in their own nature* right and wrong."²² This position, in harmony with his general contention, Locke denies, and, in turn, sets up the contention, "that moral good and evil consist in nothing but the conformity of our voluntary actions to some law; which, I think, may be called moral relation, as being that which denominates our moral actions . . . which relation as a touchstone, serves to set the mark of value upon their voluntary actions."²³ The following illustration sums up his whole position: "Our actions are considered as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this respect they are relative, it being their conformity to, or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad. . . . Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain positive mode, or particular sort of action . . . is called duelling, which, when considered in relation to the law of God, will deserve the name sin; to the law of fashion, in some countries, valor and virtue; and to the municipal laws of some governments, a capital crime."²⁴ That is, apart from our preconceived ideas, no moral determinations exist in our objects. But suppose we again raise the counter claim: apart from determinations of some kind or other in our objects, can we attain to any preconceived ideas at all? And what we find is, that pure objectivity is again distorted by the introduction of false abstract distinctions. The matter is easily presented. Modes embrace the moral concepts by reference to which actions acquire the moral distinctions of good or bad. But how do these modes originate? His answer is: modes are the pure products of reason; that is, *à priori* determinable and independent of experience. Hence there is no hope of freeing his doctrine here of an abstract conceptualism, unless Locke abandons his purely theoretical dogmatic view concerning modes. And on this point, Locke, in theory at least, concedes nothing. Until such *à priori*

22. Bk. II, ch. 28, sec. 10. Italics are mine.

23. Ibid., secs. 4, 5, 14.

24. Ibid., sec. 15.

pretensions concerning modes, however, are abandoned, the original objectivity of our experience cannot be restored.²⁵

To view morality as a relation of actions to a law, as he does, and yet not find that law in those actions themselves as their expression in certain fundamental relations, but, instead, to find that law the expression of an abstract Reason divorced from Experience, reveals anew how deep Locke, in certain aspects of his doctrine, remained sticking in rationalism, and by contrast, reveals the vast strides made by him in those other phases of his doctrine. If, as Ethics tends to enforce, a man is not truly moralized until the moral values are worked into the very texture of his being, I fail to see how values as a class can remain distinctions "extraneous and superinduced." For grant that the "preconceived idea" is involved at every point in an object's determination, as Locke insists upon, and the "preconceived idea" little else than a synthesis of a very complex situation, as Locke seems further to maintain, then how prove the validity of that idea or its applicability without admitting at the same time that objects, in some form or other of their constitution, control the formation of the idea. And as one and the same object may be variously conceived (the outcome of a varied analysis and synthesis), the primacy of the idea and the object is of necessity found to interchange. Thus, if an artist finds an object's particular soul and pulse in its color, who will prove that he has failed to get its soul and pulse, save by dogmatically sticking to the claim that we to the contrary, in some other equally specialized view or determination, have gotten such soul or pulse of the objects about us,—objects, by theory, variable and indefinite in their determination *and* signification. And if this be true of their more distinctively sensuous aspect, how much more so of their meaning-aspect; that is, if the determination of substances (in Locke's terminology) depends upon our ideas of them variously formed; how much more so in the case of the modes and the relations, as he insists.

25. This situation represents Locke's general position; but fortunately it is not an expression of his sole utterance. For, if "good and evil," as Locke contends, "are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us" and our state, "as fitted for the neighborhood of the bodies that surround us," giving us no concernment beyond either to know or to be, our "preconceived idea" will depend upon a consideration of the various factors able to produce and suffer pleasure or pain, and, as thus considered, organized into a whole. And with this degree of a suggested reconstruction of such elements as appear in his Essay, I think I may let the matter rest.

But the latter are merely 'extraneous and superinduced,' the realist may persist in proclaiming. Well, then, let him be equally ready to maintain that civilization, with all its distinctions and achievements, wrought out with the brain and hands of man, and grounded in the heart and stomach and skin, as well as in other assumed facts, is an extraneous superinduction upon a more real world. The nihilist, strange to say, champions the same creed, and to him art, morality, government, refinement, culture, science are but specious falsification of reality. If this is not the logic of realism, I have yet to learn it; and if such is not its logic, then its logic is that of Locke: "All such patterns and standards laid aside, particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their qualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will be essential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all;"²⁶ namely, the truth of reality is ideality—"the new way of ideas."

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

THE primacy of the idea in the determination of our objects culminates in the claim that, apart from the idea, an object is "at once everything or nothing."¹ An object is "everything," in so far as it "exists in nature with no prefixed bounds," and, hence, may with equal logical validity assume this, that, or the other determination, since our only reference in its formation is "the constant and regular order," in "the changes which one body is apt to receive from or produce in other bodies upon due application, which exceed far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine."² It is "nothing," for the reason that without some more or less specific inclusion and exclusion of parts, we deal with nothing specific.

Secondly, Locke insisted upon the ultimate character of the Self and its unavoidable implication in all such determinations; and, further, insisted upon a radical difference in the constitution of the self with different men. Not only was the Self held as involved in the production of the secondary qualities, which, under a conceived difference in its constitution or structure, according to Locke, are bound to reveal things very differently, but our complex ideas, whether substances or modes or relations, were

26. Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 5.

1. Bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 35.

2. Bk. II, ch. 31, sec. 10.

held as further dependent in their formation, not only "upon the minds of men," but "upon the minds of men *variously* collecting them." Every man, then, the measure of his own truth! "Our business is living"; our needs are ultimates; "our faculties are suited to our state"; "men determine sorts" and determine them *variously*—here we have fundamental tenets in Locke, and, taken together, they spell relativity of the Protagorean type.

On the other hand, Locke strongly emphasizes the fact of a *common* standard of reference in the "constant and regular order" of things; he also, speaks of "unalterable organs"; and, further, speaks of certain *common* ends,—language, duty, common affairs, and whatnot, and such principles, as he enforces, make for identity in our perceptions and not for diversity. But even within the range of a *common* knowledge, Locke's emphasis is upon individual *diversity*; that such differences are ultimate and are no more to be crowded out than our *identity* with others, in so far as we are identical, is to be eliminated. *We perceive as we are conditioned to perceive, be the conditions for likeness or differences in perception what they may.*

His philosophy, therefore, involves the relativistic principle in three forms: (a) that objects are determined within change which, although constant and regular in its order, remains indefinite and unprefixd in respect to its quantity; (b) that the individual, as one object among other objects, is involved in that determination; and, (c) that different individuals are unavoidably differently involved.

Does this spell scepticism? No, not any more so than it can be made to spell phenomenalism. Failure to perceive this truth lies in our failure properly to conceive and apply the principle of relativity. I shall, therefore, in conclusion, enlarge upon each of the three forms of the principle.

A

Consistently hold to the fact (1) that objects in nature exist with no "prefixed bounds," and (2) to the principle that given conditions give a given result—then whatever the conditions, the result *is reality*. Break up that result into parts, if you choose, or synthesize the given results with other results, and, together, organize them into a larger result; either procedure is valid and in common practice found to be a fact. But if it be once admitted

that objects exist in nature with no prefixed, natural, or inevitable boundaries of their own (shall we exclude the elementary substances of Chemistry or the electrons of Physics from this conclusion?),³ then one boundary of them is no more true in the abstract than another, whether we proceed by the way of analysis to a pale and vapid "quale," or, by way of a synthesis, advance to the Absolute of our objective idealists. Whatever works from a given standpoint, or within a given situation or series of situations, analyzed and synthesized or unanalyzed and unsynthesized, as the case may be, is real. Hence, if valid from one point of view to turn to a sensationalism or to some "quale" for truth or the real, no viewpoint could be more astray if such pale and ghostly types are offered as samples of "immediacy" in general. Analysis carried to the *n*th degree is still analysis carried out to a degree, and except from some restricted aim or other, no more capable of uncovering *the* reals than synthesis carried to the Absolute is a thing necessary in order to conceive them. Our reality, at whatever point we may grapple with it or break off with it, is, in principle, still complex—it is the postulate of all scientific inquiry thus to conceive the matter. For the fact remains (1) that reality never reveals itself except in a more or less circumscribed situation or in a series of them held together in an idea; and, (2) whether as something to be analyzed or synthesized, reality is never considered wholly independent of all viewpoints nor of the available technique elaborated within any such viewpoint, either practical or scientific. Hence the violinist, in seeking what he calls a "tone," does not turn to abstract analysis nor to an Absolute, but he turns to his instrument held intact in a complex situation of which he too forms a part. And when that tone, to which he dedicates years and his developed technique in achieving, is eventually evolved, then he claims to have the supremely *real* and beautiful one which the particular soul (circumscribed context) of his instrument seems to him capable of producing. He seeks the real by forging ahead, and when once attained, weaves his whole subsequent network of tones with that one as its ultimate ground or basis. And his experience is a very common experience whether we turn to science or to life in general. The stripping-process, so common in our current search and definitions of Immediacy of Experience, is either a search for a non-relative real, or for a relative real at its protoplasmic stage (which even at this stage,

3. See pp. 31-32.

Heaven knows how complex it may be!). It would be like the absurdity of a violinist abandoning instruments entirely for getting a tone, or, in the other case, abandoning the violin, let us say, for a Jews-harp or some possible protoplasmic instrument. In either event, what bearing has such search in the world of art, or in any present metaphysical effort to determine an object? There is the tree before me. What is its total reality or meaning for me? Is yours likely to be mine, or mine yours? That, says Locke, depends upon our complex ideas of it variously formed under varying and very complex conditions. Science would yield the fullest account of it no doubt, and yet the artist's view of it need not be primarily the view of the scientist, not any more so than the psychologist's view of it need be that of a botanist. Such I consider to be Locke's philosophy, and the *reductio ad absurdum* of his own sensationalistic premises!

Hence neither a *Ding an Sich* nor a phenomenism really has any meaning from a relativistic standpoint. A thing *is* what it reveals itself to be in any given situation, or, by a process of construction, *is* what it was found to be in a series of situations, which "exceed far not only what we know but what we are apt to imagine"; and it logically remains entirely beside the issue whether a Self constitutes a part of each one of such situations or whether other objects do. For no set of conditions with their specific result, in the abstract, has a prerogative or monopoly upon so-called reality.

Adhering, then, to the current terminology, we may conclude this division by saying: whatever works is real; merely adding thereto: whatever works in an articulated world of recognized and established values; a world where Mill's methods, so to speak, are found efficient in producing results, and where art, morality and refinement in the directions given to them, are the *accepted* directions to still larger growths and results. Let any one reverse such general order and directions if he choose. But if he does so with the hope of getting something *intrinsically* more absolute, he pursues, he knows not what—a shadow. Whatever works, is real, *whatever works in the fully articulated world of generally accepted science and values, in its highly diversified and elaborated directions of interest and activities, and not merely what works*, as this term *what works* is so narrowly, loosely, and vaguely defined in our modern use of it.

B

If empirical relativity stands for one significant fact, it is that our universe is not only a place where novelty may occur, but a place where novelty *is* continually occurring. Things are and may be brought into conjunction and interaction today which never before have been, and because reality manifests itself only in circumscribed situations, all of which never have and never will realize themselves in one single moment of actual existence, therefore, one such manifestation of it is as real as another, and reality itself is thus continually in the making. I presented this view in an earlier chapter and gave reasons in support of it (chapter II). I now wish to show its bearing upon the fact that the individual, as one object among other objects, is involved in a varying degree, from nothing to much, in the determination or making of reality.

If philosophy, in opposition to the physical sciences, has one central tenet, it is that the individual is involved in and contributes toward the determination or making of reality. Its interpretation of this fact for the present is of little interest; but the insistence it puts upon this fact is paramount. The physical sciences, on the contrary, have as insistently affirmed that the individual stands outside of reality, and is, in his invasion of reality, a disturbing and vitiating factor. The scientist's point of view, I take for granted, is generally understood; it is the every-day view. I shall accordingly confine myself to the outline of the philosophical view. Resting its case upon the established truths within the spheres of physiological psychology and physics, philosophy concludes that, in respect to the sense-qualities—sound, color, taste and what not—if no individual exists, then there are no sense-qualities. To this extent, then, the individual is inevitably involved in the determination or making of reality. But this is far from the whole story. That all our ideas are *motor* in character and constitution, and not merely sensational, one of the most significant contributions to the field of thought by modern psychology, carries with it metaphysical implications that are simply tremendous. Broadly stated, it means that the *whole* man contributes in the structure and constitution of his ideas (as constructs and otherwise) and not merely his sense organs. Yet man's ideas, originating as they may, are his only reality. So much granted the next step follows: If man is involved in the determination or

making of reality, in what way does he differ from any other object of the universe in the give-and-take process existing among all other objects? And I affirm, that he does not differ in this respect from any other object in the universe. Hence what is true of other objects is also true of man. As has been stated; certain objects in a given situation affect each other, just as others in the same situation do not. Any object, therefore, in any given situation may be very much affected by other objects, but the same object in other situations may neither affect other objects within those situations nor be affected by them.⁴ In the light of such facts, then, science is correct in its claim that the individual is not involved in the determination of reality; but its claim remains correct only to that extent in which it can find, and thus comes to deal with, objects whose interactions with the psychophysical organism are at a minimum or more or less constant and uniform in their effects.

But, then, just as there are facts and situations which make possible this affirmed objective type of truth of the physical sciences, so there are other facts and situations in which the attainment of truth has for its prescribed ideal the inclusion of just that individual element or factor which the other ideal seeks to eliminate. Psychology, Ethics, Aesthetics, Economics and Sociology may be cited as some of the sciences falling within the sphere of this latter ideal.

But when all has been said in proper appraisement of either of these scientific ideals, the ultimate fact remains, that they are differences of degree rather than of kind; for with the world of a structure so complex as to involve analysis and synthesis, comparison and organization at every turn, the rôle of the individual in the making of reality cannot be too conspicuously emphasized. For, whichever of the ideals we embrace, the fact remains, that, in the last analysis, the worlds we come to know and inhabit depend more upon a man's brain, character, and training, so to speak, than upon his eyes. Thus Michael Angelo has been led to say that a great artist paints, not with his hands, but with his brain; and the same may be said with equal truth of even the most objective of the sciences; the research student sees with his brain rather than with his eyes. If this were not so, what need of our Newtons to discern the big meaning in the little fact.

4. See pp. 15-17 for a fuller account of this principle.

If reality were, indeed, the prefixed thing so commonly presented in our abstract theories (and those of common-sense and science are only too frequently the most abstract), perhaps the Self, as they ordain, would be rightly excluded from this or that synthesis of the world and from the rôle it, notwithstanding, stubbornly enacts therein. Let me present the subject of this division in a slightly different light.

It is admitted that all our thinking proceeds by the joint process of analysis and synthesis. These processes may go on consciously or unconsciously. Where they proceed consciously, as in any specific scientific sphere, the disclosure of a growing world follows,—a world that becomes ever more engrossing, ramified, and heterogeneous. When unconsciously employed, these processes, notwithstanding, impel in the same direction. Worlds open up to us on all sides whose existence involves *such an interchange of elements*, that, if it were not for man, these worlds would never have been produced nor capable of a reproduction. Literally described, they are human constructs, and to enter any one of them in any real sense demands a step by step reproduction or reconstruction. Are these varied worlds (those of the varied sciences, of the varied arts, of business, industry, social relationships, and what not) fundamental phases of reality or mere disfigurements and distortions of it? Let us assume the latter view, the disfigurement view. In the adoption of any such assumption, however, we postulate, whether we know it or not, the existence of a ready-made, prefixed world capable of direct and easy apprehension. But the notion of a ready-made world precludes the idea of all real change and novelty in it, and, at best, is an assumption loudly demanding a proof. In the second place, if the world were capable of a direct and easy apprehension on our part, why speak of analysis and synthesis as the inevitable mental processes employed in its apprehension, and of the different sciences as the most approved and inevitable means? We cannot evade the issue. Either the world as ready-made involves the most delusive kind of abstraction, or the relative and diverse views we acquire of it, and, as thus more or less variously determined, held to as fixed, is all there is of a world for us. But then, unconsciously to substitute any one or more of such constructions of it for *the* world is about as legitimate as the unknown substitution of a self-built house for the infinity and variety of the universe. Hence

two facts come out clearly: (1) that the individual is involved in the world he achieves; (2) that, in the abstract, one such world is as real as another. The next division of this chapter, division C, is intended to enlarge upon this second point. The practice to overlook both these facts, however, is so ingrained in our usual view of things and the practice itself is so strikingly presented in a fragment of a poem by Robert Browning, that I shall proceed to quote it with subsequent comment.

"The common problem, yours, mine, every one's
Is not to fancy what were fair in life,
Provided it could be; but, finding first
What may be, then find how to make it fair
Up to our means, a very different thing!
No abstract, intellectual plan of life
Quite irrespective of life's plainest laws,
But one, a man, who is a man and nothing more,
May lead within a world which, by your leave,
Is Rome or London, not Fool's paradise.
Embellish Rome, idealize away,
Make paradise of London, if you can;
You're welcome, nay, you're wise."

These lines taken at their face value certainly sound plausible; but things are not always what they seem. He advocates a plan for a man who is a man and nothing more. But when is a man a man and nothing more? Is he a man when we conceive him as a natural animal, a noble savage, a Shakespeare, a mass of atoms, a group of cells, or an image of God? The fact is that he assumes a ready-made, prefixed existence of man, to apprehend whom, it would only appear necessary to open our eyes and look, whereas the truth remains that almost any conception of man is possible; that the whole matter remains an indeterminable problem, and that no two men living are likely to agree in their full conception of what a man is or should be. So much for that! Now let us turn to the other phase of the poem. He demands a plan of the world for a man destined to live in a Rome or a London, and not in a fool's paradise. Here the same sort of error confronts us. Rome or London is represented in what man's view of them? In their vast, bewildering, multiplicity of detail of vast and most diverse relationship, man-made and otherwise, what man's segment of them is the proper one, since nothing

less than an omniscience could possibly exhaust and embrace them all? The fact is that every man inhabits, and in his own complex nature offers additional elements for, a segment of them quite his own, and to substitute this segment for the whole is to convert his more or less *concrete* segment into an *abstract* symbol,—a very facile procedure, but one easily misleading and fraught with confusion. Rome and London, then, as well as the term man, as used in the poem, are sheer abstractions, conceived quite irrespective of the plainest laws,—ironically to re-phrase Browning.

The principle of uniformity, as it reflects itself with specific terms in specific and circumscribed relations, is the only thing approximating a fixity that is absolute.

C

I shall now set forth the claim that different individuals are, unavoidably, differently involved in the determination of reality, with its outcome for philosophy. I make no apology for again presenting the matter in the concrete.

Every man inhabits a world of his own and the tongue he speaks is not always the tongue others speak. Untrained in music, how can I begin to picture that world, in all its serious interest, beauty, and significance, in which a Beethoven, a Wagner, or a Handel really had his being? Unless I have felt the heart-throb of nature as a Wordsworth felt it, can I really understand and appreciate half that Wordsworth writes and talks about? Keeping such facts in mind, we are in a position to appraise some very general convictions: among artists, that men have eyes yet see not; among musicians, that men have ears yet hear not; among poets, that men have hearts yet feel not; and among thinkers, that men have brains yet think not. They forget that each of us and each of them has his special and conditioned range of vision, and, in consequence, his particular world, and that we, in each case, may be using all our faculties to their fullest extent even though we use them differently. Thus for an artist, there is no object in nature but has its constantly shifting and varying moods, tints, forms, expression, light and shade, and herein alone, he holds, do you get an object's particular soul and pulse. He sees a thousand shades and tints where we see none. Hence we go reputed as blind. But even if the botanist fails to note this rich play of light and shade, has the artist necessarily on the other hand the botanist's keen perception for plant structure.

or the physician's keen perception for the most evanescent symptom of disease? And when you complicate the situation by the addition in each case of interests, aims, standards, and conditions more or less unique with the general world of each, and with each individual in particular, where in this state of affairs is one man likely to find the other?

But it may be argued that the difference in each case is nothing compared to what is held in common. If the world of the artist, in its difference, did not constitute the main world with him, why does his world so completely fill his space, that, not to exercise our eyes and faculties as he does, however much we exercise them differently, is nevertheless by him viewed as not using them at all. "The little more to him, and how much that is; the little less, and what worlds between!" One man stands by an accepted fact or truth and is ready to die for it, which another mocks, but mocks for the reason that he, in turn, consciously or unconsciously, stands by some other accepted fact or truth which the former man may scorn. Professor James, within our own times, has rendered this order of experience an emphasis which demands a recognition even larger than has yet been accorded to it. Yet for convenience, I again turn to Robert Browning, the arch-relativist, for a trenchant formulation:

"What does it all mean, poet? Well,
Your brain's beat into rhythm—you tell
What we felt only; you expressed
You hold things beautiful the best,
And pace them in rhyme so, side by side.
'Tis something, nay 'tis much—but then,
Have you yourself what's best for men?
Are you—poor, sick, old ere your time—
Nearer one whit your own sublime
Than we who never have turned a rhyme?

* * * * *

"And you, great sculptor—so you gave
A score of years to art, her slave,
And that's your Venus—whence we turn
To yonder girl that fords the burn!
You acquiesce and shall I repine?
What, man* of music, you grown gray
With notes and nothing else to say;

And thus Browning may have continued through the whole range and sweep of human interests and activities, with the result that we unfailingly find what is ultimate in reality, within limits divergently affirmed in the experience of different men, and, yet, in each case, affirmed with a finality that appears to him conclusive. But with "our business living"; "our needs ultimate"; "our faculties suited to our state"; "our objects without prefixed bounds"; how justify the claim that divergency in our views, in so far as they are fundamentally divergent, spells scepticism and that concord in our views, unless they are conditioned to be in concord, spells truth? I fail to see the logic of such a contention, just as I failed to see the logic of a view of reality that would claim to know reality as if the psycho-physical self, with all its varied needs, hopes, aspirations, defeats, sense of life, were not directly involved in its constitution, and, from a relativistic standpoint, varying in its significance, like things in general, from much to little or from little to much. "God has made the intellectual world harmonious and beautiful without us," writes Locke, "but it will never come into our heads all at once; we must bring it home piecemeal, and *there set it up by our own industry*, or else we shall have nothing but darkness and chaos within, whatever order and light be in things without us."⁵

The solution to this question of ultimate differences is found in pluralism; namely, that from a cosmic point of view the psychical is as real and as ultimate as the physical;⁶ that music and art are as compelling in their reality as a stone or a house; that affections, friendship, enmity are as ultimate as the atoms, electrons, or ions of science and far more concrete and definite to boot; that civilization may be and for us is more full of reality than crude nature, and that an Aristotle who thus finds the fulfillment of life in its developed and complex forms is far ahead of a Rousseau who would find it in his noble savage and in the return to simple life; that, in the last analysis, to talk of a thing as real or ultimate or rational presupposes some standard in reference to which reality and rationality acquire whatever meaning we may be led to ascribe to them, and that, apart from such standard or standards, reality and rationality remain without one

5. Conduct of the Understanding, sec. 38. Italics mine.

6. Reality in its totality, in accord with the principles set forth, reveals itself in circumscribed situations, each manifestation of which, in the abstract, is as real or unreal as the other.

shred of sensible meaning attaching to them. And since every single fact of life must alike conform to this general truth of things, let the materialist, the sensationalist, the champions of conduct (as types of monists) stand by their ultimates if they will, but if they think they have condensed into their respective ultimates a truth and reality higher or better than the accepted ultimates of some other possible monist, it only remains necessary to turn them all over to some sound philosophical student, such as our Locke, to teach them individually the full extent of their unconscious dogmatism. For, as I stated in a previous chapter, the question is not so much whether we have gotten beyond Locke, but whether we have caught up to him. And in conclusion, I content myself in saying that the present accepted understanding of him is a travesty.



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